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ABSTRACT  
How do organizations strategize for legitimacy in pluralistic contexts? Little is known about 
the strategies organizations use to manage their legitimacy with multiple internal and 
external stakeholders within pluralism. For instance, how strategies interrelate and are 
combined simultaneously by organizations has not been researched. Through addressing 
this question the thesis seeks theoretical elaboration that contributes to our understanding 
in this regard and addresses this gap in the legitimacy literature. In particular, a 
combinatorial picture of legitimacy strategies is provided that provides insight into how 
strategies might be combined and interrelate. 
Based on a novel tabulation that brings the various strands of the literature together a 
framework is developed for investigating the research problem. Theoretical extension is 
then sought through an empirical focus on the pluralistic setting of New Zealand’s science 
sector. Six case studies based on two layers of replication are explored, principally through 
58 multi-stakeholder interviews. The findings show that multiple embedded tensions and 
complex diffused power relationships characterise these organization cases. This provides a 
basis for investigating legitimacy strategies amidst pluralism: the basis of the analysis 
A picture of agency intensive legitimation is provided with organizations found to construct 
and change, as well as conform to, legitimacy demands. This informs the research agenda 
focused on redressing an identified ‘conformity bias’ (Kitchener, 2002) in much legitimacy 
theory. Further, a traditional preoccupation with overarching field level systems within 
dominant strands of legitimacy research has been recognized (Kraatz & Block, 2008). This 
research contributes by seeking to rectify this imbalance through adopting a framework of 
legitimacy strategies at the organizational level.  
The result is five propositions and extension to the theoretical framework. Prior work has 
tended to associate an organization with a dominant single strategy. This thesis finds 
multiple legitimacy strategies and strategic combinations being implemented by 
organizations amidst pluralism. Propositions are offered in this regards. The result is 
increased understanding of both infrequently explored legitimacy strategies and the 
relationships between them. Such theoretical development blurs the ‘demarcating lines’ 
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that and are implicit in many frameworks and empirical studies. Additional propositions are 
also provided regarding why similar organizations experiencing similar pluralism might 
implement different legitimacy strategies. It is proposed that differences in stakeholder 
perceptions of pluralism’s dimensions are associated with the implementation of different 
legitimacy strategies by organizations.  
Overall, both the creative potential and challenges inherent in strategizing for legitimacy 
amidst pluralism are illustrated. A nuanced picture in this regard is enabled by the diverse 
array of strategies surfaced both within and across the focal pluralistic organizations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction: Strategizing at the Clashing Point 
The clashing point of two subjects, two disciplines, two cultures of two galaxies, so far as 
that goes ought to produce creative chances. (Snow, 1959, p. 16) 
It’s been two different planets almost. This is the public good planet and this is the making 
money planet. (Manager, CRI 1) 
With this thesis I ask: How do organizations strategize for legitimacy in pluralistic contexts? 
As the above quotations suggest, this study is consequently focused on contexts in which 
stakeholder demands come from ‘different planets’ and investigates the strategies 
implemented at the multiple ‘clashing points’ that pluralism presents. The legitimacy 
strategies apparent in the findings here included innovative organizational responses and 
combinations of strategies. This is something that Snow alludes to above regarding the 
creative possibility amidst pluralism; it is also reiterated in the organizational literature 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008; Smith & Tushman, 2005). I address this under-investigated question 
through six qualitative case studies within New Zealand’s (NZ) science sector: a sector 
selected because it is characterized by pluralism at multiple levels (Colyvas & Powell, 2006; 
Leitch & Davenport, 2005). In this endeavour a strategy framework at the intersection of 
pluralism and legitimacy literature will be used (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Below I introduce 
how I arrived at this research problem; highlight the theoretical underpinnings and 
associated research gap; present the research questions guiding this research; introduce 
how these questions were investigated; and, finally, outline the structure of this thesis.  
1.1 Arriving at a Research Problem 
As I looked for a research problem to guide my investigation, my focus fell upon the case of 
a Steiner School, an alternative education provider with which I was familiar. What were 
strategically important issues for them? One was their balancing of government’s demands 
(NZ Steiner schools are required to meet obligations as state-funded entities) while also 
meeting the ideologically stringent demands of their school community. This school 
community was made up of both internal (teachers) and external (parents and other 
community benefactors) stakeholders. These stakeholders’ demands were experienced by 
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school managers as divergent. For instance, the Ministry of Education expected adherence 
to the State curriculum (for example, implementation of NZ’s National Certificate of 
Educational Achievement (NCEA)) while the school community felt such demands put the 
alternative pedagogy of the school at risk (for example, the implementation of NCEA was 
resisted).  
I translated this into the theoretical language of ‘legitimacy’: the issue was framed in terms 
of what stakeholders considered a desirable and appropriate Steiner school to be. I also 
utilized the concept of ‘pluralism’: the school was operating within a pluralistic context of 
multiple salient but divergent stakeholder demands. Thus, I focused my attention on the 
strategies used to manage legitimacy within pluralistic contexts. Framing what I perceived to 
be a central strategy question for the Steiner school in terms of ‘legitimacy’ implicitly linked 
my interest in strategy to the call to “bring society back in” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 
232). In this case society was brought ‘back in’ through an appreciation of both the task 
environment (and the provision of resources) and the institutional environment (associated 
rules, values, and norms) within which organizations operate. Such issues were put forward 
as something that organizations engaged with strategically (Oliver, 1991).  
As I arrived at a theoretical expression for my research its empirical setting also shifted. My 
focus turned to the pluralism of the NZ science system and the organizations operating 
within it. It is the divergent ‘planets’ contained in this sector that are represented in the 
quotations introducing this chapter.  
1.2 Theoretical Underpinnings 
We suspect that the effective management of pluralism may be a critical organizational (and 
managerial) capability. Its relative scarcity may be one reason why most organizations do 
not survive very long (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 250).  
Legitimacy strategies amidst pluralism. Pluralism is described as an increasingly pertinent 
contextual dynamic (Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2007; Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006) and, as 
Kraatz and Block (2008) suggest above, successfully managing this plurality can be classified 
as an important performance determinant for organizations. Glynn, Barr and Dacin (2000, p. 
732) point out that there is a consequent need for more organizational research that 
addresses the current imbalance vis-à-vis pluralistic contexts: “*t+he world is changing and 
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becoming more pluralistic; as organizational students, we have to keep pace.” The aim here 
is to address this issue as it relates to legitimacy theory. The assumption is that situating 
legitimacy within the pluralistic context will enable more ‘accurate’ and ‘nuanced’ theory 
(Glynn et al., 2000; Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006; Rescher, 1993). Accordingly, the 
contribution envisaged here is one of theoretical extension and refinement (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002).  
There is longstanding acknowledgement of the existence of pluralism within legitimacy 
literature (D'Aunno, Sutton, & Price, 1991; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, what this means for our understanding of 
organizational-level legitimacy strategies remains both under-theorized and under-
empirically investigated (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, & Van de Ven, 2009a; Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Lounsbury, 2007; Pache & Santos, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009).  
This lack of attention to pluralism is reflected in a gap highlighted by several authors 
regarding institutional theory’s (a dominant approach within the legitimacy literature) 
neglect of both the organizational level of analysis and organizational agency (Covaleski & 
Dirsmith, 1988; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009; Oliver, 1991). At 
the broadest level this research is positioned as part of a ‘strategic institutional’ approach 
(Alexander, 1996), seeking to address this imbalance in the treatment of legitimacy and 
explicate an understanding of organizational level agency as part of legitimation. The 
contribution made here is also aligned with Deephouse and Suchman’s (2008, pp. 54, 68) 
statement that the future of legitimacy research lies in exploring “the various internal and 
external audiences” (or ‘stakeholders’) who make legitimacy demands and the 
corresponding “struggles over what is legitimate.” The incorporation of pluralism brings 
multiple stakeholders and the tension between their legitimacy demands to the fore.  
Some definitions. Before elaborating on this research gap more fully the following 
definitions are provided for clarification purposes:  
Pluralism. The definition adopted depicts pluralism as a contextual phenomenon. It 
is a organizational context characterized by 1) diffused power and 2) divergent 
objectives (Denis et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006).  
 4 
 
 
Legitimacy. An explicitly stakeholder-focused definition of legitimacy is used. This 
draws from both the institutional and more strategic strands (e.g., resource 
dependence theory) of legitimacy research (Suchman, 1995). These theoretical 
traditions will be laid out in Chapter 2, with legitimacy defined as: A perception or 
assumption by particular internal and external organizational stakeholder groups 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate (Hybels, 1995; 
Suchman, 1995). In pluralistic contexts, organizations face multiple demands based 
on different perceptions and assumptions of what is desirable, proper, or 
appropriate.  
 
Legitimacy strategy. The increase, maintenance, or repair of legitimacy that is 
achieved or attempted through a consistent stream of action (Aldrich & Baker, 2001; 
Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Vaara, Tienari, & Laurila, 2006). At 
times labelled legitimacy management (Suchman, 1995).  
Extended discussions of these definitions will be provided in Chapter 2 below.  
A research gap. In pluralistic contexts, what legitimates an organization with one 
stakeholder group can make it illegitimate with another (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; 
Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Seo & Creed, 2002; Stryker, 2000). 
Organizations therefore need to develop strategies to attain, maintain, or defend sufficient 
legitimacy from multiple salient stakeholders with divergent demands. Situating research 
within pluralistic settings therefore provides an opportunity for increased understanding of 
strategies that, despite being outlined in existing legitimacy frameworks (Oliver, 1991; 
Kraatz & Block, 2008; Suchman, 1995), have rarely been explored empirically. In particular, 
Kraatz and Block’s legitimacy strategy framework focused on the organizational level was 
selected to guide this thesis due to its alignment with the identified research problem. 
The literature discusses a preoccupation with conformity and isomorphism within much 
legitimacy theory (Fligstein, 1997; Kitchener, 2002; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 1991). 
However, such an approach is fraught with difficulty in pluralistic settings (Oliver, 1991; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Seo & Creed, 2002). Pluralism in this way expands the range of 
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potential and/or necessary legitimacy strategies engaged in. Strategies less central in more 
homogenized settings take on greater import (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Lounsbury, 2007; Mars 
& Lounsbury, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002). Pluralism in this way enables investigation of 
strategies that have previously been less of a research focus. Specifically, insight into 
aspects of Kraatz and Block’s (2008) theoretical framework is enhanced through being 
empirically investigated as legitimacy strategies for what appears to be the first time.  
Another particular aspect is a lack of understanding into how organizations may combine 
multiple strategies simultaneously. It was observed that there is an implicit assumption 
within the presentation of some foundational legitimacy strategy frameworks (e.g., Kraatz & 
Block, 2008; Oliver, 1991) that a single legitimacy strategy will be dominant within an 
organization. With regards to empirical work, it is argued (Pache & Santos, 2010; Binder, 
2007) that studies have tended to focus on the identification and exploration of 
idiosyncratic responses (e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 2010; D'Aunno et al., 1991; Elsbach & 
Sutton, 1992). These empirical studies have also infrequently reflected their findings back to 
or proposed general legitimacy strategy framework such as the one provided by Kraatz and 
Block (2008). Understanding how different strategies might interrelate or be combined by 
organizations is, consequently, partially lacking. This study focuses this issue.  
Increasing research interest. An illustrative description of this theoretical domain is 
contained in my own experience with the literature. Since commencing this PhD I have 
watched the research interest at the specific intersection between legitimacy strategy and 
pluralism increase markedly. This was particularly the case regarding empirical studies 
outlining strategies for managing divergent legitimacy demands in the form of institutional 
logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009), a related but slightly different 
frame from the one adopted here. The foundational framework this research draws from 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008) was similarly unpublished at the time I identified the broad research 
gap I sought to address. This has meant that since starting my PhD journey, the literature 
has provided a framework and an increasing number of empirical studies to draw from that 
have helped increase the understanding of specific strategies. This suggests that the 
research problem identified here has been increasingly recognized as important for 
legitimacy strategy frameworks and institutional theory more broadly. This growing body of 
work provided me with an increased capacity to refine (and hopefully strengthen) the 
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contribution made here as the conversation I was engaged in progressed. As a result, a 
more nuanced discussion regarding combining legitimacy strategies was enabled.  
1.3 Research Questions 
My thesis is that pluralism has much to contribute to our understanding of legitimacy 
strategies. The overarching question I explore is: How do organizations strategize for 
legitimacy in pluralistic contexts?  
The following sub-questions further focused the investigation:  
1. How are stakeholder legitimacy demands and pluralism experienced by different 
organizations in NZ’s science sector?  
 
2. What strategies are perceived by stakeholders as being implemented by 
organizations to manage their legitimacies in pluralistic contexts? 
 
3. How, if at all, are organizations perceived to combine different legitimacy 
strategies in pluralistic contexts?  
 
4. Why might particular legitimacy strategies, rather than others, be implemented 
by organizations in pluralistic contexts?  
1.4 How the Research Questions Were Explored 
The focus in these research questions on participant perception reflects the post-positivist 
approach adopted here. The perceptions and experiences of research participants are the 
means through which the complexity and tensions associated with legitimacy and pluralism 
are investigated. Such a position is aligned with pluralism as it moves beyond uncovering 
singular truth and instead embraces the existence of pluralistic perceptions. A post-positivist 
approach that focuses on the perspectives of participants is important when investigating 
legitimacy (Crotty, 1998; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). While maintaining a belief in a mind-
independent reality, post-positivism argues with constructivist perspectives that knowledge 
and beliefs, including legitimacy, are human constructions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). It also 
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provides a foundation for research seeking to explore concepts like legitimacy that cannot 
be presented as objective reality (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Hammersley, 2001; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Miller, 2000, p. 38; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). 
Selecting an empirical setting was primarily based on the requirement that it enabled the 
investigation of legitimacy strategies within a pluralistic setting. The science sector was 
therefore selected, being identified as experiencing both divergence objectives and diffused 
power (Ziman, 1994). Science organizations are outlined as frequently facing science, public 
good, and commercially based legitimacy demands (Colyvas & Powell, 2006; Mars & 
Lounsbury, 2009; Rip, 2004; Ziman, 1994). Within the NZ context specifically, researchers 
have described the sector as characterized by a “relevance debate” and multiple divergent 
objectives (Devine, 2003; Leitch & Davenport, 2005). Diffused power also characterizes the 
science sector and organizations within it. For example, there are high levels of resource 
dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), collaboration is increasingly necessary (Powell, 
Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996), and finally accountability to and evaluation by the public 
funders of research has increased (Ziman, 1994). This also represents a novel empirical 
setting within which to study pluralistic legitimacy strategies, with previous studies not 
exploring this particular context. Accompanying this primary rationale was my growing 
personal interest in NZ’s science sector. In particular, the dialogue regarding the vital nature 
of the science sector in determining NZ’s future prosperity (e.g., Callaghan, 2009) held 
strong personal resonance.  
Within this sector, six qualitative case studies were undertaken. The structure of the sector 
enabled replication of different types of science organizations that nonetheless dealt with 
broadly similar pluralism. This included a replication of similar organizational types (for 
example, two high-tech start-ups). It also included a degree of theoretical replication. Three 
types of organizations defined by the literature (Stone & Brush, 1996) as likely to be 
pluralistic were selected: public (two Crown Research Institutes), non-profit (two Centres of 
Research Excellence), and start-up (two high-tech start-ups) organizations. The pluralistic 
contexts within which these organizations operate and the legitimacy strategies they 
implemented as a response are explored through in-depth multi-stakeholder interviews. 
Fifty-eight interviews were conducted as the primary data collection method, supplemented 
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with secondary data (approximately 136 documents). It is rare for research to incorporate 
multiple case studies to explore a legitimation amidst pluralism in this way.  
Thematic analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994) was conducted based on an analytical 
framework which incorporated stakeholder legitimacy demands, the dimensions of 
pluralism, and a legitimacy strategy framework (Kraatz & Block, 2008). A multi-step process 
in this regard will be outlined more fully in Chapter 3. This follows the example of other 
institutional and legitimacy studies that have contextualized a discussion of strategies within 
a description of divergent demands (Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Reay 
& Hinings, 2009). This approach exhibits what has been described as a rare abductive 
treatment of a legitimacy strategy framework amidst pluralism (Pache & Santos, 2010). Both 
abduction as well as the case study research strategy are suited to theoretical extension and 
development which underpins the contribution and intent of this thesis (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009).  
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters, including this introduction (Figure 1.1). It follows 
a traditional thesis structure and incorporates Wolcott’s (1994) advice to separate the 
analysis (findings chapters) from interpretive (discussion) aspects of the research 
endeavour. The thesis structure is outlined in Figure 1.1 below before being described more 
fully.  
Chapter Two provides the theoretical framework guiding this thesis. First, a review of the 
concept of pluralism is provided. Second, the theoretical foundations of legitimacy research 
are outlined and the intersection between legitimacy theory and pluralism explored. In the 
third sub-section traditional legitimacy strategies are reviewed before the question of 
legitimation in pluralistic contexts is focused on. In this final sub-section a theoretical 
framework (Kraatz & Block, 2008) is outlined and the sparse literature is reviewed around 
that conceptualization.  
Chapter Three outlines the methodological approach and methods adopted in this study. It 
expands on the post-positivist assumptions and the case study strategy guiding this 
research. The concepts of pluralism and legitimacy are more fully contextualized within the 
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empirical setting of NZ’s science sector. Detailed explanation of case selection, the data 
collection processes and the stages of thematic analysis and interpretation are provided.  
Chapters Four and Five outline the findings that emerged from the analysis. Chapter Four 
focuses on using the empirical data to explore the pluralism experienced in the three types 
of organization included in this study. The findings highlight that the organizations 
experience a complex array of legitimacy demands, embedded tensions, and power 
diffusion. The organizations of a similar type are shown to experience broadly similar 
contextual dynamics; however, slight differences in perspective regarding these dimensions 
are also highlighted. Chapter Five focuses specifically on the ‘strategy question’ and its 
structure is based on six case studies organized around the theoretical framework. Multiple 
different strategies and strategic patterns were found. Strategic stories that highlight the 
possibilities and challenges of legitimation amidst pluralism were evident.   
Chapter Six, the discussion chapter, moves into the more interpretive realm of this thesis. 
This involves three interrelated aspects: 1) incorporating both the literature and empirical 
findings; 2) cross-case comparison; and 3) bringing together the ‘context’ and ‘strategy’ 
parts of the analysis. The findings provide support for focal framework as a useful way of 
understanding legitimation in pluralistic settings while also enabling theoretical extension of 
it. Increased understanding and empirical elaboration of some seldom investigated 
strategies is also gained. Propositions 1–4 are put forward to help understand why 
particular strategies are utilized by an organization in a particular pluralistic setting. They 
are based on the different perspectives of pluralism observed between similar 
organizational cases. Proposition 5 highlights the importance of understanding 
combinations of, sometimes paradoxical, strategies in pluralistic contexts.  
Chapter Seven outlines more fully the contribution contained in the theoretical elaboration 
that is enabled by the thesis’ findings. Future research avenues and an overview of the 
associated limitations of this current study are also discussed. The central picture with 
which this conclusion ends is one of organizations utilizing a gamut of strategies that 
traverse the sharp delineation between them. This ability to combine multiple strategies 
contributes to the opportunity for organizations to exhibit creativity (Snow, 1959) and high 
degrees of legitimacy (Kraatz & Block, 2008) within pluralism. The difficulty of harnessing 
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this potential nonetheless sits alongside this discussion of creative possibility within 
pluralistic contexts. 
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Figure 1.1 Thesis structure 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review: Pluralism and Legitimacy Strategies 
This chapter positions this thesis in relation to contextual pluralism and organizational 
legitimacy. It highlights the literature gap concerning strategizing for legitimacy in pluralistic 
contexts. Third, a theoretical framework for understanding and investigating this research 
problem and question is provided. This structure is briefly illustrated in Figure 2.1 as is the 
comparative ‘size’ of each body of literature.  
Figure 2.1 Literature review 
 
Section 2.1
Pluralism 
Definition:  Denis et al. 
(2007), 
strategy framework: 
Pratt & Foreman (2000)
Section 2.2
Legitimacy
 Institutional and 
strategic approaches 
(Suchman, 1995)
              Section 2.3.1
Legitimacy strategies
(e.g., Oliver, 1991; 
Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975)
Pluralistic legitimacy 
strategies  
Section 2.2.2
Legitimacy 
and pluralism
Section  
2.3.2-2.3.3
(Kraatz & Block, 2008)
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2.1 Pluralism: A Definition and Introduction 
Pluralism is defined as contexts characterized by: 1) divergent objectives and 2) diffused 
stakeholder power (Denis et al., 2007). It denotes contexts consisting of divergent objectives 
held by multiple salient stakeholders (Cohen & March, 1986; Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006; 
Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a). Power is the capability for a group or individual to “bring about 
the outcomes they desire” (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977, p. 3). Diffusing power amongst multiple 
stakeholders therefore affects the relative power of managers and their ability to impose 
top-down decisions (Cohen & March, 1986; Denis, Lamothe, & Langley, 2001; Denis, Langley, 
& Rouleau, 2006, p. 368; Denis et al., 2007).1 The concepts of diffused and relative power 
are therefore understood here as closely related. Figure 2.2 also illustrates that the degree 
of divergence and diffusion lie on a continuum (Denis et al., 2007). The level of divergence 
between objectives may be perceived as partly commensurable (+) or incommensurable 
(++); while power may be similarly more (++) or less (+) highly diffused.  
Figure 2.2 Contextual pluralism (adapted from Denis et al. (2007)). 
Low
Diffused  power
Semi-
pluralistic
Limited 
pluralism 
Semi-
pluralistic
Pluralistic
High
Low High
Divergent 
Objectives
++
++
+
 
                                                     
1
 The assumption underlying this mirrors that made by Jones when discussing stakeholder management of 
utilising ‘managers’ as the representation of ‘the organization’, as their primary role is one of “contracting on 
behalf of the firm (directly or indirectly) with other stakeholders” (Jones, 1995, p. 408).  
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A brief overview of pluralism is followed by a more comprehensive review of the specific 
intersection between pluralism and legitimacy. In relation to pluralism and management 
research, authors make three points: 1) interest in pluralism is increasing (Denis et al., 2007; 
Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006); 2) pluralism, however, has not been fully translated into our 
theories of management (Denis et al., 2007; Glynn et al., 2000); and 3) this compromises the 
relevance of organization theories as pluralism is an increasingly prevalent 21st century 
dynamic (Glynn et al., 2000; Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002). In particular, 
how organizations strategize in pluralistic contexts has received less attention and is in need 
of further exploration (Denis et al., 2001; Denis et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006; 
Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010; Pratt & Foreman, 
2000). The resultant argument is that there is a need for a picture of strategy that 
incorporates pluralism in a way that conventional strategy research does not.  
Pluralism has, though, been evoked in many disparate strands of organizational literature. 
For example, pluralism is inherent in the recognition of multiple conflicting identities (Fiol, 
Pratt, & O'Connor, 2009; Pratt & Foreman, 2000) and multiple conflicting institutions and 
institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Scott, 1991; Seo & Creed, 
2002). The effect of pluralism on decision making (Cohen & March, 1986; Cohen, March, & 
Olsen, 1972); governance (Molz, 1995), leadership (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003; Denis, et 
al., 2001; Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2010), strategizing in the public sector (Bryson, 1988; 
Nutt, 1984; Ring & Perry, 1985), and strategy more generally (Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006; 
Jarzabkowski, Sillince, & Shaw, 2009b; Stone & Brush, 1996) have also been touched upon.  
One particular body of work has highlighted various organizational tensions through a 
‘paradox lens’ (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Lewis, 2000; Quinn & Cameron, 1988). This 
perspective focused on contradictory yet interrelated tensions that exist simultaneously and 
persist over time (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Smith et al. (2010, p. 450) use the term ‘paradoxical 
strategy’ to denote the simultaneous implementation of contradictory yet interrelated 
strategies. Paradox differs from the broader contextually based definition of pluralism 
adopted here. Further, as Smith and Lewis (2011) outline, the paradox literature has tended 
to restrict its focus to specific dualities. By comparison, studies utilizing the concept of 
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pluralism are more likely to incorporate a multiplicity of competing demands and embedded 
points of divergence (e.g., Jarzabkowski & Sillince, 2007).  
Another applicable theoretical tradition is stakeholder theory. It outlines that organizations 
should, for both normative and performance reasons, take note of a range of stakeholders 
and potentially divergent objectives and commitments. A foundation for a broader 
conception of who is salient beyond a traditional shareholder-centric focus is provided and 
this is also central to understanding pluralism (Donaldon & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; 
Frooman, 1999; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Nonetheless, it has been argued that from a 
pluralism perspective (Kraatz & Block, 2008), stakeholder theory has not yet fully explored 
how corporations can effectively manage the divergent stakeholder interests. From Kraatz 
and Block’s perspective the complexity associated with moving beyond shareholder-
centrism is not yet fully addressed by stakeholder research.  
A number of general strategy frameworks have been proposed in the above literature for 
managing pluralism. Frameworks for meeting divergence demands exist in the identity 
(Pratt & Foreman, 2000), paradox (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Werner & Baxter, 1994), and 
legitimacy literature (Kraatz & Block, 2008). It is the specific legitimacy/pluralism 
intersection represented by Kraatz & Block’s framework that will be reviewed further below. 
First, however, the next step is to situate this within the legitimacy literature.  
2.2 Organizational Legitimacy 
Organizational legitimacy has been associated, using a variety of measures, with the 
enhancement of organizational survival (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Hamilton, 2006; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986). It has been connected to 
resource attainment (Deeds, Mang, & Frandsen, 2004; Parsons, 1960; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), and indicators of performance such as IPOs (Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Pollock & 
Rindova, 2003) and new venture growth (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). The broad consensus is 
that legitimacy matters.  
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2.2.1 Organizational Legitimacy: An Overview 
Weber’s (1925/1968) conceptualization of legitimacy is the starting point of many 
organizational legitimacy reviews (e.g., Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006; Ruef & Scott, 
1998; Suchman, 1995). He introduced legitimacy into sociological theory and subsequently 
into organization studies and provided the first categorization of different legitimacy 
dimensions (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). 2  This incorporation of legitimacy into 
organizational research was part of a movement towards contextually focused theory. From 
the 1960s the proliferation of open system theories (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Thompson, 
1967/2005) had meant the “imagery of organizations” was developing. Specifically, 
organizational boundaries were re-conceptualized as “porous and problematic” (Suchman, 
1995, p. 571). Legitimacy is one concept that focused on this “relationship between 
organizations and their environments” (Richardson & Dowling, 1986, p. 94) and was 
incorporated as part of this research agenda (e.g., Epstein & Votaw, 1975; Maurer, 1971; 
Parsons, 1960; Perrow, 1970; Terreberry, 1968). In particular, legitimacy became central to 
institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  
Legitimacy dimensions. The literature has been somewhat preoccupied with classifying 
legitimacy’s dimensions (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Suchman (1995) distinguished 
between authors who have defined organizations as legitimate when they are desirable 
(evaluative definitions) and those who have defined organization as legitimate when they 
are understandable (cognitive definitions). Evaluative definitions encapsulate socio-political 
legitimacy, which can be further subdivided to include legitimacy as adherence to norms 
and values (normative legitimacy), explicit rules and regulations (regulative legitimacy), and 
the self-interested calculations of an organization’s stakeholders (pragmatic legitimacy). 
Cognitive legitimacy, by contrast, highlights that for something to be legitimate it must be 
understandable. The end-point is ‘taken-for-grantedness’, which in contrast to the 
                                                     
2 In additional to the studies reviewed here some organizational research has used Weber’s “ruled-based 
conception of authority” to focus on legitimacy as inherent in “structures of domination” (Courpasson, 2000; 
Gordon, Kornberger, & Clegg, 2009, p. 15). Incorporating this aspect of legitimacy’s Weberian foundation has, 
however, not been central within the research informing this study.  
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dimensions above implies a lack of evaluation (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Ruef & Scott, 1998; 
Suchman, 1995) (Table 2.1).  
These categorizations provide a useful frame through which to understand legitimacy’s 
theoretical strands (Suchman, 1995). These dimensions have not developed as a single 
theory, but rather as a collection of concepts with different conceptual histories (Deephouse 
& Carter, 2005; Suchman, 1995). Specifically, resource dependence (‘strategic’), institutional, 
and population ecology research have been central to legitimacy theory. 
Table 2.1 Overview: Legitimacy dimensions (Bridwell-Mitchell, 2008; Deephouse & Suchman, 
2008) 
 
Resource dependence definitions. Parsons (1960) emphasized that organizations are part of 
a larger social system upon which they depend for scarce resources. The value systems of an 
organization must, therefore, be congruent with those of that super-ordinate system. 
Within this interaction with the environment, legitimacy involves “the appraisal of action in 
terms of shared or common values” (p. 175). Parson’s evaluative (rather than cognitive) 
understanding (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 16) has been the basis of resource dependence 
theory treatment of legitimacy. Suchman (1995) labelled this theoretical tradition the 
strategic approach to legitimacy (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Weber  
(1925/1968) 
Aldrich and Fiol 
(1994) 
Scott (1995); 
Ruef & Scott 
(1998).  
Suchman (1995) Overarching 
Summary 
 Cognitive  
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grantedness) 
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From such a perspective, Dowling and Pfeffer define organizational legitimacy as:  
Congruence between the social values associated with or implied by their activities and the 
norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social system of which they are a part  (1975, p. 
122).  
They state that legitimacy “may be assessed by an examination of the values and norms 
prevalent in a society” (1975, p. 124) as well as resource allocation (e.g., Terreberry, 1968). 
This indicates that, despite the focus on resource dependencies and the ‘technical’ or ‘task’ 
environment (Oliver, 1991; Scott & Meyer, 1991) this definition also incorporates values and 
norms. Similar definitions of legitimacy as congruence (Epstein & Votaw, 1975; Hannigan & 
Kueneman, 1977) ensued, and the resource dependence definition was used as a 
foundation for much research that followed (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Deephouse, 1996; 
Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). The resource dependence definition retains an external focus (e.g., 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 194). However, the strategic treatments of legitimacy have since 
moved beyond this and include both internal and external sources of legitimacy (Elsbach & 
Sutton, 1992). 
Resource dependence theory depicted legitimacy as “ambiguous, retrospective and socially 
constructed” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 195). This implied that a degree of strategic 
control over legitimacy was possible and legitimacy strategies were a resultant focus (see 
Section 2.3). In this way the strategic school provided a foundation for addressing legitimacy 
from an impression management perspective (e.g., Arndt & Bigelow, 2000; Elsbach, 1994; 
Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Hearit, 1995; Massey, 2001; Stryker, 2000). More recently, this 
instrumental perspective of “legitimacy as a resource to be manipulated” has been 
connected to stakeholder theory. The connection has been made both in terms of 
understanding ‘stakeholder legitimacy’ as part of stakeholder salience (Driscoll & Crombie, 
2001, p. 445; Mitchell et al., 1997) and in how a stakeholders’ perspective is crucial to 
‘organizational legitimacy’ (the focus here) (Hybels, 1995; Sonpar, Pazzaglia, & Kornijenko, 
2010; Woodward, Edwards, & Birkin, 1996). Finally, insights from resource dependence 
theory have provided a foundation for integrative efforts that have resulted in a more 
strategic approach to legitimacy within institutional theory (e.g., Alexander, 1996; Kraatz & 
Block, 2008; Oliver, 1991).  
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Institutional theory and legitimacy. A foundation to a cognitive understanding of legitimacy is 
provided by Berger and Luckmann (1966): “legitimation is not just a matter of ‘values.’ It 
always implies ‘knowledge’ as well” (p. 86). This became part of the basis of institutional 
theory (Seo & Creed, 2002; Zilber, 2002), which similarly incorporates a cognitive 
understanding of legitimacy. Within the seminal 1970s texts (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1977) ‘new institutionalism’ paid attention to previously neglected facets of the 
environment: institutionalized beliefs, rules, and roles (Scott, 1991, p. 346).3 In fact it is said 
that legitimacy is “perhaps the most central concept in institutional research” (Colyvas & 
Powell, 2006, p. 308).  
Meyer and Rowan (1977) focus on legitimacy but do not explicitly define it. They variously 
discuss legal mandates (regulative), rational effectiveness (pragmatic), and valued means 
and goals (normative) (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 50). They differ, however, from the 
strategic approach by including cognitive rules that specify existence and meaning (Ruef & 
Scott, 1998). For instance, they argue that “institutionalized rules…may be simply taken for 
granted…*they+ often enter into social life primarily as facts which must be taken into 
account” (p. 341). Legitimation in this sense is about creating accounts that prevent 
questioning (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 349) and “appearing to be rational” (Greenwood, et 
al., 2008, p. 5).  
Meyer and Scott (1983) provide the first explicitly institutional definition of legitimacy 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Legitimacy is: 
The extent to which the array of established cultural accounts provides explanations for its 
existence, function, and jurisdiction, and lack or deny alternatives…a completely legitimate 
organization would be one about which no question could be raised (Meyer & Scott, 1983, p. 
201). 
                                                     
3 The definition of institutions used here is tied to Scott’s (1995, p. 33) three institutional pillars of legitimacy. 
This broad definition defines institutions as consisting of “the cognitive, normative, and regulative structures 
and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by various 
carriers – culture, structures, and routines – and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction.” (also see 
Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008). Some conceptual slippage can occur between the definitions of 
institutions and legitimacy (Hybels, 1995; Johnson et al., 2006). The legitimate cannot be conceptualized apart 
from the institutionalized. Consequently, Johnson et al., (2006) define institutions as “legitimate conventions.” 
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While this cognitive dimension has defined the institutional perspective (e.g., DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), the conceptualization of legitimacy by 
institutional theory has incorporated and focused on regulative, normative, and cognitive 
‘pillars of legitimacy’ (Baum & Powell, 1995; Galvin, Ventresca, & Hudson, 2005; Ruef & 
Scott, 1998). These pillars of legitimacy are largely understood as constraining organizations 
– or ‘legitimacy as being a source of action as well as a product of it” (Kraatz & Block, 2008, 
p. 247). This contrasts with the strategic strand of research’s depiction of legitimacy as a 
resource (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).  
Population ecology definitions. Population ecology’s density dependence theory provides 
empirical evidence of lower founding and higher disbanding rates when industries are small, 
due to the lack of (external) legitimacy associated with their low density (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994; Archibald, 2008; Barron, 1998; Dobrev, 2001; Hannan & Carroll, 1992). This means 
that population ecology focused on cognitive legitimacy: the greater the density the greater 
the taken-for-grantedness and survival chances (Baum & Powell, 1995; Hannan & Carroll, 
1995; Hannan, Carroll, Dundon, & Torres, 1995). Due to its lack of focus on organizational 
level strategies, population ecology theory does not explicitly add insight into the research 
question guiding this study.  
Multidimensional definitions. Because of this fragmented history, legitimacy theory 
threatened to “degenerate into a chorus of dissonant voices” (Suchman, 1995, p. 572) (see, 
for example, the discussion between institutional (Baum & Powell, 1995) and population 
econology (Hannan & Carroll, 1995) theorists). However, the 1990s brought integrative 
multidimensional definitions as well as increased clarification (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Ruef & 
Scott, 1998; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995). These definitions incorporating and outlining 
multiple legitimacy dimensions were summarized in Table 2.1.  
Of these, Suchman’s (1995) definition of legitimacy has become the most widely used. It had 
the expressed goal of synthesizing and incorporating insight from both strategic and 
institutional theory. Both traditions are encapsulated in his definition of legitimacy as:  
A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions (p. 574).  
 21 
 
Suchman outlines that legitimacy is generalized as it is potentially “resilient to particular 
events, yet dependent on a history of events.” It is a perception or assumption, as an 
organization may diverge from societal norms but remains ‘legitimate’ as long as this 
divergence goes unnoticed. Similarly, legitimacy is socially constructed because organization 
can deviate from an individual’s values but remain legitimate because of the lack of 
collective disapproval (Johnson et al., 2006, p. 213; Weber, 1925/1968). This understanding 
of legitimacy draws from both institutional and resource dependence theoretical 
perspectives, and provides a foundation for this thesis. However, it will be revisited once the 
intersection between pluralism and legitimacy is explored.  
2.2.2 Legitimacy Literature and Pluralism: An Overview 
Neither institutional theory nor resource dependency theory has adequately 
addressed the issue of conflicting pressures. (Alexander, 1996, p. 832) 
As Alexander (1996) suggests, an assumption of a ‘single’ legitimacy can be observed in 
many legitimacy definitions. The critique reiterated here is that much research has collapsed 
legitimacy into a “solitary construct…attributable to an entire industry” (Galvin et al., 2005, 
p. 78). Despite some of the theoretical foundations, particularly within institutional and 
population ecology, of legitimacy research being antithetical to pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Stryker, 2000), there has, however, been increasing acknowledgement that multiple 
conflicting legitimacy demands can confront organizations (e.g., D'Aunno et al., 1991; 
Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). While 
much of the history of legitimacy theory has a ‘monolithic feel’ (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a, p. 
284; Lounsbury, 2007) there is growing appreciation of pluralism.  
Drawing from the concept of ‘institutional demands’ (Pache & Santos, 2010), and the 
definitional link between legitimacy and conformity, ‘legitimacy demands’ are defined as 
pressures for conformity (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Suchman, 1995). The focus is on demands 
made by various stakeholders (i.e., sources of legitimacy) that organizations are required to 
respond to, in order to be perceived as “desirable, proper and appropriate” by those 
stakeholders (Suchman, 1995). In conceptualizing this both ‘institutional logics’ and 
‘stakeholders’ are important. For clarity, the discussion below is segmented into two sub-
sections: a discussion of multiple contradictory institutional logics and, secondly ,a linking of 
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that to a stakeholder perspective. Clemens and Cook (1999, p. 457 emphasis added) state 
that these two aspects are important for understanding legitimacy amidst pluralism: “the 
institutional effects attributable to normative legitimacy or taken-for-grantedness…are 
reinforced by the more explicitly political mobilization of a set of stakeholders” (also see: 
Stryker, 2000, p. 214).  
Conflicting institutional logics. Institutional theory offers a view of legitimacy that discounts 
pluralism (e.g. Greenwood, Diaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Powell, 1991; 
Suchman, 1995). It has instead traditionally emphasized “widely shared and taken-for-
granted social values and ideas” (Greenwood et al., 2008, p. 12). For example, Zucker (1983, 
p. 5) and Tolbert & Zucker (1983, p.25) argue that institutionalization means “alternatives 
may be literally unthinkable.” Further, a focus on isomorphism means that institutionalism 
highlights “sameness” rather than difference (Dacin, 1997; Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Greenwood et al., 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Indeed, the assertion that 
legitimacy lies in isomorphism implies a common conception of what is legitimate, namely, 
that which the organization is becoming similar to. As Kraatz and Block (2008) state, at first 
glance institutionalism appears to be incommensurable with pluralism.  
Attempts to develop a view of legitimacy that incorporated pluralism is observable from as 
early as the 1980s with DiMaggio (1988) arguing that institutional theory must account for 
conflict. Indeed, while this is most obvious in recent theory, such a foundation is also 
observable in early institutional research. Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 356) state that: 
“institutional environments are often pluralistic and organization and societies promulgate 
sharply inconsistent myths.” Meyer, Scott & Strange (1987) and Scott & Meyer (1991) 
similarly expanded on these ideas through the idea of fragmentation. Their point is that 
conflicting institutional demands are likely to emerge within fields defined by uncoordinated 
organizations. Focusing more explicitly on legitimacy, D’Aunno et al. (1991) applied this 
literature in their analysis of drug abuse units caught between the conflicting ‘rational 
myths’ of mental health and drug abuse treatment. They argued that their study was the 
first to address the difficulty of conformity to strong beliefs and rules in fragmented 
environments.  
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Friedland and Alford (1991) cement the intersection between institutional theory and 
pluralism by illuminating the idea of contradicting institutional logics.4 Theirs is a macro-
view, with a focus on the capitalist market, the bureaucratic state, families, democracy and 
religion as conflicting institutional logics. Logics provide a foundation for theorizing “sources 
of heterogeneity” through alternative logics of actions, and “sources of legitimacy”, within 
the institutional system (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Seo & Creed, 2002, p. 243; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008, pp. 104, 108). For example, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005, p. 35) outlined 
institutional logics as the basis “by which legitimacy is assessed.” This framework has been 
the dominant one for institutional theorists seeking an understanding that has incorporates 
pluralism.  
An array of both theoretical (Pache & Santos, 2010; Seo & Creed, 2002) and empirical 
studies have since followed, exploring multiple conflicting logics and sources of legitimacy 
within institutional theory. An indicative review of institutional theory shows an extensive, 
largely recent, building of knowledge in this regard. Understanding legitimacy amidst 
divergence has been explored in this way within settings as varied as law and accounting 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Stryker, 2000; Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2005), tobacco and gambling industries (Galvin et al., 2005), multinational corporations 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002); artistic organizations (Alexander, 1996; 
Glynn, 2000; Glynn, 2002; Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005); health care (D'Auuno, Succi, & 
Alexander, 2000; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Fiol & O'Connor, 2005; Heimer, 1999; Reay & Hinings, 
2009; Ruef & Scott, 1998); the effect of regional and family logics on Spanish firms 
(Greenwood, et al., 2010); banking and finance (Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 
2007); rape crisis centres (Zilber, 2002); Taiwanese computer industries (Hung & 
Whittington, 1997); companies in highly regulated industries (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a) 
and organizations with a social mandate (Binder, 2007; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). 
Within institutional theory this discussion has frequently centred on a professional logic (for 
example, around medicine) encountering a managerial one in broad institutional fields 
                                                     
4
 Logics provide “the formal and informal rules of action, interaction and interpretation that guide and 
constrain decision makers” (Thornton, 2004, p. 70). They represent shared understanding of what “constitutes 
legitimate goals and how they might be pursued” (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, p. 1420) 
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(Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996; Kitchener, 2002; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; 
Reay & Hinings, 2005; Scott, Ruef, Mendel & Caronna, 2000; Thornton, 2002).  
Despite the studies reviewed above, Kraatz and Block (2008, p. 246) recently noted that 
“the recognition of institutional pluralism *still+ points towards a major void in our collective 
understanding” (also see Greenwood et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009). A 
common critique (Kraatz & Block, 2008) is that institutional studies, including many of those 
cited above, have focused on divergent legitimating logics at the broad field level rather 
than seeking to understand its implications specifically at the organizational level (e.g., 
Driscoll, 2006; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Galvin et al., 2005; Goodrick, 2002; Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006; Meyer & Hollerer, 2010; 
Reay & Hinings, 2005; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005).5 Indeed, 
institutional research (Clemens & Cook, 1999; D'Auuno et al., 2000; Rao et al., 2003; Seo & 
Creed, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Townley, 2002) has generally focused on the 
issue of explaining and theorizing change within a broad field rather than a specific focus on 
the effect of pluralism on organizational level legitimacy (and associated strategies). It is 
suggested (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Reay & 
Hinings, 2009) that such a focus has meant that pluralism is considered a temporary 
phenomenon as entire sectors such as publishing or healthcare move from one dominant 
logic to another (whereby one logic is replaced or suppressed) (D'Auuno et al., 2000; 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Hinings, Greenwood, 
Reay, & Suddaby, 2004, p. 316; Hoffman, 1999; Lounsbury, 2002; Rao et al., 2003). To 
highlight an illustrative example, Thornton (2002) discusses the ‘market period’ and the 
‘editorial period’ in a publishing industry. Within that study a period in time when a 
transition occurred between these ‘logics’ as the basis of legitimacy for the publishing 
industry is outlined. This differs from a focus on the tension of organizations existing in 
fields where both market and editorial (for example) demands exist simultaneously as a 
source of ongoing tension (notable exceptions include Cooper et al., 1996; D'Aunno et al., 
1991; Reay & Hinings, 2005). To summarize, legitimacy research from an institutional 
                                                     
5 DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 13) define this focus as: “nonlocal environments, either organizational sectors 
or fields roughly conterminous with the boundaries of industries, professions, or national societies.”  
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perspective has only infrequently dealt with pluralism as multiple specific stakeholder 
expectations affecting organizations (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).  
Multiple conflicting stakeholder demands.  
When we speak of legitimacy…we must also ask, “Legitimacy to whom?” or “endorsed by 
whom?” (Hudson, 2008, p. 262) 
From its inception the ‘strategic-school’ has incorporated conflict into its image of 
legitimacy. According to Suchman (1995, p. 576), the strategic approach starts with the 
observation that “one of the elements of competition and conflict among social 
organizations involves the conflict between…systems of belief or points of view.” 
Contrasting with institutionalism, the strategic perspective predicts recurrent conflicts 
between managers and stakeholders regarding legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; 
Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy in this way is viewed as “purposive, calculated, and frequently 
oppositional” (Stryker, 2000; Suchman, 1995, p. 576; emphasis added).  
Legitimacy is also treated within this approach as an intangible resource conferred by both 
internal and external stakeholders (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; 
Hamilton, 2006; Perrow, 1970).6 Simultaneously, organizations are dependent on those 
multiple stakeholders for resources, a relationship that depends on legitimacy being 
perceived or assumed (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Rutherford & Buller, 2007). This picture of 
multiple stakeholders making divergent legitimacy demands assist in an account that 
incorporates pluralism. While institutional theory has been critiqued for “inattention to the 
audience responsible for conferring legitimacy” (Zuckerman, 1999, p.1398); these sources of 
legitimacy have also been highlighted by some institutional studies (Reay & Hinings, 2005; 
Ruef & Scott, 1998). Such a focus is outlined as pivotal for the future of legitimacy theory 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).  
Elsbach and Sutton’s (1992) empirical study offers an early example of research that 
explicitly distinguishes between the legitimacy demands of different stakeholder groups, in 
                                                     
6 Freeman’s classic definition is that “a stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (1984, p. 46). According to the 
pluralistic dimension of diffused power, the focus here is on those who can affect an organization’s objectives.  
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their case activists and stakeholders, such as politicians, in the wider community. Hybels’ 
(1995) theoretical article was one of the first to explicitly integrate ‘constituents’ into a 
legitimacy framework. The underlying assumption is that the legitimacy demands of such 
groups would differ. However, Hybels does not explicitly incorporate pluralism in this way. 
Woodward, Edwards & Birkin (1996) more directly argue that different stakeholder groups 
can hold divergent legitimacy conferring expectations. Deephouse (1996) also incorporates 
stakeholders into his definition stating that “a key step in defining it is identifying relevant 
social actors” (p. 1025). The evaluations of two social actors are included and Deephouse 
acknowledges this limitation regarding focusing on only two sources, rather than including a 
wider variety of stakeholders. A similar pattern is evident in other quantitative studies 
(Deephouse & Carter, 2005, p. 337; Ruef & Scott, 1998).  
Nonetheless, a growing number of empirical studies have included a range of stakeholders 
as a way of incorporating pluralism. Examples include Brown’s (1995) study of different 
internal stakeholder perceptions and how this affected the legitimacy of an IT project. 
Glynn’s (2002) study from an institutional perspective incorporated different stakeholders 
(critics, managers, musicians) and linked their different perspectives to conflict between 
logics. Driscoll’s (2006) study of the Canadian forest industry discussed legitimacy 
management where marginalized perspectives in the context of multi-stakeholder contexts 
undermined the dominant logic. Sonpar et al. (2010), meanwhile, outline the importance of 
addressing the demands of multiple stakeholders rather than a single dominant source of 
legitimacy (government). These provide empirical examples of relating broader legitimating 
‘logics’ to struggles regarding legitimacy demands between stakeholders (also see 
Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Reay & Hinings, 2009).  
An omission within the literature remains a predominant focus on external sources of 
legitimacy. Legitimacy’s main theoretical strands are all critiqued for not emphasizing 
internal legitimacy dynamics (Stryker, 2000). Indeed, while a theoretical foundation for 
incorporating internal stakeholders as legitimacy-conferring constituents now exists (Pache 
& Santos, 2010; Stryker, 2000; Woodward et al., 1996), few legitimacy studies have included 
internal stakeholders (Greenwood et al., 2008). Nonetheless, exceptions are growing and 
show that incorporating internal stakeholders is important in understanding legitimacy and 
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legitimacy strategies amidst pluralistic contexts (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Brown, 1995; 
Glynn, 2002; Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Sonpar et al., 2010; Zilber, 2002). Indeed, as studies 
of legitimacy within multinational organizations remind us: “organizations themselves can 
be complex and fragmented” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999, p. 67).  
Erickson (2006) criticizes legitimacy authors (e.g., Hybels, 1995) for failing to acknowledge 
the relative importance of each stakeholder group they identify. Understanding legitimacy 
entails a focus on those with the power to determine what “counts as legitimate” (Brown, 
1994, p. 862). A key issue becomes stakeholder salience, or the degree to which a 
stakeholder’s legitimacy demand can affect an organization (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; 
Driscoll & Crombie, 2001; Erickson, 2006; O'Donovan, 2002; Ruef & Scott, 1998). Mitchell et 
al. (1997) provide a framework of stakeholder salience that incorporates power, legitimacy 
(of the stakeholder) and the urgency of the demand. Stakeholder salience explains Pfeffer 
and Salancik’s (1978) observation that an organization need only be endorsed by a segment 
of society and can remain legitimate in the face of external attack by less salient groups 
(Suchman, 1995). Other empirical studies have explicitly incorporated the broad idea of 
salience in their studies of legitimacy (Brown, 1995; Driscoll & Crombie, 2001; Elsbach & 
Sutton, 1992; Erickson, 2006). This incorporation of stakeholder salience is connected to 
pluralism’s diffused power dimension (Denis, et al., 2007).  
2.2.3 A Stakeholder-Centric Legitimacy Definition  
The overview above provides a theoretical base from which to settle on a definition of 
legitimacy for this project. Through integrating insights from both the strategic and 
institutional conceptions of legitimacy this definition positions this study as drawing from 
both theoretical strands. Such positioning has a broad basis in the literature (Elsbach & 
Sutton, 1992; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995) with Alexander (1996) labelling it ‘strategic 
institutionalism.’  
Suchman’s (1995) definition of legitimacy has become widely used; however, its selection 
here is not automatic. Hybels (1995) offers both a critique of the vagueness of legitimacy 
definitions and his own stakeholder-focused conception of legitimacy, something which the 
above discussion has suggested is important for a conception of legitimacy that incorporates 
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pluralism. For Hybels it is “necessary above all to identify the critical actors, both internal 
and external, whose approval is necessary to the fulfilment of an organization’s function” (p. 
243). The argument is that contemporary legitimacy research should be contextualized, with 
analysis grounded in concrete actors and their interests (Galvin, et al., 2005; Stryker, 2000; 
Van Leeuwen, 2007). 7 
In order to more explicitly incorporate pluralism Suchman’s (1995) definition is expanded 
upon. Legitimacy is defined here as:  
A perception or assumption by particular internal and external organizational 
stakeholder groups that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate.  
This moves research, in accordance with Deephouse and Suchman’s (2008, p. 68) call, 
beyond the traditional focus on “analytic distinctions among the various dimensions of 
legitimacy” to (potentially multiple and conflicting) sources of legitimacy, i.e., included here 
via stakeholders. It also allows for a conception of ‘legitimacies’ rather than a singular 
‘generalized legitimacy’ (Suchman, 1995). This provides a foundation for investigating 
strategies for managing those multiple, potentially divergent, stakeholder legitimacies.  
2.3 Strategizing for Legitimacy in Pluralistic Contexts 
Historically, different assumptions about organizational agency and cultural embeddedness 
have distinguished the “strategic tradition” from institutional theory and led to the former’s 
focus on organizational level legitimacy strategies (Suchman, 1995). There is a long history 
of literature establishing that organizations take steps to ensure their continued legitimacy 
(Parsons, 1960; Perrow, 1970). Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 3), 
in particular, argued that research attention had been paid to the “problem of using 
resources” rather than on “the problem of acquiring resources.” Legitimacy strategy focuses 
us on this less developed side of strategy. By contrast:  
The lofty concern for populations has left institutionalists exposed to accusations of 
                                                     
7 While emphasising the ‘particular’, this definition does not contradict the long-held definition of legitimacy as 
collectively rather than individually conferred (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Johnson et al., 2006, p. 57; 
Suchman, 1995, p. 574) due to maintaining an emphasis on groups of stakeholders rather than locating it with 
individuals.  
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marginalizing individual agency and smothering diversity in aggregation (Hung & 
Whittington, 1997, p. 553) 
As this suggests, institutional theory can be seen as a strand of legitimacy literature that has 
not focused on exploring different legitimacy strategies. A ‘conformity’ bias in its 
explanations of the organizational world is widely recognized and used as a basis for critique 
(Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Kitchener, 2002; Kraatz & 
Block, 2008). 
Legitimation is the process whereby legitimacy (as defined above) is “established or 
defended” (Driscoll, 2006; Hybels, 1995; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kraatz & Block, 2008; 
Richardson & Dowling, 1986, p. 91; Richardson, 1985). The concept of “legitimacy 
strategies” refers to legitimation (the increase, maintenance or repair of legitimacy) 
achieved or attempted through a consistent stream of action (Aldrich & Baker, 2001; 
Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Suchman, 1995; Vaara et al., 2006). These strategies have been 
clustered under the label ‘legitimacy management’ by some authors providing legitimacy 
strategy frameworks (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1991; Suchman, 1995). In pluralistic contexts, 
legitimation involves strategies for adapting to divergent legitimacy demands (Kraatz & 
Block, 2008). Reflecting an appreciation of pluralism this definition here of legitimacy 
strategy recognizes strategies as action resulting “from strategic managerial action or 
emerge more naturally from interaction of constituent groups” (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 
285).  
2.3.1 Foundational Legitimacy Strategy Frameworks 
This sub-section outlines the foundational legitimacy strategy frameworks while the next 
sections review legitimation amidst pluralism specifically.  
Strategy frameworks. In the earliest legitimacy strategy framework Dowling and Pfeffer 
(1975) outline three broad strategies. Legitimacy can be achieved by: 1) adapting to 
conform to prevailing definitions of legitimacy in its environment; 2) altering the definition 
of legitimacy so that it conforms to the organization’s current practice; or, 3) identification 
of organizations with legitimate symbols. Many other authors have made similar distinctions 
(Epstein & Votaw, 1975; O'Donovan, 2002; Sethi, 1979) or explicitly used this framework 
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(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The agency continuum apparent in Dowling and Pfeffer’s 
framework between an organization adapting (low agency) versus altering (high agency) 
stakeholder’s legitimacy demands is well cemented in legitimacy research (Suchman, 1995). 
In particular, Oliver (1991) integrates institutional and strategic legitimacy theory and, 
through her typology refining the ‘agency’ continuum, proposes that organizational 
strategies vary from acquiescence to manipulation. In its incorporation of agency, Oliver’s 
framework was central to institutional theory moving beyond its ‘structure’ and ‘conformity’ 
centralism (Heugens & Lander, 2009).  
More agency-intensive strategies such as ‘altering legitimacy definitions’ (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975) or ‘manipulation’ (Oliver, 1991), remain the least understood of legitimacy strategies, 
with many authors mentioning them but simultaneously dismissing them as difficult and less 
viable than more adaptive strategies (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; 
Epstein & Votaw, 1975; Suchman, 1995). For example, two studies that statistically test 
Oliver’s framework do not include the most agency-intensive strategy of manipulation 
(Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995).  
A distinction between ‘substantive action’ and ‘symbolic management’ observable within 
Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) framework is further developed by Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, 
pp. 178, 180). They describe this as the difference between “real, material change” and 
symbolic processes that “appear consistent” (also see Richardson & Dowling, 1986; 
Richardson, 1985). Based on this distinction, Ashforth and Gibbs outline ten specific 
strategies, many of which draw from impression management theory. Although no empirical 
work has explicitly applied their framework, many studies have followed integrating 
impression management and institutional theories (Arndt & Bigelow, 2000; Bansal & 
Clelland, 2004; Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Massey, 2001). An additional 
distinction highlighted by Ashforth and Gibbs’ framework is between gaining, maintaining, 
and defending (or repairing) legitimacy. It is argued that strategic action will differ 
depending on which of these is the focus (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Massey, 2001; 
O'Donovan, 2002).  
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In another comprehensive framework, Suchman (1995) elaborates on Ashforth and Gibb’s 
(1991) theorizing based on this distinction between legitimation activities. He also further 
differentiates between strategies focused on pragmatic, normative or cognitive legitimacy. 
However, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) argue that any legitimacy strategy may operate 
on a variety of dimensions so that a strict demarcation between legitimacy forms is perhaps 
less central than Suchman (1995) suggests. Finally, Suchman is another example of a 
legitimacy strategy framework utilizing an agency continuum. His moves from ‘conformity to 
the environment’ to ‘selecting the environment’ to ‘manipulating the environment.’ 
Zimmerman & Zeitz (2002) expand on this through an additional category of ‘creation’; 
however, this can be still understood as part of ‘manipulation’. A summary of these 
foundational frameworks from the strategy strand of literature is provided in Figure 2.3.  
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Figure 2.3 Summary of foundational legitimacy strategy frameworks (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995)  
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Institutional theory and legitimacy strategies. Despite the centrality of resource dependence 
theory in the development of an understanding of legitimacy strategy, insight from 
institutional theory is still prevalent in the summary in Figure 2.3. First, institutional theory 
provides much of the theoretical foundation regarding “conformity” as a strategic response. 
This is the concept of isomorphism whereby organizational forms, structures, policies, and 
practices that are similar to others institutionalized in their environment are adopted 
(Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). Indeed, isomorphism is the most empirically supported legitimacy strategy (Dacin, 
1997; Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Glynn & Abzyg, 2002; Haveman, 1993; 
Heugens & Lander, 2009; Ruef & Scott, 1998). Second, from the inception of institutional 
theory Meyer and Rowan (1977) outline decoupling, separating structures “from each other 
and from ongoing activities” (p. 340), as a legitimacy strategy (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008). 
Isomorphism, decoupling, and more broadly the language of institutional theory (e.g., 
“altering socially institutionalized practices” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990, p. 178)) are adopted 
within the strategy frameworks outlined above.  
While institutional literature has tended to downplay the potential for organizations and 
organizational actors to actively manage their contexts, this can be exaggerated (e.g., 
Lawrence, 1999). In particular, Oliver’s (1991) framework of institutional response strategies, 
already outlined above, is a seminal example of incorporating a strategic approach with 
institutional theory (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Indeed, broad theoretical frames within 
institutional theory have increasingly directly addressed the over-deterministic view of the 
environment. Focused on the issue of explaining institutional change, ‘institutional 
entrepreneurs’ are defined as individual actors with the capacity to develop strategies and 
shape institutions (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; DiMaggio, 1988), and institutional 
entrepreneurship has becomes a broad term to mean any action geared at creating or 
changing institutions (Levy & Scully, 2007). Drawing from Oliver (1991) a closely related 
term, ‘institutional work’ has been defined as being less focused on ‘heroic’ actors. It is a 
more a general view of “the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at 
creative, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215; 
Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). In short, institutional work encompasses a wider variety 
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of actors (beyond the institutional entrepreneur) and agency-intensive activity beyond 
institutional creation (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Perkmann & Spicer, 2008).  
Discursive legitimacy strategies. Recently, the impression management strategies contained 
in foundation strategy frameworks have been extended through critical discourse (Vaara et 
al., 2006; Van Leeuwen, 2007; Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999) and rhetorical (Erkama & 
Vaara, 2010; Green, 2004; Hearit, 1995; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) legitimacy strategy 
frameworks. This ‘turn to language’ has been evident both within (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 
2002; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004) and outside (Vaara & Monin, 2010) an institutional 
approach. One example is Suddaby and Greenwood’s (2005) identification of five rhetorical 
legitimacy strategies within change processes. These are ontological (rhetoric based on 
assumptions about what can/cannot exist or co-exist), historical (appeals to history and 
tradition), teleological (divine purpose or final cause), cosmological (emphasis on 
inevitability), and value-based theorizations (appeals to wider belief systems). This different 
level of analysis provides a distinct conceptualization of legitimacy strategy.  
2.3.2 Effect of Pluralism on Legitimacy Strategies  
That pluralism increases the complexity of legitimacy management is widely recognized 
(D'Aunno, et al., 1991; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kraatz & 
Block, 2008; Seo & Creed, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). For instance, Meyer and 
Scott (1983, p. 202), argue: “the legitimacy of a given organization is negatively affected by 
the number of different authorities sovereign over it and by the diversity or inconsistency of 
their accounts of how it is to function.” Three tensions will be briefly touched upon to 
highlight the complexity strategizing for legitimacy amidst pluralism entails. 
Most notably, in pluralistic contexts, organizational efforts to legitimize themselves with one 
stakeholder group may have a negative effect on its legitimacy with another (Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 27). As Stryker (2000, p. 209) outlines, in pluralistic 
contexts “you are damned if you do, damned if you don’t” as the  “search for legitimacy will 
produce some unintended delegitimation.” This issue was explored empirically by Elsbach 
and Sutton (1992) in their study of social movement organizations where attacks by some 
hostile stakeholder groups were directly related to legitimacy conferment by other groups. 
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In particular, as outlined above, a cornerstone of the institutional understanding of 
legitimation is isomorphism (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse & 
Carter, 2005; Lawrence, 1999). However, isomorphism becomes problematic when the 
assumption that the organization operates in a single, clearly defined field does not hold 
(Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Indeed, isomorphism and acquiescence 
potentially decrease legitimacy: becoming isomorphic to particular institutional 
arrangements can heighten conflict and reduce legitimacy with respect to those 
stakeholders whose expectations differ (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Seo 
& Creed, 2002). 
Another tension exists between ambiguity and clarity. The pluralism literature suggests the 
merits of strategically utilizing ambiguity (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009b; Ring & Perry, 1985; 
Stone & Brush, 1996). Ambiguity can enable multiple relationships to a broadly 
communicated objective and, therefore, can be helpful within pluralism (Contractor & 
Ehrlich, 1993; Davenport & Leitch, 2005; Eisenberg, 1984; Jarzabkowski et al., 2009b). 
Within the legitimacy literature the strategic use of ambiguity is contained in the concept of 
decoupling, where “goals are made ambiguous” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 354). Other 
legitimacy literature, though, considers ambiguity to be a threat to legitimacy. For example, 
the foundational concept of cognitive legitimacy, making something understandable and 
knowable, explicitly contradicts the ambiguity argument (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 
1995). Stone and Brush (1996, p. 647) outline this contradiction when arguing that formal 
planning is integral to attaining legitimacy, yet in pluralistic contexts this clarification can 
exacerbate stakeholder conflict.  
A tension between conformity to stakeholder demands and consistency (in response and 
over time) is highlighted. The consistency/legitimacy link is articulated by Kraatz and Block 
(2008, p. 261): stakeholders “anthropomorphize organizations and look for evidence of 
integrity and self-consistency in their actions…the legitimacy-seeking organization needs not 
only to be multiple things to multiple people, but also something unto itself.” They argue 
that organizations are not only expected to symbolize their conformity with immediate 
legitimacy demands but also to demonstrate cross-temporal and spatial consistency. 
Consistency has been similarly emphasised in other legitimacy research (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Massey, 2001). However, a tension remains between the consistency prerequisite and many 
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of the ideas associated with managing legitimacy demands amidst pluralism (Brunsson, 
2002). Pluralism means that adopting only those beliefs that produce internally consistent 
practices is too “risky” (D'Aunno et al., 1991, p. 641) and “organizations in search of external 
support and stability incorporate all sorts of incompatible structural elements” (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977, p. 356). Achieving the organizational flexibility and adaptability required in 
pluralistic contexts (Denis et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006) also becomes difficult 
if consistency is over-emphasized. This issue appeared to have been largely unexplored 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008).  
Rather than depicting this complexity as negative (Meyer & Scott, 1983), pluralism can also 
be viewed as offering organizations an expanded array of potential strategic options (Kraatz 
& Block, 2008). From an institutional theory perspective, “the presence of multiple 
institutional orders or alternatives constitutes an opportunity for agency” (Clemens & Cook, 
1999, p. 459). Pluralism helps explain strategic activity and institutional entrepreneurship in 
the face of constraining forces that demand conformity; that is, the problem of embedded 
agency (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002).8 Pluralism therefore enables an 
expanded gamut of strategic possibilities (Aurini, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & 
Lounsbury, 2007). It can create increased opportunity for organizations to exercise strategic 
choice (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Mars & Lounsbury, 2009; Pache & Santos, 2010; Seo & Creed, 
2002). In this way pluralism can assist in extending legitimacy theory away from the 
dominant focus on ‘isomorphism’ (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or ‘congruence’ (e.g., 
Ashforth & Gibbs, 1991; Deephouse, 1996; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). In this way pluralism 
can be an avenue to contribute to the broad research gap regarding what has been labelled 
the “pro-conformance bias” that underpins institutional theory’s treatment of legitimacy 
(Fligstein, 1997; Kitchener, 2002, p. 411; Kraatz & Block, 2008).  
 
 
                                                     
8 The embedded agency problem is the paradox of “how institutional change is possible if actor’s intentions, 
action, and rationality are conditions by the institutions they wish to change” (Dorado, 2005, p. 285). That 
actors gain their agency from the presence of multiple, potentially divergent, institutions is a central ‘solution’ 
evident in the literature (Seo & Creed, 2002; Dorado, 2005). 
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2.3.3 Legitimacy Strategies amidst Pluralism: A Framework and Review 
Kraatz & Block (2008, p. 244) state that despite broad recognition of institutional pluralism 
“there has to date been little apparent attempt to systematically assess its practical and 
theoretical implications.” As already outlined, this has included a dearth of research 
focusing on the strategies organizations use to manage their legitimacy in pluralistic 
contexts.  Indeed, authors argue that increased acknowledgement of pluralism by legitimacy 
literature has not translated into research that has addressed this strategy question 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Pache & Santos, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009). In particular, the 
question of how organizations strategize for legitimacy in such contexts remains rarely 
empirically investigated. Binder (2007) and Pache and Santos (2010) point out that the few 
studies in this space have tended to focus on the identification and exploration of a single, 
often idiosyncratic, strategy. Similarly, empirical studies (e.g., D’Aunno et al., 1991; Reay & 
Hinings, 2009) have tended not reflected their findings back to or proposed a general 
legitimacy strategy framework such as the one proposed by Kraatz & Block (2008).9 
While insightful, most foundational legitimacy strategy frameworks outlined above 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995) do not adequately 
address such a pluralistic context. For instance, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, p. 177) mention 
that “organizations are answerable to a number of diffuse constituencies with frequently 
conflicting expectations and perceptions”, but do not reflect on how affects legitimacy 
strategies. This is mirrored by Suchman (1995, p. 590) who argues that organizations only 
“occasionally find themselves” in pluralistic contexts when they cannot choose a more 
unitary one. Consequently, he discusses the managing legitimacy in pluralistic contexts only 
peripherally, and this discussion is not represented in his framework. Pluralism, despite 
being acknowledged, has therefore been rarely used to extend, or reflect on these 
dominant legitimacy frameworks.  
                                                     
9 An exception is Purdy and Grey (2009) who found four legitimacy strategies used by “state dispute resolution 
offices” within a context of conflicting logics. However, they only spend one or two paragraphs exploring each 
of the strategies they found.  
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The dominance of field-level studies has also meant that broad resistance dynamics in the 
face of pluralistic demands have been studied at the field level rather than developing an 
understanding of organization level strategies (Greenwood et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; 
Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Further, these studies have 
explored resistance through focusing on a single practices, such as workforce downsizing 
(Greenwood et al., 2010) or CEO incentive plans (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). This issue was 
identified by Kraatz and Block (2008, p. 249) who instead provided a theoretical framework 
at the organizational level for understanding how organizations can manage “pluralistic 
legitimacy criteria.” In focusing on legitimacy strategies at the organizational level, they 
draw from old-institutionalism (Selznick, 1957; Selznick, 1992) and label their approach 
“institutional organizationalism.” While old-institutionalism did not focus in legitimacy in the 
way ‘new’ institutionalism did, Selznick’s theorizing was used to focus their legitimacy 
framework on the heterogeneous “internal and local environment” of specific organizations 
(Arndt & Bigelow, 2000, p. 512; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), and more local influences, 
such as community, rather than broad sectors or fields (Marquis, Glynn & Davis, 2007). ‘New 
institutionalism’ has traditionally been focused at the field level and highlighted 
homogeneity. By contrast, incorporating ‘old-institutionalism’ focuses research on ‘local 
community’ dynamics, the organizational level, and a strategic approach (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991).  
Kraatz and Block’s (2008) framework is adopted here due to this direct focus on the 
intersection of legitimacy strategies and pluralism at the organizational level. 10  They outline 
four strategies for adapting to legitimacy demands within pluralism. Organizations can 1) 
attempt to eliminate the pluralism, 2) compartmentalize and deal with legitimacies 
separately, 3) reign in tensions through finding balance, and 4) forge new orders and 
become self-legitimating. While they provide rich pictures of these strategies, they do not 
                                                     
10 Additional frameworks for understanding legitimation in contested organizational environments have been 
provided, addressing the discourse (Creed et al., 2002; Vaara et al., 2006) and rhetorical strategies that 
individuals and groups can use to persuade (Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005); or what 
Zilber (2002) labels as the micro-politics of meaning. By adopting Kraatz and Block’s (2008) model, although 
recognizing the importance of such understanding, I am focused on a different broader picture of response 
strategies concerning what organizations do as well as say that is distinct from these frameworks. Such a 
framework is aligned with recent observations of the dominance of ‘discourse’ within studies of institutional 
entrepreneurship and a call to ‘expand the methods’ to include to account for other dimensions such as 
practices and material resources (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009).  
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develop the dimensions underlying their framework. In order to refine our understanding 
two additional frameworks are turned to.  
Although not specifically focused on pluralism, Oliver’s (1991) response strategy framework 
has been previously applied to theorize about legitimation within such contexts (Pache & 
Santos, 2010). It provides greater insight vis-à-vis pluralism than other foundational 
theorization due to its incorporation of ‘compromise’ and even ‘defiance’ as potential 
responses, something not explicitly incorporated by other foundational frameworks (e.g., 
Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995). To reiterate, a central aspect of Oliver’s 
framework is an organizational agency continuum. This can be usefully linked to Kraatz and 
Block’s (2008) strategies. For instance, their fourth strategy (labelled transcension here) 
highlights the ability to construct “a logic of its own” (p. 20) and attain autonomy as a way of 
managing legitimacy amidst pluralism. This is indicative of the high degree of agency 
inherent at one end of Oliver’s continuum. Likewise, Kraatz and Block refer to Oliver’s 
compromise strategy in describing the lower agency response of balancing demands. This 
link will be further discussed below. While Oliver’s framework adds key supplementary 
insight it is not the central framework adopted here: Kraatz and Block (2008) incorporate 
internal stakeholders into their strategic picture (as sources of both legitimacy and pluralism) 
whereas what the organization is ‘responding to’ in Oliver’s framework is firmly external.   
Pratt and Foreman’s (2000) identity framework incorporates another useful dimension: 
strategies that seek to integrate versus segregate demands. This distinction is also explicitly, 
although briefly, mentioned within legitimacy theory (Suchman, 1995). Pratt and Foreman’s 
framework is also incorporated due its explicit utilization by Kraatz and Block (2008). The 
latter directly link Pratt and Foreman’s categories to their first three strategies. With regards 
to their fourth ‘transcension’ strategy, Kraatz and Block implicitly illustrate the strategy’s 
integrative impulse, describing it as entailing “the ability to integrate” (p. 252) multiple 
legitimacy demands.  
The updated framework is depicted in Figure 2.4. The strategies will now each be explored 
as a way of further reviewing the literature. This ‘pluralism legitimacy’ framework draws 
from foundational strategy frameworks (see figure 2.3) which were developed with ‘less 
pluralistic’ (see figure 2.2) contexts in mind to the extent that they provide insight into 
 40 
 
Kraatz and Block’s framework. That is, to the extent that they are also applicable to 
pluralistic contexts. It also incorporates the growing number of empirical studies that have 
increased insight into specific strategies. In reviewing these empirical studies the example 
provided by the central theoretical articles (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010; 
Suchman, 1995) is followed whereby “institutional response strategies” (e.g., Oliver, 1991) 
and legitimacy strategies are viewed as closely interlinked. Institutional research that 
discusses strategies for managing conflicting institutional logics, without framing them as 
“legitimacy strategies” per-se, therefore also form part of this review. 
Figure 2.4 A pluralistic legitimacy framework 11 
Strategic 
Adaptation
Compart-
mentalization
NegotiationTranscension
Contraction
Strategic 
Manipulation
Segregation
Integration
Organizational agency
Degree of integration 
 
                                                     
11The placement of the strategies along the agency continuum is based on Oliver’s (1991) positioning. The 
adaptation of this continuum in the framework illustrated here (e.g., ‘strategic’ rather than ‘passive’ 
adaptation) reflects that acquiescence is defined as less applicable to pluralistic contexts (Oliver, 1991, p. 163; 
Pache & Santos, 2010). The placement along the integration continuum partly reflects insights developed by 
Pratt and Foreman (2000) and Suchman (1995). While this framework has focused on and drawn on the 
literature specifically addressing legitimacy strategies, a degree of alignment with dialectical or paradox 
frameworks is evident (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Werner & Baxter, 1994). These include: ignoring one pole 
(contraction here); satisfying the poles sequentially (compartmentalization here); moderation through 
satisfying them both at once (negotiation here); and reframing them as complementary (transcension here).  
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Segregation strategies. Segregation implies that some legitimacy demands are not included 
or that they are separated from each other (Pratt & Foreman, 2000; Suchman, 1995). 
Organizations can either delete or marginalize some of them (contraction); or deal with 
them individually and in a targeted fashion (compartmentalization). These segregation 
strategies are distinguished by the degree of organizational agency involved. With 
contraction, an organization is seeking to transform the pluralistic context with which it is 
faced. Compartmentalization, meanwhile, entails a more adaptive impulse through still 
seeking to comply, or at least being perceived to comply, with multiple stakeholder 
demands (Oliver, 1991).  
Contraction. Contraction seeks to reduce the number of legitimacy demands to which an 
organization is required to respond. Based on the assumption that pluralism is a ‘problem’, 
organizations can manage their legitimacy through “trying to eliminate pluralism” (Kraatz & 
Block, 2008, p. 250). Foundational to this strategy is resource dependence theory’s 
assumption that organizations can either control or choose their contexts so that they 
provide more unitary legitimacy expectations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975; Suchman, 1995). Indicative of this is Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 27) statement that 
“faced with conflicting demands, the organization must decide which groups to attend to 
and which to ignore.”  
Here, contraction is considered to be a matter of degree: a specific demand can either be 
deleted completely (e.g., ‘deletion’ (Pratt & Foreman, 2000); ‘escaping’ or ‘dismissing’ 
(Oliver, 1991) strategies) or marginalized (e.g., ‘defiance’ strategies of ‘challenging’ or 
‘attacking’ institutional demands (Oliver, 1991), or ‘marginalization’ (Kraatz & Block, 2008)). 
An example of a deletion strategy is an organization outsourcing parts of their operations to 
an alternative labour market to circumvent regulative legitimacy demands (e.g., related to 
employees or environmental regulation) in their home countries (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Marginalization occurs when an organization seeks to marginalize a 
stakeholder or particular demand. One can observe such a strategy in reports of some 
petroleum companies actively attempting to undermine the climate change lobby (through 
such things as sponsoring research and reports that throw doubt on the lobbyists claims) 
(Kolk & Levy, 2001; Levy & Kolk, 2002).  
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The choice of whether to play in one or more “games” (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 243) is often, 
however, outside the control of organizations (Humphreys & Brown, 2002). As Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978, p. 27) warn: “favouring one group offends another.” It may be that multiple 
stakeholders are all too salient (Mitchell et al., 1997) to ‘offend’ let alone ‘delete.’ This is 
particularly true for organizations in pluralistic contexts, which are characterized by multiple 
salient stakeholder voices (Boyle, 2004; Denis et al., 2007). From the paradox literature, 
Lewis (2000) suggests that contraction may actually generate a vicious self-reinforcing cycle 
of exacerbated contradiction as the marginalized rally in response to their observation of 
that strategy.  
The majority of examples of contraction are of failures and are illustrative of this proposition 
(Lewis, 2000). Humphreys and Brown (2002) show how attempts to delete a identity were 
unsuccessful within a higher-education institute seeking university status. In their study of 
how a utility company coped with pluralistic logics, Jarzabkowski et al. (2009a, p. 307) 
outline how at one stage particular stakeholders: “demonized any actions that countered its 
[organizational division] market-based beliefs.” This attempted marginalization meant the 
conflict escalated rather than pluralism being successfully reduced. Similarly, Sonpar et al. 
(2010, p. 17) highlighted how a strategy of “singularly focusing on the government mandate 
for market-based logics and largely ignoring the concerns of their stakeholders” fostered 
anger and activism from certain stakeholders rather than successful management of 
pluralistic legitimacy demands. In these latter two examples the result was a transition to 
more integrative strategies.  
By contrast, there are limited examples of successful contraction. Successful 
‘marginalization’ has usually entailed utilizing a lack of diffused power as a way of managing 
divergence (e.g., Driscoll & Crombie, 2001). An exception is Purdy and Gray’s (2009) 
example where they highlighted a strategy of ‘exiting’ a particular context. They observed 
that some law offices were able to leave one environment (judiciary and the state) to join 
another (university) within which they could gain legitimacy based on more unitary 
demands. However, they did not explore the intricacies of how they did this, including how 
powerful stakeholders were managed. In sum, this discussion perhaps suggests that 
contraction may be utilized in isolated areas, rather than in an all-encompassing fashion 
(Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002).  
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Compartmentalization. Compartmentalization is the isolation of legitimacy demands from 
each other so that they can be dealt with separately in a targeted fashion (Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Massey, 2001; Pratt & Foreman, 2000). Sets of “structures and processes,” one for 
each legitimacy demand, are segregated so as not to interfere with one another (Brunsson, 
2002, p. 7). The rationale behind such a strategy is articulated by Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 
357): “because integration is avoided, disputes and conflicts are minimized, and an 
organization can mobilize support from a broader range of external constituents.” Such 
processes are discussed in terms of decoupling and loose coupling and can be implemented 
in a variety of ways including structurally and symbolically (Pratt & Foreman, 2000).  
Separate accounts can be promulgated through the process that Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 
357) defined as ‘decoupling’, where “elements of structure are decoupled from activities 
and from each other” (also see Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Edelman, 1992; Hirsch & 
Bermiss, 2009; Westphal & Zajac, 2001). An organization can manage a heterogeneous 
context by responding to some legitimacy demands symbolically and others with 
substantive action, something that relies on separation between the two (George, 
Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006 Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 2006). Oliver (1991) links the 
response strategies of ‘concealment’ (disguising nonconformity) and ‘buffering’ (reducing 
external evaluation) to this concept.  
Decoupling has infrequently been explored as a legitimacy strategy in response to pluralism 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Scott, 2001; Westphal & Zajac, 2001). One example is Elsbach 
and Sutton’s (1992) description of how, through decoupling the actions of SMO members 
from the SMO itself, two organizations were able to successfully adapt to the legitimacy 
demands of both SMO activists who demanded decisive action and more ‘mainstream’ 
stakeholders who considered such activities illegitimate. There is scope to extend Elsbach 
and Sutton’s (1992) study through looking at organizations other than SMOs (which are 
potentially distinctive) and focusing explicitly on pluralism rather than Elsbach and Sutton’s 
focus on managing illegitimate actions. Another example is Beverland and Luxton’s (2005) 
description of how luxury wineries deliberately separate their image of craftsmanship from 
their own internal commercially driven operations as a way of managing divergent 
objectives. Aurini (2006) shows how decoupling by alternative education providers enabled 
them to craft a legitimation project of strategic isomorphism. Finally, Westphal & Zajac’s 
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(1995, 2001) statistical studies indicate that decoupling can be used to manage the specific 
tension between CEOs and shareholders regarding incentive and stock repurchasing plans.  
Kraatz and Block (2008) argue that loose coupling is a more suitable concept (than 
decoupling) for managing pluralism as it does not entail the distinction between the 
‘peripheral’ (those demands responded to symbolically) and ‘core’ (those demands 
responded to with substantive action). They argue that this distinction is different in 
pluralistic contexts where something peripheral to one stakeholder group can be central to 
another. They therefore position compartmentalization as loose coupling: managing 
multiple demands through separating them (Orton & Weick, 1990; Pratt & Foreman, 2000). 
Such a strategy is depicted empirically by Brown (1995) who showed how an IT project’s 
implementation team understood the legitimacy demands of different powerful stakeholder 
groups and offered them separate tailored legitimacy accounts. Hypocritically offering such 
targeted interpretation was a prerequisite for legitimacy. Binder (2007), meanwhile, 
provides an example of a transitional housing organization (i.e., social organization) using 
compartmentalization whereby some sub-units focused on responding to funding demands 
(“money”) and others to  focus on “really doing the program” separately from the funding 
requirements (p. 562).  
While the idea of targeting strategies and accounts at specific groups is an important one, 
there are limitations. Organizations are usually responding to an interconnected network of 
stakeholders rather than to individual stakeholder groups (Rowley, 1997). Stakeholder 
groups overlap, may communicate directly, or have access to similar communication 
channels; there is a limit to how contradictory or selectively targeted legitimacy strategies 
can be (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 248). This is especially true for smaller organizations, which 
have reduced capacity to separate the conflicting practices and parties in time and/or space 
(D'Aunno et al., 1991). As such, it is unlikely that different legitimacy strategies are able to 
be applied to isolated groups as if the multiple contexts are independent and themselves 
homogenous.  
Integrative strategies. An alternative approach is to integrate legitimacy demands. Such 
strategies do not seek to separate the legitimacies but rather appeal to multiple divergent 
demands simultaneously (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pratt & Foreman, 2000; Suchman, 1995). 
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Integration in this sense is about a focus on the interconnections between legitimacy 
demands rather than necessarily complete ‘synthesis’ (Pratt & Foreman, 2000). Also 
contained in the term ‘integrative’ is the idea of inclusion of multiple demands rather than 
their exclusion (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Again, the degree of agency involved distinguishes 
the two integrative strategies. Negotiation can be described as involving greater adaptation, 
with its focus on seeking balance and compromise. By contrast, transcension tends to imply 
an ability to set, shape and redefine legitimacy demands (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 1991).   
Negotiation. The aim of negotiation is to achieve an accepted balance between multiple 
legitimacy demands. The ‘negotiation’ label appears in multinational enterprise (MNE) 
research (Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), which argues that legitimacy must 
be individually negotiated by the MNE with each of its relevant constituencies. Resource 
dependence theory similarly provides a theoretical foundation through having outlined the 
“‘negotiated environment’ of organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, pp. 143–187), 
assuming that organizational relations with the environment are open to negotiation and 
the exchange of concessions” (Oliver, 1991, p. 154). Kraatz and Block (2008) describe it in 
terms of ‘reining in’ tensions, ‘balance’, ‘compromise’ and ‘cooperation’ as stakeholders 
recognize, sometimes grudgingly, a degree of mutual dependence. This strategic category 
corresponds to Oliver’s ‘compromise’ strategy of “balancing the expectations of multiple 
constituents” (1991, p. 52). The political theory concept of mutual adjustment (Lindblom, 
1965) is used by some studies (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a) to further theorize Kraatz and 
Block’s strategy. Mutual adjustment is outlined as a strategy whereby stakeholders adjust in 
various ways to each other with no overarching coordinating device or purpose. This 
adjustment can be more or less passive moving from seeking to avoid adverse 
consequences for another party to more active bargaining strategies.  
One way negotiation can be implemented is through what Pratt and Foreman (2000) label 
aggregation. Here a degree of distinction is retained but, in contrast to 
compartmentalization, efforts are made to forge links and exploit synergies between 
demands. While aggregation is not discussed explicitly within the legitimacy literature, a 
parallel can be drawn to Boyle’s (2004) discussion of how legitimation efforts in business 
schools included linking the values of higher education and business as a way of managing 
the conflicting demands from both contexts. Similarly, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005, p. 50) 
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field-level study discusses how the “Big Five” accounting firms attempted to blur the lines 
between professional and market logics to legitimate a new contested organizational form.   
Another strategy is partial adaptation, based on D’Aunno et al.’s (1991) empirical study and 
resulting conclusion that organizations have limited ability to respond to conflicting 
demands and will therefore conform to each of them only partially. Additional empirical 
studies have reached similar conclusions (Alexander, 1996; Glynn, 2002). Partial adaptation 
can be seen as a continuum. It can attempt to incorporate several legitimacy demands 
(roughly) equally, relating to, for example, Oliver’s (1991) strategy of a balance where parity 
amongst multiple logics is reached. It can also represent a ‘managing the periphery’ strategy, 
where the ‘core’ is protected through doing enough to pacify other so-conceived less central 
demands. This is reflected in Oliver’s ‘pacifying’ strategy and what Pratt and Foreman (2000) 
evocatively labelled ‘nurturing the unchosen’. The main distinction between this and the 
two segregative strategies is that this partial adaptation remains a negotiated compromise 
amongst stakeholders (Oliver, 1991; Pratt & Foreman, 2000).  
This strategy is illustrated by Glynn (2002, p. 83), who shows how a symphony orchestra 
made marginal changes to the programme to satisfy a new managerial philosophy, while 
keeping the core orchestra repertoire and traditional artistic philosophy intact. It was 
instead “at the margins” that changes were made. Similar conclusions were reached by 
Alexander (1996, p. 805) who outlines how museum curators protected their museums 
most “crucial functions by allowing change in more peripheral areas.” Montgomery and 
Oliver (1996, p. 665) show how hospitals dealing with AIDS utilized Oliver’s (1991) 
compromise strategy in managing multiple pressures. They highlight a strategy where “a 
general preferences for the interests of the more dominant constituent group” was 
supplemented “with evidence that rights of other constituent groups are taken into account 
as well” (1996, p. 665). This also refers to D’Aunno et al. (1991) highlighting the importance 
of ‘ranking’ demands as part of partial adaptation. Meanwhile, Purdy and Gray (2009) 
describe ‘grafting’ as a strategy used by some organizations, whereby they add or graft 
additional legitimacy demands within existing practices rather than replacing those 
foundational ways of operating.  
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Negotiation can be also understood as a response that explicitly incorporates bargaining 
tactics by stakeholders (Lindblom, 1965). This reflects Oliver’s (1991) more agency intensive 
‘bargaining’ strategy where concessions from another party are sought. For example, 
Glynn’s (2000) other study of the orchestra case focuses on the conflict-ridden nature of 
bargaining regarding resources in the give-and-take associated with resolving a musicians’ 
strike. Similarly, Sonpar et al. (2010) outline how organizations in Canadian health care 
moved from a contracted focus to processes of renegotiation due to strikes and activism. 
Because of these ‘bargaining’ activities the organizations (Canadian Regional Health 
Authorities) compromised to partially adapt to those demands.  
While ‘competition’ is dominant in the above discussion (D'Aunno et al., 1991; Glynn et al., 
2000; Sonpar, et al., 2010), one can conceive of this process of negotiation being instead 
based on cooperation. Stakeholders and organizations negotiate away some of their 
legitimacy demands in the spirit of collaboration and conflict reduction: a process of 
collaborative compromise. Reay and Hinings (2009, p. 630), show how stakeholders in the 
health sector managed rivalry between institutional logics through “collaborative efforts” 
based on pragmatic recognition of their interdependence. Simultaneously maintaining the 
distinction between the interests of collaborators was also shown to be important. 
Jarzabokowski et al. (2009a, p. 300) provide another example showing how stakeholders 
moved beyond open conflict to more collaborative mutual adjustment. Each party tried “to 
accommodate the other, advocating tolerance of the other’s position in relation to their 
own logic.” In this way divergent legitimacy demands can be managed through collaboration 
that maintains independence. This rests on acknowledgement by stakeholders, grudgingly 
or otherwise, of their mutual dependencies (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Reay & Hinings, 
2009). 
Transcension. Transcension as a strategy entails rising above the divergence between 
legitimacy demands. This is based on the distinction made by Kraatz and Block (2008, p. 251) 
that while negotiation is often based on grudging acceptance, some organizations can 
instead “rise above” the conflicting interests. They become self-legitimating while 
simultaneously addressing all legitimacy demands. They link this strategy of transcending 
divergent legitimacy demands to Selznick’s (1957) ‘old’ institutionalism whereby 
institutionalized organizations become “infused with value” by multiple constituencies 
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beyond their short-term interests. The organizational autonomy this then entails can be 
related to a higher-level of agency, articulated in Oliver’s (1991) manipulation strategies, 
where an organization seeks to construct for itself its own legitimacy criteria (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). For example, Aurini (2006, p. 103) argues that the 
heterogeneity was part of what enabled alternative schools to “define the terms of their 
legitimation”, or their own logic of confidence as she labels it, rather than being determined 
by pre-defined legitimating ‘cultural schema.’  
The legitimacy literature outlines that organizations are sometimes able to exert influence 
on their immediate stakeholders to transform (or manipulate) the legitimacy demands with 
which they are faced (Oliver, 1991). Resource dependence theory in particular argues that, 
although difficult, organizations can ‘manipulate’ and transform the legitimacy demands 
confronting them (e.g., laws, regulations, evaluation criteria) (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1991; 
Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995). Purdy and Gray (2009) highlight how only a 
limited number of organizations were able to successfully transform the legitimacy demands 
deriving from the context in which they operated. While this remains rarely discussed as a 
legitimacy strategy amidst pluralism, a growing number of examples illustrate that an 
organization can transform divergent legitimacy demands in a way that enables them to be 
more easily aligned and managed. An empirical example is Alexander’s (1996, p. 828) study 
of how, through creative enactment, museum curators were able to “extend the 
possibilities of the environment beyond standards limitations.” They were able to create 
innovative integrative possibilities and solutions. Battilana and Dorado (2010) show how a 
commercial microfinance organization, drawing from conflicting ‘development’ and 
‘banking’ logics, sought to transform their internal staff through socialization and education 
as a way of managing this divergence internally. Finally, Kitchener (2002), while focused on 
change in the ‘basis of legitimacy’ rather than pluralism specifically, does highlight how 
managers ‘manipulated’ legitimacy assessments from internal and external stakeholders 
through their ‘selling’ of a merger.   
Another transcension strategy is the idea of infusing an organization with value (Selznick, 
1957; Selznick, 1992). Kraatz and Block (2008) outline that organizations can create durable 
identities of their own that provide them with “social fact status” and enable them to 
legitimate their “own actions, within limits” (p. 251). In so doing they can integrate and 
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transcend the divergent legitimacy demands. Such organizations are perceived by their 
diverse stakeholders as ‘theirs’; they are “infused with value” by those stakeholders as a 
conduit through which they can pursue their ideals or identity (p. 152). A illustrative 
example is the cult-like status Apple and its products has with its customer base (Belk, 2005; 
Kahney, 2004). As Selznick explains: “as the source of integration shifts from goals to values, 
from specific objectives to ways of thinking…a sense of community” and corresponding high 
level of commitment to the organization are created (1992, p. 236). While not discussing 
legitimacy, Mintzberg (2009, p. 140) similarly uses the term ‘community’ to describe how 
companies can bind people together “for the greater good” and foster their “sense of 
belonging to and caring for something larger than themselves.” With this strategy an 
organization can retain freedom and continued support, even when it makes decisions that 
conflict with a particular stakeholder’s immediate interests and “parochial” values. As part 
of this, symbolism is important because a stakeholder focus solely on material outputs and 
short-term objectives makes cooperation amid pluralism difficult (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 
252). This concept provides an extension to the question of how organizations can 
implement agency intensive strategies (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995), which legitimacy 
research does not appear to have fully pursued.  
Selznick (1992) also outlines that infusion with value can be thought of in psychological 
terms and also in more practical ways such as developing strong ties and selectively 
recruiting staff. Along these lines, co-opting is discussed as a more specific strategy. Defined 
as “the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining 
structures of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence” 
(Selznick, 1949, p. 13) this is about drawing the external environment in (Honig & Hatch, 
2004). Including regulators on the Board of Directors is a common example (Hillman, 2005; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Selznick, 1949). Through co-opting stakeholders with divergent 
legitimacy demands, an organization may transform some of their demands and blur 
boundaries between the internal and external demands.  
Another potential transcension strategy involves tapping into an overarching objective or 
vision (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pratt & Foreman, 2000). Pluralism literature was turned to 
as a foundation for explicating this strategy due to the fewer examples in the legitimacy 
literature. The paradox literature (Smith & Tushman, 2005; Smith et al., 2010) discuss this as 
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a process of shifting to a super-ordinate level or overarching frame and linking contradictory 
objectives to this. In particular, the idea of tapping into a universal narrative “gives meaning 
to the apparent contradiction” and is transformative, as “tensions become viewed as 
complementary and interwoven” (Lewis, 2000, p. 764). This can be connected to 
Jarzabkowski and Sillince’s (2007, p.1647) discussion of a “synergy rhetoric” which 
“constructs a context in which multiple activities are compatible and mutually supportive. 
Within the legitimacy literature a “bridging” strategy is described by Purdy and Gray (2009) 
is indicative. They observed organizations meeting divergent expectations through a broad 
mission enabling them to appear legitimate in relation to both. Zilber (2002) meanwhile 
shows how individuals were able to attribute diverse meanings (based on feminist and 
therapeutic logics) to shared practices within a rape crisis centre. Another example is 
Battilana and Dorado’s (2010) illustration of hybrid organizations constructing a single 
integrative identity and vision as a way of managing ‘duelling’ demands internally. They 
discuss the particular importance of creating a common organizational identity and argue 
that this highly integrative approach prevented sub-group formation and that this was 
integral to organizational sustainability. Battilana and Dorado’s example differs slightly from 
the above discussion (e.g., Smith & Tushman, 2005) in being a particularly synergistic 
argument. Indeed, Pratt and Foreman (2000) discuss how varying degrees of integration can 
be associated with the use of an overarching ‘identity’ or objective. Additional examples in 
legitimacy research are rare. Boyle (2004) provides a brief example, discussing how 
‘citizenship activities’ are considered legitimate to both the corporate and university 
‘worlds’ and can therefore potentially be used by business schools to seek integration 
between the two.  
This framework and associated literature is summarized in Table 2.2 below. 
 51 
 
Table 2.2 Summary of the literature: legitimacy strategies and pluralism 
 
Framework Additional literature summary 
Contraction (Kraatz & Block, 
2008) 
 
Label origin: incorporation by 
author of impulses of ‘deletion’ 
& ‘marginalization’ (Pratt & 
Foreman, 2000; Kraatz & Block, 
2008). 
Indicative characteristics: High 
agency; Low integration (Oliver, 
1991; Pratt & Foreman, 2000). 
Theoretical: 
- Institutional theory: Oliver (1991; Pache & Santos, 2010) [Avoid - 
‘escaping’; ‘dismissing’; ‘Defy - ‘challenging’; ‘attaching’+.  
- Insight from identity theory: Pratt & Foreman (2000) [Deletion];  
- Strategy / resource dependence literature: Ashforth & Gibbs 
(1991); Pfeffer et al. (1975; 1978); Suchman (1995) [Choosing and 
creating unitary contexts].  
Empirical examples: 
- Less successful contraction: (Humphreys & Brown, 2002; 
Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Sonpar et al., 2009)  
- Successful contraction: Exit (Purdy & Gray, 2009).  
 
Compartmentalization 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008) 
 
Label origin: Kraatz and Block 
(2008); Pratt & Foreman (2000). 
 
Indicative characteristics 
Low agency; Low integration 
(Oliver, 1991; Pratt & Foreman, 
2000).   
Theoretical: 
- Institutional theory: Meyer and Rowan (1977)[decoupling]; Oliver 
(1991; Pache & Santos, 2010) [buffering].  
- Identity theory: Pratt & Foreman (2000) [compartmentalization].  
Empirical examples: 
- Decoupling explored extensively; however explicitly applied to the 
pluralistic contexts by: Elsbach & Sutton (1991); Beverland & 
Luxton (2005); Aurini (2006). 
- Different sub-units with different foci (Binder, 2007); targeted 
legitimacy accounts (Brown, 1995).  
 
Negotiation 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008) 
 
Label origin:  Kostova et al. 
(1998, 2008). 
 
Indicative characteristics  
Low agency; High integration  
(Oliver, 1991; Pratt & Foreman, 
2000).   
Theoretical : 
- Institutional theory: Oliver (1991; Pache & Santos, 2010) 
[compromise].  
- Identity theory: Pratt & Foreman (2000) [aggregation].  
- Resource dependence literature (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978): the 
‘negotiated environment of organizations’.  
- MNC literature: Kostova et al. (1998, 2008) [negotiation]. 
Empirical examples: 
- D’Aunno et al., (1991); Glynn (2002); Alexander (1996); 
Montgomery & Oliver (1996); Purdy & Gray (2009) [partial 
adaptation/managing the periphery; grafting].  
- Sonpar et al. (2010); Glynn (2002): Bargaining / activism.  
- Jarzabkowski et al. (2009a); Reay & Hinings (2009) [mutual 
adjustment; collaboration].  
 
Transcension  
(Kraatz & Block, 2008) 
 
Label: Kraatz & Block (2008); 
paradox literature (Lewis, 2000).  
 
Indicative characteristics:  
High agency; High integration  
(Oliver, 1991; Pratt & Foreman, 
2000).  
Theoretical 
- Institutional theory: Oliver (1991; Pache & Santos, 2010) 
[manipulation; also see: Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995).  
- Identity theory: Pratt & Foreman (2000) [integration].  
- Selznick (1957, 1992) [theoretical framing used by Kraatz and 
Block (2008); Infused with value].  
Empirical examples 
- Creative enactment (Alexander, 1996); transformation (Purdy & 
Gray, 2009); logic of confidence (Aurini, 2006).  
- Integrative new identity (Battilana & Dorado, 2010); ‘bridging’  
(Purdy & Gray, 2009); attributing multiple different meanings to 
practices (Zilber, 2000).  
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2.3.4 Combining Strategies. 
An assumption within many of the underlying theoretical frameworks (Kraatz & Block, 2008; 
Oliver, 1991) appears to be that organizations will implement a single dominant strategic 
process. That organizations cannot combine different strategies as a way of managing 
pluralism is not explicitly stated, but there is no mention of combinatorial approaches in the 
presentation of the frameworks. How the various strategies in the frameworks are 
combined and interrelate is, therefore, not discussed within these focal frameworks. It is 
argued (Binder, 2007, p. 551) that a focus on the search for “an organization’s single 
response” has defined, and limited, understanding within the legitimacy literature.  
There are exceptions regarding theorizing a more combinatorial picture within the broader 
legitimacy literature. For example, Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) outline how adaptation was 
combined with identifying an organization with prominent “legitimacy symbols” but they do 
not explore how more ‘manipulative’ strategies might be combined within that adaptive 
picture. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) argue that symbolic and substantive strategies will be 
combined by organizations, and this has been explored empirically (Driscoll, 2006). They do 
not, however, suggest how or in what ways specific strategies will interact or be combined. 
Suchman (1995), meanwhile, acknowledges that organizations will likely seek multiple 
different types of legitimacy, which demands multiple different responses. The focus, 
though, remains on demarcating specific strategies not exploring their interaction. In their 
theoretical article Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) explicitly outline that new ventures are likely 
to limit their agency intensive strategies with conformity in other areas and combine 
multiple strategies.  
Exceptions are observable in an alternative body focused on rhetorical and discursive 
legitimacy strategy frameworks. These highlight the simultaneous implementation of 
multiple rhetorical and discourse strategies by an organization or groups of organizations, 
including within pluralism or settings characterized by conflict (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; 
Vaara & Monin, 2010; Vaara et al., 2006). However, this is not evident in the same way at 
the broader organization level which incorporates organizational practice (e.g., Kraatz & 
Block, 2008). In particular, the broad tendency remains to apply the organizational level 
legitimacy strategy typologies, for example, Oliver’s (1991), to classify an organization 
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against a single response (e.g., Aaltonen & Sivonen, 2009; Bigelow & Stone, 1995; 
Deephouse, 1996; Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  
Within the empirical literature focused on pluralistic contexts specifically, there is a similar 
focus on singular strategic responses. Pache and Santos (2010) outline that the majority of 
empirical examples have focused on and explored idiosyncratic strategies and generally do 
not reflect back to broad strategy frameworks. The majority of studies in the review appear 
to focus on outlining a single strategy such as partial adaptation (D'Aunno et al., 1991); or 
failed contraction (Humphreys & Brown, 2002). Elsbach and Sutton (1992) focus primarily 
on decoupling, albeit incorporating that strategy within a broader process model that 
includes impression management tactics in support of the decoupling process. Similarly, 
other studies which have found different strategies across a number of organizations have 
associated a single strategy with each organization rather than investigating more closely 
the potential of combinations of strategies (e.g., Purdy & Gray, 2009). Part of the 
explanation may be that many studies have focused on specific practices such as hiring and 
socialization of staff (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), stock repurchasing programs (Westphal & 
Zajac, 2001), dealing with AIDs (Montgomery & Oliver, 1996), or collaboration practices 
(Reay & Hinings, 2009) rather than developing a holistic strategic picture at the 
organizational level which would highlight combinations. 
Another aspect might be a growing distinction between studies of negotiation and 
transcension. One interpretation is that the literature is increasingly forming into two 
‘camps.’ First, the implicit assumption made by Kraatz and Block (2008) regards the primacy 
of transcension as a way of managing pluralism. Other authors highlight the importance of 
an integrative identity in managing divergent logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). By contrast, 
other studies have positioned their examples as explicitly non-transcentive, focused on the 
development of an “on-going and uneasy truce” or “pragmatic collaboration” as the means 
through which pluralism is managed (Glynn, 2002; Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a). The 
assumption that more integrative strategies are less desirable or likely is evident. For 
example, Reay and Hinings (2009) highlight the lack of an overarching hybrid ‘logic’ or 
shared identity in their study. They argue that negotiation through pragmatic collaboration 
may be more successful than such synergistic efforts. This distinction between studies of 
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negotiation and transcension has perhaps overshadowed any discussion of the potential for 
simultaneous implementation of these by organizations.  
Some studies do mention strategic approaches that appear to traverse Kraatz and Block’s 
categories. However, they do not explicitly highlight or reflect on this fact or ground it 
within an understanding of simultaneous implementation by a single organization (e.g., 
Alexander, 1996; Aurini, 2006). Others take a longitudinal view which outlines multiple 
strategies pursued over time or in sequence, but not simultaneously (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2009a; Sonpar et al., 2010). Another study outlined multiple responses to different demands 
being enabled through a broader compartmentalization strategy. For example, with 
different subunits exhibiting different relationships with different stakeholder demands 
(Binder, 2007). An example that can be reflected upon further is Reay and Hinings’ (2009) 
study. While they ultimately present a central strategy of ‘pragmatic collaboration’ 
singularly, their discussion of this broad strategy does incorporate an element of 
compartmentalization as one of four “supporting mechanisms.” This enabled the broad 
negotiation process of collaboration between stakeholders. Finally, Aurini (2006, p. 83) 
offers an example of pluralism providing a context wherein “garnering legitimacy is thus 
conceived as an active and multifaceted process that can include multiple avenues for myth-
making, coupling, and logic-of-confidence strategies.” These examples provide a foundation 
for suggesting that organizations may combine multiple strategies, sometimes in ways that 
appear paradoxical, in their management of legitimacy amidst pluralism. Yet this remains an 
area that few studies have explicitly explored.  
Overall, this review of the literature has focused attention on this research omission (Binder, 
2007; Pache & Santos, 2010) and results in a supplementary focus regarding: do 
organizations combine different legitimacy strategies in pluralistic contexts? And, if so, how 
do these strategies interrelate and how are combined by organizations?  
2.4 Summary: Chapter Two 
This chapter first introduced the concept of pluralism and provided a brief overview of the 
associated literature. The second section discussed legitimacy, largely based around the two 
broad traditions that comprise it: the ‘strategic’ and ‘institutional’ approaches. Definitions 
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were outlined, the relationship between legitimacy theory and pluralism explored and a 
stakeholder-centric definition provided. Third, the specific intersection between legitimacy 
strategy and pluralism was reviewed. Foundational legitimacy strategy frameworks were 
summarized and the impact of pluralistic contexts on legitimacy strategy briefly outlined. 
Finally, a specific framework for understanding legitimacy strategy in pluralistic settings was 
provided and used to review the literature. This theoretical framework, along with the 
definition of pluralism and legitimacy developed here, will be taken forward as an analytical 
framework through which to explore the empirical domain of interest: organizations within 
NZ’s science sector. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
Methodology and Context: NZ’s Science Sector 
The following quotations from media commentary about the New Zealand (NZ) science 
sector introduce the relationship between the empirical setting of my research and the 
concept of pluralism: 
Scientists need to be more understanding about how the business marketplace works. We 
need quick solution to our current challenges within days, weeks or months, not within years. 
(Mario Wynands in Casinader, 2010) 
Scientists are understandably growing weary of this approach. They point to many of the 
world’s great scientific discoveries and the many years of research that preceded them. They 
claim, rightly, that many commercially successful applications of scientific discoveries were 
the result of serendipity; the product of true scientific exploration. (Britten & Scott, 2009, p. 
14) 
These two perspectives provide an indication of some divergent stakeholder legitimacy 
demands that science organizations (the unit of analysis in this research) encounter.  
The goal of this chapter is to provide an understanding and explanation of the research 
processes I engaged in. There are five main parts: a description of the ontological and 
epistemological positioning; the case study approach adopted and decisions concerning 
sector and organization selection; the empirical context of this study (NZ’s science sector); 
and the data collection and analysis procedures followed. This methodology is summarized 
in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1 Summary of research methodology 
Research 
Design
Data Collection Data Analysis 
Literature review 
(legitimacy; pluralism)
Output: 
Research 
questions 
Multiple case 
studies as 
appropriate (post-
positivist) research 
strategy
Output: Selection 
of sector
Output:
Selection of 6 
cases; 2 layers of 
replication 
Secondary data 
collected (sector 
and case specific)
58 semi-structured 
interviews with 
multiple 
stakeholders 
Immersion 
(transcription; reading 
& rereading) 
Thematic 
analysis: 
Legitimacy  & 
pluralism 
Output: 
Framework 
for analysis Output: 136 
documents; 
approx. 2395 
pages.
Output:  approx. 
60 hours recorded 
data
Thematic 
analysis: 
Legitimacy strategies 
(intra-case)
Output: 
Chapter 4
Research 
Question 1
Broad Categories:  
analytical framework; 
Sub-themes: 
secondary data & 
interviews.
Output: 
Chapter 5
Inter-case 
comparison and 
referring back to 
the literature Research 
Question 1-4  
Output: Chapter 
6
Step 1: Inductively 
surfacing different 
sub-themes 
Step 2: Sub-themes 
related to analytical 
framework
Output:  Notes; 
holistic understanding; 
iteration between field 
and theory
Case reports 
(stakeholders; 
legitimacy & pluralism)
abduction
Output: 58 word 
files (transcribed 
data) entered into 
NVivo
Research 
Questions 2-3
Conclusions
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3.1 Research Philosophy 
3.1.1 Post-Positivism  
To explicate some of the underlying assumptions contained within my research questions 
two illustrative points are considered. First, I assumed a tentative ability to explore strategic 
regularities and patterns within my engagement with the empirical domain (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Miller, 2000). An understanding and organization of the central strategies, 
based on the participant’s perceptions, implemented by an organization was sought. Second, 
central to embracing pluralism, was a respect for and understanding of the multiple 
perspectives (or ‘realities’) of participants. This contrasts with a research approach of 
“simply judging them as true or false” (Hammersley, 2001, p. 45).  
Post-positivism best illuminates the philosophical underpinnings reflected in these 
assumptions. Such a position offers a “space in-between” positivism and radical 
constructivism (Crotty, 1998; Hammersley, 2001; Patton, 2002a; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). 
To illustrate my experience of post-positivism, I quote Miles and Huberman as they similarly 
position themselves:  
The lines between epistemologies have become blurred…approaches like ours, which do 
away with correspondence theory (direct, objective knowledge of forms) and include 
phenomenological meaning, are hard to situate ( Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 5) 
This difficulty relates to the balancing act such an position entails due to sitting between 
more definitively positioned traditions (Hammersley, 2001). Authors define post-positivism 
as a philosophy that seeks to address perceived “imbalances” within other paradigms; 
juggling, for example, the need for precision and richness (Guba, 1990; Phillips & Burbules, 
2000). The self-referential analogy is that this perhaps has semblance to the organizational 
experience of managing legitimacy within pluralism.   
Post-positivism draws on social anthropology and is said to have had widespread influence 
within qualitative methodologies (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Patton, 2002a; Tesch, 1990). 
This includes grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and transcendental realism (Bhaskar, 
1979, 1989; Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002). Important here is its 
frequent association (e.g., Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Huberman & Miles, 2001; Tesch, 
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1990) with both the case study strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009) and Miles and 
Huberman’ (1994) analytical approach adopted in this research.  
As a philosophical framework, post-positivism addresses questions regarding both the 
nature of reality (ontology) and epistemological question regarding the nature of knowledge 
and the relationship between what can be known and the ‘knower’ (epistemology) (Ackroyd 
& Fleetwood, 2000; Guba & Lincoln, 1994) (Table 3.1). Post-positivism provides a ‘subtle 
realist’ position (Hammersley, 2001). It is:  
Ontologically bold but epistemologically cautious (Outhwaite in Bhaskar, 1989, p. 186).  
While maintaining a belief in the existence of mind-independent phenomena, post-
positivism breaks from positivism in disputing our direct access to it. Instead, it shares with 
constructivist perspectives the belief that knowledge, including legitimacy in this case, is a 
human construction and contextually determined (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Hammersley, 
2001; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Miller, 2000; Patton, 2002a; Reed, 2005; Sayer, 1992). 
Through drawing a distinction between beliefs and objective reality, post-positivism enables 
appreciation of the multiple “realities” or perceptions of participants (Creswell, 2007; 
Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Miller, 2000, p. 38; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). This is 
something a focus on pluralism led me to embrace. Such a position is aligned with much of 
the institutional theory approach to legitimacy: objective reality is not denied but rather 
argued “to be shaped and understood by cognitive frames” (Alexander, 1996, p. 832; Scott, 
2001).  
Post-positivism also assumes that “we severely limit the scope of research” and our 
understanding of social phenomena if we exclude a research interest in the perspectives 
(including their values and interests) of participants. It is aligned with an focus on exploring 
the roots and motivating beliefs within organizations (Crotty, 1998; Phillips & Burbules, 
2000, p. 66). This is important in a study focused on the perceptions of desirability and 
appropriateness (i.e., legitimacy). Aligned with this is an openness to qualitative methods as 
a way of investigating ‘deeper’ social phenomena (Gray, 2009; Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 144) stipulate that:   
The fallibilities of explanation of daily life are central to qualitative researchers: we must 
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traffic in meanings, as well as actions; who must rely, in part, on the explanations that 
people give us; and who must live with the knowledge that because we, too, are “people” 
our own explanations are equally vulnerable. 
This ‘epistemologically cautious’ position entails recognition that “evidence 
underdetermines theory.” While empirical evidence serves as a constraining boundary for 
our beliefs, there remains room for alternative accounts and interpretations. This means it 
would be “sloppy” to “speak of ‘the truth’” as if there were only one truth to be discovered 
about a particular research problem (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Miller, 2000; Phillips & 
Burbules, 2000, p. 38). Instead, post-positivism accepts there can be “multiple, non-
contradictory and valid” descriptions and explanations regarding the phenomena of study 
(Hammersley, 1992, p. 55; Maxwell, 1992). This is a point of differentiation from positivism: 
post-positivism has an anti-foundational epistemology. It does not assume a secure 
foundation for beliefs and knowledge claims within the research process (Phillips & Burbules, 
2000).  
Post-positivism also questions the possibility of objectivism, whereby ‘known’ (i.e., the 
theme of ‘transcension’) and ‘knower’ (i.e., me as the researcher) can be separated 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Maxwell, 1992; Miller, 2000). This less 
privileged position for “science” can be related to an increased regard within post-positivism 
for the voice of the participant: the perspective of participants is as important as any other 
(Creswell, 2007; Crotty, 1998; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). A decreased faith in objectivity also 
relates to the point regarding the under-determination of theory by evidence: so-called 
disinterested observation takes place within the context of theory and is shaped by it. It is 
therefore “necessarily selective” (Crotty, 1998, p. 33; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Phillips & 
Burbules, 2000). The analytical approach is one of managing biases to determine that an 
appropriate theoretical lens is used based on the dataset at hand and to ensure the 
transformation of that framework as necessary. Objectivism, in this way, remains a 
regulative (albeit unattainable) ideal, something which I can seek a degree of but no more 
(Crotty, 1998; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). We can talk in terms of tendencies and provisional 
descriptions rather than “conjunctions of events” (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 24). Such an 
assumption means, for example, that prediction lies outside the scope of this project.  
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Nonetheless, judgmental relativism, the argument that all beliefs and explanations are 
equally valid, is rejected (Bhaskar, 1989, p. 24; Hammersley, 2001; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). 
We can still talk about degrees of “epistemological gain” (Sayer, 2004, p. 8): recognition of 
the fallibility of knowledge does not mean all knowledge is equally fallible. Rational grounds 
for choosing between interpretations generally can be found (Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Sayer, 1992). Post-positivists use Dewey’s (1938) substitution of truth with “warranted 
assertibility” to explain this (Phillips & Burbules, 2000). For example, in surfacing what 
participants perceive to be the central strategies associated with particular organizations 
through interviews, secondary data can be used to increase understanding (i.e., 
epistemological gain) of those stakeholder perceptions. Post-positivism provides the 
qualitative researcher the methodological space for “guesswork, intuition and the following 
up of hunches” (Crotty, 1998, p. 33). However, it maintains that degrees of epistemological 
gain are achieved through adopting rigorous data collection and analytical methods (Dewey, 
1938; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002a; Phillips & 
Burbules, 2000). As Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 277) argue: “the fact is that some 
accounts are better than others. Although we may acknowledge that ‘getting it all right’ is 
an unworkable aim, we should, as Wolcott (1990) suggests, try to ‘not get it all wrong’” (also 
see: Maxwell, 1992). Hammersley’s (1992) post-positivist ‘mid-way’ position regarding 
validity is perhaps illustrative. He outlines that an empirical account must be plausible and 
credible. As part of this, the amount and kind of evidence used in relation to a finding needs 
to be taken into account. In this sense plausibility is inherent in the relationship between an 
account and that of which it is intended to be an account (Maxwell, 1992). For example, 
whether a perception of a legitimacy strategy is widely or consistently held by participants is 
considered here to be part of building plausible findings that are reflections of my dataset 
and the ‘reality’ that it is a partial reflection of. This is contained in my display of the analysis 
to the reader (Chapter 5).  
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Table 3.1 Post-positivism (Crotty, 1998; Patton, 2002a; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). 
 
3.1.2 A Pragmatic Note  
An additional aspect of my research process is its pragmatic nature. Such an approach is 
associated within the methodology below (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002a). Indeed, 
much of what Creswell (2009) identifies with a “pragmatic worldview” is aligned with post-
positivism. This includes being open to both qualitative and quantitative research depending 
on the research questions. Both maintain a belief in realism as well as multiple (pluralistic) 
perceptions of that reality. Patton (2002b, p. 271) outlines that his pragmatic utilitarian 
stance is based on a method being “useful, practical and accurate.” A concern for “what 
 
Ontology 
“what is the nature 
of reality?” 
 
 Subtle realism: A mind-independent reality exists, but can only be partially rather 
than fully accessed by a researcher.  
 Reality as pluralistic and ‘local’: The “reality” that I have access to (through 
participant perceptions) is instead contextual and is multiple: the focus is on 
multiple participants perceptions.   
 Not singular/universal reality/truth: I therefore cannot speak about “the truth” or a 
“single reality” as something I have access to it.  
 
 
Epistemology 
 
“what is the nature 
of the relationship 
between the knower 
and the known?” 
 
 
 Anti-foundationalist: A firm foundation for knowledge is rejected within a 
epistemologically cautious position (empiricism and rationalism rejected).  
 Epistemological gain sought, but objectivism unattainable: Objectivism and the 
pursuit of knowledge remain regulatory ideals. I seek degrees of epistemological 
gain and to limit bias. However, this does not mean I claim access to “truth” or 
absolute objectivity: the theoretical frame applied here is only one possible lens. 
However, it can still be shown to be a more or less ‘warranted’ one.  
 Participant perceptions: This places the researcher in a less privileged position. The 
perspective/experience of participants is as important as any other. Grounding my 
research questions in participant perspectives also reflects epistemological caution. 
Gaining knowledge through a correspondence with ‘reality’ beyond that perception 
is not assumed.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
 Qualitative methods/multiple case studies: Post-positivism advocates conducting 
inquiry in natural settings using more qualitative methods. Multiple case studies 
(Yin, 2009) and the analytical method followed here (Huberman & Miles, 1994) 
have been associated with post-positivism.  
 Exploring rather than predicting: There is value in findings that are not necessarily 
predictive but seek to illuminate patterns and explanations. 
 Triangulation as important in attaining degrees of epistemological gain (see Section 
3.4.3).  
 Aligned with exploring legitimacy within pluralism: Issues of research focus 
incorporates understanding of deeper structures (i.e., legitimacy, perceptions of 
legitimacy strategies). Similarly, the methodological approach can be grounded in 
the exploration of pluralism (e.g., multiple worldviews and associated legitimacy 
demands).  
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works” and the problem or research question is primary, and is what I mean by a ‘pragmatic 
approach’ here (Creswell, 2007; Patton, 2002a; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2007).12 My 
research process can be defined as pragmatic to the extent that my experience of this 
research journey is one of commitment to the research question that originally sparked my 
interest. This is distinct from commitment “to any one system of philosophy and reality” 
(Creswell, 2009, p. 10). My primary reference point remained the research questions I had 
set out to explore, with pluralism and legitimacy being at the core of these.  
3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Legitimacy Research and Qualitative Case Studies  
Much early understanding of organizational legitimacy was sought through statistical 
studies (e.g., Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Elsbach, 1994; Ruef & Scott, 
1998). For example, the population ecology stream has been almost entirely dominated by 
quantitative methods and has not measured legitimacy directly (e.g., Carroll & Hannan, 
1989; Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Hannan et al., 1995; Singh et al., 1986). There is also a 
tendency of much research to use proxies, such as the population density of particular 
organizational forms, rather than direct measures of legitimacy (Baum & Oliver, 1992; 
Zucker, 1989). 13  Quantitative articles that acknowledge a degree of pluralism in 
conceptualizing legitimacy follow a similar pattern of developing a complex theoretical 
picture before justifying its limitation to a few operationalized variables (e.g., Deephouse, 
1996; Elsbach, 1994; Ruef & Scott, 1998). For example, Deephouse and Carter (2005, p. 337) 
state that while legitimacy “is a complex, multidimensional concept linked to a variety of 
stakeholders…from a pragmatic perspective, we limit our research design to certain 
dimensions.” Similarly, quantitative studies of legitimacy strategies within pluralistic settings 
tend to focus on a single type of strategy such as decoupling (Westphal & Zajac, 2001), or 
specific examples of ‘resistance’ in relation to a specific practice such as downsizing 
                                                     
12 The full implications of a pragmatic approach to research is outlined within the philosophical tradition of 
‘pragmatism,’ a paradigm distinct from post-positivism (see Cherryholmes, 1992; Crotty, 1998). 
13 The ability in qualitative interviews of being able ask participants directly regarding their perceptions of 
‘desirability and appropriateness’ and the content of those assessments, namely, their legitimacy demands 
contrasts with this.  
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(Greenwood et al., 2010). Potentially, such a focus on particular dimensions and 
stakeholders as well as general proxies of legitimacy at the field level has resulted in 
legitimacy research that does not fully account for pluralism.  
At least partly in response to these limitations, researchers are increasingly turning to 
qualitative methods to study legitimation. Authors argue that legitimacy research should 
account for its complexity, multidimensionality, and multiple sources (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008; Epstein & Votaw, 1975; Pache & Santos, 2010). Previous studies have 
indeed shown that qualitative case studies can offer holistic treatments of legitimacy that 
highlight pluralism and provide in-depth pictures of strategic processes at the organizational, 
rather than field, level (e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Brown, 1995; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; 
Glynn, 2002; Vaara & Monin, 2010). Reflecting on their own quantitative investigation into 
‘resistance’ as a institutional response strategy, Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) suggest that 
qualitative studies that investigate actor’s accounts of various legitimacy strategies would 
be beneficial. In sum, the ability of qualitative research to incorporate complexity (e.g., 
multiple perspectives) and holism (e.g., situating legitimacy within pluralism) is important, 
given the research agenda I have set myself (Becker, 1992; Creswell, 2007; Mabry, 2008; 
Orum, Feagin, & Sjoberg, 1991; Stake, 1995).  
In reflecting on qualitative studies exploring legitimation amidst pluralism two things are 
apparent. First, the majority of these studies are single case studies (e.g., Glynn, 2002). 
Some exceptions combine two cases within a single sector (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Other studies (e.g., Alexander, 1996; Reay & Hinings, 2009) explore 
a range of organizations within a sector but do not take a case-based approach to reach 
understanding of strategies in individual organizations (an exception is Purdy & Gray, 2009). 
That multi-case comparative research designs remain rare is argued with regards to the 
institutional entrepreneurship literature more broadly. For example, Battilana et al. (2009) 
argue that a sole focus of successful institutional entrepreneurs is linked to a focus in the 
literature premised on this focus on singular “successful” cases. Second, a characteristic of 
these studies is that they have either focused specifically on intra- (Jarzabkowski, et al., 
2009a) or inter- (Reay & Hinings, 2009) organizational dynamics and sources of legitimacy, 
rather than combining both. In particular, the employee level appears to be infrequently 
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represented in previous studies at the intersection of pluralism and legitimacy. This suggests 
that the following may be a research design of particular value:   
 Exploring the research problem through multiple case studies within a single 
sector with varying layers of replication (discussed further below); while  
 Maintaining appreciation for the complexity and detail of each case ; and  
 Incorporating both inter and intra organizational stakeholders as sources of 
legitimacy within that understanding.  
Such a design will now be outlined.  
3.2.2 Multiple Case Studies 
Context counts and, where possible, should be given theoretical consideration. (Bamberger, 
2008, p. 839) 
Case studies are widely recognized as a distinct qualitative research strategy – differentiated, 
for example, from grounded theory, ethnography, and action research approaches (Creswell, 
2007; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). Yin (2009, p. 13) defines a case 
study as an inquiry that: “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context; especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident.” This ability to incorporate context is widely accepted as a key justification 
for a case study research design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Hartley, 
2004; Mabry, 2008; Orum et al., 1991) and, indeed, qualitative methods more broadly 
(Creswell, 2007; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Patton, 2002a). A case study strategy enabled me 
to situate a phenomenon (i.e., legitimacy management) within a specific context (i.e., 
pluralism), something my research questions demanded. Also aligned with these questions, 
case studies are suited to answering how and why questions (Easton, 2000; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007; Hussey & Hussey, 1997; Yin, 2009). Such questions focused this research on 
probing deeper into the research problem.  
A central rationale for this study is that the pluralistic case can refine, add understanding to 
and extend existing legitimacy frameworks. Importantly, case studies lend themselves to 
surfacing new theoretical interpretations and have the ability to elaborate on or revise 
existing theory. Processes previously ignored in the literature can be illustrated in a way that 
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redraws generalizations to refine or modify existing theory (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Hussey 
& Hussey, 1997; Ragin, 1992; Stake, 2005; Yin, 2009). This corresponds with the case study’s 
strength in making theoretical generalizations as opposed to population generalizations (Yin, 
2009).  
A positivist argument levelled at case study research is its lack of statistical generalizability, 
i.e., external validity (O'Leary, 2004; Yin, 2009). Studying two particular organizations does 
not provide me with a foundation to generalize the resulting findings to all similar 
population cases. Findings are, however, generalizable to theoretical propositions. For 
example, here they are ‘transferable’ to Kraatz and Block’s (2008) framework. This is a 
process Yin (2009) labels analytical generalization (also see Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Gobo, 2008; Huberman & Miles, 2001; Stake, 1995). In moving beyond empiricism, post-
positivism provides a foundation for valuing this form of generalizability (Crotty, 1998; Guba 
& Lincoln, 1994; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). Ackroyd (2004, p. 175) contrasts a subtle realist 
philosophy with positivism in this regard: “because research is theoretically based, realists 
reject the notion that case studies cannot be the basis for generalization” (Bergene, 2007; 
Harrison & Easton, 2004). Such an interpretation of generalizability is aligned with the 
strength of case studies utility in generating or, as in this thesis, extending theoretical 
understanding.  
Case studies can follow a single or multi-case design (Stake, 2005; Yin, 2009). My research 
goals contrasted with an ‘intensive’ case design where a key interest is the case itself. I had 
predefined goals of theoretical elaboration based on a theoretical framework. Such goals 
pointed to the desirability of a multiple case study design (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; 
Piekkari, Welch, & Paavilainen, 2008; Yin, 2009). Further, from a post-positivist perspective 
of “epistemological gain” it is argued that multiple case studies enable greater 
corroboration of findings through enabling comparison and identification of idiosyncrasies 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). From such a perspective, 
comparison allows researchers to distinguish between constitutive and more accidental 
aspects of the empirical data and results in more robust findings (Danermark, et al., 2002; 
Phillips & Burbules, 2000; Tsang & Kai-Man, 1999; Yin, 2009). More simply, investigating 
multiple cases increased the likelihood that different aspects of the framework (Kraatz & 
Block, 2008) might be highlighted. As Eisenhardt (1991, p.620) suggests: “different cases 
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often emphasize complementary aspects of a phenomenon. By piecing together the 
individual patterns, the research can draw a more complete theoretical picture”  
3.2.3 Case Selection 
Understanding the organization (my unit of analysis) at the time of data collection became 
the case boundary. This case “bounding” offered parameters for participant selection, 
collection and treatment of secondary data, and framing of the interview questions. For 
example it excluded a primary interest in historical interviewees (such as past CEOs, for 
example) and sector-level individuals who had no direct connection to the cases at hand. 
However, as Miles and Huberman (1994) point out “the boundary is never quite as solid as a 
rationalist might hope” (p. 27). Most importantly strategic changes over time arose as 
important to understanding “current” strategic dynamics. Finally, this focus on organizations 
as the level of analysis draws from the foundations of my theoretical framework. Kraatz & 
Block (2008, p. 246) argue that their framework is “an avowedly organization-centric 
perspective” as distinct from much institutional theory.  
Analytical generalizability can be increased by the strategic, or (theoretically) purposive, 
selection of cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Patton, 2002a). This selection process 
is outlined as replication logic. Multiple cases are treated as discrete experiments that serve 
to replicate, contrast and extend the emerging theoretical explanation (Yin, 2009). Based on 
this logic two broad practical guidelines for case selection are provided.  
First, a degree of similarity in the chosen cases is advocated so as to decrease the number of 
extraneous variables at play. Practically, this helped provide parameters to the complexity 
of the eventual dataset and analytical process. Choosing cases from within a single industry 
is suggested for this reason (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). This 
informed the decision to select NZ’s science sector as the empirical boundary rather than 
including cases from diverse sectors.  
Second, including a variety of cases operating under different conditions helps ensure the 
resulting theoretical generalizations are more robust through exploring the phenomena in a 
number of different settings (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). This guided my 
decision to choose different organizational forms within NZ’s science sector: high-tech start-
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ups (HTSUs), Crown Research Institutes (CRIs), and Centres of Research Excellence (CoREs) 
(Figure 3.2).  
Figure 3.2 Research Design: Replicated and embedded 
HTSU 1
CoRE 1 CoRE 2
CRI 2 CRI 1 
1. Internal - Management
2. Internal – Non-Management
3. External 
HTSU 2 embedded design 
(i.e., multiple levels of analysis)
Literal replication 
Theoretical 
replications 
 
Yin’s (2009) concepts of literal and theoretical replication were utilized to assist my case 
selection. Cases can be selected depending on whether they produce similar results (literal 
replication) or different results for predictable reasons (theoretical replication). Literal 
replication is achieved through duplicating the conditions of the original “experiment.” This 
guided my decision to study two rather than one of each type of organization of a broadly 
similar type. Incorporating two similar organizations (rather than four, for instance) was 
considered to be pragmatic given my desire to also incorporate an additional layer of 
theoretical replication.  
The basis for assuming a degree of literal replication between similar organizations is 
highlighted in Table 3.2. The central differences between the similar organizations are also 
highlighted so that the practical limitations of literal replication (no two organizations are 
exactly alike) are appreciated.  
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Table 3.2 Case descriptions: Broad basis for replication14 
 CoRE 1 & 2 CRI 1 & 2 HTSUs 1 & 2 
Type of organizations Non-profit collaborative 
research networks 
Government owned 
companies 
Companies 
Age 2002 1992 Similar: < 10 yrs; > 5 yrs 
Revenue Similar: approx. 20-40 
million (over six years); 
CoRE 1 larger 
 
Similar: > $50  million 
(annual) 
 
Similar: approx. $1 
million (annual) 
Total Staff Similar: < 50 PIs; CoRE 1 
slightly larger 
Similar: > 300 Similar: <12 
Funding Sources  
TEC administered CoRE 
Fund; same funding 
criteria 
Similar: core government 
(MoRST); research grants 
(FRST); clients. 
Difference: CRI 2 has a 
few larger key clients 
Similar: private investors; 
government  grants; 
University (HTSU 1 only); 
Shareholder CEO (HTSU 2 
only) 
Relevant policy / 
regulatory bodies 
Same; e.g., CoREs 
selection framework. 
Same (e.g., CRI Act; 
Shareholder’ 
expectations) 
 
n/a 
Type & domain of 
science 
Same: basic research; 
different science 
domains 
Generally applied (but 
also includes more basic 
science); different 
sectors/industries 
Similar domains; similarly 
moved from basic to 
commercialized 
science/technology 
Geographical 
spread/focus 
Similar number of 
partner organizations 
including CRIs. Both with 
international (academic) 
linkages 
Similar number of sites 
and degree of 
geographical spread. 
Both with international 
linkages 
 
Similarly export focused. 
Both with research teams 
outside of the corporate 
centre 
Role of scientists Scientists as leaders 
(Directors) and members 
(Investigators) 
 
Employees. 
Scientist founders 
original (HTSU 2) or 
current (HTSU 1) 
shareholders 
Based on the logic of theoretical replication (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009) it 
could be argued that a compelling design feature would be contrasting pluralistic cases with 
non-pluralistic cases. The rationale for not doing so was twofold. I was reluctant to divert 
my attention and limited resources away from a primary focus on the pluralistic context. 
Further, the legitimacy literature provided a foundation of non-pluralistic cases and general 
frameworks with which I could contrast my pluralistic cases (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995). Accordingly, while I decided to vary the types of 
organizations I included in my study, I only selected organizations likely to experience 
pluralism. Put simply, the question guiding case selection was: “does this organization 
appear to be characterized by interesting dynamics indicative of pluralism?”  
                                                     
14 Exact figures cannot be provided due to human ethics commitments regarding confidentiality. See Table 3.3 
for glossary of abbreviations.  
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Multiple divergent and salient stakeholder demands are said to have a relatively large effect 
on non-profit, governmental, and start-up organizations (Bryson, 1988; Jarzabkowski & 
Fenton, 2006; Stone & Brush, 1996). Therefore, I chose for-profits (high-tech start-up 
(HTSU)); government-owned companies (Crown Research Institutes (CRIs)); and public not-
for-profit collaborative networks (Centres of Research Excellence (CoREs)). For example, 
start-up firms must satisfy a variety of stakeholders who have conflicting objectives: the 
goals of the founder, employees (including scientists in the case of high-tech organizations), 
suppliers, and venture capitalists or bankers may all be widely divergent and shift over time 
(Stone & Brush, 1996). With regards to public sector and not-for-profit organizations it is 
pointed out that pluralistic tensions arise from competing demands such as a commercial 
orientation (increasingly demanded of such organizations) being managed at the same time 
as providing quality public service (Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006). While presumptions 
regarding the intricacies of each case prior to entering the field were not possible, it was 
envisaged that these two layers of replication offered an explanatory foundation for 
exploring and understanding a number of potential findings. For example, whether different 
or similar strategies were perceived in relation to dissimilar or similar organizations can both 
be explored from this platform.  
In addition to this discussion, Figure 3.3 demonstrates how case selection was also informed 
by the landscape of the NZ science system itself. A glossary related to this sector regarding 
the points relevant to this study is also provided (Table 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3 NZ RS&T system (at the time of data collection) (adapted from FRST, 2008).15 
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15 There were four choices at the organisational level within the sector. Not including the fourth, research associations, was pragmatic. It involved determining the limits 
and manageability of the PhD project. Further, research associations were assessed as dealing with distinct issues to the ones encountered by the organizations included 
here. For example, with a few exceptions they did not necessarily deal with the political interface in the way the organizations included here (including, HTSTUs through 
government grants) did. Determining a degree of literal replication would also have been less possible between research associations. There is a huge variety regarding 
structure, funding and purpose. Consequently, while research associations are likely to face pluralism and interesting issues that future research could explore, for these 
reasons they are not included here.  
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Table 3.3 Glossary: NZ Science Sector 
 
Terms/Acronyms Explanation 
  
 
HTSUs 
 
High tech start ups: Private (i.e. prior to IPO or acquisition) SMEs (small medium 
enterprises) with limited operating history engaged in research activity. 
 
CoREs 
 
Centres for Research Excellence: Seven CoREs were established in 2002, one in 
established in 2006 (the CoRE re-funding round). One of the CoRE’s funding 
ceased in 2006 during the re-funding round.  
 
Other terms related to CoREs 
Directors Scientist managers/leaders of CoREs. 
PIs Principal Investigators: Scientists who are receive funding as part of the CoRE.  
 
AIs Associate Investigators: Scientists associated with the CoRE. May not receive 
funding, but receive other benefits such as access to equipment. 
 
Outreach 
 
A descriptor of activities that CoREs engage in around disseminating knowledge 
into the community. An example is “outreach” being used as a descriptor for 
engagement with secondary schools or Maori (indigenous people of NZ). 
 
PBRF Performance Based Research Fund:  Government funding received by tertiary 
education organizations based on an assessment of research performance. 
Academics are individually ranked as part of this.  
 
 
CRIs 
 
Crown Research Institutes: There are currently eight crown research institutes. 
Ten were established in 1992 under the CRI 2 Act. One was disbanded (1993) and 
two were joined through a merger (2008).   
 
Other terms related to CRIs 
CRI Shareholders Minister of Research, Science and Technology [MoRST] and Minister of Finance 
are the shareholders of CRIs.  
 
CRI Taskforce A Taskforce set up to review the CRI model; established October 2009; Report 
released March 2010.  
 
 
MoRST 
Ministry of Research, Science and Technology: Ministry responsible for policy for 
NZ’s science sector at the time of this study *since changed into Ministry of 
Science and Innovation, est. Feb 2011]. 
 
 
FRST / “the 
Foundation” 
Foundation for Research, Science and Technology: Government funding agency in 
sector at this time of this study. Funds research in Universities (CoREs); CRIs and 
private sector companies [since subsumed within Ministry of Science and 
Innovation, est. Feb 2011]. 
 
TEC Tertiary Education Commission: Entity focused on tertiary sector within broader 
Ministry of Education. Funds and monitors CoREs. 
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3.3 NZ’s Science Sector: HTSUs, CRIs, and CoREs 
Pressures for relevance of scientific research, and in general, new linkages with, and 
interferences by the ‘outside’ world have opened up the earlier protected space for science (Rip 
2004, p.32).  
The term NZ’s science sector refers to organizations within the policy umbrella of ‘Research, 
Science and Technology’ (RS&T). The definition includes any organization conducting basic 
or applied research in the physical and biological sciences whether private, non-profit, or 
public (MoRST & Statistics NZ, 2006). Central reasons for selecting this sector are: the 
relevance debate, dispersion of stakeholder power, and legitimacy issues related to funding 
and uncertainty. While these points do not preclude the selection of an alternative industry, 
they do present a theoretically informed rationale concerning why NZ’s science sector was 
selected. These issues sit within a science system that has been transformed as part of 
wider neo-economic driven changes within NZ’s public sector (Carter, 2005; Leitch & 
Davenport, 2005; Simpson & Craig, 1997). This transformation can be summarized as 
increased levels of monitoring of science organizations (i.e., diffused power) as well as the 
explicit introduction of additional objectives and legitimacy demands (Mallon et al., 2005). 
The sources of legitimacy demands within this domain can, therefore, be defined as 
increasingly multifaceted and powerful.  
Research utilizing an institutional perspective has explored the intersection and associated 
conflict between ‘academic’ (i.e., science) and ‘commercial’ norms and logics (Vallas & 
Kleinman, 2008). However, the dominant approach from an institutional perspective has 
focused on highlighting the institutionalization and legitimation of ‘academic 
entrepreneurship’ over time, rather than exploring the conflict inherent within these 
different logics (Colyvas & Powell, 2006, 2007; Sampat & Nelson, 2002). However, other 
research, not utilizing an institutional or legitimacy lens, has focused on the inherent 
tensions between the intersection between the domains for individual scientists (Mallon, 
Duberly, & Cohen, 2005; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001) and public science organizations 
(Davenport & Bibby, 2007; Powell, Owen-Smith, & Colyvas, 2007) inherent in the coming 
together of these formally distinct spheres.  
Another issue is that the strategies NZ science organizations have used to respond to their 
changed context have been understudied. A study providing brief sketches showing the 
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different responses of four CRIs to the government reforms is a rare exception (Simpson, 
2004). The selection of this context this research project helps address this research gap.  
3.3.1 The Relevance Debate: Divergent Objectives 
Scientists must now show that we, the people, will see a return for our invested dollars. And 
that return better come pretty quickly before we lose interest! (Britten & Scott, 2009) 
A rationale for choosing the NZ science sector was the tension highlighted by both the 
academic research and media commentary between the demands for “scientific 
discovery/excellence”, “public good”, and “commerciality” (Figure 3.4). Worldwide, authors 
have depicted a changing research, science and technology sector whereby additional 
requirements (such as societal and economic robustness) have joined the traditional one of 
scientific excellence (Cohen, Duberley, & McAuley, 1999; Mars & Lounsbury, 2009; Raine & 
Beukman, 2002; Rip, 2004; Ziman, 1994). Colyvas and Powell (2006) outline that this 
transformation is a promising domain for research as it affected multiple levels of the sector 
(i.e., individuals, departments, and organizations) and multiple organizational forms (i.e., 
university, industry, and government sectors). For example, the literature, generally from a 
US university context, variably points to new institutionalized academic identities and 
practices (Colyvas & Powell, 2006, 2007), but also provides warnings regarding what this 
means for universities with commercial objectives in tension with academic objectives 
(Owen-Smith & Powell, 2003; Powell et al., 2007), and highlights the individual level 
tensions for university scientists (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001).  
 
 75 
 
Figure 3.4 Underlying multiple objectives in NZ RS&T sector 
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In NZ the creation in 1989 of the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST) 
signalled the beginning of the “deliberate marketization of science and innovation” (Leitch & 
Davenport, 2005, p. 896). Most government scientists were previously employed as public 
servants in a number of core government departments. However, a commercialized model 
was formalized with the Crown Research Institute Act (1992) which channelled government-
funded science into ten (although this quickly become nine) Crown Research Institutes 
(CRIs), each aligned to different economic sectors. This juxtaposed the traditional concern 
on “research for the good of the nation” (defined usually in economic, but also social, terms) 
with a new requirement of “financial viability.” CRIs were required to operate as commercial 
entities under the Companies Act (Davenport & Bibby, 2007; Edmeades, 2004, p.87).  
From a focus on science itself and robust processes, following NZ’s reforms in the 1980s 
“excellence” has increasingly been coupled with “relevance” (to users) based objectives and 
demands (Davenport, Leitch, & Rip, 2003, p. 244; Leitch & Davenport, 2005). This 
development can also be observed in NZ universities. An example is the introduction of 
Centres of Research Excellence (CoREs). The CoRE Fund was established in 2001 with the 
aim of producing strategically focused (i.e., relevant) as well as excellent tertiary-education 
based research (New Zealand Government, 2002; Taula, 2006; TEC, 2006, 2009). In sum, 
NZ’s science system has shifted from being based solely on scientific merit to being based 
on more complex priorities.  
These multiple demands have been experienced as tensions within the sector (Davenport, 
et al., 2003; Edmeades, 2004; Sommer, 2010). Authors highlight an “underlying struggle” as 
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user relevance and science “vied for control” (Davenport et al., 2003, p. 247); “deep-seated 
philosophical conflicts” (Edmeades, 2004, p. 91); and that “the most critical issue that has 
faced the CRIs in recent years is the tension between their public good role and their 
commercial focus” (Davenport & Bibby, 2007, p. 189). For example, it is argued that too 
much is expected from CRIs in juggling the tensions of the multiple objectives placed on 
them (Crown Research Institute Taskforce, 2010; Devine, 2003; Jordan & Atkinson, 2003). 
More specific illustrations of such divergence are that science cannot be measured in the 
same way as other commercial or output focused activities, the short-term performance 
focus of the market model undermines the long-term focus of science excellence, and the 
tension between publishing and commercialization (Bridger, 2009; Easton, 1997; Edmeades, 
2004; Revington, 2008; Simpson, 2004). As one report summarizes:  “people cannot buy 
what they cannot imagine” (Arnold, 2005, p. 6).  
While this tension between ‘relevance’ and ‘scientific discovery/excellence’ clearly affects 
CoREs and CRIs, this terrain must also frequently be navigated by start-ups. Such companies 
are frequently spun-out of universities or CRIs and rely on the scientific founders and their 
knowledge platforms due to their high-tech nature. These companies are frequently 
required to meet the needs of stakeholders with foci as potentially diverse as return on 
investment (e.g., private investors) and research funding and technological excellence (e.g., 
scientist founders). In this way they are said to be defined by interdependent stakeholders 
with conflicting interests (Djokovic & Souitaris, 2008; Duberley, 2007). For example, 
academic or technological driven objectives are frequently associated with such companies 
(Meyer, 2003). This multi-stakeholder nature of start-ups will be discussed further below. 
3.3.2 Dispersion of Stakeholder Power  
The ‘locus of innovation’ is said to reside in a network of inter-organizational relationships 
(Powell et al., 1996) and research is becoming increasingly distributed (Pisano & Verganti, 
2008; Powell et al., 1996; Rip, 2004). The fast pace, high cost, and complex nature of 
technology development has led to the establishment of consortia, alliances, and other 
cooperative efforts (Davenport, Grimes, & Davies, 1999). Indeed, studies suggest that the 
level of technological intensity is positively correlated with collaborative activity (Hagedoorn, 
2002; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Powell et al., 1996). Another example is the development of 
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“post-modern universities” characterized by “overlaps and alliances with Centres (of 
excellence and relevance)…and various private organizations managing and performing 
research” (Rip, 2004, p. 159). Within such inter-organizational collaborative systems 
“multiple constituencies with conflicting demands exist (almost by definition), and no single 
organization directly controls all of the needed resources” (Stone & Brush, 1996, p. 648). 
This diffuses power while increasing the likelihood that divergent objectives and loyalties 
exist within an organization.  
The number of relevant stakeholders with the ability to make demands on science and 
research has increased since NZ’s science reforms. Public funding of science is not only 
output focused but also more closely monitored by stakeholders external to the science 
providers themselves (Duberley, 2007; Ziman, 1994). As Davenport et al. (2003, p. 239) 
summarize, while much of the sector  “used to be entirely in the hands of “science”, the 
involvement of other stakeholders…has become important.” Such diffusion of power away 
from the providers of science is recognized and often argued against by scientists. For 
example, it is illustrated in a recent survey of NZ university and CRI scientists with “a 
common complaint of scientists” being “outside interference in their quest to satisfy their 
intrigue with the search for truth and knowledge, their principal reason for becoming a 
scientist” (Sommer, 2010, p. 30).   
Crown Research Institutes. Department of Science and Industrial Research, the main 
predecessor to CRIs, was previously both the primary provider of policy advice as well as 
being the sole controller of funding to its researchers (Davenport & Bibby, 2007; Winsley & 
Hammond, 1997). In this context, scientists had “the autonomy to determine both the 
means and ends” of their research (Simpson, 2004, p. 254). By contrast, currently “there are 
multiple lines of accountability that dilute the CRIs’ sense of purpose and direction” (CRI 
Taskforce, 2010, p. 7). Similarly, the diffused power context of CRIs is indicated by 
government’s power to determine the CRIs’ direction, survival, and the level of return they 
are required to make (CCMAU & The Treasury, 2007). The history of the CRIs is one of 
diffused power as the relevance of private companies and overseas revenue grew 
(Davenport & Bibby, 2007; Davenport & Leitch, 2005; Parker, 2002). A competitive funding 
system (Devine & Webb, 2004) and the resulting variation in FRST funding for individual CRIs 
has caused issues with some CRIs losing significant income and consequently having to 
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diversify their revenue sources (Davenport & Bibby, 2007). This has increased the 
importance of ‘clients’ while the high dependence on government (policy and funding) 
remains.  
Centres of Research Excellence. The establishment of CoREs is a specific example of the 
increasing drive towards collaboration, and accompanying power diffusion, within NZ’s 
science sector. COREs are inter-institutional networks which, while hosted by a particular 
university, comprise a number of partner organizations (universities and CRIs) (Taula, 2006; 
Tertiary Education Commission (TEC), 2009). As with CRIs, they are dependent on 
assessments by external stakeholders for their funding and existence; their re-funding is not 
assured unless they meet the objectives set for them by external stakeholders (New Zealand 
Government, 2006b; TEC, 2009) .  
High-tech start-ups. Compared to larger firms, start-ups are resource constrained and lack 
relative power within their stakeholder relations (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Stone & Brush, 1996). 
HTSUs, particularly, rely on scientific capability but usually do not have the resources to 
develop their own research. In comparison with other start-ups, high-tech start-ups face 
additional pressures due to the need to collaborate to fund high-cost R&D and acquire 
knowledge (Knockaert, Lockett, Ucbasaran & Clarysse, 2006; Pisano & Verganti, 2008). That 
is, they counter their resource constraints somewhat through collaboration (Davenport et 
al., 1999). For example, research suggests that an entrepreneurial firm’s rate of patenting 
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), product innovation (George, Zahra, & Wood, 2002), and 
foreign sales (Leiblein & Reuer, 2004) are enhanced by strategic alliances. As Knockaert et al. 
(2006) summarize: HTSUs are typically resource-poor and rely on important external 
stakeholders to provide risk capital and technology (e.g., universities or other research 
institutes). HTSUs have, therefore, become increasingly exposed to a multi-stakeholder 
context.  
Knowledge workers. Applicable to all science organizations is their dependence on 
knowledge workers. Parker (2002, p. 42) describes how when the first Chairman of the CRI 
Industrial Research Limited (IRL) addressed the CRI’s staff (a workforce that included 150 
PhDs) he noted that “it was the first company he’d been involved in where ‘all the 
intellectual property goes home at night.’” In such organizations power is more diffused 
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internally amongst the scientists who hold the intellectual property. In NZ, for example, 
there is concern regarding the ability of such workers to leave NZ and take their skills 
elsewhere if their demands are not met (Britten & Scott, 2009). Three characteristics of 
high-tech workers are highlighted in the literature: high level of education, a strong 
preference for independence, and a professional orientation rather than an organizational 
focus (Roger, 2001). The ‘science excellence’ objective outlined above is likely tied in with 
the professional identity of important internal stakeholders within science organizations.  
3.3.3 Legitimacy: Funding and Uncertainty.  
Linked to the diffused power dimension, any organization that depends heavily on its 
relationships with stakeholders (whether government agencies, venture capitalists, alliance 
partners) is likely to emphasize legitimation strategies (Boyd, 2000). Resource dependence 
theory stipulates that autonomy has an important link to legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975). Legitimacy is more important for organizations that depend heavily on social, 
resource, and political support (Brown, 1994; Parsons, 1960; Terreberry, 1968). This has 
been shown to be the case with CRIs, CoREs, and HTSUs in the discussion above.  
NZ’s funding culture vis-à-vis research, science and technology has become highly 
contractual and contestable. Monitoring and evaluations of legitimacy vis-à-vis specific 
organizations has increased within this low-trust system (Arnold, 2005; Davenport & Bibby, 
2007; Royal Society of New Zealand, 2008). In 2000 FRST introduced a narrative of 
‘disinvestment’ where NZ$26 million per annum of investment into the forestry sector 
(affecting for example the CRI Scion focused on this industry) was potentially in jeopardy 
(Davenport et al., 2003). Further, in the 2006 selection or refunding round, six of the existing 
CoREs were awarded further funding (two conditionally) while one existing CoRE was 
‘disinvested’ in by the government (TEC, 2009). This illustrates that for both CRIs and CoREs 
positive evaluation is linked to their ability to attract and retain government funding, 
suggesting that legitimacy management is an important issue for these organizations. More 
broadly, the support and funding of science in NZ is not something that can be taken for 
granted (Britten & Scott, 2009). This is demonstrated by those explicitly seeking to 
legitimate science as a “proper investment” rather than the historical perspective of it “as a 
cost to society” (Callaghan, 2009; Gorman, 2010; Royal Society of New Zealand, 2008; 
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Williams, 2004). Indeed, Stone and Brush (1996) argue that not-for-profits and start-ups 
share a common lack of control over resource flows and, therefore, must meet external 
standards of legitimacy to attain them.  
Aldrich and Fiol ask regarding start-ups: “with no external evidence, why should potential 
parties “trust” an entrepreneur’s claims…given that an entrepreneur may be no more than 
an ill-fated fool?” (1994, p. 650). In this way, start-ups are faced with a ‘liability of newness’ 
associated with a legitimacy deficit (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Singh et al., 1986). Research 
shows that start-ups face legitimacy problems due to their newness and small size and 
corresponding relative lack of power over multiple stakeholder claims, and control over 
resource flows (Deephouse, 1996; Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Singh et al., 
1986; Stinchcombe, 1965; Stone & Brush, 1996). New technology ventures in emerging 
industries are particularly difficult to evaluate: it is up to entrepreneurs to convince and 
continue to reassure stakeholders of their legitimacy (Deeds et al., 2004). In sum, for start-
ups, achieving legitimacy is relatively more difficult whilst also being vital due to their 
resource-constrained nature (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003; Parsons, 1960; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002). 
3.4 Data Collection 
3.4.1. Knowledge from Interview Data 
With my primary data being interview-based, I will briefly explicate my post-positivist view 
regarding it. King (2004a, p. 11) outlines the goal of interviews as to “see the research topic 
from the perspective of the interviewee.” This aligned with my research questions. However, 
the basis of the critique of interview data has changed from traditional practical concerns 
regarding bias, inaccuracies, and impression management to basic scepticism about the 
capacity of interviews to provide representations “either of the self (i.e., perceptions) or of 
the world” (Hammersley, 2003, p. 119). Such radical critique suggests that no knowledge 
about reality “out there” can be obtained through interview (e.g., Atkinson & Coffey, 2002; 
Dingwall, 1997; Potter, 2006; Silverman, 2006). The methodological options become 
avoiding interviews altogether or only analyzing them for what they can tell us about them 
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as sites for discursive meaning-making (Hammersley, 2003; Hammersley & Gomm, 2008; 
Miller & Glassner, 2004).  
The above critique undermines the ability of interviewers to study acts, meanings and 
experience in an organizational context. However, it is argued that such an approach may be 
over-zealous in sacrificing relevance for rigour (Holstein & Gubrium, 2004). Post-positivism 
instead suggests that claims can be made (albeit tentative ones) about the “tendency of 
things” outside the interview itself (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 24; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). I 
reiterate the ‘anti-dualist’ point made by Miller and Glassner (2004): the positivist view of 
the interview as an objective tool is not accepted, nor is the romantic view of seamless 
authenticity. I do not, however, discount the possibility of learning about the social world or, 
more accurately here, participants’ perceptions of it outside the interview. As authors 
(Hammersley, 2003; Miller & Glassner, 2004) suggest, that interview accounts are 
constructions does not mean that they cannot be accurate representations. To argue that 
an interview carries no reliable implications about events, attitudes, and perceptions 
outside the interview grants too much power to the interview context to shape those 
perceptions. Nonetheless, a level of caution in the use of interview material remains. To 
ignore warnings about the fraught nature of the link between interview data and reality 
would be complacent (Hammersley, 2003). The interviews, thus, are viewed as providing 
access to participants’ perceptions of legitimacy strategies rather than being presented as 
uncomplicated access to “reality” (Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). 
The main response suggested by post-positivism to building more (rather than less) 
warrantable representations of those perceptions is triangulation (Hammersley & Gomm, 
2008).  
3.4.2. Triangulation 
One way of increasing the plausibility of accounts is through triangulation: “the act of 
bringing more than one source of data to bear on a single point” (Marshall & Rossman, 2006, 
p. 202). Denzin (1989) identified four forms of triangulation: across data sources (i.e., 
participants), methods (i.e., interview, observation, documents), theories, and among 
different investigators. Denzin’s conception is widely accepted (Creswell & Miller, 2000; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002a) and is advocated by 
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authors from multiple perspectives as an important aspect of case study research 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Gerring, 2007; Mabry, 2008; Stake, 2005; Yin, 2009). Both 
data (multiple different participants) and method (for example both interviews and 
secondary data) triangulation are incorporated here.  
Judgments regarding the plausibility of accounts inevitably involves a tentative subscription 
to the view that language is referential to a reality outside the text (Seale, 1999), an 
approach aligned with post-positivism (Hammersley, 2001; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). 
Nonetheless, traditional conceptions of triangulation have been critiqued as assuming the 
existence of a single correct conception of a phenomenon (Flick, 1992; Silverman, 2006). 
This is partly circumvented here through the definition of triangulation being used. From the 
case study literature Stake (1995, p. 173) provides a useful definition of triangulation as 
“working to substantiate an interpretation or to clarify its different meanings.” This has 
similarities with Cohen, Manion and Morrision’s (2000, p. 112) definition of triangulation as 
an attempt to explore “the richness and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from 
more than one standpoint.” Based on these definitions, triangulation will be used in the 
more ‘traditional’ sense (e.g., Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) to gain a sense of the central 
things stakeholder’s perceptions relate to (for example, a restructuring of an organization). 
This is what Stake (1995, p. 115) calls “confirmation of a single meaning.” However, it is also 
used to increase understanding through the “search for additional interpretations” (Dubois 
& Gadde, 2002; Stake, 1995, p. 115) in terms of surfacing stakeholder legitimacy demands 
and pluralism. For example, the multi-stakeholder approach (participant triangulation) to 
participant selection was central to this. Denzin (1989) explicitly states that his categories of 
triangulation are compatible with both uses.  
3.4.3. Accessing the Organizations 
The first step in data collection was selecting and gaining access to the case organizations. 
Secondary data assisted in case selection. Case-specific reading enabled initial assessments 
regarding the existence of pluralism and potentially interesting strategic dynamics 
observable within specific organization. Informal conversations with those knowledgeable in 
the sector were also important in gaining a sense of potential case organizations.  
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There were eight CoREs to select from, six of which were science-based. All six of these 
organizations were assessed as potential options due to all appearing to experience 
pluralism (as discussed above). Pragmatic issues around ease of access then guided the 
order in which CoREs were approached. There were also eight potential CRIs to choose from, 
which similarly were assessed based on apparent pluralism and legitimacy strategies evident 
within the secondary data such as their annual reports. This list was reduced, through 
conversation with my supervisors, with regards to their openness to the research. In 
relation to the two CRIs eventually selected, potentially interesting strategies being used to 
manage divergent demands were evident both in the secondary data and apparent in 
discussions with those knowledgeable of the sector. One of the CRIs was also identified as 
dealing with some particularly interesting tensions between stakeholders. There were 
naturally a greater number of HTSUs to choose from. A list was assembled of start-ups that 
appeared to be dealing with pluralism, based on the secondary data and prior knowledge of 
individual cases. Prerequisites were that the HTSUs incorporated private investment, some 
university involvement (either as spin-outs or on-going collaboration), the involvement of 
scientist founders and technological intensity of the product offering. Two cases that fitted 
the pluralism criteria, my prior knowledge of one case, combined with views on their 
potential openness to being involved determined eventual selection. In sum, the selections 
were based on confirmation of pluralism (via secondary data); potentially interesting 
legitimacy dynamics being evident; and pragmatic issues regarding access (ease, openness, 
actual consent being granted).  
From there, this study is typical of much business research in first seeking permission at the 
organizational level prior to interview-based data collection (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). I 
contacted the CEO or equivalent (i.e., CoRE Directors) via email requesting their 
participation. A formal letter of introduction was also mailed to them. This was followed by 
a positive response in all six cases. To manage the data collection process the organizations 
were contacted sequentially, although this did overlap. After gaining organizational access, I 
then contacted individual interview participants. 
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3.4.4. Interviewing and Interview Participants  
An aspect of my design was its “embedded” (Yin, 2009) nature. It involved multiple levels of 
analysis that included managers, employees, and external stakeholders (See: Figure 3.2; 
Table 3.6). This multi-stakeholder approach enabled the inclusion of diverse vantage points 
and hence a greater capacity to incorporate pluralism. This can be described as ‘purposive’ 
(or ‘theoretical’) sampling, with participants selected based on theoretical goals (O'Leary, 
2004; Patton, 2002a). I entered each organization with an idea of who I wanted to interview 
based on prior understanding of each organization. This was determined by where the 
divergence and salient legitimacy demands were located. For example, there was no tension 
reported in the relationship between HTSUs and customers. In some cases, pragmatic 
restrictions also determined access. For example, in HTSU 1 employees were not 
interviewed at the request of the CEO. A refined understanding of the organizations through 
the initial interviews then helped determine who I needed to include. The stakeholders 
interviewed and degree of diversity in stakeholders accessed was largely similar across cases, 
with a slight exception with HTSU 1 for reasons regarding access.   
Participants were emailed a copy of the information sheet (Appendix 1) prior to the 
interview. Along with the research agreement, this was the first thing discussed at each 
interview; with an emphasis on the human ethics procedures (Appendices 2 and 3). The 
processes through which I accessed participants varied between cases. With HTSU 2 and 
two CoREs I contacted participants directly and no restrictions were placed on that. With 
HTSU 1, participants were also contacted directly. However, who I could contact was limited 
at the CEO’s request and excluded access to private investors and employees. Due to their 
larger internal structure, accessing individuals within the CRIs was more complex. In the 
case of CRI 1 no limitations were placed on who I could access but internal interviews were 
set up for me and names provided by an executive assistant. The research agreement and 
information sheet was passed on for me and participants were informed that their 
involvement was voluntary. I reiterated this with the individual participants when I then 
engaged with them directly. With CRI 2 the names and contact details of potential 
interviewees were provided and I contacted them directly with a participation request. In 
both CRIs the interview with their external clients was arranged for me by the CRI for 
practical reasons. 
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Table 3.4 Summary of interview and participants16 
 
HTSU 1 
Access : Jun–Sep 2009 
 
 CEO [1] 
 Scientist founders [2–3]  
 Board members 
[commercialization office] [4–
5] 
 University manager / 
shareholder [6] 
 
 
 
Total HTSU 1 interviews: 6 
 
CRI 1  
Access: Sep 2009–Apr 2010 
 
 CEO [14] 
 4 Managers [15–18] 
 Scientist manager [middle 
management] [19] 
 3 Scientists [20–22] 
 Board member [23] 
 Client/CRI spin-off [24] 
 
 
 
Total CRI 1 interviews: 11 
 
CoRE 1 
Access : Sep–Dec 2009 
 
 3 Directors [35–37]  
 Department/school manager 
[38] 
 3 PIs [39–41] 
 AI [42] 
 Board members [43–44] 
 Administrative manager [45] 
 University manager [46] 
 PhD Student [47] 
 
Total CoRE 1 interviews: 12 [one 
CORE 1 interviewee represented 
two position]  
  
HTSU 2 
Access: April - June 2010 
 CEO [7] 
 Manager [8] 
 Scientist founders [9, 10] 
 Investor [11] 
 PhDs scientist trained 
employees [12, 13] 
 
CRI 2 
Access: Feb – May 2010 
 CEO [25] 
 3 Managers [26–28] 
 4 Scientists [29–32]  
 Board member [33] 
 Client [34] 
 
 
CoRE 2  
Access: Dec 2009 – Aug 2010 
 3 Directors [48–50] 
 PIs  [51] 
 AI [52] 
 Board member [53] 
 Administrative manager [54] 
 University manager [55] 
 
Total HTSU 2 interviews: 7 Total CRI 2 interviews: 10  Total CoRE 2 interviews: 8 
 
External Stakeholders [ES] 
Access: Mar–Apr 2010 
 3 public sector senior managers: MoRST; FRST; 
TEC [56,57,58] 
 2 public sector observers of CRIs [59, 60]       
 1 public sector observers of CoREs [61] 
 President of NZ scientific body [62] 
 Venture capitalist [63] 
 
Total external interviews: 8 
  
 
 
 
 
Total interviews: 58 
 
 
 
 
 
Towards the end of data collection, interviews were conducted with individuals in the 
broader NZ science landscape. These are labelled external stakeholders in Table 3.4 above. 
These participants were contacted directly based on accessing the relevant government 
                                                     
16 The total number of interviews (58) does not equal the number of interview subjects represented (63) as 
some interviewees held multiple roles and were interviewed in more than one capacity. This was particularly 
true of the external stakeholders. Three interviewees are represented twice in the above table while one 
interviewee is represented three times. The numbers are individual codes given to each interviewee and will 
be used in the presentation of findings.  
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perspectives (i.e., TEC, FRST, MoRST) and on suggestions regarding relevant individuals 
made by my participants and others knowledgeable of the sector. These interviews were 
also used as a way to manage any perceived gaps regarding the stakeholder perspectives 
already gained. For example, I included the perspective of a venture capitalist who had not 
invested directly in any of the selected cases but nonetheless offered insight into the 
investor perspective of HTSUs more broadly.  
A total of 58 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted. The average time per 
recorded interview was 61 minutes, equating to nearly 60 hours of interview data. This 
reflects my commitment to the stipulated hour timeline unless participants explicitly 
indicated otherwise. Three interviews were conducted via Skype for practical reasons 
regarding geographical location. The majority of the other interviews were conducted in 
private offices or meeting rooms, with nine conducted in semi-private spaces such as cafes. 
There was no obvious difference between these interviews, with two of the most ‘frank’ 
discussions occurring either via Skype or in a semi-communal space. I requested and was 
granted permission to record all interviews. I fully transcribed the interviews as well as 
writing notes during and after each interview. The exception was one of my final interviews 
where a technical fault corrupted the data. More comprehensive notes were written within 
a few hours of that particular interview when it was realized that this fault had occurred. A 
few small snippets of direct quotation were also gained through close listening to the 
corrupted recording. 
‘Semi-structured’ means that an interview guide was used to outline key themes and 
provided guiding questions but still allowed for flexibility and the opportunity to probe and 
improvise (Noaks & Wincup, 2004; O'Leary, 2004; Patton, 2002a; Yin, 2009). The interview 
schedule was focused around three stages based on the conceptual framework (see 
Appendix 4). They sought insight into stakeholder perceptions concerning legitimacy, 
pluralisms’ dimensions, and organizational-level legitimacy strategies. First, perceptions of 
legitimacy among stakeholders, using the terms ‘desirable’ and ‘appropriate’ (Suchman, 
1995), rather than legitimacy directly, was focused on. Second, divergent objectives, and 
associated salient tensions, the organization encountered were explored. In gaining a sense 
of power diffusion, these first two steps also incorporated insight into the key stakeholders 
who were making legitimacy demands and held or prioritized divergent objectives. Finally, 
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building on the pictures created in the first two stages, the strategies use to manage 
stakeholder legitimacy demands in this context were focused on.  
3.4.5 An Additional Note on Human Ethics  
The research was performed under the guidelines of Victoria University of Wellington’s 
Human Ethics Committee (Appendices 2 and 3). Ethical concerns were incorporated 
throughout the practical decisions I made within this project. The most important decision I 
encountered regarded whether to intervene during the access process within one CRI. 
Individual participants were contacted on my behalf by an executive assistant. Given the 
practical benefits of letting their own internal process take place I instead made numerous 
stipulations regarding the ethical aspects of my study. The interviews with scientists within 
this CRI were some of the more relaxed, friendly, and frank that I conducted, which was 
important for me in personally reconciling this decision.  
Regarding confidentiality, an additional layer of caution I felt to be important was keeping 
the identities of the cases confidential as well as those of my participants. Further, in the 
reporting of the quotations, a final level of differentiation was not made at the individual 
participant level. I refer to ‘CRI 1, scientist’, for example, generally rather than the more 
specific ‘CRI 1, Scientist A’. This means that individual ‘voices’ become a little more 
anonymous. The necessity of these steps was important given that the small size of NZ 
increases the difficulty of maintaining confidentiality (Tolich & Davidson, 2003).  
The above decisions meant that when accessing external stakeholders (such as a public 
sector manager) I did not make explicit the organizations that had been selected. We 
discussed specific organization types (i.e., CoREs) rather than explicitly identifying a 
particular organization (for example, CoRE 1) as the focus of the interview. For example, 
CoREs generally were discussed with some specific examples rather than referring to ‘CoRE 
1’ specifically. Maintaining confidentiality also meant that organization-specific secondary 
data could only be used in a way that did not undermine this confidentiality. This prevented 
direct quotations from this data source.  
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3.4.6. Secondary Data 
Secondary data were collected prior, during, and after the interviews. These data were used 
according to the literature which stipulates its strength in building up knowledge of case 
background and historical contexts. Entering each case site as an informed interviewer was 
important. It also relates to triangulation; that is, to corroborate and augment the themes 
emerging from the interview data (Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Yin, 2009). An example of the 
spread sheet summary used to organize specific documents is provided below for two data 
sources related to CRI 1 (Table 3.5). The full summary provided in Table 3.6 is selective, 
indicating only the data that were most relevant rather than the full range of 
documentation engaged with (also see Section 3.3).  
Table 3.5 Example of use of secondary data: CRI 1 
 
Type of 
data/code 
 
Informed case 
selection? 
Existence of 
multiple 
objectives? 
Existence of 
diffused power?  
 
Notes: response strategy 
Example 1  
Type: Annual  
report 
 
Code applied  
To document:  
CRI 1 SD1 CRI 1 S1 Annual Report 1* Prior to interviews (93) Yes Yes: 88inancial88 focus, science, NZ.  Yes: Staff 
Evolution: 88 inancial 88 ing (previous focus 
88inancial)  
 
 
Yes: 
collected prior 
to data 
collection.  
 
September 
2009 (received) 
 
Yes:  
Commercial 
and science.  
 
Yes:  
staff (strong) and 
stakeholder (tacit) 
highlighted. 
 
 
 ‘Expanded objective’ shown 
to be recent rather than 
historical strategy. (e.g., 
focus on science and 
financials but less obvious 
“NZ”/public good focus).  
Example 2 
Type: Media 
article  
 
Code: CRI1 
SD31 
 
No:  
collected   post-
case selection.  
 
March 2010 
(online). 
 
Yes: 
Science, 
commercial, 
public good.  
 
Yes: 
Government/ 
stakeholder; 
customers and 
staff.  
 
Highlights current 
‘expanded objective’ and 
the associated more 
“balanced” approach; 
especially in comparison to 
previous strategy. 
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Table 3.6 Summary of Secondary Data (with codes) 
CoRE 1 
 4 reports [CoRE 1 SD1–4] 
 14 Newsletters [CoRE 1 SD5–18] 
 2 media articles [CoRE 1 SD 19–20] 
 
CoRE 2 
 8 Annual reports: CoRE 2 SD 1–8 
 10 Newsletters: CoRE 2 SD 9–19 
Total documents: 20 Total pages:454 Total documents: 19 Total pages:489 
CRI 1 
 17 Annual reports [CRI 1, SD 1–17] 
 Select CRI 1 press releases [CRI 1, SD18–22] 
 Public presentation by CEO [23] 
 Statement of Corporate Intent  [CRI1, SD 24] 
 6 newsletters: oldest available [CRI 1, SD25–30].  
 6 newsletters: newest available [CRI 1, 31–36] 
 3 relevant media articles [CRI 1, SD 37–39] 
 
CRI 2 
 Annual reports [CRI 2, SD1-7]. 
 Statement of corporate intent [CRI 2, SD8]. 
 Internal document [strategy] [CRI 2, SD9].  
 4 (strategy specific) published articles, media etc 
[CRI 2, SD 10–13]. 
 
 
Total documents: 39; Approximate pages: 731 Total documents: 13; Approximate pages: 466 
CoREs generally 
 6 government press releases (Maharey, 2001, 
2003; New Zealand Government, 2002, 2006a, 
2006b, 2007). 
 TEC website and related documents (e.g., re-
funding criteria): (Tertiary Education 
Commission, 2006); http://www.tec.govt.nz 
 
 
CRIs generally 
 CRI 1 Act (Crown Research Institute Act,1992 ).  
 Report: “Crown Research Institutes: Governance 
& Capability” (McKinlay Douglas Limited, 2002) 
  Report: “An appraisal of Crown Research 
Institutes 1992-2002” (MoRST & CCMAU,2003).  
 CCMAU website and related documents,  e.g., 
CCMAU (2007). Information now accessible on: 
www.comu.govt.nz); e.g., (CCMAU (Crown 
Company Monitoring Advisory Unit) & The 
Treasury, 2007) 
 CRI Taskforce Report (CRI Taskforce, 2010). 
 
Total documents: 7; Approximate pages:17 Total documents: 5; Approximate pages:178 
HTSU 1 
 1 Television media interview [HTSU 1, SD 1] 
 5 media articles [HTSU 1, SD 2–7] 
 3 Press releases (external) [HTSU 1, SD 8–10].  
 Website [HTSU 1, SD 11] 
 
HTSU 2 
 2 television media interviews [HTSU 2, SD 1,2] 
 6 press articles  [HTSU 2, SD 3–9] 
 14 company newsletters/press releases [HTSU 2, 
SD 10–23]. 
 Website [HTSU 2, SD 23] 
Total documents: 11 Total pages: 33 Total documents: 23  Approximate pages: 31 
Additional secondary data [NZ RS&T sector more broadly] 
 Reviewed literature as laid out per section 3.3 both academic (e.g., Leitch & Davenport, 2005) and media 
(e.g., Casinader, 2010; Fox, 2009) 
 Additional main government documents utilized (Ministry of Research, Science and Technology, 2006, 
2008).  
 Surveys of NZ scientists (Sommer, 2010) 
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3.5 Data Analysis 
3.5.1 Abductive Theoretical Extension 
The following quote is indicative of my analytical process:  
We often use empirical evidence to articulate theories, to flesh them out, to ascertain their 
spatiotemporal limits and establish their scope conditions…In short, ideas and evidence are 
mutually dependent; we transform evidence into results with the aid of ideas, and we make 
sense of theoretical ideas and elaborate them by linking them to empirical evidence. Cases 
figure prominently in both of these relationships (Ragin, 1992, p. 218).  
This approach can be labelled abductive and, as Ragin (1992) suggests, is closely tied to the 
notion of “case study.” Many authors argue that it is indeed a central feature differentiating 
case study from the tabula rasa of grounded theory or ethnography (e.g., Bergene, 2007; 
George & Bennett, 2004; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009). It is also associated with a 
post-positivist approach to qualitative analysis (Creswell, 2007; Järvensivu & Törnroos, 
2010), including Miles and Huberman’s (1994) thematic analysis which informs my analytical 
approach here. Within such a process, theoretical frameworks are viewed as central to 
ordering qualitative data. This is particularly true for multi-case studies where themes are 
usually partly pre-defined to enable cross-case comparison and avoid data overload 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008).  
“Abduction” involves iterative movement between the theory and data (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002; Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010; Van Maanen, Sorensen, & Mitchell, 2007). It is said to offer 
a “middle ground” between induction and deduction, accepting existing theory as improving 
the theoretical strength of case analysis while simultaneously being less theory driven than 
deduction, which enables data-driven theory generation and refinement (Järvensivu & 
Törnroos, 2010). This was aligned with the envisaged contribution in providing reflection 
back to Kraatz and Block’s (2008) empirically unexplored theoretical framework. An 
abductive approach is argued to be particularly suited to such a focus on refining and 
extending existing theories (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Aligned with this abductive process, 
theory development defined this study’s aims, rather than strictly inductive theory building 
sometimes associated with case studies (e.g., Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Woodside & 
Wilson, 2003).  
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The abductive process involved starting with a legitimacy strategy framework. For instance, 
Erkama and Vaara’s (2010) example of abduction integrates previous rhetorical legitimacy 
strategy frameworks to provide theoretical insight. The framework illustrated in the 
literature review plays a similar role here. From this starting point the aim is to develop, 
refine, and extend that framework through the empirical data. What this meant for me 
practically was continuous attention to the balance between the theoretical constructs and 
the multifaceted voices of my participants. For example, I restarted my NVivo coding after I 
assessed early coding as being overly constrained by the framework’s categories. 
Consequently, a degree of resolution lay in an effort to refrain from moving too quickly to 
theoretical categorization (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). The incorporation of both “emic” 
overarching categories (e.g., transcension) and “epic” sub-categories based on the empirical 
data was also important as a way of managing the iterative analytical processes  (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).  
3.5.2 Thematic Analysis  
Analysis was thematic and supported by NVivo (Boyatzis, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Patton, 2002a). I drew on techniques outlined by Miles and Huberman concerning data 
reduction and presentation as important parts of the analytical process. As they state, 
categories are labels assigned to units of meaning made up of chunks of varying sizes, from 
words to paragraphs. Here, thematic categories were attached to data chunks ranging from 
sentences to paragraphs depending on the time participants spent conveying a particular 
topic or issue. NVivo’s capacity as a coding tool is aligned with this process and enabled 
management and delineation of data along case, stakeholder, and thematic lines. Utilizing 
tabular displays to organize my data as part of that coding process helped refine my thinking 
and augmented and helped develop the NVivo coding rather than simply mirroring it. In 
direct response to the practical lessons contained in Miles and Huberman’s (1994) approach 
I progressed from tables depicting lists to more effective two-by-two matrices and network 
diagrams (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). Regarding the depiction of the strategies involved, I 
developed the analysis from intra-case conceptually oriented matrices and networks to 
similarly conceptually oriented inter-case displays.  
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An understanding of the ‘regularities’ or core consistencies (Patton, 2002a) was important in 
arriving at themes (Boyatzis, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2005). As Silverman 
states “counting techniques…can offer a means to survey the whole corpus of data 
ordinarily lost in intensive, qualitative research…the reader has a chance to gain a sense of 
the flavour of the data as a whole” (2006, p. 52). This was achieved in two ways: 1) the 
number of interviewees from which a particular theme was drawn and 2) the density with 
which these interviews discussed a theme (i.e., mentioned at one point in the interview 
versus six times) (Berg, 2004). This is aligned with a post-positive approach where 
regularities are not assumed to signify the existence of a particular phenomenon but do 
provide a reasonable indication (Yeung, 1997). Alongside this, a stakeholder-centric 
approach was maintained in line with a commitment to ‘pluralism’ and surfacing multiple 
stakeholder voices in relation to those ‘frequencies’ (Burgoyne, 1994).  
The concept of pattern matching was also important. This is the juxtaposition of patterns 
surfaced from the empirical data with propositions contained within the theoretical 
framework (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Trochim, 1989; Yin, 2009). My analysis was connected 
to a theoretical framework which contained implicit propositions regarding how 
organizations strategize in pluralistic settings (for example, differently to how they respond 
in non-pluralistic settings). The data were then “matched” to this framework. Here the 
original patterns contained in the framework were implicit rather than being explicitly pre-
determined as propositions in the way Yin (2009) appears to advocate. The eventual 
propositions, therefore, resulted out of the iteration between the framework and empirical 
data, as per abduction, rather than being predefined. Further, while pattern matching is 
frequently associated with surfacing causal explanations from qualitative data (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, Trochim, 1989; Yin, 2009), authors do recognize that the technique can be 
used within a more descriptive approach. The post-positivist approach adopted was that 
understanding causal relationships between variables was deemed to lie beyond the 
epistemological scope of this study.  
Pattern matching is closely aligned with an approach to analysis centred on rival 
explanations (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Trochim, 1989; Yin, 2009). For example, do some 
general traditional legitimacy frameworks (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) better explain 
legitimation in pluralistic contexts than the strategy framework developed here? Such rival 
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explanations were implicitly investigated through these strategic categories being mutually 
exclusive; that is, if one explanation (e.g., more agency intensive responses) is valid then 
others cannot be (e.g., isomorphic acquiescence) (Yin, 2009). Prior to entering the field I was 
aware that surfacing any of these rival explanations that refuted the proposed theoretical 
framework would be as theoretically compelling a finding as any confirmation. In the end, 
however, my findings extend and refine the original framework rather than explicitly 
contradict it. However, post-positivism suggests that the researcher makes their biases 
explicit and this is done here with regards to the framework. It is only one possible 
interpretation of the data based on my theoretical positioning. The analysis nonetheless 
suggests that it is a ‘warranted’ one that led to increased insight of the dataset. Finally, rival 
explanations at the level of the sub-themes (within the framework itself) were investigated 
through exploring and presenting the less supported aspects of the framework within each 
case (see Chapter 5).  
3.5.3 Thematic Codes  
An analytical framework was developed out of the literature review: legitimacy strategies 
are embedded within contextual analysis of stakeholder legitimacy demands and pluralism.  
I used a two-level scheme for thematic coding of the strategies. An “etic” level derived from 
a theoretical framework and a more specific “emic” level, which was “close to participants 
categories but nested in the etic codes”  (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 61; Patton, 2002a). 
This was guided by Constas’ (1992) framework of category development. Additional texts 
regarding the development of categories and codes also informed this process and meant 
that I utilized definitions, surfaced in the literature review, as well as “templates” with 
respect to each emerging theme (Boyatzis, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In dealing with 
these themes the issue of internal homogeneity (the extent to which the data in the theme 
“dovetail” or hold together in a meaningful way) and external heterogeneity (the extent to 
which differences between themes are bold and clear) were sought (Guba, 1978; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). For example, in differentiating ‘negotiation’ and ‘transcension,’ the 
degree to which the strategy was reported as entailing self-determination or transformation 
rather than adapting to legitimacy demands, differentiated the two categories. This 
differentiation was also supported through locating key words such as ‘balance’ and 
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‘compromise’ (negotiation) found in the literature review. Table 3.7 introduces these central 
thematic categories. 
Constas’ (1992) framework enables representation of the ‘time’ particular categories were 
identified as well as where they came from (origin); how their inclusion was justified 
(verification); and the naming of the category (nominal). For example, the category 
“transcension” originated out of legitimacy literature (Kraatz & Block, 2008); while the 
choice of name was chosen by the researcher rather than explicitly being labelled within the 
literature (investigator). I entered the field with the category ‘transcension’ already 
established in my theoretical framework. Table 3.8 shows the degree to which the broad 
categories were developed ‘a priori’ (e.g., ‘negotiation’) versus the sub-categories being 
developed ‘a posteriori’ (e.g., ‘partial adaptation’). This is reflective of the abductive 
analytical process already discussed.  
Table 3.7 Central thematic categories 
Stakeholder 
legitimacy  
Pluralism Legitimacy 
strategies 
Sub-categories [strategies]
17
 
1.Commerical 
demands 
 
4.Diffused power  
Sub-category:  
4a + /++ perceived power 
diffusion  
6. Transcension 6a Transformation 
6b Infusing organization with value 
6c Overarching objectives / 
expanded vision 
2. Public good 
demands 
 
5.Divergent objectives 
Sub-categories 
5a +/++ perceived 
divergence  
5b Specific tension points 
7. Negotiation 7a Partial adaptation 
7b Active bargaining 
7c  Inter-stakeholder understanding 
/collaboration 
7d Democratic partnership  
3.Science  
demands 
 8.Compart- 
mentalization 
8a Bounded separation 
8b Separation 
 9. Contraction 9a Restructuring  
 9b Pre-emptive contraction 
9c Singular focus / ignoring 
 
                                                     
17 These categories reflect those outlined in Chapter 6; the case-specific descriptions of strategies (Chapter 5) 
are more various and are not included in this table.  
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Table 3.8 Constas’ (1992) categorization framework18 
Component of categorization Temporal Designation 
At what point were categories specified? 
Origination 
Where does the authority for 
creating the categories reside? 
A priori 
(before) 
A posterior 
(after) 
Iterative 
(continual) 
Participants 
 
 4a, 5a, 5b, 6a, 6b, 
6c,  7a, 7b, 7c, 7d, 
8a, 8b, 9a, 9b, 9c 
1,2,3 
Literature 
 
4,5,6,7, 8,9  1,  2, 3, 6a, 6b, 6c,7a, 7b, 
7c, 8b, 9a, 9b, 9c 
Verification 
On what grounds can one justify 
a given category 
 
External - panel of experts. General framework 
[legitimacy; pluralism; 
strategies].  
 [conferences] 
1-3 [discussions with 
industry experts] 
 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (a–
c), 7 (a-d), 8, 9 (a–
c) [conferences] 
Entire framework and 
categories [supervisors]. 
Rational – logic and reasoning. 
 
6, 7, 8, 9 
 
  
Referential (Literature) – existing 
research. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9  6,  6b, 6c, 7a, 7b, 7c, 8b, 
9a, 9b, 9c 
Nomination 
What is the source of the name 
used to describe a category 
 
Literature 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
 6b, 7b, 7c, 8b, 9a, 9c  
Investigative (researcher) 6, 7,  9 
[choice of exact 
label] 
7d, 8a, 9b 
 
6a, 6c, 7a, 7d 
With regards to verification, three processes highlighted by Constas (1992) formed part of 
the analysis. First, the framework was based on rational grounds, one that relies on ‘logic 
and reasoning’ through the establishment of the appearance of logical connectedness. This 
was established in the literature review through explanation of the theoretical framework. 
Second, ‘referential’ verification is evident here: reference to the literature to justify the use 
of particular categories was central. Third, the external source of verification represents the 
use of “experts outside of the study” to verify the categories. Most directly, two interviews 
from different cases were independently analysed by my supervisor. Their interpretation of 
the text reflected the analysis I had similarly reached regarding those transcripts. Further, 
                                                     
18 Constas’ (1992) represents a number of different categorization options. Only those relevant to this project 
are included. The categories outlined above are those that were surfaced after the case-specific themes where 
reduced/incorporated within cross-case comparison (see Chapter 6).  
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‘peer debriefing’ is said to assist in the validity of the findings (Creswell, 2009) and can be 
connected to this verification category. Several parts of the work here were presented at 
academic conferences and, thus, the analytical framing benefited from several rounds of 
peer review. A version of the developed theoretical framework as a way of investigating 
legitimation strategies amidst pluralism was presented at the 2009 Academy of 
Management Meeting (Chicago). A version of the same framework substantiated with case 
data from a study of a Steiner School was also presented at the EGOS (European Group for 
Organization Studies) Colloquium in Barcelona in 2009. Early analysis, using the analytical 
model based primarily on the first three cases, was presented at the EGOS in the paradox 
stream in Lisbon, 2010. Finally, a more developed analysis was peer-reviewed and accepted 
for the upcoming Academy of Management Meeting in San Antonio (2011).  
3.5.6. Phases in Analysis 
To provide further description I will briefly explain my analysis as consisting of five phases. 
These built on each other, although also overlapped in an iterative fashion. The first defining 
process within these phases is the movement from intra-case to inter-case analysis, a key 
element of multiple case study analysis (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Stake, 2005; Yin, 2009). As Patton (2002a, p. 449) states, my first ‘responsibility’ as an 
analyser of qualitative text is to do ‘justice’ to each individual case. The second aspect 
contained within the phases of analysis was determined by my research questions. 
Developing understanding of a particular context (and the divergent legitimacy demands 
within it) before analyzing the organizational responses to this is one observable trend in 
many previous studies within the institutional and legitimacy literature ( Erkama & Vaara, 
2010; Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Such 
an approach is mirrored here. The explication of stakeholder legitimacies and the associated 
pluralism forms phase two (Chapter 4), and the legitimacy strategies participants outline 
relates to phases 3 and 4 (Chapter 5).  
 
The first phase  was the least structured and had the goal of immersion in the interviews 
and interview data. I transcribed then read and reread each transcript to gain an 
understanding of each interview and reach a picture of the data as a whole (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2006). During this phase I was not coding as such but rather identifying key ideas 
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of interest. This is most aptly described as a process of “indexing.” Seale (1999, p. 154) 
describes: “The early stages of coding are therefore more appropriately called ‘indexing’, 
acting as signposts to interesting bits of data, rather than representing some final argument 
about meaning.” 
 
Familiarity with my data increased throughout the analysis. I was increasingly able (at least 
to a degree) to hold a picture of my dataset as whole, despite the multi-case structure and 
number of interviews. As analysis progressed I could place a particular “data chunk” within 
its context of a whole interview, an organizational case, and my broad cross-case data-set. 
For example, the realization, towards the end of the analysis, of the distinction between 
perceptions of power diffusion between similar cases (e.g., CoRE 1 and CoRE 2) arose from 
understanding of the entire data set, not out of the activity of coding individual interviews 
or particular data segments. This phase also corresponds to widespread advice regarding 
qualitative analysis to not move too quickly to categorization (Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Patton, 2002a; Yin, 2009).  
The second phase involved developing case reports for each organization’s context 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1995, 2005; Yin, 2009). This contextual understanding focused on 
the basis of stakeholder assessments and associated demands regarding organizational 
desirability and appropriateness (Hybels, 1995; Suchman, 1995). This step highlights that an 
understanding of the central legitimacy themes (Erkama & Vaara, 2010) was developed 
before exploring the strategies in relation to those. Suddaby and Greenwood’s (2005) 
example of developing understanding of the ‘institutional vocabularies’ associated with 
stakeholders’ different legitimacy criteria was also helpful. For example, the term “freedom” 
was usefully indicative of legitimacy assessments based on science-excellence; while 
“efficiency” tended to be indicative of commercially-based demands. Understanding of the 
perceptions of desirability and appropriateness built on the commercial, public good, and 
science excellence understanding explained in this chapter’s discussion of the science sector 
as its starting point.  
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This understanding was supplemented by stakeholder analysis (Burgoyne, 1994). This 
focused the analysis on who was making a particular legitimacy demand and who, 
conversely, was de-prioritizing it.19  This treatment of legitimacy is aligned with the 
stakeholder-centric definition (a focus on legitimacy sources rather than dimensions 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008)) developed in this study. It resulted in “stakeholder 
legitimacy maps” which I developed through both network and matrix displays. The 
resulting display in Chapter 4 utilized examples already provided in institutional theory 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Reay & Hinings, 2005) regarding presenting the “belief systems” 
(both goals and values) within a given context, but supplemented it with an explicit 
stakeholder focus.  
The dimensions of power and divergent objectives were explored directly to provide in-
depth understanding of the pluralism each organization was dealing with and confirm its 
existence. Diffused power was based primarily on a stakeholder analysis (Burgoyne, 1994): 
who were discussed as the salient stakeholders? Second, a diverse range of tension points 
were raised and described in different ways by interviewees. To help make sense of these, 
the analysis of objective divergence built on the analysis of stakeholder legitimacy demands 
to organize this multi-faceted discussion. I moved from within-case pictures of legitimacies 
and pluralism to writing these up as three descriptions based on HTSUs, CRIs, and CoREs 
(Chapter 4). This was enabled by the similarities between these cases and the 
tensions/legitimacies they faced. Bringing the cases together in three ‘sets’ yielded 
additional insights: there was a slight difference in how pluralism was perceived between 
organizations of a similar type. This phase provided a contextualization for the strategic 
themes, that is, linking situational conditions to the phenomenon of interest (i.e., legitimacy 
strategies) (Bamberger, 2008; Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010).  
The third phase involved developing an understanding of the legitimacy strategies 
implemented by each organization. This remains the central focus of the thesis. In the 
interviews and in the analysis the understanding of divergence legitimacy demands and 
pluralism laid the foundation for investigating the strategies that were implemented in 
                                                     
19 Stakeholder analysis can be described as a focus on some of the stakeholders involved in a case and 
analysing data based on their perceptions or experiences in relation to the phenomena (Burgoyne, 1994). 
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relation to that context. During the early stages of analysis the strategies within each 
specific case were analyzed without reference to the framework’s broad categories or the 
other cases. Building the strategic sub-themes (e.g., surfacing perceptions of “expanded 
vision” as a strategy) was initially based on the case data rather than immediately focusing 
on the emic-level categories (i.e., transcension).   
Attention to the internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity (Miles & Huberman, 1994) 
of the strategic themes being revealed was maintained. These criteria helped reduce an 
initial long list of categories. Reduction in the number of themes was also assisted through 
attention to frequencies and sensitivity to the importance placed by participants on 
particular strategies. Finally, the connections between the strategies discussed was 
important (Boyatzis, 1998; O'Leary, 2004), with some being shown to be  particularly 
interconnected. I followed the advice that it is permissible for the same data-rich chunks of 
my interviews to be assigned to more than one node (Miles & Huberman, 1994; King, 2004b; 
Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). A high degree of overlapping coding (whilst also ensuring 
there was enough difference identified to maintain their external heterogeneity) was one 
way these inter-connecting patterns were highlighted.  
The fourth phase involved both cross-case comparison of the strategies and referring back 
to theory (Miles & Huberman, 1994). First, the theoretical framework (Kraatz & Block, 2008; 
Oliver, 1991; Pratt & Foreman, 2000) was referred to as an explanatory and organizing 
device to make sense of the empirical data. This provided a framework for organizing and 
reporting the findings (Chapter 5) as well as enabling the similarities and differences 
between cases to be highlighted and communicated more effectively as I moved to inter-
case analysis (Chapter 6). Such an approach within thematic analysis has been described as 
“clustering” (Boyatzis, 1998; Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Miles & Huberman, 1994), the 
organization of multiple themes into groups utilizing a higher-order or meta-theme. It was in 
this phase the pattern matching or “noting patterns” was most directly incorporated in my 
analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009). This was evident in the matching of the 
themes to the proposed strategic framework developed from the literature. This pattern 
matching confirmed aspects of but also added insight into and refined the original 
framework (Dubois & Gadde, 2002).  
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Next, cross-case comparison was engaged in and forms the basis of the ‘Discussion’ in 
Chapter 6. While engaging in this cross-case comparison a potentially important distinction 
contained in the data was developed and is reported in Chapter 5 in relation to each case. 
This related to differences between organizations in terms of the perceived success of the 
response strategies used. This assessment arose out of the stakeholders’ own perceptions 
rather than any singular or externally imposed definition of success (which would contradict 
the pluralistic focus of this study). It was not something explicitly looked for but arose as I 
became aware of inter-case distinctions. The comparison was made between organizations 
of a similar type (e.g., HTSU 1 and 2) due to the variance between the organizational forms 
making broader comparisons of relative success more problematic. It relates to the point in 
time the interview was conducted rather than being a historical or future orientated 
assessment. A pictorial example of the above process and its relation to the NVivo coding is 
provided in Appendix 5.  
The final phase was a more directly interpretive phase. I follow Wolcott’s advice to 
differentiate this aspect of the analytical process as a separate chapter (Chapter 6) (Marshall 
& Rossman, 2006; Wolcott, 1994). As Patton (2002a, p. 480) notes: “interpretation means 
attaching significance to what was found, making sense of the findings, offering 
explanations, drawing conclusions, extrapolating lessons, making inferences.” This final step 
draws from but goes beyond the findings. It involved bringing together the different 
elements of the project (the literature, the context, and the strategies) and making 
inferences and seeking explanations within that (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Particular 
patterns could be observed and reflected on to form propositions. This denotes a more 
abductive approach to pattern matching whereby a particular pattern originated out of the 
data and was then matched across cases rather than being predefined prior to entering the 
field.  
3.6 Summary: Chapter Three 
This chapter has outlined the philosophical (post-positivism) and contextual (NZ’s pluralistic 
science sector) foundation for the empirical study. The practical steps engaged in, both in 
terms of data collection and analyses have been detailed. The different phases, and 
associated findings, in analysis and interpretation will now be outlined in the following three 
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chapters. As the analytical framework suggests, a contextual understanding based on 
pluralism is developed before uncovering the legitimacy strategies. It also moves from 
analysis (Chapters 4 and 5) to the interpretation of those findings (Chapter 6). 
 102 
 
Chapter Four 
Findings: Contextual Descriptions 
To understand the behaviour of an organization, you must understand the context of that 
behaviour.  (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 1) 
This chapter contextualizes the six organizations in relation to the multiple legitimacy 
demands and pluralism within their contexts. It is divided into four sections. First, the 
stakeholder legitimacy demands encountered by the science organizations are outlined. 
Legitimacy demands were found to be related to commercial, science and public good based 
perceptions of desirability and appropriateness (section 4.1). Second, the pluralism (i.e., 
diffused power and divergence objectives) the organizations are faced with is discussed 
moving from CoREs (4.2) to CRIs (4.3) to HTSUs (4.4). The sequence adopted reflects the 
progression within these organizations from basic research (CoREs) to applied research 
focused on an industry sector (CRIs) to commercialized research (HTSUs). Multiple points of 
divergence were surfaced within each case and these were shown to exist both within the 
broad legitimacy demands (e.g., between long-term growth and short-term ROI) as well as 
between them (e.g., between legitimacy demands based on ‘commercial’ and ‘public good’ 
criteria).  
High degrees of power diffusion and divergence were evident in all six cases. However, 
unexpected subtle differences were also found between similar organizational cases (for 
example CRI 1 and CRI 2). Perceptions of the degree of power diffusion and objective 
divergence are shown to differ slightly between organizations. This is summarized in the 
concluding section of this chapter.  
4.1 Stakeholder Legitimacy Demands 
From a pure commercial investor point of view…the first hurdle is ‘this company has to be 
able to return thirty times our investment inside five to seven years’…it’s pure financial 
(Investor, HTSU 2;  commercial based legitimacy).  
I just want to play in my sandpit with my toys (First Scientist Founder, HTSU 1; science based 
legitimacy).  
I can say things like ‘my research over the last *decades+ has cost 600 hip replacements…or 
120 herceptin breast cancer treatments, that’s what it’s cost – a lot of money. But, in two 
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years (at the present rate) that will all be paid off in terms of *HTSU 1’s+ export sales. 
(Second Scientist Founder, HTSU 1; public-good based legitimacy).  
The above quotations illustrate commercial, science and public good based perceptions of 
desirability and appropriateness respectively, using the HTSUs as an example. The primary 
focus was on the stakeholders and the basis of their assessments of CoRE, CRI, or HTSU 
desirability and appropriateness. This relates to the stakeholder-centric definition of 
legitimacy guiding this study. These stakeholder legitimacy demands varied slightly both in 
degree and form between the different types of organizations. However, they can all be 
framed as reflective of the “relevance debate” discussed in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.4).  
Interviewees highlighted that CoREs faced demands based on relevance in a public good 
sense (i.e., contributing to national development both socially and economically) and 
science excellence (i.e., traditional academic indicators of legitimacy). As well as being 
reported within the interviews, these demands were regulated in the funding and reporting 
policy associated with the CoRE Fund. CRIs, meanwhile, were shown to face legitimacy 
demands based on contributing to NZ (public good), being at the forefront of science in 
order to provide that benefit, maintaining financial viability, and a mandated level of return 
on equity. These demands were communicated through the reported perceptions of 
desirability and appropriateness from various stakeholders and were reflected in legislation 
and policy. Finally, the two HTSUs were not driven solely by commercial demands (although 
this was central in both cases) but also around demands based on science (for example, 
technological excellence and ongoing R&D) and public good (e.g., staying NZ based and 
contributing to its future prosperity). A summary is provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Stakeholder legitimacy demands: Summary 
Stakeholder legitimacy demands  
(assessments of desirability and appropriateness) 
Examples of associated practices 
(means for pursuing legitimacy demands) 
Stakeholders making/prioritizing legitimacy 
demands  
 
Commercial 
 
Sub-categories & key 
words:    
 
efficiency; value;  
financial viability; 
bottom-line; growth; 
profit; ROI; costs; 
budget; customers;  
market.  
 
 
Representative data :  
 
“We are trying to make a profit - 
profit’s not a dirty word. We have to 
make the 8 or 9 percent.” (CRI 1, 
Manager).  
 
“Dollars. First and foremost, and I’ve 
talked about all those values and 
excitement about the technology, but 
it’s got to be sales.” (Scientist Founder, 
HTSU 1).  
 
“I’m here just to make a dollar for us.” 
(University Shareholder, HTSU 1). 
 
CRI examples:  
- Spin-out companies to create revenue for 
CRI.  
- Cut capabilities to meet prescribed level of 
ROI.  
- Focus on monthly budgets and targets.  
- Search for alternative revenue streams.  
- Charge clients market, or close to market, 
rates.  
 
HTSU examples:  
- Everything secondary to growth/sales. 
- Shareholder future return determines 
current decision-making.  
- Focused product offering targeting a 
particular defined market segment.  
 
 
Legitimacy demands prioritized by: 
 
- CRIs: Government/Board; lesser extent 
management; also: regulated in CRI ACT; 
reporting requirements. 
- HTSUs: All stakeholders, but in particular 
investors/shareholder (ROI); directors and 
managers. 
 
Less prioritized by: 
- CRIs: Scientist 
- HTSUs: Scientist founders  
 
Science Excellence 
 
Sub-categories & Key 
words:   
academia; new 
knowledge; 
publishing; freedom; 
exploration; 
technological / 
scientific excellence;  
PBRF (CoREs & HTSU 
1); education (CoREs); 
 
Representative data :  
 
“As a scientist you do want to be doing 
research….that’s really what makes 
you tick…your self-esteem is very much 
the last paper you wrote and your last 
good idea. And if those start drying up 
then you start losing your own sense of 
self-worth.” Director, CoRE 1.  
 
“That’s what keeps you going as a 
scientist. Coming up with new ideas 
 
CoRE examples:  
- Provide freedom to follow ideas. 
- Focus on publication, citations, PBRF 
rankings as measures of success. 
- No expectation of short-term outputs.  
- Providing students with interesting 
projects.  
 
CRI examples:  
- Build up and invest in research capability.  
- Measure academic indicators such as 
publications and conference presentations.  
 
Legitimacy demands prioritized by:  
- All six organizations: Scientists; also: 
regulated in CRI ACT & CoRE legislation.  
- CoREs: widely held by stakeholders (e.g., 
partner organizations; government; TEC). 
 
Less prioritized by:   
- CoREs: Government (TEC; as well as more 
broadly) and some CoRE leaders described 
as increasingly focused on other indicators of 
legitimacy.  
- CRIs: Government and boards outlined as 
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collaboration (CoREs).  
 
 
and being able to follow interesting 
leads” (Scientist, CRI 2).  
 
“I don’t actually really like business…I 
am most comfortable when I am 
dabbling in the lab or designing 
something. I actually don’t like the 
business world at all.” (Scientist 
Founder, HTSU 2).  
-  Freedom to pursue scientifically interesting 
avenues not directly related to client needs.  
 
HTSU examples:  
- Focus on technological excellence and 
perfection.  
- Focus on new ideas/products within broad 
product platforms.  
- Build collaborative research partnerships. 
- Maintain freedom to ‘potter’ / play in the 
‘sand pit.’  
more directly interested in public good 
outcomes and financials; managers’ 
conception of research linked to public good; 
clients interested in immediate output of 
science.  
- HTSUs: Many stakeholders (e.g., Directors; 
investors; CEO (HTSU 1); two scientist 
employees (HTSU 2)) de-prioritized research 
based demands either explicitly or implicitly 
in relation to the commercial.  
 
Public Good 
 
Sub-categories & Key 
words:   
prosperity; economy; 
relevance; NZ/NZ Inc.; 
environment/climate 
change.  
 
CoRE examples: 
industry; outreach; 
culture change; 
education; end-users 
CRI examples: industry 
engagement; service; 
clients; essential 
infrastructure  
HTSU examples: 
employment; ‘giving 
back’; socially 
significant; education 
(HTSU 1); leading the 
way.  
 
Representative data  
“The message we’re been getting 
[from government] in the last couple 
of years or so is community 
engagement…The outreach work we 
do is top of the pops for us at the 
moment. (Board Member, CoRE 2) 
 
“Are they a research organization? 
They do research but their main 
purpose is about enhancing the social 
wellbeing of the country by assisting 
[us+.” (Client, CRI 2) 
 
“*the CEO+ has stated that we want to 
be a billion dollar company…we want 
to do something socially compelling … 
and we want to stay ultimately with 
our roots in NZ.” (Manager, HTSU 2) 
 
“I want to be involved with bold 
initiatives that do great things for NZ 
and our ecosystem” (Investor, HTSU 2) 
 
 
CoRE examples 
- Perusing practices that contribute to NZ’s 
economy (spin-outs; assisting industry).  
- Increasing profile of science and creating 
‘culture change’ through outreach activities; 
science communication.  
- Contribute to NZ’s social indictors (outreach 
with Maori and schools etc).  
 
CRI examples:  
- Delivering benefits to clients that contributes 
to NZ’s economy or essential infrastructure.  
- Activities that contribute to NZ’s balance 
sheet not the CRI’s balance sheet.  
- Providing “free” /subsidised services. 
 
HTSU examples:  
- Growth contributing to NZ economy.  
- Providing employment opportunities for 
young scientists.  
- Showing other NZers it can be done. 
- Giving back to NZ taxpayer.   
 
 
Legitimacy demands prioritized by:  
- CoREs: Government; some directors, PIs and 
boards; also: regulated in funding and 
reporting criteria; reporting. 
- CRIs: All stakeholders define public good as 
central indicator of legitimacy, especially 
managers and scientists; also: regulated in 
CRI ACT.  
- HTSUs: Varied between cases. Scientist 
founders (in particular HTSU 1); government 
and HTSU 2 CEO.  
 
Less prioritized by:   
- CoREs: PIs and some Directors. 
- CRIs: Government and boards reported as 
prioritizing financial demands instead. 
Previous management regime in CRI 1 also 
outlined as prioritizing the financial.   
- HTSUs: CEO [HTSU 1]; investors/ 
shareholders; directors [HTSU 1]. Investors 
prioritized the commercial but also 
appreciated public good objectives.  
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4.2 CoREs: Pluralism 
4.2.1 Diffused Power 
It comes back to this ironical thinking. Centres of Research Excellence. Think about what that 
means. Centre means in one place. We are not a centre, we are an anti-centre. (Director, 
CoRE 1) 
The term ‘anti-centre’ is a reference to how power in the CoREs was not located centrally 
but rather diffused amongst multiple partner organizations and PIs (Principal Investigators). 
The stakeholders highlighted as defining the diffused power context are summarised in 
Table 4.2. While participants in both CoREs described organizational contexts defined by 
diffused power, the following overview also suggests that CoRE 2 participants perceived a 
slightly higher degree of power diffusion (++) than those in CoRE 1 (+).  
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Table 4.2 Summary of diffused power: CoREs 
Partner Organizations/ Universities   
 
Reported by: CoRE 1: 35–47; CoRE 2: 4955; ES (External Stakeholders): 58, 61.  
 
- “The notion that *CoRE 1+ is independent when it is so deeply entangled with the institution can 
be hard to get your head around. Practically speaking there are substantial limits to their ability to 
exercise any real independence.” (University Manager, CoRE 1) 
 
- “The host institution wants to kill *CoRE 2’s engagement with end-users+ and won’t let us sign 
agreements with [end-user], because we don’t exist, we’re not a legal entity.” (Director, CoRE 2) 
 
CoRE 1 – perceived slightly lower (+) level of power diffusion:  
“*CoRE 1+ is the CoRE that is most independent of its host.” (University Manager, CoRE 1)   
 
Scientists  
 
Reported by: CoRE 1: 35–39; 43; 45; 47; CoRE 2: 48–51; 53–55; ES: 61.  
 
- “The scientists are the important thing. They’ve got to be, they’re the foundation.” (CoRE 1, 
Administrative Manager)  
 
- “It’s never a directed thing…I would have been wasting my time *saying+ to people: “I want you to 
do this”…Because that’s *not+ the way science works. You don’t work in a directed way easily – not 
in a university environment anyway.” (CoRE 1, Director) 
 
- “For a group of senior researchers …a controlled collaboration was not going to work. So we had 
to endeavour to get consensus among the whole set of investigators.” (CoRE 2, Director) 
 
 
Government  
 
Reported by: CoRE 1: 35–43; 45; CoRE 2: 48–55; ES: 56; 58; 61.  
 
- “I wouldn’t say it’s entirely political game but it *direction of CoRE 1+ is driven very much around a 
sense of we’ve got a very limited amount of time to prove impact *to government…] And let’s be 
blunt about why we are doing this. It is partly about the good of the country...but there is also an 
institutional aim there and that is that we want to see *CoRE 1+ go on.”  (Director, CoRE 1)  
 
- “You can start with TEC. They expect certain things out of all the CoREs. So you are dealing with 
the life of *CoRE 2+ at that level. And I do mean the word ‘life’ literally because at the end of the 
day if TEC isn’t happy there isn’t any money for *CoRE 2+.” (Board member, CoRE 2)  
 
CoRE 1 perceived slightly lower (+) level of power diffusion (especially: 35-37):  
- “*TEC+ are happy for us to provide the aspirations that we see best for ourselves and for us to 
report on those.” (Director, CoRE 1) 
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Partner organizations. The CoREs were both spread over multiple collaborating institutions 
(rather than being located within a single organization). They were also virtual entities 
nested within the infrastructure of, and dependent on, their partner organizations. This 
“host parasitic relationship” as an interviewee described it, was evident in all interviews 
with CoRE stakeholders:  
For each CoRE to have its own independence and sense of governance and yet be hosted by 
a university is fraught with tensions…you’ve got this relationship which is difficult to define 
but both sides know they need it (Industry Observer)  
A distinction between the organizations was that participants in CoRE 2 appeared to 
perceive the power of the partner organizations, and in particular its host, to dictate CoRE 
decision making and practices to be particularly high. In CoRE 2, the host was perceived to 
be able to enforce ways of operating that CoRE 2 members were not comfortable with (e.g., 
especially interviews 49–50; 53; 54):  
Our University does not trust us to be involved with it. So we’ve been completely removed 
from our involvement […they] wanted to highjack that success for their own purposes 
(Director, CoRE 2).  
This was not the case in CoRE 1 where stakeholders largely characterized the CoRE’s 
relationship with its partner organizations as being mutually supportive. This was partly 
related to CoRE 1’s perceived success, limiting some of the power diffusion away from them. 
For example, a Director recalls the first question a CRI CEO was asked by a visiting Minister:  
“why aren’t you guys associated with *CoRE 1+?” Nonetheless, to reiterate, both CoREs were 
perceived to be dependent on their host and partner organizations.  
Scientists. Interviewees from both CoREs highlighted the diffused nature of the Institute’s 
internal power dynamics in relation to their PIs:  
I like to talk about it as a collective, a scientists’ collective, rather than a heavily top-down 
driven activity. (Director, CoRE 1) 
We saw ourselves [as], the scientists were leading the way and we were helping them. 
(Director, CoRE 2) 
Through defining scientific excellence as central to the CoREs, participants recognized that 
this was held by, and dependent on, the PIs.  
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Government. That CoREs were dependent on government was identified by the majority (21) 
of CoRE stakeholders. For instance, just under half of the CoRE participants explicitly 
discussed the power of government to “cull” CoREs:  
Whether *CoRE 2+ should or shouldn’t have gone and changed direction is just a pragmatic 
thing in that if you want the funding you have to respond to those signals. At a philosophical 
level it seems to be irrelevant…you have to respond to the people giving you the money 
[otherwise] you will lose your funding. (PI, CoRE 2)  
CoRE 1’s focus regarding meeting the government’s requirements so as to be refunded was 
widely evident both in the interviews and secondary data. For example, it was a focus 
reflected in their newsletters. However, in comparison to CoRE 2, participants from CoRE 1 
perceived government as largely benign. A degree of freedom to self-define was outlined 
(Table 4.2). By contrast, CoRE 2 participants perceived a more ‘intense’ relationship with 
TEC concerning for example being the “last funded” of the CoREs. The following quotations 
highlight this perception of particularly high power diffusion in CoRE 2:  
Our primary stakeholder in many respects is TEC. I think our internal history has been one, 
been quite variable…So if I was TEC I would be suspect. But we talk to them regularly… we’ll 
just keep working [on that]. (Director, CoRE 2)  
*CoRE’s are+ whatever the Government want them to be. They call the rules. (PI, CoRE 2)  
4.2.2. Divergent Objectives 
All CoRE participants as well as external stakeholders outlined various points of divergence 
between the different objectives faced by CoREs. Three broad points of divergence were 
identified: 1) ‘science excellence’ and ‘relevance’, 2) ‘science excellence’ and ‘economic 
development’, and 3) tension concerning collaboration and competition (Figure 4.1). A brief 
discussion of divergence related to defining some of these broad objectives follows. A 
particularly high degree of perceived divergence between research excellence and other 
objectives was evident in CoRE 2:  
It takes a certain amount of discipline to say ‘you can only do this at the expense of what 
we’re best at. We can do these other things well but what we’re doing best is what we’d like 
to do.’ (Director, CoRE 2) 
An overall finding was that CoRE 2 participants appeared to perceive a greater level of 
divergence (++) than those in CoRE 1 (+).  
 110 
 
Figure 4.1 Divergent objectives: CoREs 
RelevanceScience Excellence Economic 
Development 
($$$)
Collaboration 
Divergent objectives: 
collaboration / competition 
Tension 3
Divergent objectives: 
Science excellence and 
relevance. 
Tension 1
Divergent objectives: 
Science  excellence & economic 
development/industry
(related to the broader tension between 
relevance and science excellence)
Tension 2
Collaboration within 
competitive science 
system
Freedom
Interviewees: 
CoRE 1: 35–37; 39–41
CoRE 2: 48–54
ES: 56; 61–62
Interviewees: 
CoRE 1: 35–38; 41; 45
CoRE 2: 48–54
ES: 56-58
Interviewees: 
CoRE 1: 35,37,39,41,46
CoRE 2: 48–55
ES: 58, 61
 
Divergence 1: Science excellence and relevance.  
Research excellence in anything? Would an Old Norse Centre of Research Excellence be 
acceptable? I don’t think so. That’s one of the challenges that academics would hate but it’s 
probably a political reality if there’s going to be more money. (Public Sector Manager) 
As the quote above illustrates, CoREs sit within a broad relevance-based discussion 
concerning the justification of spending public money on research. This tension can be 
described in three ways: a misalignment between research and short-term relevance; 
scientists thinking in new ways about their work; and anything outside science being 
perceived as a “sacrifice” or distracting from research.   
The first aspect to this tension concerns demands for short-term outcomes:  
It’s like Queen Victoria going into somebody’s lab…: “Mr. - whatever your name is - of what 
use is this?” And he said “Madam of what use is a baby?” The whole point is that you don’t 
know until it is twenty years old whether it’s going to be of any use. (Administrative 
Manager, CoRE 1)  
For CoRE 2 this was explicitly linked to a vision to see CoREs as “free of these pressures” 
with regards to defining outcomes and relevance:  
Our model was very much trying to help the researchers with good ideas follow on and 
accomplish ideas which were not easy to get done with just short-term funding. And also, 
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would not appeal necessarily to short-term outside users…they were novel and they weren’t 
appealing yet. (Director, CoRE 2).  
This idea of “users” being perceived by some in CoRE 2 as detracting from scientific 
discovery was not expressed in CoRE 1.  
Second, was the tension of “relevance” entailing a different mind-set from scientists. This 
divergence was perceived mainly in relation to CoRE 2. For example, the quotations below 
show a tension between a NZ (versus international) focus being divergent with research 
excellence:  
We’re probably losing ground internationally… the focus has been local. (AI, CoRE 2) 
I thought of myself as a [particular type of scientist] not as a contributor to national 
development…*For example+ most of our investigators would have spent most of their 
career without having to engage with Maori. And would find it a bother and a nuisance and 
not understand why it was important. (Director, CoRE 2) 
This tension was also apparent in the perspective whereby anything outside of research was 
considered a sacrifice and detracting from the “excellence.” This was evident in both CoREs:  
To take on those jobs you give up your science. And you’re sacrificing. (Director, CoRE 1).  
A cynical side of me could say that it may have been a distraction at times. (AI, CoRE 2).  
The PIs are focused on their research…Promotion doesn’t come from being friendly to the 
local school. (Administrative manager, CoRE 2) 
For CoRE 1 the broad tension between relevance and science was evident as shown in the 
quotations above and reflected by the number of interviewees who discussed it. However, 
in comparison to CoRE 2 it was largely perceived as less divergent and more manageable:  
I see it as a critical obligation *outreach+…there’s no point getting frustrated (PI, CoRE 1).  
An example of this difference in perspective related to their treatment of the budget. That a 
proportion of the budget would be devoted to outreach, for example, was assumed in CoRE 
1:  
We’ve got a budget, we’ve got a large amount of money coming in. So let’s make sure that 
we set aside a significant amount of money…not just to spend on science, or PhD students or 
whatever, but we use this to build that added dimension. (Director, CoRE 1).  
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By comparison, in CoRE 2 the perception by those involved of higher divergence between 
these objectives was evident as this had been contested as detracting from the CoRE’s 
raison d'être:  
The tension point…is often around money. It is getting the approval to spend some money 
on maybe some Outreach activities. Because some of the investigators would think ‘why are 
we spending the money on management? The money should just be spent on research.’ 
(Administrative Manager, CoRE 2) 
Some CoRE 2 scientists (both Directors and PIs) in this way considered funds not directly 
going into research to be wasted. This was not a sentiment evident in CoRE 1.  
Divergence 2: Science excellence and economic development. 
CoREs have a very big struggle really. They have to, on the one hand, achieve academic 
excellence which is at a higher level than the average level for the universities. On the other 
hand they are perceived to have to meet economic targets…That’s a really hard thing to 
manage…For example, *one CoRE+ which has been hugely successful in the commercial 
space…their tension is that they feel they should achieve commercial success and keep going 
with that, but they might not get refunded because they’ve moved too far away from the 
research excellence criteria. (Industry Observer) 
The tension between CoRE activity that leads to direct economic benefit for NZ, for instance 
spin-out companies, and science excellence is highlighted in the quote above. Differences 
between the academic ‘world’ of research excellence and the commercial ‘world’ of spin-
outs or engaging with industry was either explicitly outlined or implied by most interviewees 
(Figure 4.1 above). The ability claim a direct contribution to NZ economy was one way a 
CoRE can demonstrate its relevance. In terms of the relationship with Government, some 
argued that this was that most compelling way that CoRes could meet the demand for 
greater relevance. However, a tension related to the difficulty CoREs, and indeed science 
activity generally, had in demonstrating its economic contribution:  
We can say…‘Yes there is good evidence that it [research and science] matters for our 
economic future.’ But when you step down and say “point me to the evidence.” It’s really 
really hard. In part investing in science and technology for our future is a leap of faith. 
(Public Sector Manager).  
There was also divergence related to the broad cultures of science and industry that 
affected the CoREs’ engagement in these areas:  
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In the traditional academic sense business is the bad guys. Because there’s different 
timelines, different cultures and all that sort of stuff and ideally from an academic view you 
want to funnel money back into blue sky research. (PhD Student, CoRE 1).  
Further, the tension related to anything outside science being viewed as a sacrifice 
particularly applied to economic development:  
Some of [our PIs] might want to just be left to concentrate on their basic research. And some 
of the external stakeholders and even ourselves sometimes we want to pull the industry 
development stuff. (Director, CoRE 1) 
As a country we need to be stretched in our economic thinking…but in helping with that he’s 
making use of knowledge he already knows…the challenge then is to keep that quest for 
excellence up. (Chairman, CoRE 1) 
Interviewees also commented on the divergence between ‘publishing’ (upon which science 
careers are built) and commercial objectives. 
For CoRE 2 the higher level of perceived divergence between these objectives was inherent 
within their assessment of the difficulty of meeting economically based relevance demands:  
Even the [previous left-wing] Labour Government was pushing these buttons of more 
immediate economic return. And we will not measure up on that. (Director, CoRE 2) 
In the area that we work in that [direct economic development] is unrealistic. (PI, CoRE 2) 
Indeed, only one CoRE 2 stakeholder perceived meeting this demand to be possible or 
desirable. This perspective can be contrasted with how the economic dimension was 
perceived in CoRE 1. A degree of commensurability is evident in the latter:  
I think it’s a really good tension. The basic science versus the let’s get out of the lab and see 
what money we can make out of it. (Director, CoRE 1)  
Consequently, CoRE 2 participants largely perceived the level of divergence to be 
comparatively higher.  
Divergence 3: Collaboration and competition. There are two aspects to the divergence 
between collaboration and competition. It was raised as a point of divergence by 5 CoRE 1 
but all eight CoRE 2 interviewees. There were also over twice as many instances of this 
tension being commented on in CoRE 2 than in CoRE 1. This is indicative of the degree of 
divergence between these objectives being perceived to be greater by CoRE 2 (++) 
interviewees than those in CoRE 1 (+).  
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The first aspect of this tension was reflected at the individual level:  
[Collaboration] is for some people bloody difficult. A lot of academics who have spent their 
whole lives doing the complete opposite…it’s the academic model...“go ahead and do what 
you’re interested in and do it very well.” So a lot of people are very focused on being 
individuals and their individual goals. (PI, CoRE 2).  
A tension between “individual freedom” and research sitting within a collaborative system 
with a broadly defined research agenda is apparent. Divergence between ‘collaboration’ and 
‘competition’ at the scientist level was, however, only outlined by two CoRE 2 interviewees.  
There was greater evidence regarding the tension between competitive and collaborative 
goals at the inter-organizational level. The competitive RS&T systems and “institutionally-
centric” focus of their partner organizations sat alongside the CoRE’s requirement to be 
collaborative. One example, outlined by four interviewees, was CoRE 2’s host trying to 
retain as much of the financial benefits within its university as possible rather than adopting 
a more collaborative approach. The following anecdote is illustrative:  
Whenever I used to see him *particular university manager+ in the corridor he’d say: ‘you’re 
not handing *host’s+ money over to anybody else are you?’...And every time he made me 
swear hand on heart ‘I promise you I haven’t given any of the *host+ returned money to 
anybody outside *the host+, it’s only benefiting *the host+’…Every time I’d see him he’d say 
“are you sure, are you sure?” (Administrative Manager, CoRE 2).  
This was identified as a point of divergence by many interviewees, with some outlining that 
the CoREs had “in some ways… exacerbated it” (PI, CoRE 1). However, the level of 
divergence was perceived to be higher by CoRE 2 interviewees. For example, in the above 
anecdote the university manager is directly intervening (and, thus, exacerbating the tension) 
based on a competitive-oriented objective. Such a dynamic was not outlined in relation to 
CoRE 1. 
Despite this, a concluding quote shows that this tension was evident in both CoREs:   
The government talks as though it [collaboration] was trivially easy, but my performance 
objectives are not to make [CoRE 1 partner organization+ a more productive place. It’s to 
make *my university+ a more productive place. I’m only interested in cooperating with 
[another organization] to the extent that it helps [my organization]. (University Manager, 
CoRE 1).  
An additional point: divergent definitions of objectives. A final tension is not related to any 
one “legitimacy demand” in particular. Instead, it reflects that different stakeholders had 
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divergent conceptions of how a particular CoRE should actualize each of its broadly 
conceived objectives. For example, in CoRE 1, while a PI explicitly focused on liking their 
educative role to explaining their economic ‘relevance’, a Director argued against relying on 
such an argument.  
In CoRE 2 a tension regarding the definition of “outreach” was evident. A scientist highlights 
divergent definitions of what outreach meant within CoRE 2:  
The *CoRE+ is far too focused on Outreach and…the wrong sort of Outreach, not on big ideas 
about “let’s bring a conference here.” And also it’s missing the boat in terms of the 
advantage it can provide to the economy. (AI, CoRE 2) 
Another tension concerned how CoRE 2 defined their science excellence. Again the AI 
outlined how, from his perspective, CoRE 2 was relinquishing their “greatest strategic asset” 
in terms of a particular capability. This suggests divergent perspectives regarding CoRE 2’s 
scientific capabilities and focus and was commented on by four CoRE 2 participants. This 
again indicates that CoRE 2 dealt with more fundamental points of divergence regarding its 
definition of itself than CoRE 1.  
4.3 CRIs: Pluralism 
4.3.1 CRIs: Diffused Power 
CRIs’ diffused power context was illustrated by the range of stakeholders identified as a) 
central to the CRI’s operation (e.g., staff, government and clients) and/or b) whom the CRI 
had no choice but to respond to (e.g., government via regulation) (Table 4.3). A CRI 2 
manager outlines the current lack of organizational autonomy when articulating a hope for 
CRI 2’s future: “we just need flexibility from our two key stakeholders, which is our 
shareholder and our clients.” Participants in both CRIs described contexts defined by 
diffused power. However, it was also found that CRI 2 participants perceived a slightly 
higher degree (++) of power diffusion than those in CRI 1 (+).  
 116 
 
Table 4.3 Diffused power: CRI Summary 
Government/Shareholder 
Reported by: CRI 1: 14,15; 17–24; CRI 2: 25-29; 32–33; ES (External Stakeholders): 54, 57; 
60  
 
- “We’re sort of doing a dance with government. And we’re such an addict. We are such a 
junkie. We just put our arm out for another fix every time it comes along.(Scientist, CRI 1) 
 
- “Ultimately each CRI is dependent on the shareholder, represented by two shareholder 
Ministers as to whether they continue their existence or not.” (Industry observer) 
 
Clients 
Reported by : CRI 1: 14–16; 18; 21; 23; CRI 2: 26–32; ES: 55; 57; 60; 61 
 
- “The second bunch of people – and the most important at the end of the day – are our 
customers…They are our prime stakeholders. Without them, whatever government may 
say…we would not exist.” (CRI 1, Manager) 
 
- “We do what they [clients] want - we get paid to do what they want…then the contracts are 
managed through the course of the year to make sure that we’re on track...and still doing 
what they want. And if they change what they want we vary - we stop doing something and 
start doing something else.” (CRI 2, Manager) 
 
Scientist/staff 
Reported by: Implied by all CRI stakeholders.  
 
- “Scientists are the engine room and the life of any scientific organisation.” (CRI 1, Director) 
 
- “If we lose capability in one area…we can’t go out and replace that…they’ve gone through 
rigorous long-term training...if we lose them, we won’t get them back.” (CRI 2, Manager) 
 
Counter-argument: CRI 1: 15, 21; CRI 2: 25; 28; 32; External stakeholder: 60 
- “Our people are worried about their jobs and whether there’s going to be more cuts.” CRI 2, 
CEO 
 
- “The CEO of a CRI can walk down a research bench and say to you “Rebecca for the next ten 
years you are working on the dynamics of steel”… And like it or not, that’s your job.” (Industry 
Observer) 
 
 
Government. The representative quotations in Table 4.3 indicate the importance of 
government as shareholder and CRI regulator:  
The government wants 9 percent. So what’s coming to dominate is the money. And to some 
extent the CRIs have to bite the bullet really. They’ve got to do what their masters tell them. 
(Scientist, CRI 2) 
This quote is suggestive of how the shareholder was, at the time of the interviews, 
perceived to be dictating decision making in CRI 2. This reported immediate pressure meant 
that CRI 2 interviewees were particularly aware of government’s ability to dictate their 
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decision making and operations. They perceived themselves as currently being “driven 
rigidly by the almighty return on equity”, in response to government’s “inflexible” demands.  
By contrast, in CRI 1 alongside broad acknowledgement of its dependence on government 
there was a perception of less direct and immediate exertion of power. A degree of self-
determination with regards to delivering on government demands was outlined. For 
example, one scientist said they just needed to “tell [government] what our capabilities 
are.” There was not the impression of being directly dictated to by government that was 
evident in CRI 2. By contrast, in CRI 2, government’s requirement for a certain level of return 
was, at the time of the interviews, meaning that decisions were being implemented that 
internal stakeholders (both managers and scientists) did not agree with.  
Clients. CRI 2 was “dominated” by some “big service contract[s]”:  
Sometimes they *large client+ think we should just do as we’re told…you’ve got to constantly 
be careful that you’re not in a master/slave relationship. Where they’ve got the money and 
they just tell you what to do. (Manager, CRI 2).  
For CRI 1, responding to and engaging with clients was identified by management as central 
to their purpose (Table 4.3). Client engagement was their current focus and defined as 
crucial. Nonetheless, a comparison can be made that CRI 1 clients were not outlined as 
being able to dictate the operation of the CRI as a whole, in the way CRI 2’s large client did. 
Another example was how interviewees discussed CRI 1’s capacity to select the clients it 
engaged with, whereas this was not outlined as a possibility for CRI 2. As an industry 
observer states of CRI 1:  
I think it’s probably shifted from a false sense of democracy: ‘We will open our doors and be 
ready to service anybody.’ We’ve got to have the political spine and support to tell 
businesses…that we will do stuff with people who are ready to work with us. (Industry 
Observer) 
This distinction was also suggested by “clients” being over twice as densely coded in the 
case of CRI 2.  
Scientists. Scientists were identified as the “engine room” of both CRIs. For example, CRI 2 
managers discussed the danger of any potential downsizing. Nonetheless, it was also 
evident that managers retained the power to enforce redundancies, if required, and to 
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determine the requirements of employment (Table 4.3). Further, as was pointed out (by two 
CRI interviewees) jobs for scientifically trained employees in NZ were not readily available. 
This made them less mobile than might otherwise be assumed of such highly qualified 
‘knowledge workers’. The evidence of diffused power internally, although evident, is, 
therefore, not quite as strong as the external diffusion of power in the case for both CRIs.  
4.3.2 Divergent Objectives: CRIs 
We’re required to service industry. We’re required to make a profit. We’re required to do 
new scientific discovery. At the same time we’re required to deliver commercial outcomes 
(Manager, CRI 2).  
All CRI participants outlined the existence of divergent objectives. Four broad points of 
divergence were identified: 1) ‘research’ and ‘making money’; 2) public good and financial 
performance; 3) research and public good; and 4) definitions of public good. The tensions in 
the CRIs appeared to be particularly centred around the commercial demands:  
That we’re supposed to return 9 percent is just nonsense. But that’s just politics you see. 
That’s what you get when you have a politician running an organisation like this. *Minister X+ 
thinks he looks like the man asking for 9 percent – he just looks like a jerk! (Scientist, CRI 1).  
 
An overall impression was that CRI 2 participants perceived the level of divergence between 
objectives to be higher (++) than did CRI 1 participants (+). For example, three managers in 
CRI 1 refuted the existence of divergence, either with regards to one of the tensions, or 
initially before then acknowledging examples of divergence. The following quote indicated 
the degree of commensurability perceived by some CRI 1 stakeholders:  
I think the tensions exist until you actually start to analyse them. (Manager, CRI 1)  
Such a perspective was not made explicit in CRI 2.  
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Figure 4.2 Divergence Objectives: CRIs 
Commerical  
Public Good
Science Excellence 
Tension 3 Divergent objectives: 
Commercial and public 
good  
Tension 2
Tension 1
Divergent objectives: 
Science excellence and 
finances
Divergent 
objectives: 
Science and 
client delivery
Tension 4
Divergent objectives: 
Definition of public good 
Interview data
CRI 1: 15 –20; 22 –24; CRI 2: 27-32
Secondary data: CRI 2 SD: 6 –7; 9 –11; 
CRI 2002; 2003; 2009; 2010
Interview data
CRI 1: 15–16; 18; 20–23; CRI 2: 
25 –34; ES: 56 –57; 59; 60; 62
Secondary data
 CRI 1 SD 32; 33; CRI 2 SD: 6–7; 
9 –11;  CRI 2002; 2003; 2009; 
2010; CRI Taskforce Report; 
MoRST, 2003. 
Interview data
CRI 1: 16; 22; 23; 
CRI 2: 25–26; 28-29; 33–34
 ES: 56; 59 60
Interview data
CRI 1: 15–24;  
CRI 2: 25–32; ES: 60; 62
Also connected to revenue
 generating role of client delivery
 
Divergence 1: Science excellence & financial demands. A tension was the general difficulty 
regarding making money from science. This was highlighted by nine participants in CRI 1 and 
all CRI 2 interviewees:  
Managing that complexity between that high-commercial return and the need to invest in 
long-term research, which you may not get a return from, is a complex problem. (Board 
Member, CRI 1) 
That’s our flagship programme…It takes ten to fifteen years of investment with no return 
during that time. (Scientist, CRI 1) 
 *My field of science+ doesn’t make money - it eats up the money. (Scientist, CRI 2) 
A distinction can be made between the two cases regarding the perceived level of 
divergence. CRI 2 interviewees appeared to perceive the ability to fund research (rather 
than just delivering service outputs) without harming their bottom line to be relatively more 
difficult than those in CRI 1. The comparison is shown in the following:  
We’re in this bloody situation…there is a bit of an issue of developing a capability *via 
research+ and making sure it gets paid for… you’ve got to find new money or you’ve got to 
stop doing something else. In which case what was the point really, if you’re not expanding 
you’re revenue base? (CRI 2, Manager) 
We were able to do that [improve their finances] in parallel with a range of other activities 
such as improving our research and development outputs. (CRI 1, CEO) 
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In comparison with CRI 1, that research related activity “is not a revenue generating 
exercise”, as one CRI 2 manager explained, appeared to be perceived as particularly 
divergent by CRI 2 interviewees.  
Divergence 2: Commercial and public good. 
You can’t have a *disaster+ event and go “oh right! How much is the client prepared to pay to 
help us maximise our profit.” It just doesn’t work. And the scientists…if we were trying to 
maximise our profit on that, it wouldn’t go down that well in terms of their ethics. (Manager, 
CRI 2).  
The following above highlights that CRIs cannot be focused on profit maximization in the 
way commercial companies can be due to its public good objective. The divergence was that 
this was coupled with objectives around profit and prescribed levels of ROI. This tension was 
recognized by all CRI interview participants. For example:   
Our tension is ‘how do we earn enough money from public good services?’ (Manager, CRI 2).  
[I]n the past people have seen a – it’s not even two different ends of a spectrum because it’s 
not even a spectrum the way people have seen it - it’s been two different planets almost. 
‘This is the public good planet and this is the making money planet.’ (Manager, CRI 1) 
The references to “in the past” by the CRI 1 Manager above highlights that perceptions in 
CRI 1 were, compared with CRI 2, perhaps moving beyond seeing the two objectives as so 
highly divergent.   
Within CRI 1 this tension was frequently described by participants as divergence between an 
internal versus external (NZ focus):  
Ninety percent of the meeting is “you’ve got to meet your budget” “you’ve got to meet your 
budget” “you’ve got to meet your budget.” Which is effectively internal. I think the 
management focus has been on meeting their own budget requirements. That doesn’t 
create wealth for NZ. That’s just about making sure they keep their own house in order so 
that the management can see a profit overall…*they+ say: “you’ve got to make a profit” 
“you’ve got to make a profit.” “Why didn’t you make a profit?” (Scientist, CRI 1).  
This was also outlined in the secondary data, for example: “It is not clear if a CRI’s objective 
is to create value for itself, as a company, or to generate value for NZ” (Crown Research 
Institute Taskforce, 2010, p. 7).  
In CRI 1, an example was not being able to assist some potential clients, which some defined 
as crucial from a public good standpoint, as they could not afford the CRI’s services:  
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The public good thing is something we really can’t afford to do. (Scientist, CRI 1).  
The same scientist continues: “so they come to us, they’ll want us to do something but 
they’re not expecting to pay for it.” This issue of expectations of a free or subsidised service 
due to CRIs being government-owned while having to make a profit was raised by seven 
interviewees as a tension.  
For CRI 2 the level of divergence between these objectives was experienced as being at 
crisis level at the time of the interviews. As a scientist started “there’s a lot of panic around 
at the moment.” The experience of the tension related to the inflexible demand (by the 
board/government) of a particular level of ROI meaning CRI 2 was contemplating cuts in 
capability and, hence, in public good:  
The Board is driving the organization currently to deliver on financial outcomes rather than 
public good outcomes. Because if somebody took a step back and said “what’s the best for 
the public of NZ as a whole?” It might be CRIs having a lesser return but maintaining 
capability for the future (Manager, CRI 2) 
In response to the financial viability criterion one manager stated: “we’ve cut our 
infrastructure to the bare bone. We’re now left that any other cuts will have to be in 
national capability.” The tension was exacerbated by the expectation, already outlined, on 
the part of the clients that the CRI would “hold on” and subsidise the service due to its 
public good mandate.  
This tension in CRI 2 was also reported in relation to the commitment of the scientists to 
their public good delivery affecting the CRI’s bottom line:  
Rather than deliver what they want we have a history of over-delivery. And that’s where you 
get into trouble with our finances. Our scientists are so keen they tend to over rather than 
under deliver. So the client’s actually getting more than what they are paying for (CEO, CRI 2) 
Consequently, both CRI 2’s clients and scientists believed some services should be 
subsidised:  
What I want [CRI 2] to do is take seriously the public good component of what it does so that 
we don’t have to make a profit on every single thing that we do (Scientist, CRI 2).  
To summarize, the tension between public good and financial demands was highlighted in 
both cases. However, it was perceived as particularly divergent by CRI 2 interviewees. The 
following quotations show the slight difference in perspective:  
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The services being performed, by their nature, are public good…So you’ve got quasi-
commercial drivers on something in all other countries is seen to be free… that’s always a 
challenge. (Manager, CRI 2)  
Two or three years ago we would have been asked ‘shouldn’t you be providing that for 
free?’ This *client+ now recognises the potential value of that to them and is prepared to 
pay…there’s also going to be short-term benefits for them. So it’s only reasonable that they 
share the costs. (CEO, CRI 1) 
Perhaps indicatively, for CRI 2 it was three times more densely coded than the other 
tensions and nearly twice as densely coded than for CRI 1. 
Divergence 3: Science and client delivery. 
You were expected to go and keep up to date and do research. Do things that were expected 
because you’re a scientist. You should go on Friday afternoon to the library and read the 
journals. Well, if anyone around here started to go off on Friday afternoons to read the 
journals they’d get kicked up the bum. (Scientist, CRI 2).  
The above quote reflects how in CRI 2 finding the space to do research clashed with the 
(revenue generating) client delivery work and pressure to be focused on delivering in this 
way. Another scientist highlights this tension from another perspective:  
The only time I’ve got angry around here recently was when people were slagging off the 
*business development team+…Someone was opting to cut them adrift: “let’s just be done 
with it and we’ll just do science.” Well no one’s going to pay for it. You’re just going to die 
slowly. You’re like a rat bolting to get down the hole. There is no Elysian field where 
someone just dished out money for wonderful science out of the goodness of their heart. 
(CRI 1, Scientist) 
All except one CRI interviewee confirmed the existence of this as a tension. Two external 
participants also spoke of this general divergence between client engagement and science. 
Issues related to time frames (immediate versus long-term) and inability to predefine 
scientific outcomes due to the nature of scientific discovery were highlighted:  
My friend…used to say ‘people expect an immediate result on something that has never 
been done before’ – it makes it [engaging with industry] quite challenging. (Manager, CRI 1)  
Tensions related to the demands for aspects of traditional science indicators such as 
publishing and new knowledge were painted as conflicting with client demands in both CRIs:  
We are doing an awful lot of commercial work… it’s almost turned…certain members of the 
team…into factory workers actually. It seems to have, for want of a better word, dumbed 
the team down quite a bit…finding that balance between dumbing down your scientists with 
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the factory type commercial work…and managing to push those technological boundaries…is 
very difficult. (Scientist, CRI 1)  
Clients don’t pay us to write papers. They pay us to give them a service. (Manager, CRI 2) 
The tension is between the science culture, which is essentially a university science culture 
around publication. And there’s quite a broad-based desire amongst CRI scientists to 
participate in that culture rather than participate in the service culture of the application of 
science to their sector. And that tension manifests itself at management and board level. 
(CRI 2, Board Member) 
A greater degree of difficulty was reported for CRI 2 regarding maintaining a research 
capability rather than simply focusing on the service. For example, interviewees perceived a 
larger amount of CRI 2’s work to be incompatible with research excellence:  
One of the problems we do have in this organisation is that a lot of the work we do is routine. 
(Scientist, CRI 2) 
A perceived high degree of divergence between “research” and “service” in CRI 2 is also 
apparent in the introductory quote to this section. There the scientist reflects on a particular 
lack of space to focus on research within CRI 2. Interviewees in CRI 2 also talked about 
“research” and “client engagement” in a way that conveyed a clear distinction, and 
accompanying sense of divergence. For example:  
Often you hear things from the CEO and you think “well that doesn’t apply to me because 
I’m not service.” And I think the different groups have different challenges and you don’t 
necessarily understand service delivery people’s issues and they don’t necessarily 
understand research people’s issues. (Scientist, CRI 2) 
This level of distinction between ‘service’ and ‘research’ scientists was not as apparent in 
CRI 1.  
Divergence 4: Defining public good. 
You get these very extreme views of a customer or a group of customers – who are clients – 
trying to determine what the science should be, which gets things screwed up. (Industry 
Observer) 
A fourth tension was initially made explicit by three external stakeholders and then became 
apparent within the internal CRI interviews. There was tension identified between 
responding to immediate client need versus leading/pushing an industry sector, something 
described as having a more strategic picture of public good. For example, interviewees 
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discussed CRIs having to push their conservative industry to develop versus just delivering 
what they wanted:  
*particular CRI+ has a very Jurassic industry in its thinking. It’s just totally backward…But 
they’ve *CRI+ been doing things that are challenging the sector…And that’s challenging 
because the sector doesn’t really want to know that. But for New Zealand’s future we 
probably need people like [CRI 1] thinking like that. (Public Sector Manager) 
For CRI 1 this divergence was reported as being manifested in clients demanding an 
immediate response to their individual needs:  
You get a *small client x+ ringing up *CRI 1+ and saying, in effect: “please take your world class 
research scientists off whatever stupid stuff they are working on at the moment. I want a 
new *x+ designed. I want it by next week. You’re taxpayer owned. I pay my taxes. Do 
it.”…Actually the CRI…has assessed where NZ’s needs are…has seen where NZ’s needs might 
be tomorrow and said: “we are maintaining capability, and building capability and building 
products and services in this area. We cannot be doing this stuff over here just on a whim.” 
They are not a service organisation to that extent. (Industry Observer)  
This was also highlighted as a tension between a service focus versus building up larger 
research and IP platforms. The later may not be directly connected to a particular client’s 
expressed needs.  
With CRI 2, this divergence was articulated in the tension between new versus existing 
capabilities. Existing capabilities provided an expected service to pre-defined clients. The 
tension was how to fund research platforms that were (potentially) vital for those clients 
and NZ in the longer-term. As a CRI 2 manager explains “a different mind-set” exists 
between research and service delivery. “With service delivery you are driven by direct client 
needs.” The tension for CRI 2 was maintaining their service delivery capability and focus 
while also finding the funds and space to extend beyond that:  
*CRI 2’s+ tried to get out from underneath that *being dictated to by clients+ by doing other 
research. But then of course people say “you’re *supposed to be delivering in this particular 
area+, why are you doing this other stuff?” So they have a bit of a trouble really. (Industry 
observer, CRI 2) 
To reiterate, in CRI 2 they were fighting to avoid a “master/slave relationship” with their 
clients. By contrast, in CRI 1 there was wide recognition that: “You can’t just say, ‘go and 
help Joe Blogs fix his thing.’ It’s got to be much more mature than that.” Consequently, 
divergence was again perceived to be particularly high for CRI 2.  
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4.4 HTSUs: Pluralism 
There are multiple stakeholders with multiple requirements, expectations, and views of the 
company. Absolutely, we are a classic example of that and probably more so than most 
companies in NZ. (CEO, HTSU 1).  
4.4.1 Diffused Power  
The interviewees confirmed the existence of diffused power in the literature associated with 
HTSUs. Reliance on the providers of scientific capabilities and capital was highlighted: 
At the moment [HTSU 1] is still being propped up by a lot of people who are just helping 
(Scientist, HTSU 1) 
 With regards to investment there was a difference between the more direct pressure from 
private investors and the more passive involvement on the part of government. The key 
stakeholders were the universities (HTSU 1); private investors, scientist founders, university 
collaborators (HTSU 2), and government, summarised in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.4 Summary of diffused power: HTSUs20 
Universities [HTSU 1 only] 
Reported by: all HTSU 1 interviewees 
-  “If you get a…Vice-Chancellor…who doesn’t understand commerce at all, then they will try and control 
the subsidiary company more.” (HTSU 1, Director) 
- “We still interact very strongly with the universities. There’s a lot of information that flows backwards 
and forwards. There’s a lot of time and effort and energy that still comes into the company from the 
university.” (CEO, HTSU 1) 
- Counter point (I1; I4): “I think it’s got to the point…of being less beholden to the University….I think they 
are able to go their own way quite nicely.” (Director, HTSU 1) 
 
Private Investors  
Reported by: all HTSU 1 & 2 interviewees; also ES: 56,57, 63 
- “They are always trying to raise investment privately.” (Director,  HTSU 1)  
- “At Christmas time it was really hard, there was just no money…and I pulled in about a quarter of a 
million bucks from existing investors…I said…“I’ll give you a really great deal”…so one guy…he was happy 
then. And before that he was moaning because he was always the first to put up his money. ‘We ‘Okay 
I’ll give you $100,000.’ Every few months another $100,000.” (CEO, HTSU 2) 
- It’s a big learning curve…you do begin to realise what different things cost us and how much investor 
money you need to survive this month or next month. (Scientist employee, HTSU 2). 
 
Scientists/Research groups 
Reported by: 1-6, 7–13. 
- “The main constraint was a people constraint…*Scientist X+ couldn’t devote as much of his time as he 
should and they [HTSU 1] desperately needed material from [Scientist X+, which only he could do.”  HTSU 
1, Director.   
- In terms of the inventors we deal with them every day… they can just turn up and say ‘*CEO+ I’ve got this 
great idea we should do this’ and it’s like ‘No’…*but+ they’ve already started talking to one of the staff 
members and they’re already half way through doing it and its like ‘for god’s sake.’ HTSU 1, CEO.  
- HTSU 2 Research collaborators as important [7, 8, 10] or impactful [13]: “My next offshore trip is to 
*country x, where an institution+…is doing some analysis on our technology to kind of cross-validate it 
with other technologies particularly the current world-standard…So this is a very important…meeting. 
We know the guys quite well and this is a relationship we’ve been developing for quite a long time.” 
HTSU 2, Manager 
- Counter-point HTSU 2: As employees scientists/scientist founders being able to be directed by managers 
and the issue of lack of opportunities for their skill set in NZ (7; 12; 13).  
Government 
Reported by: HTSU 1: I2–I4; I6; HTSU 2: 7–12.  
- “You’ve got to get into a position where you can tell the government to drop dead basically." HTSU 1, 
Director, implying HTSU 1 is not yet in that position. 
- “The government was a huge player…initially they were probably the dominant extra party.” HTSU 2, 
Founder 
- “It’s *government funding+ still very important because at the moment…we don’t make money, we don’t 
come out of the red each month. So if you can get funding to update your website or send someone to a 
trade show…anything that pays for that is a bonus.” (Scientist, HTSU 2).  
                                                     
20 In both HTSUs customers, although central stakeholders, were not interviewed. This was partly due to 
customers simply being part of decision making as a component of the commercial focus rather than being 
explicitly discussed as applying a distinct demand on the company. Both HTSUs were also not forthcoming with 
potential customer interviewees. This table reflects both the structural differences and degree of access 
granted in each case. To summarise: HTSU 2 was not a spin-out and, therefore, unlike HTSU 1, does not involve 
a university stakeholder; access in HTSU 1 was restricted regarding employees and private investors; and, the 
CEO in HTSU 2 was also the dominant investor. 
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Despite the power diffusion highlighted in both HTSUs, two points of difference regarding 
the providers of their science platform were evident. First, was the involvement (both in 
terms of science and as shareholder) of the university in HTSU 1. Second, was that the 
scientist founders were perceived as having a higher degree of autonomy in HTSU 1. For 
instance, one HTSU 1 scientist founder reiterated his ability to say: “hang on; we don’t work 
for you [CEO].” This contrasts with a perception expressed in HTSU 2:  
I told them [scientist-founders/employees] what to do. (CEO, HTSU 2) 
With regards to investors, while there was not as large a distinction, there also appeared to 
be a perception in HTSU 2 that those shareholders could be managed and their input 
directed:  
I think a lot of them are his *CEO’s+ friends…He has quite a good, very personal relationship 
with the shareholders. (Scientist employee, HTSU 2) 
This difference in perspective was reflected in the boards. HTSU 1 had from the beginning a 
board the represented the university, scientists, shareholder, and private investor interests. 
By comparison, the board outlined on HTSU 2’s website in 2011 consisted of a single 
member: the CEO. This perceived lack of power diffusion in this regard was reported as a 
concern by two HTSU 2 interviewees.  
Accordingly, while both organizations operated in diffused power contexts they differed 
slightly in the degree to which this was reported on by participants. It was perceived to be 
higher in HTSU 1 (++) than HTSU 2 (+). In reflecting on both the scientists and investors, a 
quote from the HTSU 2 CEO summarises this distinction: “it’s not a democracy…It’s a little 
bit autocratic.” Finally, despite this distinction, as Table 4.4 shows, in both cases power was 
highlighted as diffused. The following quote illustrates this:  
It’s been situation normal *for start-ups] where you have so many conflicting and divergent 
agendas…I think it’s probably even more so in this particular organisation because we’ve had 
the on-going requirement for research. (Investor, HTSU 2) 
4.4.2 Divergent Objectives 
There was general confirmation of divergent objectives by all HTSU interviewees as well as 
four external stakeholders. The following is a reflection on the science/commerce divide:  
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You’ve got a bunch of people on this side who say the worlds like this and a bunch of people 
on the other side who say the worlds like that …its sort of different ways of thinking and 
looking at the world. (HTSU 1, CEO) 
Three tensions were outlined. First, was a divergence between science and the commercial 
objectives, with science objectives remaining central due to their high-tech nature. Second, 
was tension between sales and any other demands which detract from those commercial-
legitimacies (for example, a public good objective centred on contributing to NZ). Third, was 
divergence regarding the demand for ROI (Figure 4.3). In comparison with the two CoREs 
and CRIs, a distinction between the two HTSUs regarding perceived degree of divergence 
was not obvious. 
Figure 4.3 Divergent objectives: HTSUs 
Commercial  
Public Good
Science 
ROI 
Growth & Sales 
Divergent objectives: 
Business and science 
Tension  1
Divergent objectives: 
ROI as foci of tensions
Divergent objectives: 
Other objectives distracting 
from commercial objectives
Tension  2
Tension  3
Tension 1 part 
of Tension 2
Tension 2
Interview data 
HTSU 1 & 2: All; 
ES: 56, 57, 62, 63
Interview data 
HTSU 1: 1, 2, 4, 6
HTSU 2: 7–9; 11–13;
 ES:  63
Interview data 
HTSU 1: 1–3; 5–6 
HTSU 2: 7–9; 11–13;
ES:  56,57,62,63
 
Divergence 1: Business and science excellence. The following illustrates the general 
divergence between ‘science’ and ‘business’:  
I’ve been ridiculed by other pure scientists: ‘oh you don’t get your hands dirty’ and all that 
sort of stuff. There’s a real feeling out there that commercialisation’s dirty: ‘You don’t go 
there. Us pure guys.’ Those are the people who…get the prestigious stuff in this business 
*academia+…‘Don’t get your fingers dirty in the commercial stuff.’ (Scientist, HTSU 1) 
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Scientists tend to see business as dirty. Selling stuff it’s actually sort of icky. (CEO, HTSU 1) 
This was highlighted by all HTSU participants and four external stakeholders. External 
stakeholders tended to comment generally regarding the divergence between being 
focused on the technology (science) versus market relevance (commerce). For example, a 
venture capitalist argues that in technologically intensive companies those involved can 
believe: 
‘This is going to work because the science was so good.’ They totally overlooked the fact that 
the product or service being offered was of no relevance whatsoever. So they did not 
understand the fundamentals of market and market connectedness. (Venture Capitalist) 
Another manifestation of this tension was the divergence between creating new knowledge 
and refining and developing existing product offerings:  
That tension is: ‘Look you scientists want to make all these different products, but maybe we 
should kill that one and kill that one…Are you prepared to take the baby out the back and 
shoot it?’ And we say ‘oh no no.’ Because we love what we’re doing and want to try these 
things. So there’s a tension there around the people like me and the people in my team who 
want to try new things…and the company saying ‘We can’t afford to do everything.’ (Science 
Founder, HTSU 1) 
This tension between business and the freedom to explore new scientifically interesting 
avenues was also reiterated by another HTSU 1 scientist founder. He emphasized the 
freedom to “play in my sandpit”:  
The big thing for me has been product handover. I design something…*but+ I’ve got to hand 
this over so that it can be manufactured and everything has to be specified. And to me that’s 
boring…it’s not that exciting…so there’s all these necessary evils that we have to do.  
(Scientist Founder, HTSU 1).  
This was reiterated in HTSU 2 as the tension between the freedom to “potter” (in the words 
of two scientists) and being more directed in their research.  
In HTSU 2 another tension regarded when to sell and what to “claim” regarding the product. 
Those with science-based objectives were perceived as more inclined to be conservative 
and wanting to perfect the technology before taking it to the market. One of the founder’s 
outlines: “We’ve got a saying: “development’s where the rubber meets the road. And 
marketing/[CEO] is where the rubber meets the sky.” That science reputation was tied to 
being conservative and focused on technological perfection was outlined by four 
stakeholders:  
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I’m almost pathologically attracted to risk…I claim we’re going to do this. And then you’ve 
got to back it up. It’s quite a high-risk personal position to take…you’re credibility is on the 
line…Whereas your typical scientist is often quite conservative….Some of our founders were 
opposite to that. Hugely hugely worried about their reputations… *I+ sell something on a 
50:50 basis. If it’s a 50:50 call about whether it’s going to work or not you just keep moving 
along. Whereas for them, “no, no, no, you can’t tell them that, we haven’t proven that yet.” 
Five years later you’d be broke. So to some extent I sell what I expect us to be  like in three –
six months. (CEO, HTSU 2) 
In the academic world, you really seriously need to understand and have all your ‘i’s’ doted 
and ‘t’s’ crossed…and spend years proving every statement that you make. Whereas the 
commercial driver you want to make quite a song and dance about things and get a bit of a 
buzz going. So there’s a real tensions.  (Scientist Founder, HTSU 2) 
More broadly, this was also expressed as a tension between “beauty” (technological 
perfection) on the one hand and commercial realities (selling the product now) on the other.  
Another tension was outlined between commercial work and university indicators of 
research productivity and excellence:  
People like [HTSU 1 scientist] would be hard pressed to produce very high-grade research 
publications working for [HTSU 1]. (Director, HTSU 1).  
It’s been a huge problem for me personally with PBRF, for example…as you try and 
commercialise you’ve got to keep your mouth shut…So I don’t publish anything. (Scientist 
Founder, HTSU 1).  
Further, the university manager interviewed, through not recognizing this divergence 
helped confirm this reported tension. His perspective was that if they were “good scientists” 
their HTSU work would still result in “publishing and other things that the university wants.”  
Two additional manifestations of this tension were raised explicitly by HTSU 2 participants. 
First, four interviewees outlined the tension of research as an expense that did not 
necessarily contribute directly to their commercial objectives:  
It does tend to gobble up large volumes of money without an output that can necessarily be 
taken to market. (Manager, HTSU 2).  
A further tension point of divergence by three interviewees concerned time. This was 
highlighted in terms of the HTSU 2’s scientists and their collaborators:  
Something at *university collaborator+ was going to take six months and I said “shit, it’s going 
to take two weeks.” And in fact it has dribbled on for four to six weeks already…that’s 
ridiculous. (CEO, HTSU 2)  
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This exploration leads into, and indeed is part of, the broader tension that sees anything not 
directly connected to sales as a distraction.  
Divergence 2: Commercial and other objectives. 
Running a little business in a high-tech area where your market is principally outside NZ is 
hard enough…without having other people impose other agendas…you can just do without. 
(HTSU 1, Director).   
The interviewees outlined divergence between sales and anything not directly tied to this 
objective. The divergence already highlighted above between science and commerce is part 
of this tension. However, it also included public good type objectives as well as political 
motivations such as engaging with government. With the science-based objectives already 
outlined above, this second cluster of objectives will now be focused on. This was most 
explicitly evident within the interview with HTSU 1’s CEO. The need to focus on “growth” 
and not being “distracted” by additional legitimacy demands was discussed, with 
“distracted” being used in this sense five times within the interview.  
In HTSU 1, the CEO, directors, and university manager highlighted this tension regarding 
anything outside the commercial realm being potentially detracting. For example, a Director 
outlined how government-based objectives: “interfere and distract you from the business 
that you are supposed to be running and at the end of the day you’ve got to ask yourself 
“what the hell was all that about?” The CEO discussed how even going for a local award 
could be potentially distracting as it was not directly linked to sales:  
“My initial reaction was “no”…why should we waste our time…when it’s not really going to 
help us *in relation to export sales+.” (CEO, HTSU 1) 
For HTSU 2, the main example of additional objectives distracting from sales was highlighted 
in relation to their research collaborations. HTSU 2 participants either expressed frustration 
that they were not commercially oriented or indicated efforts to move beyond them and 
become more sales rather than partnership oriented:  
The reality is if that [collaboration] does not translate into money in the door then it 
becomes a liability. (Scientist employee, HTSU 2) 
Mirroring the discussion in HTSU 1, two HTSU 2 interviewees also outlined how involvement 
with government can be distracting: 
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Some of the *government’s+ focus in terms of advancing NZ Inc. brands…you’ve got to do 
that to an extent to keep them happy. So there is a bit of wasted effort there. (Scientists 
Founder, HTSU 2) 
HTSU 2’s CEO also outlined that some stakeholders regarded his objective of remaining NZ 
owned and located as naive:  
They [FRST] regard it as a little naïve. They think that you need the foreign partners to do 
any good… *And I think+ we don’t need to have them *foreign investors+ controlling the 
company.  (CEO, HTSU 2).  
This is indicative of the perceived tension between public good/NZ focused objectives and a 
more purely commercial focus.  
To conclude, an example of this tension between public good and commercial objectives is 
provided below by the university manager speaking as a HTSU 1 shareholder: 
[Scientist founder] talks about those things *public good focus+ but …I have to be interested 
primarily in the benefits that the University can capture because we’re not running a charity 
here…Because, it’s not in my job description to make the government look good. I’m here 
just here to make a dollar for us (University Shareholder, HTSU 1) 
This quote leads into the final tension focused around return on investment. 
Divergence 3: ROI as a source of tension.  
As you get seed or investment funding, once you get equity partners you start to get 
different tensions. There are lots and lots of examples of that. (Public Sector Manager) 
Both the HTSUs had brought in private investors with ROI expectations. This, as the above 
quote indicates, brings in additional pressures. The ROI objective was perceived as a source 
of tension in three ways. First, a focus on ROI heightens the tensions already illustrated 
above through being the toughest litmus test of commercial success for an HTSU to achieve 
(e.g., in contrast to general indicators of growth). Second, some stakeholders saw it as 
opposed to other commercially oriented goals such as long-term growth. Third, it brought 
into focus different timelines and relationships to risk. An example was the reported 
divergence between a shorter-term ROI focus and the CEO’s, still commercial, vision: 
Their [Venture Capitalist’s+ primary goal is looking at an exit strategy…That isn’t *CEO’s] 
aspiration for the company. He wants to build a company that has value and keep it in NZ, 
not sell it offshore. So there’s a fundamental philosophical difference between *CEO’s+ 
view…and the venture capital. (Manager, HTSU 2) 
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This tension was discussed by five HTSU 1 and four HTSU 2 interviewees and four external 
stakeholders.  
That the all-consuming nature of the ROI requirement can heighten tensions was discussed:  
The big challenge with spin-off companies is typically the balance of the financial 
drivers…Typically the financial drivers on companies can be quite dramatic. Particularly if 
they have significant venture capital investment which is expecting their share price to hit 
key targets…if you’re a start-up company and you’ve got venture capitalist that’s invested 
$250,000 and you know that in a year’s time your share price has to be worth $2.50 so that 
they can get a return. Your share price is currently worth 90 cents. That’s a huge driver to 
change the dynamics of the company. (Public Sector Manager).  
The later stage the investor coming in…the more demanding they are for returns. And they 
don’t care about wonderful science…So there’s a big tension there. (Venture Capitalist).  
The CEO in HTSU 1 provides a similar example of how the ROI criteria can be particularly 
hard to align with other objectives:  
We have our very commercial shareholder who just basically invested cash…He would be 
thinking, ‘why do I necessarily care about the reputation with FRST?’ ‘Why do I really care 
about all these other things that all the other directors and shareholder think is important?’ 
If you are purely focused on ROI then a lot of the other stuff we do, the more intangible 
benefits don’t really translate into benefits. (CEO, HTSU 1) 
In both HTSUs interviewees distinguished between ROI and other commercial goals such as 
long-term growth, implicitly perceiving them as in tension: 
You’ve got to be careful too because you can have investors which all they want to do is 
basically come in take everything and rip you off [Scientist Founder, HTSU 1] 
Observable in the quotations above are the issues of risk and timelines that the ROI 
objective brings into focus:   
There are the people who say ‘I want to rapidly ramp up this business in two or three years 
time. I’m impatient’… Another approach might be to say: ‘We really want to be here building 
up this company almost organically if you like. Within its own portfolio of products over 
many many years…we are determined to be safe.’ In other words it’s a question of risk. You 
go for the high risk, quick return, or do you go for the slightly lower risk longer term 
approach… it is another one of the central issues that we are continually in tension about. 
(HTSU 1, Scientist) 
These issues around risk and timelines were discussed by nearly half of HTSU participants. 
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4.5 Summary: Chapter Four 
This chapter described the organizations through a focus on the theoretically informed 
phenomenon of interest: stakeholder legitimacy demands and pluralism. The two 
dimensions of pluralism: divergent objectives and diffused power were explored. The cases 
of a similar type dealt with similar forms of power diffusion and divergent objectives. 
Despite pluralism being evident in all organizations, subtle differences were also evident 
between similar cases (for example, CoRE 1 and CoRE 2). Participants perceived the degree 
of pluralism to be slightly higher (++) in some cases than in others (+) (Table 4.5).  
Table 4.5 Summary of pluralism 
Cases Diffused power Divergent objectives 
 
CoRE 1 
 
+ 
perceived degree of diffusion. 
 
 
+ 
perceived degree of divergence 
CoRE 2 ++ 
perceived degree of diffusion 
 
++ 
perceived degree of divergence. 
 
CRI 1 
 
+ 
perceived degree of diffusion. 
 
 
+ 
perceived degree of divergence 
 
        CRI 2 ++ 
perceived degree of diffusion 
++ 
perceived degree of divergence. 
 
HTSU 1 
 
+ 
perceived degree of diffusion. 
 
 
 
Similar 
perceived degree of divergence 
HTSU 2 ++ 
perceived degree of diffusion 
 
   
This provides the foundation for explicating the legitimacy strategies within each of the 
cases in relation to that pluralism. The contextual descriptions will returned to in the 
discussion as a way of further exploring certain ‘legitimacy strategies’ that were 
implemented in certain cases.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Findings: Legitimacy Strategies and Pluralism 
Often you have totally different cultures between business and science. Where the 
success occurs is where…they dance and don’t stand on each other toes. (Manager, CRI 
1).  
Given the primary focus of this thesis on legitimacy strategies, if Chapter 4 was 
described as setting the contextual scene, Chapter 5 is what the scene was being set for. 
It outlines the strategies each of the six cases implemented based on the perceptions of 
those involved. In reference to the introductory quote: I am exploring the dance these 
organizations engage in as they manage their legitimacy demands amidst pluralism.  
Each of the six organizations are first addressed individually. The framework – 
transcension, negotiation, compartmentalization, and contraction, provides 
categorization for the inductively derived sub-themes. Each section follows the same 
pattern: depiction of the main strategies, followed by briefly discussing any less 
prevalent strategic themes. Finally, before the section is concluded a concise overview 
of stakeholder assessments of the legitimacy strategies implemented is provided. The 
same order that was utilized for Chapter 4 is again followed here: science organizations 
focused on basic (CoREs), applied (CRIs), and commercialized (HTSUs) research.  
5.1 CoRE 1: Legitimacy Strategies 
The central ‘strategic story’ conveyed in CoRE 1 was a combination of transcension and 
negotiation. These are represented in Figure 5.1 and will be discussed in turn, beginning 
with transcension due to its primacy in understanding the strategies. Of all the cases, 
CoRE 1 will be shown to provide the most obvious example of an organization embracing 
both the divergent objectives (e.g., ‘expanded vision’ and ‘expanding expectations’) and 
diffused power (‘democratic partnership’ and ‘entwining with the system’) that defined 
its context.  
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Figure 5.1 CoRE 1: Legitimacy strategies21 
 
Transcension
Contraction 
Compart-
mentalization
   Negotiation
Expanding 
what’s 
expected
Democratic 
partnership
Expanded 
vision
Entwining 
within system
Leading the way
(Self-defining)
  Managing the 
periphery
 (flexible balance)
Manipulation
Integration
Segregation
Adaptation
 
5.1.1 Transcension 
Four CoRE 1 strategies can be defined in terms of high-degrees of agency (i.e., 
transformation of context and stakeholders) as well as integration (they were inclusive 
of multiple stakeholders legitimacy demands). The ability to ‘rise above the tension’ 
through these strategies involved moving beyond the traditional limits of their context 
(i.e., agency). While not the focus of the following discussion, their capacity to 
implement the following strategies and innovations can be understood in the enabling 
context of the increased funding that the formation of the CoREs entailed.  
Leading the way (self-defining).  
                                                     
21 Dashed lined in Figure 5.1 as well as in the similar figures for other 5 cases (Figures 5.2; 5.3; 5.6; 5.7; 5.8) 
indicate strategies that appear particularly interconnected.  
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They’ve blazed their own path in a way. (Chairman, CoRE 1)  
Nearly all CoRE 1 participants, plus an additional 6 interviewees external to the 
organization identified the capacity of CoRE 1 to “blaze their own path.” Participants 
described CoRE 1 as leading the way and, in doing so; self-defining what a legitimate 
CoRE looked like. Internal reports as well as newsletters and a media article also 
provided examples of this strategy.  
This strategy was connected to the CoREs being new entities:  
TEC was feeling its way; they were learning too. We had the opportunity to drive the 
process in directions they felt comfortable with but where we were setting the agenda. 
Now that’s because it was a new phenomenon. We were able to grab it by the throat 
and take it where we wanted to take it. (Director, CoRE 1)  
This freedom continues into the present; another Director explains:  
I don’t think they *TEC+ have a strong clear view of what a CoRE should be. So to some 
extent our job is to try and develop that with them...it’s a benign disinterest. (Director, 
CoRE 1)  
This strategy was particularly evident in the interviews with the three directors and TEC 
manager. 
CoRE 1 made the most of this opportunity to self-define through initiating innovative 
ideas and thinking. This meant it did not follow the direction set by others. For example, 
interviewees from the second CoRE included in this study instead reflect on CoRE 1 
setting the format other CoREs were then required to follow:  
To some extent, it’s *government expectations+ been influenced by the CoREs that have 
been the most successful *including CoRE 1+…So the rest of the CoREs are trying to 
follow their model. (PI, CoRE 2)  
Indeed, being first and trying new things was seen as a defining aspect of CoRE 1 and an 
ongoing challenge:  
The group was miles ahead of the game. That’s a plus, but it’s also a minus. The easiest 
thing in the world to do is to have a cup of tea. But the moment you have a cup of tea 
and let the world catch up with you you’re doomed. So you have to keep reaching 
forward. (Chairman, CoRE 1)  
This sense of momentum was perceived by participants as also important vis-à-vis CoRE 
1’s relationships with its partner organizations: 
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When the [RS&T] Minister Mapp came for a visit to [partner CRI], one of the first things 
he asked was ‘why aren’t you guys associated with the *CoRE 1+?” Luckily our CEO was 
able to say “ah we are.” So our partner institutions see a value in being associated with 
us (Director, CoRE 1)  
This was also important with regards to the relationship of internal participants with the 
CoRE. An example is explicitly connecting their identification with CoRE 1 to its strategy 
of leading the way:  
*CoRE 1+ first, *University+ second. There’s *CoRE 1+ because they’re pushing forwards. It 
was leading the way. (PhD Student, CoRE 1)  
Another aspect in terms of this strategy of self-defining was highlighted as CoRE 1’s 
focus on self-evaluation:   
We’re quite keen on measuring ourselves and understanding ourselves. We had this 
idea that we would be harder on ourselves than anyone looking in. So we’ll be the 
harshest judge of our own performance. (Director, CoRE 1) 
The freedom to self-define was seen as entailing an obligation to self-monitor their 
performance:  
We have been entrusted and boy we better reward that trust. Show that that trust was 
worthy. (Director, CoRE 1) 
For instance, individuals were asked to leave the CoRE if they were not producing at the 
required level of excellence. In all eight participants discussed CoRE 1’s ability to define 
its own objectives as linked to its capacity to self-monitor in this way.  
A final aspect of CoRE 1’s ability to lead and self-define was discussed as lobbying with 
government more broadly (as opposed to simply within its relationship to TEC). For 
example:  
Why back to Wellington? Because this is about political process….there’s an element of 
politics here. It’s about showing that there’s impact…making that argument *to 
government] that individually as world-class research groups we have a certain amount 
of clout but put together in a network in a partnership like [CoRE 1] we have a huge 
amount of international clout. (Director, CoRE 1)  
Being active at this policy level was mentioned by eight participants. 
Expanded vision. Having expanded objectives beyond funding research excellence was 
central to how CoRE 1 saw themselves: 
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I remember [the director] saying ‘we’ve got to tick every one of these boxes’…the first 
set of criteria was pretty high and we set out to tick all the boxes. (Chairman, CoRE 1).  
Part of this is saying ‘okay excellent science is absolutely vital to what we do. But it’s 
only part of the story. And in a way it’s the least interesting part.’ It’s probably the 
hardest part to get right but the interesting part is the added value around that. So then 
it becomes things like culture change.  (Director, CoRE 1) 
A determination to “be the best” (again to quote the Chairman) was behind CoRE 1 
leading the way (as above). However, it was also connected to CoRE 1 setting 
themselves an expanded set of objectives. The majority (ten of twelve) participants 
explicitly described CoRE 1 in this way: an expanded vision was part of what defined 
CoRE 1. Rather than involving an overarching singular objective as such, this involved the 
embracing of an expanded view of science and its role.  
An expanded vision was accepted as central to CoRE 1 from the start:  
There were very clear expectations of that from the time that [CoRE 1] was established. 
And I think that that certainty has been embraced by the PIs in the Institute…the 
rationale for the [CoRE 1] was that it would do these things...it was perfectly clear to us 
in constructing this bid that there had to be more than science excellence. (PI, CoRE 1)  
This vision was personified and communicated in stories and in the individuals or names 
associated with the organization. At least 5 interviewees conveyed this:  
The other driver was [famous scientist] himself who was an inspiration for many of us. 
His name is behind the *CoRE+. *He+ was an active communicator of science…So in a 
sense we saw the power of that kind of activity within science…We kind of had the sense 
of picking up his inspiration and ultimately his legacy. (Director, CoRE 1) 
These objectives were reflected in how CoRE’s funding and resources were managed:  
We’ve got a large amount of money coming in. So let’s make sure that we set aside a 
significant amount of money…to build that added dimension. (Director, CoRE 1)  
It was also pointed out by six participants that the broadly defined and multi-faceted 
nature of this vision enabled those involved internally to have their own relationship to 
the fulfilment of these. For example:  
There’s certainly a difference in perspective. But there’s generally a common goal to 
achieve good science in a NZ context, preferably but not necessarily of relevance to NZ. I 
think everyone, although they may put different emphases on it, on different aspects of 
it, would have those sort of general objectives. (AI, CoRE 1)  
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This picture of flexibility with regards to the objectives outside of the science excellence 
“foundation” making up this vision will be outlined further below as a negotiation 
strategy.  
Expand what is expected (of scientists). 
Interviewer: So it’s almost, because of what’s given, expecting more [of your PIs]?  
Director: Yes, so we are a bit greedy that way. (Director, CoRE 1)  
CoRE 1’s capacity to lead the way and encompass an expanded vision was connected to 
a strategy of expanding what was expected of its PIs and scientists generally. ‘Expecting 
more’ from scientists was mentioned by 10 interviewees in relation to the CoRE’s ability 
to meet multiple demands beyond science excellence. This involved connecting the 
expectations the CoRE had of the PIs to the expanded objectives:  
We are not just a funding agency. We’re going to change behaviours here. (Director, 
CoRE 1) 
This ability to “expect more” and “change behaviours” was connected to the benefits 
and funding associated with being a PI of the CoRE:   
Now [research] freedom comes at a cost. We ask them [PIs] all to – they actually have to 
do some voluntary service for us…we do have a requirement that they will commit to 
the broader objectives of [CoRE 1], which are around public communication, outreach, 
even in some of the industry engagement and they have to report on what they’ve done 
along those lines. (Director, CoRE 1)  
We’ve written the rules and conditions for being a PI and we have a very stringent 
requirement for additional contribution beyond science…You don’t get into this *CoRE+ 
unless you buy into this vision and say “what are you going to do to help? What are you 
going to do for kids? What are you going to do about educating the public? What are 
you going to do about commercialization?”…The fact that you’re a fabulous scientist 
that’s nice but it’s not enough.” So we’ve formalized that more now. (Director, CoRE )  
Other interviewees described this as a “tax” associated with the research funding a PI 
status provides.  
This process was, however, identified as being more transformative than simply being a 
negotiated exchange for funding:  
There was a change in mentality introduced with the creation of [CoRE 1] in which 
people who were in their own isolated ivory towers…that has been transformed. 
(Scientist, CoRE 1) 
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What the institute’s doing is changing what it is to be an academic…And it’s almost doing 
it from the inside in a positive way. (PhD student, CoRE 1) 
This focus on transforming academic scientists suggests the strategy is one of 
transcension.  
Entwining within existing system.  
Let’s own nothing and employ no one. ( Director, CoRE 1)  
A strategy of becoming part of, rather than being distinct from or in competition with, 
the existing system was outlined as directed predominantly at the CoRE’s partner 
organizations. It can be described as a strategy of embracing the diffused power context. 
Expanding on the introductory quote above, this strategy was outlined as manifested in 
decisions regarding the ownership structure:  
The approach of the Institute that it employs no-one and owns nothing helped a great 
deal in terms of breaking down the barriers. (University Science Department Manager, 
CoRE 1)  
We are going to be organisation that owns nothing and employs no one. What is the 
effect of that? It means you approach this in a different way. You say we are building a 
partnership here. That partnership comprises of institutions. The problem is that there 
have been institutional rivalries…There’s naturally going to be suspicion. If we have a 
brilliant idea who owns the intellectual property? Not us. Who will own it? You [the 
universities+ will own it…PI’s in our *CoRE+ have employment contracts with [their 
various institutions]. None of that is going to be perturbed in the slightest. (Director, 
CoRE 1)  
Lack of “ownership” was central to CoRE 1 being seen as entwined within and part of its 
partner organizations. This strategy of entwining itself within the existing system was 
outlined by 7 interviewees. While it was the least densely coded strategy it was also 
explicitly reiterated as a strategy in three secondary data documents.  
An additional component of this strategy was developing ambiguous rather than clearly 
defined boundaries: 
We are wanting to enmesh ourselves and entwine ourselves into the whole organ of the 
RS&T environment. Because the more we are enmeshed in everything, the more 
successful I think we are as an Institute. We don’t want to separate ourselves out and 
say “this is us and this is what we do and we’re competing with everything else.” We 
want to show how things can be done collaboratively and within all the other funding 
schemes and agencies within the system. (Director, CoRE 1)  
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By far the strength of this *CoRE+ is that we are…not defined. We cross over a lot with 
the *particular department/school+ because we work together….There’s a blurry line and 
long may it stay blurry. Because immediately once you say “this is what you do. And 
there’s the line” we’re in trouble, because that’s not how this *CoRE+ works. 
(Administrative manager, CoRE 1)  
Becoming part of rather than competing with the existing system enabled CoRE 1 to 
manage the demands of those stakeholders and help determine their relationship to 
them. The relationships were transformed from one of an external stakeholder (i.e., a 
partner organization) making demands on CoRE 1, to the partner being more likely to 
see its own success entwined in that of the CoRE’s. This shifted the debate from being 
about institutional interests to a broader sense of shared ownership.  
5.1.2 Negotiation  
Two negotiation strategies were evident in CoRE 1. The first involved partially adapting 
to some legitimacy demands. The second involved enabling multiple stakeholders to be 
represented in decision making. Both remained inclusive of multiple objectives but were 
more adaptive and less focused on transformation than the transcension strategies 
above. 
Managing the periphery through maintaining a balance. In CoRE 1, science excellence was 
discussed by the participants as the centre around which the periphery (other legitimacy 
demands such as commercialization and outreach) was balanced. For example:  
At the hard core of [CoRE 1] there is this matter of science quality. (Director, CoRE 1).  
This managing of the periphery strategy also explicitly incorporated ‘balance’ as a 
central to enabling this. A balanced approach to the incorporation of additional 
demands helped avoid detracting from the CoRE’s research excellence. This balance in 
relation to the “hard core” was also outlined as enabled by a flexible trial and error, 
rather than fixed or dogmatic, relationship to these additional demands. However, 
similarly, maintaining ‘balance’ reflects how incorporating these multiple objectives was 
accepted (as discussed above). This strategy was outlined within ten interviews. 
Firstly, this strategy was explained in terms of maintaining a balance: avoiding imbalance 
in relation to the science foundation. This is highlighted below:   
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[the Director] managed to give the different emphases the right proportion in the [CoRE]. 
Say “look we are not going to become an Institute of Management…we are not going to 
become an educational institution doing outreach all the time, we are not going to 
become a business generator with people spinning off companies every week. Our 
mission has got to be the science…The rest has to be there in its right proportion. I think 
that’s the right approach. You don’t want to be concentrating only on one topic. But you 
don’t want to be doing everything because it’s then unrealistic…But you have to do 
some of it in the right proportion. (PI, CoRE 1)  
Where other CoREs have got into problems is where they have gone out and they’ve 
stretched the boundaries too far...long term the activity might have been to support 
excellence but…perhaps *it+ did not require that excellence to be the key reason for why 
you are doing something. So that’s quite important that we hold on to that. (Director, 
CoRE 1)  
Partially adapting to rather than over-emphasizing demands beyond research excellence 
enabled this balance:  
Asking people to think harder about what commercial applications might come from 
their work has been healthy enough…that hasn’t been a problem. But because all these 
people are scientists first and foremost they haven’t spent huge amounts of time 
chasing commercial applications as opposed to doing good science…it’s dangerous for 
CoREs….to chase commercialisation too hard. (University manager, CoRE 1)  
As long as that [CoRE activities outside research] takes up a reasonable amount of my 
time – say 25 percent of my time – then its fine (PI, CoRE 1)  
Second, important to enabling this capacity to balance the ‘periphery’ was having a 
flexible and “not defined” relationship to demands outside research excellence. Balance 
was contained in promulgating stories regarding many different activities that did not 
over-emphasize any one area of “relevance.” This was observable in both the interviews 
and CoRE newsletters. Parity between these different activities geared at responding to 
the demand for relevance meant overemphasizing on any one element in relation to 
other objectives was avoided, for example, spin-outs or outreach with schools. This is 
connected to their approach of ticking “every one of these boxes.” Through this 
multifaceted approach CoRE 1 could flexibly demonstrate its relationship to different 
non-science related demands as required:  
We don’t have formal objectives around engagement with industry. We don’t say “we 
need at least ten people doing twenty visits with industry.” We let some of those things 
fall where they lie. We did at the start, have a plan on having an [event] every two years. 
But that fell over…so we just let that go into a “happen naturally” mode. (Director, CoRE 
1)  
That’s *emphasis on commercialization+ waxed and waned…it was a strong focus of the 
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original bid. Then followed the realisation that commercialization wasn’t going to be 
straight forward. (University department manager, CoRE 1)  
Different legitimacy demands (e.g., commercialization) were in this way flexibly 
incorporated in relation to the research foundation of the CoRE rather than dogmatically 
demanded. Importantly, this trial and error approach meant CoRE 1 was able to adapt its 
emphasis as the success or otherwise of different endeavours became evident. Further, 
at the PI level the CoRE’s multifaceted and balanced approach to relevance based 
demands meant they could then find individual way of contributing. This enabled them 
to balance this in relation to their research and interests rather than it impacting 
negatively or being all-consuming at the individual level.  
In summary, CoRE 1 incorporated a combination of elements indicative of negotiation 
here: a flexible balance developed through adapting partially to some legitimacy 
demands. This enabled different objectives to be incorporated in a way that did not 
adversely impact research excellence but instead moved around it.  
Democratic partnership: “Organ of democratic power.”  
Where does the power lie? It’s not the director. The Director’s role is to provide 
leadership, not exercise power…You have to carry people with you by having this 
democratically elected group that actually made the decisions. (Director, CoRE 1) 
Interviewees reflected on the use of democratic principles of representation and 
inclusion as exemplified in the quote above. This ‘democratic partnership’ was identified 
as a strategy by nine interviewees. It involved embracing the diffused nature of its 
stakeholder relationships and emphasized providing stakeholders with a voice and 
involvement in CoRE 1’s decision making. It provided a space within which the different 
PIs and partner organizations involved could negotiate. It was consequently defined by 
an inclusive impulse (integration) as well as being responsive (rather than focus on self-
autonomy or manipulation). As well as being reflected in representation-based 
structures, this strategy was also outlined in terms of foundational values of partnership 
and fairness that defined the CoRE: 
The values of [CoRE 1] are: partnership, collegiality, equity, fairness, transparency. 
(Director, CoRE 1)  
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These values were also explicitly reiterated in various reports and newsletters associated 
with the CoRE (Table 5.1). They are indicative of a sense of fairness enabling the give and 
take required for effective negotiation.  
A focus on representation was outlined in relation to both the partner organization and 
PIs. The CoRE’s board was built around balanced representation from the partner 
organizations and the CoRE’s decision-making body was an elected body of PIs from 
different parts of the CoRE. These structural elements were confirmed in the CoRE’s 
website. The effect of this representational structure in relation to the PIs was outlined:  
Another thing is our *decision making body+. It’s an elected body…and that manages the 
way we spend our money…The fact that it’s elected and we try and maintain a balance 
between the different institutions and it’s fairly transparent, by and large everyone gets 
an opportunity to be involved in it, and it lets people buy-in. It’s a mechanism by which 
you feel connected. (Director, CoRE 1)  
This connection between balanced representation at the board level and the ability to 
foster a greater feeling of connectedness to CoRE 1 was also reported in relation to the 
partner organizations:  
Having a representative at the board ensured that [my organization] at the management 
level has a continued interest. So I think it was a very positive thing. Otherwise…by now 
*my organization+ might have said “are you making enough money from it. If not. Then 
that’s not in our strategic interest.” But being a true fully recognised member puts a 
different spin on it. (PI, CoRE 1)  
This quote is indicative of the link (Figure 5.1) between this negotiation strategy and the 
transcentive strategy, outlined above, of the CoRE entwining itself within the system.  
At the PI level, these democratic structures and practices fostered acceptance by 
internal participants of decisions made. As the Chairman outlines: “there’s ownership by 
the group itself” even in the face of tough decision regarding, for example, asking some 
PIs to leave the CoRE. These decisions were negotiated by the group:  
They *review panel+ suggested…“look sooner or later you’re going to have to say good-
bye to people…Why don’t you set up some kind of small group so that when the time 
comes it’s not seen as being these bad guys *management+ up there? (Chairman, CoRE 1)  
Behind these democratic systems was an ethos of inclusiveness and fairness rather than 
being dominated by a single voice:  
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[Our] governance board has representation from those major partner organisations. So 
there is a forum for those organisations to have their voices heard…*It+ isn’t controlled in 
a majority of one or any of the partners…it has to be consultative. (Director, CoRE 1).  
Then there’s the thing about the story telling. We’ll be meticulous about when we are 
telling stories to give credit to everyone…And we make absolutely certain that *the host] 
is not dominating this…we make sure we tell a story about everyone so that no one 
story is missed out. (Director, CoRE 1) 
Transparency and open communication was also important as a way of helping foster 
those values of inclusion and fairness central to this strategy:  
I felt valued because people were communicating with me…In some ways because they 
were virtual and they realised that they would have this problem of engaging they 
focused on it and it became one of their best features. (PhD Student, CoRE 1) 
CoRE 1 fostered underlying values that enabled an active forum of negotiation between 
multiple stakeholders. It was based on the ideas of balance representation this strategy 
entailed, something central to discussions of negotiation. This fostered a sense of 
fairness and assisted in breaking down strong distinctions of “them” and “us” between 
the CoRE and its stakeholders. In this way this negotiation strategy was strongly 
associated with the strategy of ‘entwining within system’ transcension strategy (Figure 
5.1). This strategy, along with the other sub-themes surfaced, is depicted in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 CoRE 1 legitimacy strategies: Summary22 
Strategies   
 Summary of CoRE 1 data-set 
Interviewees: 35–47; Transcribed data: 722 minutes 
External stakeholders [ES]: 56, 58, 61, 62.  
Secondary data [SD]: CoRE 1 SD 1–19 
 
Transcension  
 
Leading the way 
(self-defining) 
 
 
 
Interviews: 17 interviewees [35–37, 39–45, 47, ES: 56, 58, 
61; CoRE 2 interviewees: 48, 51, 54] 
Coding density: 67 separate data segments.  
SD: CoRE 1 SD 1–3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 16; 19 
 
 
Expanded vision 
 
 
Interviews: 11 interviewees [35–39;  41–43, 45, 47; ES: 58] 
Coding density: 49 
SD: CoRE 1 SD 1,3, all newsletters (especially 10, 12–13, 20) 
 
 
Expand what’s expected 
(of scientists) 
 
Interviewees: 9 interviewees [35–39,  41, 43, 45, 47] 
Coding density: 31 
 
 
Entwining within system 
 
Interviews: 7 interviewees [35–40, 45]. 
Coding density: 19 
SD: CoRE 1 SD 1, 3, 13 
Negotiation  
 
Managing the periphery 
through maintaining balance 
 
 
Interviewees: 10 interviewees [35–40, 43, 45, 46; ES: 62]. 
Coding density: 46 
SD: CoRE 1 SD 8, 17. Flexible balance also evident in 
newsletters more widely.  
 
 
Democratic partnership 
 
Interviews: 9 interviewees [35–38, 41, 43–45, 47] 
Coding density: 35 
SD: CoRE 1 SD 1–3, 5, 13, 18, CoRE website.  
5.1.3 Less Prevalent Strategies  
Compartmentalization. A degree of compartmentalization was discussed in relation to a 
strategy of “expanded objectives.” PIs were able to focus on particular things depending 
                                                     
22 The numbers reflect the code given to each interview and secondary data document. The codes are 
provided in Tables 3.4 and 4.5.  
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on their own personal interests and strengths. This enabled a degree of segregation at 
the individual level:   
That’s the whole thing underpinning science: let people follow where they want to 
go…you can create that within the [CoRE]. Just let people do what they do best. But 
increase the metrics (PhD student, CoRE 1) 
Six interviewees (across nine separate data segments) discussed this element of 
enabling PIs to isolate particular CoRE objectives.  
Contraction. Contraction was not evident with the strategies centred on achieving 
multiple objectives and inclusion of multiple stakeholders. For example, even though the 
compartmentalization strategy above outlined that individuals can separate themselves 
from some legitimacy demands placed on the CoRE, such as commercialization, the 
requirement for PIs to contribute in some way beyond a contracted focus on science 
excellence remained.   
5.1.4 Assessments of Strategies and Legitimacies 
I really do look at how [CoRE 1] handled things as a model for how we can manage 
relationships between the different players in the science sector. (Director, CoRE 1) 
Exploring the assessment of the strategies engaged in CoRE 1 was relatively 
unproblematic: there was wide-spread recognition regarding the success of CoRE 1 
generally and their legitimacy strategies specifically. This included external stakeholders 
and interviewees from CoRE 2. For example, participants in CoRE 2 referred to some 
CoRE 1 strategies, such as the expanded set of objectives, as ones they would like to 
emulate. Similarly, the secondary data used terms such as “exemplar.”  
Seven participants directly connected their positive assessments of CoRE 1 approach 
with its embracing of pluralism. For example:   
It’s almost that by setting itself these broad objectives that that was why people 
responded positively to it. (PhD student, CoRE 1) 
Positive assessments were not solely focused on the transcension strategies. Explicitly 
positive comments, for example, regarding the democratic partnership strategy from PIs 
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and directors, are evident in the relevant section above. Participants also outlined the 
success of the negotiation strategy of maintaining balance:  
The balance we have achieved in [CoRE 1] at the moment looks to be pretty close to the 
ideal. I think that if you move too much into doing more outreach or trying to excel in 
areas that are not our – management areas and things like this – we would probably 
start spreading ourselves too thin. (Scientist, CoRE 1) 
The closest any stakeholder came to expressing a less positive assessment regarding the 
strategies was the university manager who considered the democratic partnership 
strategy to sometimes be more problematic from the university host’s perspective than 
if decision making had been more closely tied to the host. However, the university 
manager simultaneously acknowledged the benefits of this strategy more broadly.  
5.1.5 Summary: CoRE 1 
This discussion of CoRE 1 has outlined multiple legitimacy strategies of transcension and 
negotiation. These strategies were assessed positively by stakeholders involved. CoRE 2 
will now be outlined and provides a different strategic picture.  
5.2 CoRE 2: Legitimacy Strategies 
The strategic story of CoRE 2 was told in a temporal fashion by the interviewees. This 
was evident to the degree that one interviewee differentiated the CoRE through two 
labels: “CoRE 2 – One” and “CoRE 2 – Two.” Stage one is dominated by a ‘contraction’ 
strategy: focusing on and excelling at research excellence. Stage two is one of 
‘negotiation’ as the CoRE reaches compromises with its stakeholders regarding meeting 
additional legitimacy demands. These strategies are represented in Figure 5.2 and will 
be discussed below adhering to the temporal sequence. Despite this shift in which 
strategy was ‘dominant’, the two strategies also overlapped through aspects of both 
being evident during each phase.  
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Figure 5.2 CoRE 2: legitimacy strategies 
Transcension
Contraction 
Compart-
mentalization
   Negotiation
Stage 1: 
Focusing on 
singular objective
compromise  
(science 
excellence)
compromise 
(relevance)
Stage 2: 
Partial adaptation: 
Focus on outreach
Manipulation
Integration
Segregation
Adaptation
 
5.2.1 Contraction 
Stage 1: Focusing on singular objective. 
People just thought “bugger it.” A lot of the time we get signals from the government 
that we should change this or change that and then they get reverted. So people do get 
a bit wary of “well there’s this signal so we should do this fad or we should do that fad. 
(PI, CoRE 2)  
A strategy reported in CoRE 2 was to focus on a single objective, while ignoring 
additional demands (e.g., outreach or industry engagement). This was highlighted by all 
CoRE 2 participants. This was also reflected in the secondary data where a strong focus 
on research excellence was exhibited early in the CoRE’s history and additional 
objectives were only slowly introduced. For instance, in an early annual report the 
incorporation of additional objectives (“relevance”) was explicitly argued against by the 
CoRE’s then Chairman. This strategy is defined as contraction due to its focus on limiting 
pluralism. Ignoring stakeholders illustrates the lack of adaptation in this strategy.  
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Participants portrayed this strategy as both a matter of misunderstanding the multiple 
legitimacy demands directed at CoREs and purposefully resisting these other legitimacy 
demands. This second point is expanded on: 
We’ve attempted to just keep our heads down and just focus on the research because 
that was the primary thing. (Director, CoRE 2) 
This was reflected in CoRE 2’s initial budgets which were reported as focused primarily 
on research:  
It (outreach) was a sell job. A lot of the work I did with *outreach activities+ wasn’t 
funded. There was no money coming from the CoRE. (Administrative Manager, CoRE 2) 
I tried to partition the budget in such a way that the amount available for basic research 
was sacrosanct. (Director, CoRE 2)  
Interviewees linked this strategy to assumptions that excelling to such a degree at 
“research excellence” would assist in the ability to maintain a unitary focus; for example:   
So what they are doing is creating a reputation in one area that is inarguable on their 
strengths to bide time to build up their weaknesses. (Industry Observer) 
This was made explicit by a Director who told the story of how they only decided to put 
in a CoRE ‘bid’ once they realised that science-based assessments of these applications 
would not be “thrown away” after “step 1” of the selection process. Instead, their 
strength in this regard was “carried forward” providing a buffer to assessments based on 
other objectives such as industry engagement (the second step in the selection process). 
He continues:  
Then we knew we were in with a chance [when they saw the focus on excellence in the 
first selection round], because our work is aimed pretty much on the scientists finding 
really good ideas and trying to be effective. (Director, CoRE 2) 
The perception that they were the most successful CoRE in terms of the research 
excellence objective (something reiterated by 5 interviewees) was connected to 
expectations that they would have capacity to marginalize government’s other 
legitimacy demands. For example:  
It [the requirement to meet other objectives at re-funding round] was a bit of a shock to 
the group within [CoRE 2] because the excellence of the science, it was just absolutely 
blinding. (CoRE 2, University Manager).  
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5.2.2 Catalyst to Change 
The university manager’s point that CoRE 2 got “a shock” regarding the re-funding round 
helps illustrate the transition into the negotiation strategy becoming dominant. 
Contraction in a context where government clarified its demands beyond science 
excellence and where other CoREs pursued multiple objectives became less sustainable. 
While the CoRE had initially resisted pressures, a change in strategy was eventually 
required through the crisis associated with their re-funding:  
I think we were the next to be cut…our inability to respond to those changes was 
reflected in what happened to us…Ironically, in the beginning we were the most 
successful. But then by the time the six years came round [re-funding] we were second 
to last because we didn’t respond. I think the directorship didn’t see those signals 
coming. And even if they saw them coming didn’t want to respond to them. They 
wanted to do what they wanted to do… *there was+ really an inability to focus on 
anything other than what it was originally formulated as. (PI, CoRE 2).   
CoRE 2’s contraction strategy had focused them on a single legitimacy demand while not 
addressing the diffused power context they faced. The ability of external stakeholders to 
exert their legitimacy demands had not been mitigated. In this way the quote above 
highlights the catalyst to incorporating an additional strategic response of negotiation. 
As the PI continues: “whatever has happened [in terms of strategy] has been a crisis 
type thing.”  
Nonetheless, this additional strategy did not completely replace contraction efforts. An 
increased focus on negotiation was still conducted in combination with some PIs and 
Directors still pursuing a strategy of contraction. For example, this was evident in the 
interviews with two directors and reported in relation to some in the wider PI group.  
5.2.3 Negotiation 
Stage 2: Partial adaptation.  
You only have to look at them [CoREs] to see that they are asking them to be all things 
to all people at all levels…And when you look at the dollars that were thrown at them in 
the very first place it’s actually an unreasonable ask. So they will fail in some areas and 
be excellent in other areas. Being excellent: you can’t be excellent across everything at 
all. You just can’t. So you’ll see some areas where they are not as good as they could be 
and others where they are superb. (Industry observer) 
 153 
 
The quote above illustrates the importance of negotiation for CoREs, fulfilling some 
demands partially rather than fully in an adaptive (rather than manipulative) 
relationship with external demands. In CoRE 2 this was engaged in internally through 
communicating the necessity with the PIs regarding compromising the sole focus on 
research excellence with the PIs. Second, partial adaptation took place with regard to 
external constituents with a negotiated compromise regarding the “relevance” based 
requirement taking place. As per the definition of negotiation, and in comparison to the 
contraction strategy above, this process was integrative in attempting to include, at least 
partially, all stakeholder demands.  
These strategies are reflected in the increased resources and energy that were put into 
outreach, something which covers a large range of activities from engagement with 
schools, Maori and local organizations and groups, to science communication more 
generally. This was evident in the interviews and confirmed by the budgets displayed in 
CoRE 2’s annual reports. While this strategy became more obvious within “stage 2” of 
the CoRE’s strategic lifespan, negotiation regarding additional non-research related 
legitimacies were reported even while the dominant strategy was contraction. This is 
shown in the annual reports, for example, and shown in the following quote regarding 
the necessity of negotiation with regards to compromises within the budget:  
Each year you prepare a budget which has all the money going to the investigators and 
the other things that have to be funded. There was quite a discussion around “why is 
that much going to Outreach?” and you would have to negotiate it with the entire 
investigator group. (Administrative manager, CoRE 2) 
In short, while a primary focus on “contraction” and “negotiation” represent different 
phases in the organization, these also overlapped to a degree.  
Compromising research excellence (internal stakeholders). The compromise reached 
within the CoRE was not so much explicit bargaining with the scientists involved but 
rather recognition that this was a necessity (linked to the CoRE’s survival and crisis point) 
by those involved. These compromises were recognized as a reality that PIs had to 
accept if they wanted to continue to be part of the CoRE and receive the associated 
research benefits. This compromise was talked about in terms of an increased focus on a 
range of outreach activities by a PI:  
 154 
 
There’s quite a compromise, some of the sort of outreach stuff we might have to do, 
some of the actual research we might do…it’s not the sort of stuff that I would be 
particularly focused on normally. So you’ve got to make a compromise and say: “will I be 
part of this and involved with this perhaps as less of a focus…but there’s still benefits to 
being there.” (PI, CoRE 2) 
It’s about focus. It’s about “this CoRE started out this way. But it’s going to end up this 
way. Do you still – one – want to be part of it? And two, can you still be part of it and do 
what you want to do? Can you recognise that there are these changing things and that 
you have to contribute to those? There were certainly people – I know – who left who 
said “ I don’t want to do that.” (PI, CoRE 2) 
In having “signed up for” the CoRE under the premise of a unitary emphasis, some 
scientists did decide that they could not compromise.  
This strategy also involved prompting new conversations with PIs aimed at illustrating 
links to broader questions of relevance as a way of managing this compromise. “All it 
needs is a wee bit of stimulus”, a board member outlined:  
The other issue or questions we’ve been *focused on], is scientists being aware…that 
outreach is critical for them…we’re putting a lot of emphasis on that at the moment. 
(Board member) 
This process was one of the CoRE communicating the necessity of new multi-objective 
compromised reality and linking this to flexible balance between performance measures 
rather than a sole focus on science. The experience of these changed performance 
measures are discussed below:  
The focus has very much changed from *the beginning+ in that it’s become “we have to 
be seen to be doing something in society.” And, the focus has almost just completely 
gone onto how we outreach onto society. By that it means: are we giving public talks, 
are we organizing school trips, are we engaging local *…+ organizations and local 
Maori…And that’s a sort of an attempt: “look at how we justify our existence.” To me, 
and to most people, it’s always been about science excellence. (AI, CoRE 2) 
While this “compromise” was felt strongly by the scientists (as in the quote above), it 
was generally perceived as a partial adaption rather than dominance by objectives 
outside science excellence. Namely, the CoRE retained a science-centric vision of 
relevance:  
You can’t forget your main game *science excellence+…But I don’t think it’s unfair to 
expect us to go beyond sitting at our lab benches writing papers. (Director, CoRE 2) 
This limiting of the relevance-based objectives is discussed further below.  
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Negotiating a restricted view of relevance.  
Most people would realise that in the area that we work in, that [sector transfer] is 
unrealistic …The government has certain expectations of the CoRE, I think there are five 
of them. That is one of them. I don’t think we would consider that we are very strong in 
that and we don’t have to meet all of them. (PI, CoRE 2) 
As the above quote indicates, the type of objectives beyond science excellence that 
CoRE 2 was required to meet was to a degree restricted (i.e., partially responded to) by 
the CoRE. Combined with an increased focus on the government’s objectives beyond 
research excellence (which has helped restore their relationship with government), CoRE 
2 worked to negotiate a partial version of this. This was done through engagement with 
its government stakeholders.  
A component of this strategy was fostering a better relationship with TEC through 
utilizing its more active engagement with outreach. CoRE 2 had become active in 
engaging with TEC around its fulfilment of their legitimacy demands:  
*CoRE 2 has+ being going through some reorganisation…and *the director+ rings me 
almost every two or three weeks to have a conversation about what they are doing. (TEC 
manager) 
This increased direct engagement with TEC was also recognized by a director and board 
member.  
Through this increased engagement with the legitimacy demands of government, CoRE 2 
also actively sought to limit the conception of the form of ‘relevance’ that was expected. 
There was recognition that CoRE 2 was not going to contribute directly in an economic 
sense: 
I’m not aware of too much drive for them in terms of the economic side of things. I think 
it’s been much more awareness raising…a social driver. The social driver being getting 
young people inspired by the work that they’re doing…It’s about trying to achieve a 
sensible balance. (University manager, CoRE 2) 
We don’t have expectations of producing spin-off companies, that’s just not what *we+ 
do. (Director, CoRE 2) 
From TEC’s perspective they still felt that their demands had been responded to. For 
example: “they’re going to develop an Outreach program…So that’s something *…that+ 
has developed over the last, best part of a year.” However, they were happy with CoRE 2 
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restricting the degree of that adaptation: “it’s not high-tech commercialisation stuff.” 
This was a continuation of the strategy of arguing away the “economic” observable in 
CoRE 2’s earlier annual report (e.g., CoRE 2, SD 4).  
That this strategy involved a potentially tenuous compromise that will need to be 
renegotiated in the future was also evident:  
The…three pillars of the National Government…are the economy, society and the 
environment. And so the [CoRE 2] decided that the environment, this is [CoRE 2, Phase 
Two] that the environment and social aspects are the areas which we may be able to 
gain the most traction. I of course think that’s a mistake…fundamentally we miss out of 
the importance we can bring to the economy…that might be a problem later on… I think 
it’s a big gap. (AI, CoRE 2).  
I bet if you tried to get more money for CoREs now they would be right down that path 
of “show us how this is going to deliver in terms of economic impact for NZ. (Public 
Sector Manager).  
The scientist above was, however, the only CoRE 2 interviewee who perceived this 
negotiated compromise as being inadequate in terms of meeting government’s 
demands for relevance.This strategy and others outlined above are summarized in Table 
5.2.  
 157 
 
Table 5.2 CoRE 2 legitimacy strategies: Summary 
 
5.2.4 Less Prevalent Strategies  
Compartmentalization. There were isolated instances where compartmentalization was 
mentioned. However, it was not highlighted to the extent of being the central strategy. 
Two interviewees mentioned separating ‘management’ from ‘research’: 
I went to the Directors…and said “look, you guys got funded for this because you have 
an excellent research background…You guys carry on with your research…I’ll manage, 
you guys research. (Administrative manager, CoRE 2) 
A university manager, meanwhile, described how CoRE 2 attempted to separate itself 
from the host, but this was a strategy that had not been realized:  
Although the original intention…was to try and have it significantly isolated *i.e., 
Strategies   
 Summary of CoRE 2 data-set 
Interviewees: 48–55; transcribed data 516.5 minutes. 
External interviewees [ES]: 56;  58; 61–62 
Secondary data [SD]: CoRE 2 SD 1-19 
 
Contraction  
 
Focusing on singular 
objective 
(excelling at it ) 
 
 
Interviewees: all participants [8]; ES: 58, 61,62 
Coding density: 66 separate data segments.  
Secondary data: Annual reports and newsletters confirm strong 
initial focus on research [CoRE 2 SD 1–5; 9–12]  
 
Negotiation  
Partial Adaptation 
(incorporating an outreach 
focus) 
Coding density total:  67 
 
Compromising research 
excellence 
(internal stakeholders) 
 
Interviewees: 6 interviewees [48, 51–55] 
Coding density: 29 
SD: CoRE 2 SD 7-8 outreach budgets; mention of additional 
objectives in earlier reports [SD 36]; increased focus on 
demonstrating relevance in newsletters [CoRE 2 SD 11–19]. 
  
 
Negotiating a restricted  view 
of relevance 
(external stakeholders) 
 
 
Interviewees: 11 interviewees [48–49, 51–55; ES: 56, 58, 61, 
62].  
Coding density: 42 
SD: All [CoRE 2, SD 1–19]. Economic development/industry 
either discounted; or not included.  
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separated] financially, in reality that hasn’t occurred. (Director, CoRE 2) 
Transcension. There was little evidence that CoRE 2 had been able to transcend the 
tensions between its stakeholder legitimacy demands. The following quote is indicative:  
It’s very hard to find somebody who can rise above all those personal agendas. (AI, CoRE 
2) 
One isolated example was three participants providing an example of transcension in 
connection to the conferences and “big events” organized during phase 1 of CoRE 2. The 
following reflected a desire to move beyond current compromise in reference back to 
that recalled experience:  
Whereas in *CoRE 2, phase 2+ there’s no big ideas like that *larger conference+ about 
let’s get out there and get this other thing happening...It’s sort let’s give some school 
talks, sort of do this, it’s very…*CoRE 2+ had some big thinking ideas and now it’s got lots 
of piecemeal small thinking stuff. (AI, CoRE 2) 
Similarly, a manager outlines an envisaged strategy for CoRE 2 as one of moving past 
negotiation: 
You won’t have to negotiate because the stakeholders believe in you…You stand on your 
own soap box and you tell them. (Administrative manager, CoRE 2) 
These discussions of desired transcension suggest recognition of the current lack of such 
a strategy.  
5.2.5 Stakeholder Assessments of Legitimacy Strategies 
The above story leads into the overview of stakeholder assessment of the strategies 
provided in Table 5.3. A scientist provides an overview that illustrates the sharp 
distinction between how CoRE 2’s strategies were perceived in comparison to CoRE 1: 
“in terms patterns of behaviour I just see us repeating the same mistake over and over 
again.” The overview in Table 5.3 shows that a mix of both positive and less positive 
(even negative) stakeholder assessments of CoRE 2’s strategies.  
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Table 5.3 CoRE 2 Stakeholder assessments 
 
5.2.6 Summary 
A final point of note regarding the above analysis is that not every tension identified as 
affecting CoRE 2 (Chapter 4) was addressed with strategic action. Specifically, a strategy 
directed at the divergence between collaboration and competition was not reported. 
This lack of strategic attention coincided with CoRE 2 experiencing this tension 
comparatively more strongly. This perhaps hints at a lack of strategic focus exacerbating 
the perceived divergence between objectives. For example, CoRE 1 more actively 
managed the collaborative/competitive tension (Section 5.1), which may be linked to 
the divergence between these elements being perceived as lower in comparison to CoRE 
2.  
Contraction 
[Phase 1] 
Positive: Four interviewees (a manager, a scientist, and two directors) provided 
positive assessments of “stage 1” (contraction). This was largely illustrated in terms of 
having lost something in recent years.  
 
Less positive: 1 director; 1 board member; 1 PI;  
- With Government they’ve done very little. They haven’t done any lobbying …They 
have not put a lot of emphasis on outreach and even publicity. ..If you look at 
*successful CoREs+…they spend a huge amount of time down in Wellington working 
on their perception…certainly the politicians’ one...Our people…didn’t see it as 
important, and so I don’t think they’ve done particularly well. (Scientist, CoRE 2) 
 
Negotiation 
[Phase 2] 
 
Positive: TEC; Director; Board  
- “So that *increased understanding of relevance+ is something that *…+ the new 
Director has developed…So they’ve worked quite hard since he’s been there thinking 
about who their key stakeholders are.” (TEC Manager) 
- “One of the ways we have developed is understanding better that Outreach is 
absolutely critical…I think it will become an increasingly big part of what we do…TEC is 
quite happy with the direction we are going right now.” (Director, CoRE 2) 
 
Less Positive: Two directors; manager; AI; PI.  
- “I don’t think we’ve made that transition very well…we’re very biased towards some 
of those government objectives and not others. And I think it’s to our detriment in 
terms of our perception. The perception the government’s going to have of the *CoRE 
2] is probably not going to be as good as it could be.” (Scientist, CoRE 2) 
- “They were a very cohesive group who were working very well together. Lot’s of 
momentum, lots of international standing. And all of that’s just flattened down…And I 
say “just forget that one. Let’s see what we can do. And we’ll start up something new. 
And it won’t be called the *CoRE 2+, it’ll be called something new.” (Administrative 
manager, CoRE 2) 
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Two main strategies of contraction and negotiation have been outlined in relation to 
CoRE 2. Stakeholders held varied assessments of these strategies, which contrasted with 
the broadly positive assessments outlined in relation to CoRE 1. Having discussed the 
two CoREs, the strategies implemented by the CRIs will now be presented.  
5.3 CRI 1: Legitimacy Strategies 
It’s all about this [participant indicates overarching ‘why’ in the diagram he had drawn]. 
Because you can easily disagree with the ‘what’ and ‘how.’ If you start down here – 
“how we are going to do this is this?” “No – I disagree.” You’ve got to get agreement at 
this [higher] level. So why are we doing this? To create wealth and prosperity for NZ. 
(Board member, CRI 1) 
CRI 1’s ‘strategy story’ was one of transcension and negotiation (Figure 5.3). The quote 
above illustrates this relationship between transcension (defining ‘the why’) and 
negotiation (flexibly navigating a balance concerning the ‘what’ and ‘how’). The data are 
focused on CRI 1’s strategies at the time of the interviews; however, a sense of moving 
forward (that is, leaving past strategies behind) was evident in the discussion of these 
current strategies. The reported past configuration of objectives by CRI 1 is used as part 
of understanding the current strategies. Transcension will be discussed first as the 
dominant strategy (based on coding density). 
 161 
 
Figure 5.3 Legitimacy Strategies: CRI 1 
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5.3.1 Transcension 
In the case of [CRI 1] it is interesting that of late they have, not so much managed the 
tension but kind of diffused it.(Industry Observer).  
Transcension was evident in CRI 1, as exemplified in the quote above. Three strategies 
were identified as rising above the divergent legitimacy demands. These represent 
transcension focused broadly on different stakeholders: the overarching purpose 
represented a change in understanding on the part of management; the self-
determination strategy represents a focus on external stakeholders; while strategies 
termed as transforming scientists were, self-evidently, focused on that internal 
stakeholder group. All three strategies involved creatively expanding the possibilities 
inherent in their context and were in this way agency intensive (rather than being 
primarily adaption) as well as integrative.  
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Overarching objective: broadening and reconfiguring. 
I think the main one [strategy] is…to be focused *on+…putting this into NZ [and] creating 
wealth. That choice to do that. That’s been a fundamental one – getting really clear 
about why we are here. (Board Member, CRI 1) 
A CRI 1 strategy entailed reconfiguring the objectives of the CRI to create an overarching 
objective, or ‘purpose’ as it was frequently labelled by participants. This strategy of 
developing an overarching purpose can be viewed as the central CRI 1 strategy due to 
the density of coding associated with it (summarized in Table 5.4 at the end of this 
section). Although not explicitly agency intensive to the degree that the following two 
transcension strategies (transforming scientists and self-determination) are, this 
overarching purpose became central as part of shaping the legitimacy demands of 
stakeholders and the CRI’s ability to find a degree of self-determination.  
Previous configuration of objectives. Depicting this strategy is assisted by briefly outlining 
participants’ perceptions of how CRI 1 management had previously configured its 
objectives. This understanding of the CRI’s previous strategy draws from eight 
interviewees and secondary data. Below are indicative reflections: 
There was a feeling at the time when we were going down this [commercialization] line 
that science was undervalued. (Scientist, CRI 1) 
That was the mistake that some of the previous parties made. They focused all about 
making money for [CRI 1]. Until very recently the creating wealth for NZ has been 
forgotten or else paid the tiniest lip service. (Scientist, CRI 1) 
The CEO similarly explains how a previous narrow focus was limiting though meaning: 
“an under-emphasis on the whole spectrum of technology transfer.” As these quotations 
suggest, a generalized depiction was of financial viability being the central objective and 
commercialization being the means through which CRI 1 sought to achieve both its 
commercial and (perhaps less importantly) public good objectives. A change in strategy 
from this was associated with the failure of this approach: “We were bleeding money 
every month”; “when we were in the depths of our despair.” CRI 1 moved beyond this 
more narrow focus to an expanded overarching objective and balanced approach. This 
generalized overview of CRI’s 1 past strategy is outlined in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 CRI 1 past configuration of objectives 
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Current strategy: An overarching purpose. From this starting point the strategy 
participants described was one of reconfiguring objectives in relation to a clarified 
overarching purpose. A manager explains this in relation to the previous 
“commercialization” focus: “There will be occasions when we will create a spin-out 
business. But we will be keeping our eye on the main objective.” Consensus regarding 
that “main objective” or “broader purpose” was evident; the following is indicative:  
Focusing on what’s important – and I think that’s actually the thing, we are focused on 
what’s important – delivering to NZ. (Manager, CRI 1) 
As part of fulfilling that broader purpose, the CRI 1 focused on multiple things 
simultaneously. Through this understanding of the CRI’s purpose, all other objectives 
(such as financial viability and research excellence) were described as working towards 
the same broad purpose:  
Everything, these four or five things here, lead to that one thing at the end. (Manager, 
CRI 1) 
Even when faced with financial concerns this strategy meant that the research-based 
objectives were not de-prioritized. It also enabled them to position the “financial 
viability” demand in relation to that purpose rather than it being an end in its own right:  
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Whilst one of our objectives in accordance with the CRI Act is to provide a return to the 
shareholder on the equity that they have invested in the business, in doing so we also 
have to bear in mind that we are not doing it for the sake of [CRI 1] we are doing it for 
the sake of NZ.  (Manager, CRI 1)  
This strategy assisted in meeting the legitimacy demands of both internal and external 
stakeholders. For example, in comparison to a focus on the financials such a strategy 
was described in the following way:  
It’s [benefit to NZ] a much softer message to sell...[CRI 1 scientists] feel much more 
motivated to create wealth for NZ  because that’s what they came to do...the public 
good. (Scientist, CRI 1) 
This broadened objective was also discussed in terms of the CRI’s relationship with 
clients. Through no longer having commercialization as its prime focus, CRI 1 was less 
likely to be seen as a competitor by those potential clients.  
The secondary data provided evidence in support of this strategic theme. First, with 
regards to annual reports, three earlier reports (CRI 1 SD 6–13) particularly highlighted 
an emphasis on commercialization. In one report, the CRI appeared to be depicting itself 
as a business incubator. This contrasted with more recent annual reports (CRI 1 SD 14–
17) that appear to present a broader and more multi-faceted focus. Second, a similar 
interpretation of the newsletters is possible: older newsletters appeared to exhibit a 
predominant emphasis on commercialization. For example, in one newsletter (CRI 1 SD 
26) four of the five stories addressed this. More recent newsletters, by contrast, 
highlight a plethora of activities including commercialization but also science and 
research-level collaborations, different forms of industry sector engagement, and other 
forms of public good such as supporting key NZ infrastructure. Third, this was also 
evident in media articles (CRI 1 SD 37, 39), in which this movement from a previous 
focus on a sole objective (something which adversely affected other objectives) towards 
an expanded purpose was evident. Finally, this strategy was reiterated by the CEO in a 
public address (CRI 1 SD 23).  
Self-determination: Influencing stakeholder demands. 
*CEO’s+ trying to get those changes made at the policy level. (Scientist, CRI 1) 
Part of what we try and do in the thought leadership area is set the contextual settings 
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in which those individual discussions can take place. (CEO, CRI 1) 
Another transcension strategy emphasised transforming the broader system that CRI 1 
was part of. First, this involved efforts to prompt changes in the RS&T system, both with 
industry and government. Second, it entailed utilizing the clarified purpose (as outlined 
above) to enable CRI 1 to self-determine the legitimacy demands stakeholders place on 
them. Both of these are evident in the CEO’s quote above where he discusses CRI 1’s 
engagement at the thought leadership level within NZ’s science system and its ability to 
set its own boundaries with regards to stakeholder demands.  
Changes in broader RS&T context. Six participants (including two external stakeholders) 
mentioned CRI 1’s focus on influencing the political system and ultimately creating 
changes within that:  
[CEO] is a very good advocate for [CRI 1] because he goes out and – lobby’s perhaps not 
the right word – but he’s prepare to go out and talk to these people, talk about our 
capabilities and talk about these mixed signals or issues we have. Not just try and juggle 
them but come up with a solution about how we might perhaps align them. (Scientist, 
CRI 1) 
Fostering this voice within the system frequently relied on one-on-one relationships and 
deliberate relationship building:  
Our CEO talking to the CEO of the Foundation or MoRST, with the CEOs of our major 
clients. So *CRI 1+ has done a lot of work…building those relationships and that rapport. 
(Manager, CRI 1) 
As an example the CEO explained CRI 1’s position in relation to the recent CRI Taskforce 
Report to the NZ government: “I think we’ve had a major influence in the thinking.” He 
went on to describe that being active at this level had been a conscious strategy. This 
strategy was confirmed in a comment from an interviewee involved in the CRI Taskforce 
that: “They [CRI 1] were onto this before the CRI Taskforce came along.”23 This strategy 
was similarly evident within the secondary data (Table 5.4).  
A second aspect to influencing the system involved transforming the CRI’s sector itself. 
                                                     
23 To reiterate, the CRI Taskforce was a working group who produced a report and recommendations 
regarding NZ’s CRIs which were subsequently adopted by government. The report was released at the end 
of the data collection period in this study.  
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This was discussed by six participants; for example:  
Has [strategic event] changed the landscape in terms of creating wealth for NZ? I like to 
think is has done a little bit. (Scientist, CRI 1) 
What we tried to demonstrate [to NZ] there [with particular strategic event] also was 
that to achieve the type of innovation required for economic growth we’ve got to think 
more about larger projects. We’ve got to think more about larger impact. We’ve got to 
think more about larger opportunity. (CEO, CRI 1) 
This strategy was about transforming CRI 1’s sector and through that the sector’s 
relationship to the CRI:  
One of the problems… that the *sector+ groups…that we are working with by OECD 
standards under invests in R&D…we don’t have a largish number of largish firms actually 
doing their own R&D. So a lot of our thinking over the last couple of years has been 
around how we actually address that problem. If we can address that problem as a 
nation there will be more opportunity for [CRI 1] to expand its offering to [its sector] and 
so on. So some hallmark programme like [particular strategic event] have allowed us to 
demonstrate that yes there is a huge unmet demand by industry for R&D…*that 
particular strategic event+ has also …forced *our customers+ to start thinking…more 
about innovation…So there’s been a range of activities like that. (CEO, CRI 1)  
Another manager connected this strategy to a broad vision for NZ and the sector CRI 1 
works in.  The CRI 1 should implement strategies that helped create “a whole culture in 
NZ more broadly” around innovation. Additional understanding regarding this process 
was gained through the secondary data. In both press releases (CRI 1 SD 19 & 20) and 
company newsletters (CRI 1 SD 34; 36), this strategy was described in terms of 
transforming the sector itself to become a more favourable context within which CRI 1 
could fulfil its purpose and the multiple legitimacy demands placed on it.  
Clarified overarching objective used to determine parameters. An additional aspect to CRI 
1 seeking to self-define rather than simply responding to stakeholder demands was 
through its utilization of the clarity it has built around its overarching purpose. This was 
mentioned by five participants. Having defined its purpose, this could then be used to 
determine and create parameters for stakeholder legitimacy demands:  
Things like core purpose statements are going to be particularly valuable as a means of 
encouraging dialogue and understanding across the full range of stakeholders *…+ in the 
absence of a clearly stated core purpose statement it’s very difficult to reconcile those 
[stakeholder] differences. (CEO, CRI 1) 
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As he continued saying, through articulating their purpose CRI 1 should be able to 
“establish the boundaries in the relationship with those groups.” Through the 
clarification of their purpose and capabilities with their stakeholders the potential was 
there for greater self-determination on the part of CRI 1:  
It’s defined in the CRI Act. There are no bones about it: we’re here to transform NZ 
economically. We just have to decide for ourselves what capabilities that can best do 
that…So we really need to go to the stakeholders and say: ‘this is what we are capable of. 
We really need some stable funding so that we can continue to do what we do best.’ 
(Scientist, CRI 1) 
Clarifying the overarching purpose was also discussed as meaning the CRI 1 remained 
committed to that regardless of external turbulence:  
While policy may change, individual Ministers…you try and have a purpose and a vision – 
I wouldn’t say permanent as nothing is permanent – but a more enduring type of 
thing…we've done that for *CRI 1+ I think relatively effectively…within the pressures that 
we get from these various things. (Manager, CRI 1) 
It enabled a degree of self-determination and resistance and a way to justify this to 
stakeholders in relation to immediate external pressures.  
Transforming scientists: Engagement. 
So [CRI 1] in the last couple of years has spent a lot of energy in getting the scientists, 
particularly the leaders, commercially savvy - a lot of management investment in their 
training. And that has paid massive dividends. (Director, CRI 1).  
The “engagement” subheading used to describe this strategy of transforming the CRI 1 
scientists is represented in two ways. First, transforming scientists’ relationship, or their 
level of ‘engagement’, with the CRI itself through improved communication and 
including them in decision making. This then fostered greater connection by staff with 
the broader purpose of CRI 1. Consequently, there was also increased connection by 
scientists to issues outside of science and specifically being able to engage with industry. 
This transformation of their role included educating scientists regarding business, was 
something referred to in the quote above. This strategy was discussed by eight 
participants including all CRI 1 scientists bar one.  
The first aspect to this strategy focused on transforming the relationship scientists had 
with the organization itself. This entailed overcoming previous discontent and isolation, 
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something reported as having existed in the past by interviewees and secondary data 
(e.g., CRI 1 SD 31). A manager outlined how the current management team: “has 
brought in this whole thing of empowerment. Where he [CEO] not only involves them 
but empowers them to make decisions.” Two other interviewees make similar points:    
We’ve invested a lot in the people… *staff+ get on these courses and thinking “wow I can 
really do something here.” It’s been a significant investment…I know a chap working on 
*particular university strategy+, and we showed him around and he said “there’s 
something happening here.” And he spoke about it and said “it’s the attitude of the 
people.” And it’s positive. (Manager, CRI 1) 
I really want others to have the same sort of belief in their potential in the organisation 
[that I have]. (Scientist, CRI 1) 
As another scientist explained, the current (and recent) mandate from management of 
“If there’s something that you think is a good idea, get off your arse and go and do it” 
was important in terms of his level of engagement with CRI 1. From the point of view of 
scientists, improved communication generally was also vital in increasing their 
engagement with CRI 1 goals: 
I think first and foremost has been communication…when I’m saying communication 
here it’s not one-way communication and I think that’s the key thing. So the information 
is flowing but it flows in both directions. You have the opportunity to have your say. If 
you have an idea you don’t just have to sit on it you can take it forward. (Scientist, CRI 1) 
As well as engaging scientists with the organization itself (and hence its broader purpose) 
strategies had focused on transforming scientists’ view of themselves to become aligned 
with contributing to NZ through industry engagement. The role of language in this was 
highlighted:  
Quite often it’s just a re-expression. Trying to develop some commonality around 
language. In a conversation, you might be using different words to say the same 
thing…We’ve done a lot of that…it’s a capability of…being comfortable that we can talk 
about or projects in a board room, in a largely commercial context, at the same time as 
we can talk about it with some of our scientific peers at a scientific conference in a 
largely scientific context. And being able to manage those different contextual settings 
with the same people in the same conversation quite often. (CEO, CRI 1) 
This entailed an educative dimension:  
So that’s *particular training+ a way of…up-skilling me with a commercial view. While I 
have no interest in being a commercial manager at all I definitely need to talk the 
language. I’ve got to understand things. Think about the markets. (Scientist, CRI 1) 
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With these scientists coming out of universities and so on, the doctorates, they’ve had 
no exposure to business generally and they just want to continue with their science. So 
one of the reasons we run these in-house programmes we do…they come away 
understanding business and understanding science. And once that’s the case they start 
to link the two together. (Manager, CRI 1)  
This strategy also involved transforming assumptions regarding what a CRI 1 scientist 
was; that is, the CRI 1 scientist was defined in relation to the organization’s purpose:  
For us that’s around purpose and a clear understanding that at the end of the day we all 
choose to work in [CRI 1] because we want to make an impact. And we want to make an 
impact through working with *our sector+ and that’s at the core of our individual 
professionalism. (CEO, CRI 1).  
Incorporating this picture of business literate CRI scientists at the recruitment phase was 
also highlighted as important:  
I had this debate about recruitment…and I said, “if you’re recruiting, when you decide 
their post-doc work’s equally relevant, ask which one had the paper round. Take the one 
with the paper round. Someone who’s shown a bit of business initiative at all.” …*but] 
don’t stop there. Say “What is their drive?” Do they understand profit and loss? Do the 
understand the principles of Return on Investment?” (Scientist, CRI 1) 
This image of a business-orientated CRI 1 scientist was made explicitly in one press 
release and newsletter.  
5.3.2 Negotiation  
A flexible balance. A final strategy focused on avoiding imbalance between legitimacy 
demands. This entailed flexibly adapting the degree of emphasis within that overall 
balanced approach as required at any point in time. This constant need to renegotiate 
emphases in response to the context is contained in the quotations below:  
It’s recognising that you have to manage the whole as a portfolio and at various time 
you have to make decisions around how much effort is put into each part of it. (CEO, CRI 
1) 
If recession hit us, which it hasn’t in a big way, then our emphasis would probably more 
over to the financial side…So we’ve always got to have the four *objectives+ together but 
the emphasis is going to move from one side of the spectrum to the other. (Manager, 
CRI 1) 
Both integration (multiple demands being incorporated through balance) and 
adaptation (changing the emphasis in response to stakeholder demands) are observable.  
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Eight CRI interviewees highlighted this strategy, as did one external observer. It was also 
reflected in the secondary data in the form of a public address by the CEO, media 
articles that explicitly highlighted the strategic importance of “balance”, and newsletters 
that illustrated the greater balance achieved in recent years between objectives. A 
manager explains: “we…have managed to bring real balance to the organisation” with 
regards to decreasing the previous lack of balance focused on financial viability and 
commercialization. A board director similarly noted that previously “that pendulum had 
swung too far” and that key to their strategy was “swinging the balance back” because 
“any time you swing it you’re going to get conflict…so you must have a balance at all 
times.”  
This strategy was not primarily focused on the overarching purpose (see above), but on 
the balance between the objectives defined as working towards the overarching “public 
good” purpose. For instance:   
For example, a school has a motto…but often a vision and a set of values and a purpose 
are encapsulated in that motto. Do we change the motto every year? No. But we might 
have a different emphasis…it might be “okay guys you’ve got to get more commercial 
revenue.” Or you might want to be creating more jobs. Or you might want to be having 
more publications. There might a subtly different emphasis in terms of the message. 
(Manager, CRI 1) 
The negotiation strategy was in this way closely associated with the transcension 
strategy of “expanded purpose”. Specifically it involves maintaining a degree of balance 
between underlying objectives so that whole was not “distorted” – as the CEO put it. 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the two components of this strategy: overall balance and flexibility 
of emphasis. 
Figure 5.5 CRI 1: Negotiation strategy 
 171 
 
Overarching 
purpose: Public 
good
Financial 
viability 
Engagement with 
industry 
[Current emphasis: 
industry pull]
Research 
platforms
Spin-outs and 
commercialization
(industry push) 
Negotiating between objectives 
(particular things emphasised at 
particular times, but sense of 
overall  balance maintained)  
Transcension
 
Achieving this balance involved decreasing the amount of emphasis on some objectives 
that had been overemphasised in the past. One example was in relation to the financial 
objective: 
We still need to concentrate on financial stability. That doesn't mean making lots of 
money. That means making sufficient money to keep people happy. (Manager, CRI 1) 
Similarly, a need for balance was expressed regarding being demand-led versus 
research-led. That this balance and degree of emphasis was constantly negotiated over 
time (rather than being resolved) was highlighted by three interviewees:  
Turning down commercial work is…not a good look…there’s a lot of team resources and 
equipment that has gone into that work over the last few months. And it’s great…But on 
the other hand some of the other things may have suffered slightly because we haven’t 
had the people. Some of the Foundation contracts for example…it’s started to swing 
back, it’s shifted, that commercial work is starting to die down a little bit…And now 
we’re starting to focus *on the research-led projects more+ a little bit more…it very 
difficult. (Scientist, CRI 1)  
To summarise, the interviewees discussed how this balance was flexible over time as 
required in response to stakeholders and contextual shifts:  
The balance subtly changes probably daily and certainly over time…you can place an 
emphasis on particular piece but your purpose and vision stay steady…you can move in a 
particular direction subtly. Because if you move totally in one direction you forget about 
the other things. I think *CRI 1+ did that *in the past+… it forgot about science outputs. It 
forgot about engagement with *sector+…so we try and maybe emphasis that part of it 
but it’s not seen as the sole purpose. (Manager, CRI 1) 
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As such, articulating an expanded purpose was not the entire strategic story. Managing 
legitimacy demands in the CRI’s pluralistic context also involved on-going negotiation 
regarding the multiple demands associated with that expanded purpose.  
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Table 5.4 CRI 1 legitimacy Strategies: Summary 
Strategies  Data sources 
 Summary of CRI 1 dataset   
Interviewees: 14-24  Transcribed data: 624.5 minutes 
External stakeholders [ES]: 56-57; 59-61 
Secondary data [SD]: CRI 1 SD 1-39 
Transcension  
 
Overarching objective 
 
(and reconfiguring 
objectives) 
 
 
Interviewees: 14 interviewees [14–23;  ES: 56, 57,  59, 60] 
Coding density: 110 [separate data segments] 
SD: CRI 1 SD 11–17, 25–36 [annual reports and newsletters]; 
23, 37, 39 [public address and media high lightening 
broadening of focus] 
 
Self-determination 
Influencing change in the 
broader system 
 
 
Interviewees:  9 interviewees [14, 15, 17, 19–21, 23; ES: 59; 
60] 
Coding density: 39 
SD: CRI 1 SD 19, 20, 31, 33  
 
Transforming scientist 
 
Interviewees:  9interviewees [14–21, 23] 
Coding density: 40 
SD: CRI 1 SD 17, 18, 33;  
 
Negotiation  
 
A flexible balance 
 
 
 
Interviewees: 10 interviewees [14, 15, 17–23; ES: 60] 
Coding density: 48 
SD: 23, 25–36, 39  
 
5.3.3 Less Prevalent Strategies  
Segregation. Compartmentalization was not obviously outlined by CRI 1 interviewees. 
Indeed, this was being explicitly discounted by the current integrative focus:   
You talk about all being in the waka together paddling in the same direction. And I think 
that’s a good analogy. (Manager, CRI 1) 
The above quote and the strategies already outlined above instead highlight the 
strategic attention being one of bringing stakeholders together around an overarching 
purpose.   
There was similarly little evidence of contraction. For example, the CEO discounted even 
having to “de-prioritize” any stakeholder demands, let alone deleting or marginalizing 
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them. Difficulties concerning a CRI’s ability to consider contraction will be touched on 
further in relation to CRI 2 below.  
5.3.4 Stakeholders Assessments of Strategies 
Overall, participants assessed the current strategies positively, usually in contrast with 
previous strategies. Such positive assessments were implied by interviewees frequently 
stipulating that the central issue was ensuring that these strategies were promulgated 
and actualized more fully. A manager provides an example: “I think it’s really important 
that we continue to do what we are doing.” A summary is provided in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 CRI 1 stakeholder assessments 
Transcension Assessed positively:  14–23; ES: 56, 57, 59, 60. Secondary data: compare 
media articles CRI 1 SD 37 (less positive assessment of previous strategy) 
with 39 (positive assessment of current strategies).  
- “It’s starting to happen… since *strategic event+ it’s been happening quite a 
bit. We just need to keep that momentum going actually.” (Scientist, CRI 1).  
- “They’ve been doing some great rethinking.” (Public sector observer)  
More tentative assessments although acknowledgement of being on the 
right track particularly evident with one manager and scientists [15, 19, 
20, 22].  
- “We’re heading in the right direction and that’s great *But+ personally, I 
don’t think we’ve really sorted out the alternative revenue streams.” 
(Scientist, CRI 1).  
Negotiation Assessed positively: 14, 17, 18, 23, CRI 1 SD: 39. Data does not include 
explicit assessments for other stakeholders.  
- “The scientists are going ‘okay I can see the balance has come back.’” (Board 
member, CRI 1).  
Assessed more critically by two scientists (21, 22). 
- “I have a personal issue with that. It’s not clear how we are supposed to 
interact with the university system. I think that’s probably not an issue for 
*CEO+ because he thinks, ‘maybe we’re not supposed to be there.’” 
(Scientist, CRI 1).  
The clearest instance of a less than positive assessment were made by two scientists in 
relation to the negotiation strategies regarding finding balance between engagement 
and service delivery work. For example, a scientist who, while positive about the 
transcension strategies, communicated frustration with regards to the constant 
balancing between demands at the scientist level (i.e., negotiation): “I’m not sure we 
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[our team] have been successful in doing that [balancing the service delivery work with 
research].” Further, while the overall the assessment of the current strategies can be 
summarised as positive some interviewees were more tentative than others regarding 
how far the CRI still had to go in terms of fully implementing those strategies. “We’ve 
got a long way to go” as one scientist stated.  
5.3.5 Summary: CRI 1 
The strategies perceived by interviewees to be implemented by CRI 1 were transcension 
and negotiation. The discussion here focused on describing the themes surfaced in 
relation to those strategies as well as providing an overview of how the main strategies 
were assessed by stakeholders. The same will now be done with CRI 2.  
5.4 CRI 2: Legitimacy Strategies 
In times of [economic] contraction…you need to…make sure that any decision made for 
the short-term, the long-term ramifications are understood. (Manager, CRI 2). 
The central strategy conveyed by CRI 2 interviewees was negotiation, that is, reaching 
compromises between legitimacy demands. As the manager’s quote above suggests this 
involved compromising in the short-term to meet some legitimacy demands (i.e., 
financial) while attempting to limit the long-term effect of their ability to meet others 
(i.e., public good capability). At the time of the interviews, these negotiation efforts 
were heightened. The CEO explains that while: “[CRI 2] will always have services that are 
demanded by the government… they’ve reduced the envelope and we have to try and 
operate within that.” These negotiation strategies are presented first (as the dominant 
strategy), followed by a discussion of compartmentalization (Figure 5.6). 
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Figure 5.6 CRI 2: Legitimacy strategies 
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5.4.1. Negotiation  
They’re trying to negotiate a new…agreement *with clients+ at the moment. But there’s 
a lot of panic around. (Scientist, CRI 2) 
The strategies here are integrative in nature, incorporating multiple objectives rather 
than trying to exclude or separate them. They were also characterized by an adaptive 
impulse, attempting to respond rather than attempting (or being able) to manipulate 
their demands or the CRI context.  
Reaching compromises in the short-term. One negotiation strategy involved 
compromising on some legitimacy demands (either in the short term or in areas 
considered to be more peripheral) in order to meet other stakeholder legitimacy 
demands that were more immediate and measurable (i.e., financial indicators). This was 
illustrated by all ten CRI participants. It was conveyed as being enacted by CRI 
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management, affecting CRI staff, and being in response to the actions and demands of 
their clients and board (representing the shareholding minister).  
The degree of compromise required by CRI 2 regarding its public good (e.g., ‘national 
capability’) and research (e.g., ‘conferences’ and ‘infrastructure’) outputs had increased 
due to heightened pressure regarding meeting financial demands. A manager explains:  
In the short term we’ve got some key decisions to make. Do we give a lower return to 
our shareholder in return for maintaining capability for the future? Or do we reduce our 
future capability by delivering short term for our shareholder? And it’s very clear from 
the board and shareholder. They want an annual return. Not a return over three or five 
years. But that every single year there is a return. (Manager, CRI 2) 
The secondary data confirm this picture of CRI 2’s making compromises (in capability for 
example) as it sought to meet short-term legitimacy measures (CRI 2 SD: 7–12). Further, 
the “lack of flexibility” the manager refers to above was reflected in the secondary data. 
While some “non-financial” measures of legitimacy were compromised, the EBIT 
(earnings before interest and taxes) level achieved remained higher than forecasted in 
recent annual reports.  
The scientists also discussed these strategies as being based on compromise rather than 
as indicating a rewriting of the company’s commitment to service and science:  
If they *scientists+ feel that they’re still understood, that *science is+ still the main focus, 
then that’s okay they can put up with the pressures of balancing. And they don’t mind a 
little bit being taken out as long as the focus is still good science. (Scientist, CRI 2) 
Alongside managing the tension between public good (service) and the commercial 
requirements was the “juggling” of resources connected to the long-term goal of CRI 2 
of increasing its research focus. This was highlighted in the interviews with the CEO and 
one manager in particular as well as some annual reports. Increasing their research 
capability (something they defined as distinct from direct service provision) was 
frequently viewed as a process of balancing this vis-à-vis CRI’s service provision role:  
[CRI 2] has sort of systematically built its research capability. But because they are 
dominated by this big service contract, their expanding research capability is a bit of a 
juggling act. (Public sector manager)  
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While increasing research was a strategy in the long term for CRI 2, in the short term, 
research was outlined as part of the compromise being made to meet demands for a 
financial return:  
It feels from our perspective that research is getting smaller. That we’re a bit of a pain in 
the butt. I know research is difficult and we’re not making a profit and that’s an issue for 
the company. Up until this year I’ve seen a lot of internal reinvestment, holding onto key 
researchers and developing new capabilities so that’s been great. But that’s all been put 
on hold as far as I’m aware. (Scientist, CRI 2)  
Using the secondary data (CRI 2, annual reports) to explore a few indicators of research 
productivity discussed by participants showed that in the shorter-term the number of 
conference papers presented had been reduced dramatically, while the number of 
academic publications remained stagnant and below target. This was explained as a 
trade-off being made to meet commercial requirements while maintaining a focus on 
service.  
In summary, there was agreement that CRI 2’s core purpose was public good; that is, the 
provision of vital services. Nonetheless, the easy-to-measure-and-understand nature of 
financial indicators of legitimacy meant that these objectives were currently dictating 
decision making and the compromises being made.  
Negotiating for more: Pushing back. 
So no one notices if [the public good outcome is not delivered to same degree]. No one 
notices for a couple of years…So the *clients+ are hoping they can cut us this year, which 
they have done by *x+ million dollars, and next year hold it at that level…So that’s how 
they talk to me “*CEO+ if you can just hold it for this year and next year, we’ll guarantee 
we’ll get more money the year after.” But how can I do that? “You give us the money to 
hold the people.” (CEO, CRI 2) 
Interviewer: What’s behind some of these tensions is the size of the pie *…+? Answer: 
Yes. Yes…Because everyone’s trying to get their hands on a slice.”(Scientist, CRI 2).  
The above negotiation strategy concerned CRI 2 compromising internally. However, 
direct negotiation with external stakeholders was also evident and discussed by eight 
participants. There was a perception of previously being able to more effectively meet 
all legitimacy demands due to a context of growth. Connected to this assumption was a 
strategy whereby CRI 2 sought to negotiate for more from its stakeholders, or gain a 
larger “slice.” This active and direct negotiation with stakeholders is demonstrated in the 
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CEO’s quote above,. This was done in two ways. First, it involved negotiating for more 
from their clients. Second, it involved negotiating for a more favourable ROI with 
government (or their board as the interpreter of the shareholder’s demands). This more 
active negotiation can be summarised through the terminology used by two 
interviewees of “pushing back”:  
I’ve seen what is probably an unconscious management strategy, which is…to push back. 
If there is some sort of switch in support for us to push back. (Scientist, CRI 2) 
The CEO’s quote introducing this section shows that this strategy involved highlighting 
and educating clients about the result (i.e., loss in capability) of not assisting CRI 2. He 
continues:  
That’s our worry in the *particular client+ area. That when *a social crisis ‘x’+ comes, our 
surge capacity, which is what we call our standing army…we’ll lose that by 
downsizing…So that is the way we warn our clients. That these cuts have consequences. 
Not immediately apparent, but when the [social crisis] comes it will be exposed. (CEO, 
CRI 2) 
Through such warnings, CRI 2 was hoping to get more out of the contracts and thus 
avoid having to make further compromises:  
At the moment money is everything and *CRI 2’s+ strategy is to try and get more money 
out of the *client+. The *client+ strategy is not to let them. They’re in a bit of a fix at the 
moment. (Scientist, CRI 2) 
This strategy of stakeholders negotiating for more regarding their slice of the “pie” is 
again reiterated by the CEO and confirmed by the client:  
It’s human nature, you protect your own and, if you can, grab money. (CEO, CRI 2) 
It’s our job to keep costs down, get as much value but spend as little as possible. (Client, 
CRI 2) 
A strategy of “pushing back” was also evident with regards to the relationship between 
CRI 2 management and board (and by extension government). In this case, it focused on 
arguing for a more favourable level of ROI in the short term. This remained both an 
actual and a hypothesised strategy for the future:  
*It’s+ arbitrary profit at that. There is no real commercial background to the nine percent 
return. So that’s a very key thing for us is our board going in to bat for us with the 
shareholder. Instead of accepting what the shareholder says and not pushing back. 
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(Manager, CRI 2) 
Actions already being put into place around this include trying to educate the board 
regarding the public good criterion:  
We did some work with them [the board] around public good and I wrote a paper 
“what’s public good?” They were quite keen to see if we could value, put a value on 
what our public good work is worth… Bloody hard, I did a couple of case studies but it’s 
really difficult to put a dollar value on it. It’s more of a narrative. (Manager, CRI 2) 
Communication. Constant communication. Getting people to understand our position. 
That we are not just a research organisation. That we deliver in the public good area. We 
haven’t evoked this but if we had a board of directors that was so inclined [we could 
argue] that although we only produced five percent there was a four percent social 
dividend. Which is really important and that makes up to nine percent. (CEO, CRI 2) 
Finally, an additional point many interviewees discussed public good “crises” as being a 
way CRI 2 was able to gain more out of its service contracts and, thus, meet both its 
financial and public good objectives. Such events were characterized as points in time 
when the value of the public good delivered was explicit to everyone:  
Where the two [public good and commercial demands] come together though is when 
we have [public good] drama. (Scientist, CRI 2) 
Nonetheless, between external “events”, the current strategy involved negotiating a 
more favourable “number” out of the client contracts and shareholder requirements.  
Utilizing interdependencies. 
They [CRI 2} really are at the mercy of *clients+…So that’s actually more of a relationship 
issue. (Public sector manager) 
They strive to ensure that they are considered a partner. That it’s not entirely a 
client/services provider relationship. And it is, but it’s not…It’s not a cold black and white 
you provide this, we’ll provide that because there’s a hell of a lot of discussion going on. 
(Client, CRI 2)  
The strategic focus CRI 2 had put into its relationship building was another aspect to its 
being able to negotiate within its client relationship. Eight interviewees referred to 
strategies centred on fostering client relationships and building recognition of 
interdependencies on the part of both parties. Annual reports similarly indicated a 
strategic focus on long-term partnerships and trust. Indeed, the capacity to warn clients 
of the consequence of particular actions so as to ask for more (discussed above) is 
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predicated on this strategy, hence the connection between the two depicted in Figure 
5.6.  
Building strong client relationships created the scope for CRI 2 to negotiate with those 
clients was central. For example:  
The contracts we have with clients are essentially a two-way negotiation…it’s a living 
relationship. We like to think of it as partnerships rather than just contractual 
relationships. It’s very dependent on people though: people within *CRI 2+ and people 
within the [client organizations]. One of the things that we struggle with is continuity of 
staff in *the client organizations+…a lot of the people we had had relationships are no 
longer there. So there are some new relationships…So we put a lot of energy into 
relationship building so we can have more of a partnership. (Manager, CRI 2) 
This indicates fostering relationships was a constant and ongoing strategic issue for CRI 2. 
It was about constant communication with their clients to try and determine their needs 
while communicating their own: “through communication and relationship management 
is how we tend to do it”; “communication, constant communication.” This involved 
reiterating the value of the service provided by the CRI so that the client became aware 
of their reliance to the CRI:  
It’s not about marketing, it’s not about sales marketing to our clients – it just doesn’t 
work that way…We have to be very careful not to be self-serving in our promotion. We 
tend to focus on the capabilities and services that we provide, rather than “look how 
great we are.” Because, it’s more about our clients and them being successful. When 
they are successful, we are successful. It’s more relationship - working with them. So we 
do a lot of publications, briefings and examples and case studies about the work that 
we’re doing in support of *the clients+ that we’re working for. (Manager, CRI 2) 
This degree of interaction between the CRI and its clients at multiple levels offered a 
safety net in terms of the relationships:  
We’ve got CEO interaction, GM interaction and science interaction. There are  
interactions at all those levels, which forms the strength in the partnership. Because if 
someone falls out, if there’s a bit of a disagreement, there’s other layers of relationship 
in the organisation which can help sort it out. (Manager, CRI 2) 
This focus on relationship building enabled two things. Not only was the CRI able to 
respond to any change in the need of their clients (and in so doing demonstrate and 
reiterate their value) but also create a sense of interdependence in the relationship, 
with clients increasingly  appreciating the value of the CRI. The quotations below again 
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outline both the constant communication as well as an understanding on the part of 
both the CRI and the client of these mutual dependencies:   
I talk to [CRI 2] on a daily basis. And not because we have problems but because we 
simply work quite closely as a team…We talk about it being a partnership…because…we 
need that capability. We need to ensure that each of us is looking after the other to 
ensure that they’re there in the future. So we work as a partnership. (Client, CRI 2) 
I think of the situation with the laboratory in Auckland...and there has been very 
salutatory lessons for people in both sides of the relationship. One had been working for 
the other for many many years and a new kid came along and they thought ‘why should 
we keep working for them, let’s give it a shake up, let’s use the market and competitive 
bidding.’ Suddenly the contract was lost and someone else got the contract. And we all 
know that was a complete and utter disaster. So there are vulnerabilities on both sides 
of that relationship. (Scientist, CRI 2) 
The CEO provides an example of this strategy reaping the intended result:  
It’s a matter of the closeness of that relationship, which you’ve got to put a lot of effort 
into, that allowed us, that the [client] went into bat for us with *government+ to say “it’s 
stupid tendering this stuff out …why do we go through the process, why not have a basis 
where they are the sole source provider?” (CEO, CRI 2)  
This process of building interdependencies rested on a long history on the part of the 
CRI of public good delivery. The client explicitly acknowledges this in speaking of their 
relationship: “*CRI 2+ has provided that service to [us] for a hundred odd years.” He 
continues: 
By using *CRI 2+…with their long reputation there’s an acceptance that they’ve been a 
long time and do a good job…If you start doing it on price, yes you’d probably get 
*service+ cheaper…Will they have credibility? Will their staff have credibility? And you’re 
going to be testing that every time…why would you do that? (Client, CRI 2) 
To conclude, that relationship building was an on-going strategy is indicative of the 
constant give and take of negotiation rather than the agency-intensive ability to rise 
above these tensions. For example:  
There’s also been tensions…sometimes [our clients] think we should just do as we’re 
told. And we think we can add value by having more of a discussion with them…you’ve 
got to constantly be careful that you’re not in a master/slave relationship. We’re they’ve 
got the money and they just tell you what to do. We feel that we can add a lot more 
value by being more of a partner than that. (Manager, CRI 2) 
As this indicates, negotiating through the deliberate building of a close relationship and 
utilizing interdependencies was sometimes difficult for CRI 2 due to the 
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interdependence was asymmetric. While there was a degree of recognized 
interdependence on the part of the clients, CRI 2’s degree of dependence on its clients 
was greater. This connects to the observation in Chapter 4 of the perception of CRI 2’s 
dependence on its clients (diffused power) being particularly high.  
5.4.2  Compartmentalization 
Separating science work from financial/managerial concerns.  
You hear about other things, but the managers above us do quite a good job of saying 
“don’t worry about that, your job is to do the science.”  (Scientist, CRI 2) 
Within CRI 2 strategies focused on separating the science/service work and the 
management/commercial elements were evident. Six CRI 2 interviewees provided 
illustrations of this strategy (Table 5.6). One secondary data source also outlined the 
perception that the CRI 2 scientists tended to separate themselves from the CRI 
management and its commercial focus (CRI 2 SD 13).  As the quote above indicates, this 
was a strategy engaged in by the scientist but also enabled, to a degree, by the 
managers.  
Compartmentalization was discussed in terms of the active separation by scientists of 
their “public good” service work from the commercial and financial demands of the 
company. An anecdote was provided illustrating how scientists were able to find ways to 
separate their work from the commercial element of the CRI so as not to compromise 
public good delivery:  
We’ve got a lot more accountants now…They’ll tell you: if we’re not making money why 
are we doing it?...There’s all sorts of things that go on around that. *One particular 
service+ is probably the best example. We’ve pulled out of *that particular service+…*CRI 
2+ said “…It doesn’t add up so chop – we don’t do it”…*however+ I can tell you now the 
*clients+ will call up “we need someone to do this *service+, the *other provider+ haven’t 
done it properly.” So we say “we can’t do *that service+ but if you say it’s *another kind 
of service] we will send one of our [specialist scientists] and they can look at the [other 
thing+ too.” Or in one case one of the *scientist+ went down and did a *service+ for a 
cream bun. “I’ll come down and have a look. But you provide some cream buns at lunch 
time. And *CRI 2+ doesn’t need to know.” (Scientist, CRI 2) 
This ability for scientists to decouple their work from the CRI’s commercial demands was 
also recognized by the CEO:  
 184 
 
Our scientists have a very strong work ethic in terms of delivery…Despite what I say ‘You 
haven’t got funds to do that anymore, so you can’t do it.’ They do it. (CEO, CRI 2) 
Other interviewees did not explicitly describe this strategy. However, through 
highlighting the level of identification between the scientists and their clients they 
helped explain this process. The strategy of compartmentalization regarding scientists 
and the commercial concerns of the CRI was in this way shown to be related to 
scientists’ strong identification with external clients:  
What gets added into the [CRI 2] situation is that our scientists and technicians have this 
immediate and very intimate relationship with the people they work with. So the 
relationship between the *scientists+ and the *client+ is very intimate…They are sort of 
twins. So their identity, their identification with those issues is very close with the client. 
(Scientist, CRI 2).  
The client outlined how he deliberately fostered this strategy when explaining his 
current focus on “closing the loop” further between the client and the scientists 
providing the service. 
Compartmentalization was also observable internally with regards to research demands. 
CRI 2, through seeking to build up its research capability, had created within its structure 
small pockets with a sole focus on research. This function was separated from the wider 
pressures being placed on the CRI:   
In the organization we’ve got a role – a principal scientist role – and these are 
internationally recognised scientists …All they want to do is science. So we have given 
them a career path that means they can stay in science, they don’t have to be a 
manager…So I guess that’s one tangible way of showing *our commitment to research]. 
(Manager, CRI 2) 
While only a small part of their structure, this compartmentalization was identified as 
important in building their research capability.24  
To conclude, this strategy can be summarised as a separation, between scientists and 
the “corporate” level of CRI 2. This was associated with scientists’ desire to focus on 
their work whether primarily defined as service delivery or research. The scientists had 
                                                     
24 With regards to this strategy it was the doing of research not the type of research that was being 
separated from the other elements from the CRI. What research was conducted remained closely 
connected to the service that CRI 2 provided. 
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the expectation that the commercial legitimacies are dealt with elsewhere and this was 
frequently fulfilled:  
There’s a comment someone made to me a couple of weeks ago: “managers are paid 
the big bucks to sort out those issues. We’re paid the crap to do the science.” We’re not 
paid very well…so why should we have to worry about that kind of stuff? (Scientist, CRI 2)  
To be honest with the team around here people are interested in what we’re doing 
here…When it comes to… “*the management team+ has considered the new five plan”  
they don’t care. They’re *a particular kind of+ scientist. They want to be to get out there 
and [do the work]. (Scientist, CRI 2) 
This strategy, as well as the others, is summarised in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.6 CRI 2 legitimacy strategies: Summary 
Strategies  Data sources 
  
Summary of CRI 2 dataset 
Interviewees:25–33 Transcribed data: 587 minutes 
External stakeholders [ES]: 56,57, 59,60 
Secondary data [SD]: CRI 2 SD 1–12 
Negotiation  
 
Compromising 
 
(in the short-term) 
 
 
 
Interviewees: All  CRI 2 participants (ten) 
Coding density: 50 [separate data segments]: 
SD: More recent annual reports and media articles [CRI 2 SD 
4–12].  
 
 
Negotiating for “more” 
 
Interviewees:  8 interviewees [25, 26, 28, 29, 4143; ES: 57 
Coding density: 31 
 
 
Utilizing interdependencies 
 
Negotiating in the context of 
close relationships 
 
 
Interviews:  8 interviewees [25–29, 31, 32; ES: 56] 
Coding density: 32 
SD: CR 2 SD 3–6 
 
Compartmentalization  
 
Separating science work from 
financial/managerial 
concerns.  
 
 
Interviewees: 6 interviewees [25, 26, 29–31, 33] 
Coding density: 34 
SD: CoRE 2 SD 13. 
 
5.4.3 Less Prevalent Strategies  
Transcension. The analysis above suggests a degree to which CRI 2 had not transcended 
the tensions between its legitimacy demands. Instead they negotiated and renegotiated 
with stakeholders regarding them. The following quote provides further illustration:  
We’d love to get away from the dollars and cents part of the relationship but we know 
that’s not completely possible. (Manager, CRI 2) 
One area of potential future transcension was an envisaged move to diversify (i.e., 
transform their context) to enable it to more successfully fulfil multiple demands. Five 
stakeholders in nine separate data segments discuss this and it was also observable in 
the secondary data (i.e., the most recent annual reports) as desirable future strategy. 
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However, this remained a response driven by financial considerations: “truth to tell…the 
reason for us being more diversified…is purely driven by financials, we’ve been driven by 
financial concerns rather than altruistic ones.” Consequently, this ‘future’ strategy could 
potentially be characterized as not rising above the current framing of tension between 
the financial and public good. For example, one scientist explicitly disagreed with this 
strategy for that reason.  
Contraction. While stakeholders outlined a de-prioritization of non-commercial 
legitimacies in the short-term (negotiation strategy above) this was not described as a 
process of contraction, marginalizing public good and research objectives of the CRI. 
Instead, those legitimacies were codified in law (CRI Act, 1992) as well as in all 
stakeholders’ perceptions of a legitimate CRI. Similarly, any (potential or actual) staff 
layoffs were not focused on deleting that stakeholder group or their legitimacy demands. 
Again, this instead is indicative of the negotiation process of compromising a little in one 
area (potential/actual slight reduction in staff) to meet demands in another (ROI). In 
sum, no strong evidence of contraction was found within the data-set.  
5.4.4 Stakeholder Assessments of Strategies 
I’d like to see a change in the model…But at the moment *CRI 2+ and *client+ are both 
looking for the right strategy. (Scientist, CRI 2) 
A summary of participant perceptions of the different legitimacy strategies is provided in 
Table 5.7. A degree of frustration was expressed by some interviewees regarding the 
current negotiation strategy as suggested in the above quote. Many participants can be 
classified as desiring a deeper strategic solution than the one currently described. 
Indeed, one scientist depicted the strategies classified above as negotiation as a lack of 
strategy: “I don’t think there’s been any *strategy+.” Conversely, there was, however, a 
general acceptance of the need for compromise, including amongst scientists (even 
while expressing a degree of concern around over-compromising):  
We’re gone through always knowing… my generation of scientists, that’s just expected 
[compromise]. Because that’s just how it is. (Scientist, CRI 2) 
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Finally, however, the general discussion (six participants) regarding the need for new 
(more transcentive) strategies provides an indirect indication that current strategies 
responses were assessed as less than satisfactory. 
Table 5.7 Perceptions of legitimacy strategies 
 
Negotiation  
 
Degree of concern/frustration at the current response (26, 28–32) or as 
something that is difficult (25,  28); ES: CRI 2 as struggling: 56, 57, 59. 
- “I’ve had a lot of good experiences at *CRI 2+ that’s what makes me so frustrated 
with what is happening at the moment. It’s all turning to custard!” (Scientist, CRI 
2) 
- “Personally I see patterns in that regard… just doing what’s familiar. Or more of a 
protective stance rather than a development-mental stance.” (Scientist, CRI 2) 
 
 
Compart-
mentalization  
Scientists and one manager describe this strategy as a good thing and 
something they want more of (26, 30, 31). 
- “Here they do very much say ‘you’re a scientists, do your science’ which is good” 
(Scientist, CRI 2).  
 
CEO expressed concern regarding the separation between scientists and 
commercial legitimacies (25).  
5.4.5 Summary 
CRI 2 has been found to implement negotiation coupled with compartmentalization. A 
final point regarding CRI 2 was that the timing of the engagement with the organization 
was potentially particularly important in this case. CRI 2 appeared to be only recently 
experiencing a heightening of the tensions, a ‘crisis’, between their multiple legitimacy 
demands. The strategies discussed here perhaps represent a moment in time where the 
CRI is recognizing the need for a transition to other strategies in the face of increasingly 
tough compromises being required as part of their current approach.  
5.5 HTSU 1: Legitimacy Strategies 
The strategies identified with regards to HTSU 1 involved interconnected transcension 
and negotiation and negotiation and compartmentalization. For example, an 
overarching objective (transcension) enabled negotiation regarding “things around the 
outside” (managing the periphery in Figure 5.7). A temporal element was not evident 
with interviews focused on current strategies and no differentiation being made by 
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interviewees regarding past strategies. Each strategy will be discussed in turn, beginning 
with transcension as the most frequently discussed strategy.  
Figure 5.7 HTSU 1: Legitimacy strategies 
Transcension
Contraction 
Compart-
mentalization
   Negotiation
Company first
Managing the 
periphery
Overarching objective
Links of understanding
Bounded 
separation
Manipulation
Integration
Segregation
Adaptation
 
5.5.1 Transcension 
Two strategies transcended the tensions at play by defining an overarching objective or 
through HTSU 1 being able to tap into stakeholders putting the wellbeing of the 
company before some of their legitimacy demands. The strategies were integrative in 
bringing all the stakeholders, and their demands, together. Both strategies were 
manipulative rather than adaptive; it was the needs of the company (not the 
stakeholders) that was largely able to shape decision making (focused around the 
overarching objective).  
Overarching objective. The strategy that was immediately apparent within the interviews 
was the use of the overarching objective, expressed as growth or value creation. All 
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HSTU 1 interviews helped build an understanding of this strategy and it was also evident 
in the secondary data. The CEO explains:  
The common thread for me is about growth and the value of the company…there is a 
very clear need to have growth and value and nobody would disagree with that one as 
the key platform on which the company is built. (CEO, HTSU 1).  
There was consistency amongst stakeholders regarding their focus on this overarching 
objective, as evident in the CEO’s quote. The overarching objective was also consistently 
promulgated over time. For example, a scientist founder outlines that it was critical for 
HTSU 1 to be: "always fixed on the sales. And again I think that’s something that all of us 
in the company have got to espouse and articulate. And I think that happens.”  
Different stakeholders were able to connect multiple legitimacy demands to this broad 
objective, even those that perhaps appeared less commercially oriented. A venture 
capitalist not involved directly in HTSU 1 outlined this as being something strategically 
useful that HTSU 1 had with its overarching objective:  
People need to find a home in the words, the phrases that are used. (Venture Capitalist).  
For example, the scientist founders broadened the focus of “growth” beyond the 
company to the “NZ context” and public good:   
That’s *financial reward+ not really what’s driving us. The investors are obviously looking 
at that and correctly so. But for us the mark of success is that we grow the company – as 
I’ve said we start from that point. But the real pride is having done that it’s the effect on 
all those other factors, particularly in the NZ economy. (Scientist Founder, HTSU 1).  
There is a very clear need to have growth and value and nobody would disagree with 
that one as the key platform on which the company is built. What they will do is add 
different ones around the outside. (CEO, HTSU 1) 
Another illustration of the potential for different relationships with this overarching 
objective was the narrower relationship to growth defined in return on investment 
terms. This was typified in the interview with the university shareholder and was 
reported as defining the relationship between HTSU 2 and its private investors.  
Connected to this overarching objective encompassing multiple legitimacy demands was 
that “growth” remained defined in broad and ambiguous rather than precise terms. As a 
director outlines, a “rock solid customer base” had not yet been found. One of the 
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founders suggests that this was perhaps helpful with regards to the company’s 
relationship with its science teams as the broad “ecosystem…that diversity *of products+ 
is what’s motivating a lot of us *those in HTSU 1’s science teams] anyway.” As such, not 
knowing “quite where we are going” enabled an expanded vision of both the products 
and growth potential.  
An additional aspect to this strategy was that for the directors it was taken as given that 
growing the value of the company was the objective the company was focused on. 
However, they had less involvement (compared with the CEO, for example) with the 
other stakeholders’ legitimacy demands. This was potentially why the argument that this 
was a way to manage other stakeholder legitimacies (i.e., public good) was not as 
apparent for them. They discussed it more as the central objective rather than as an 
overarching one.  
Another characteristic defining this strategy was its future-focused component. The 
objective was essentially a vision for the future:  
Our strategy is that in five years time we want to be ten times as big as we are this year 
– so we will be a 10 million dollar company, in terms of sales, in five years time and five 
years after that 100 million dollar company and then eventually we are going to beat 
Fisher and Paykel Healthcare25 – that’s the dream. That’s the benchmark…Now that’s an 
awfully big ask but you’ve got to have bold visions and goals. (Scientist founder, HTSU 1) 
This was most evident in the interviews with the CEO and two scientists but also 
discussed by a Director in relation to managing the ROI objective of the investors. 
Shifting the focus of some stakeholders from the current situation to the future where 
their legitimacies would be more firmly fulfilled is discussed further as part of their 
managing the periphery strategy.  
Company first. 
*I’ve been involved+ right from the beginning and very much sort of intertwined. So…it’s 
just part of me really now. (Scientist founder, HTSU 1) 
A strategy of putting the company first was articulated by four (of the six) interviewees. 
This involved the company being put before stakeholders’ own specific interests and 
                                                     
25 A large and successful NZ technology company. 
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through this rising above some immediate stakeholder legitimacy demands. This was 
implicit throughout the CEO’s interview where decisions and actions were frequently 
discussed in relation to the litmus test of what was in “the best interest of HTSU 1.” The 
definition of “benefit” and “best interest” was connected to the overarching objective 
discussed above, which is the basis for linking the two strategies in Figure 5.7.  
Two interviewees provided the example of this strategy occurring at the board level:  
As a director for HTSU 1 my prime responsibility is to HTSU 1…I am not there to make 
HTSU 1 do anything on behalf of the university [i.e., the shareholder]. (Director, HTSU 1) 
Because the board understand the plan and where we are going, does that mean all of 
the shareholders understand and buy into that? Not necessarily so, because the 
*…board’s] task is to do what is in the best interests of the company not what is in the 
best interest of the shareholders. (CEO, HTSU 1) 
This strategy was expressed by the scientist founders. First, it became apparent that the 
scientists did in fact put the company ahead of their own personal interests, an example 
being in relation to publication. To reiterate:  
The work he does for [HTSU 1] is extremely applied. And not particularly publishable. So 
*Scientist X+ is sacrificing his PBRF rating to support HTSU 1. And he’s not the only one. 
(Director, HTSU 1) 
However, the company was able to tap into the stakeholders’ feeling they were involved 
in something fundamentally worthwhile to transcend this and ensure the ongoing 
commitment of its science stakeholders:  
We see that we are trying to build something much bigger than ourselves. (Scientist 
founder, HTSU 1) 
This was connected to the picture of the NZ context that stakeholders had linked with 
the company’s overarching objective and the broader significance of their work:  
We’re driven by ‘let’s show how it can be done’ – almost like a nationalistic thing…But 
it’s that kind of pride factor that is behind it and an agreement that we are going to 
make this work and that no egos are going to get in the way of this. And for all of the 
complexity around the competing institutional rivalries, personal ambitious or whatever, 
in the case of this thing it’s bigger than us – it’s something more important. (Scientist 
founder, HTSU 1) 
You write a paper and maybe five people read it. Here we are selling hundreds and 
hundreds of items now. And millions dollars of technology. It is significant. (Scientist 
founder, HTSU 1) 
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This ability to put the company first was also connected to the excitement and pride 
particularly around the HTSU’s sales and growth: 
I’m just running on hype basically. Because you’ve got to because I’m getting knocked in 
other areas. (Scientist founder, HTSU 1) 
This was also reflected in the secondary data (e.g., HTSU 1, SD 1).  
Finally, one scientist outlined the level of personal identification with and investment in 
HTSU 1 as explaining this strategy. This was most evident in the description of HTSU 1 as 
a “baby”:  
As I said right at the beginning *of this interview+ it’s like this baby that screams and 
you’ve got to be there for it. And you have to choose whether to be in it or walk away. 
So I decided to be in it because I can’t let go! (Scientist, HTSU 1) 
An implication was that some of the divergence was effectively transferred from the 
organizational (HTSU 1) level to that of the individual. Putting the company first involved 
some stakeholders not connecting some legitimacy demands (and associated tensions) 
they themselves dealt with (e.g., publishing their science related to their all-consuming 
work for HTSU 1) to HTSU 1 as to do so was felt to be damaging for the company.  
5.5.2 Negotiation 
Two strategies involved partial adaption with regards to less central objectives and 
increasing inter-stakeholder linkages and understanding. These strategies entailed less 
of a focus than the strategies above on self-defining and more of an adaptive impulse. 
However, they were similarly integrative as multiple demands were responded to 
simultaneously through these strategies.  
Managing the periphery. 
The way I deal with this is to keep things focused on the growth and value part and I do 
let some of these things splat onto the ground...in a sense a lot of the strategy…is we 
just ignore it and sort of get on with it and hope people forget about it and that they 
don’t sort of resent it and the danger for me is that if you start getting people talking 
about it…then you’re picking at a scab that might have only just healed over…I don’t 
want to create problems by picking over old scabs. (CEO, HTSU 1) 
The above quote illustrates that the overarching objective did not completely transcend 
the tensions associated with divergent legitimacy demands. Any ‘resolution’ in relation 
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to the overarching objective remained tentative. This meant on-going management of 
more peripheral demands. This was done through partially, rather than fully, responding 
to them as the CEO’s quote suggests. Discussed by four (of the six) HTSU 1 interviewees, 
but most explicitly by the CEO, these strategies were enacted in relation to the 
overarching objective.  
Negotiation was engaged in “around the outside,” to quote the CEO. The overarching 
objective assisted decision making regarding the additional non-commercial demands on 
the company:  
The thing that ensures that [HTSU 1] works is that there is a clear strategic objective that 
everybody has agreed on…if you start digressing away, well the argument is that we’ve 
all agreed on the strategic goal [and] you need to come back into line and start behaving 
in a way that supports our pursuit of it. (Director, HTSU 1) 
“Less compatible” demands were negotiated on a case by case basis and partially 
responded to:  
Sometimes it’s about letting some balls fall splat on the ground; trying to catch enough 
on the fringes to keep people happy without distracting from the core thing. You make 
everybody a little bit unhappy a little bit of the time. Make sure everybody has some 
happiness some of the time so that everyone feels they get a little bit of attention…but 
try and…it back towards the core focus and not let it drift off into too many sidetracks 
too often. Is that a genuine strategy? (CEO, HTSU 1) 
There’s all these other sort of objectives that the stakeholders put in there. Some of 
them are more compatible with growth than other ones….Some of them are just “no – 
we are not going to do that.” So those are the ones that tend to hit the ground 
first…other ones you say we are not going to do it ten times we will do it once. (CEO, 
HTSU 1) 
As the quotations indicate there was continued engagement with those additional 
legitimacy demands rather than complete marginalization of them. The scientists, for 
example, felt that they communicated their science and public good based demands to 
those with a more commercial focus:  
We scientists sort of try and say – because what motivates us is this bigger context in 
which we work – can we find some way to make all this work for all of us? (Scientist 
founder, HTSU 1) 
This can be classified as negotiation strategy as all stakeholders were actively involved in 
this prioritization: “it has to be dollars” as one scientist said of the basis for the 
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company’s legitimacy. However, they prioritized this whilst maintaining a link to 
additional objectives and asserting that within the company. For example, one of the 
founders outlined their capacity to say “wait a minute – we’re not working for you 
[HTSU 1]. We're working for the University” to assert their simultaneous need to focus 
on their science objectives.  
An additional point is linked to the already discussed future-focused nature of the 
overarching objective. Some stakeholders accepted the compromise regarding certain of 
their demands in the short term through envisaging a future where they no longer had 
to do so. This was reported in relation to both the investors regarding their ROI as well 
as the scientists. For example, a scientist-founder connected the image of responding to 
a “crying baby” in the present with a picture of the child having one day “growing up” 
and “leaving home”:  
It [HTSU 1] takes a lot of my time. Maybe I want to go and do something different. And 
start looking at some new technologies. I’m a science and engineering person. I just 
want to go back into my sandpit and play again. And see what else I can see. (Scientist 
founder, HTSU 1) 
In this way a future that was different from the current, more compromised, reality can 
be suggested as behind the capacity to de-prioritize some of their demands in the short 
term.  
Inter-stakeholder links of understanding. A fourth strategy was outlined as creating links 
between stakeholders through fostering understanding and respect. Two scientist 
outline these links of understanding and respect respectively:  
You’ve got to have enough knowledge. *The CEO+ knows enough about what we are 
doing, we know a bit what he’s doing so we can communicate. It’s about creating these 
terms that we can all understand really. We understand when he says certain things and 
he understands when we say certain things. (Scientist founder, HTSU 1) 
First of all it is about respect for each other. It’s about generosity, acknowledging the 
contributions of everyone. (Scientist founder, HTSU 1).  
Five interviewees identified inter-stakeholder understanding and respect as important in 
managing HTSU 1’s legitimacy with multiple stakeholders.  
The CEO summarises this as the ability to “help different stakeholders understand 
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what’s important to the other stakeholder.” He continues:  
What you’re trying to do is communicate over the top of the wall backwards and 
forwards. Because you’ve got a bunch of people on this side who say the world’s like this 
and a bunch of people on the other side who say the world’s like that…it’s sort of 
different ways of thinking and looking at the world. So what you try and do is stand on 
top of the wall and say “hey” what’s it like over there and over the other side of the wall 
it’s like this. ” So you try and give them glimpses of the other side. (CEO, HTSU 1)  
Fostering respect for the different roles within the organization was identified as part of 
creating these links of understanding:  
It’s a matter of almost mutual respect and trust. Which is to say: ‘well the scientists 
know what they are doing’…And that attitude needs to go in the other way as well. Yes 
the scientists know what they are doing and they can get on with it but so too do the 
other professionals doing other steps in this process. (Director, HTSU 1) 
They (scientists) are saying “I’m not really interested in the stuff up there I really want to 
get this technology…you know that’s what matters.” That does matter and it’s getting 
the board to respect that too. It’s me educating the board saying “wait a minute here” 
this person who you see as not being so keen on business is actually one of the key 
individuals in the company because what’s in his head is so vital. We’re only good 
because of what he’s got. (Scientist founder, HTSU 1) 
An example of how this inter-stakeholder understanding was generated was the 
constant communication between the research groups and the company. Three 
interviewees highlighted these frequent meetings as being important in managing the 
tension between ‘commerce’ and ‘science.’ Another example was utilizing hybrid 
individuals to help span the commercial/science “divide”:  
That I’m on the board also and can see governance perspective of this and try and 
convey the values of governance to people who are really interested in [particular 
science area] or whatever. (Scientist founder, HTSU 1)  
However, fostering these links of understanding did not entail transformation of 
scientists into business people:  
You want some great scientists who just focus on the science…*but+ you don’t want to 
let them to all huddle up in a little group where all they are thinking about is the 
technology and forgetting that at the end of the day someone needs to buy this and it 
needs to be valuable to them. (CEO, HTSU 1) 
This quote indicates the link between negotiation and the bounded 
compartmentalization strategy which will now be outlined.  
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5.3.3 Compartmentalization 
Bounded separation. 
Most companies will very quickly want to distance themselves from the university 
because future investors don’t like the idea that you have free-wheeling academics 
controlling the intellectual property. (Venture capitalist) 
Maintaining a degree of separation between stakeholders was a final strategy discussed. 
This separation entailed structural elements (i.e., separation between the company and 
the university foundation) as well as entailing the general capacity for stakeholders to 
separate objectives and focus on one of them rather than others.  
The following quotations expand on the venture capitalists’ point above regarding 
structural separation from the university and technical foundation:  
Probably the most important thing was forming the company outside of the university…I 
think if you are trying to do this kind of exercise giving the company a couple of rooms in 
the university to operate out of would almost be a death sentence…it’s almost 
impossible to get the commercial discipline and focus into the organisation. (CEO, HTSU 
1) 
You have to have that separation. Otherwise you get bum decisions…or no decisions. 
(Director, HTSU 1) 
However, this compartmentalization remained ‘bounded’ or restricted, as reflected in 
the sub-theme’s label:  
Don’t go so far that you alienate your technical links… so if we’d gone and sited 
ourselves [far away] and had a purely commercial interface with the world it would have 
almost alienated our scientists…you choose carefully how far away from the scientists to 
bring it. (CEO, HTSU 1) 
Compartmentalization was implemented in connection with the development of inter-
stakeholder respect and understanding. This enabled the different stakeholders to get 
on with their own part of the organizational whole while restricting the degree of 
separation:  
I‘m not a management or a business type person, but I know enough to do those right 
elements…*but+ you become totally useless if you try and do everything…and you’ve just 
got to trust that each person is going to do their part. (Scientist founder, HTSU 1) 
This suggests that compartmentalization was not simply beneficial for the company vis-
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à-vis its commercial legitimacy demands but also the science-based demands of the 
scientists. The structural separation enabled the scientists to remain focused on science 
rather than being totally dictated to by the commercially oriented demands of the 
company:  
My role is helping *HTSU 1+ stay at the leading edge of technology. I’m not interested in 
the business side of things as such. That’s not my area, I’m not interested. (Scientist 
founder, HTSU 1) 
This was also important from the university manager’s points of view. Through “not 
working on the pure business side of it” this separation enabled the scientists to 
continue to meet their science legitimacy demands dominant within the university 
context.  
In summary, this strategy entailed different stakeholders focusing separately on 
different legitimacy demands while simultaneously keeping that segregation to a 
bounded level. This strategy and the others already outlined are outlined in Table 5.8.  
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Table 5.8 Summary of main strategies: HTSU 1 
 
5.5.4 Less Prevalent Strategy 
Contraction. An alternative potential explanation of “contraction” was considered in 
relation to HTSU 1. Is the overarching objective more accurately defined as a process of 
contraction vis-à-vis the commercial objective of “growth”? Grounds for such an 
interpretation were contained in the interviews with the directors who at times 
appeared not to see how HTSU 1 was dealing with stakeholder legitimacies outside of 
the commercial. However, this was addressed as part of their solely commercially 
focused relationship to the overarching objectives. By contrast, coding this as 
contraction would have contradicted other interviews. It would have not explained the 
picture of active on-going management of non-commercial legitimacies outlined by the 
Strategies  Data sources 
 Total HTSU 1 dataset 
Interviewees: 1–6  Transcribed data: 363 minutes 
External stakeholders [ES]: 63 
Secondary data [SD]: HTSU 1, SD 1-11 
Transcension  
 
Overarching objective 
 
 
Interviews:  7 interviewees [1–5; ES: 63] 
Coding density: 52 
Secondary data: HTSU 1 SD 1, 5–7 
 
 
Putting the company first 
 
Interviews: 4 interviewees [1–3; 5] 
Coding density: 39 
Secondary data: HTSU 1 SD 1 
 
Negotiation   
 
Managing the periphery 
 
Interviews: 4 interviewees [1–3, 5] 
Coding density: 27 
 
 
Links of understanding 
 
 
Interviews: 5 interviewees [1–3, 5, 6] 
Coding density: 33 
 
Compartmentalization  
 
Bounded separation 
 
Interviews:7 interviewees [1–6; ES: 63] 
Coding density: 27 
Secondary data: Website [structural element of strategy] 
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CEO and the additional legitimacy demands held by the scientist founders (for example, 
in relation to research and public good). The CEO’s comment regarding the importance 
of not “alienating the technical links” was indicative. Consequently, a “focus” on 
commercial objectives was central as suggested by all interviewees. However, this 
commercial focus was attainable through transcension rather than contraction. This 
simultaneously enabled space for stakeholders to relate multiple legitimacy demands to 
that objective rather than it being contraction.  
Finally, there were implicit assumptions evident in all interviewees that contraction may 
be a desirable strategy for the future, although not achievable yet. This was evident in 
the scientist’s quote, outlined above, regarding seeing the future as meaning decreased 
involvement on his part and him returning to his “sand-pit” to “play.” This suggests, 
though, that contraction was not yet a current strategy.  
5.5.5 Stakeholder Assessment of Strategies 
If you put all that together you say ‘well this is quite virtuous’… I mean there are no 
losers out of this. (Scientist founder, HTSU 1) 
No explicitly negative assessments regarding the strategies utilized were outlined by the 
participants (in contrast to HTSU 2 below). The three instances that came closest to 
being a negative assessment were: 1) the reflection by one of the other scientist 
founders that he was being “knocked in other areas” (although he associated this with 
the university system not HTSU 1); and 2) the university manager not being completely 
positive with how the research group related to the organization and also being 
explicitly wary of a public good objective. However, a scientist founder statement that: 
“I’m not saying that there aren’t tensions there but they are managed” sums up the 
perception of the legitimacy strategies being utilized. This was reiterated by one of the 
directors: “None *tensions+ that are unmanaged…and HTSU 1 wouldn’t be on the path 
that it is going if the differences weren’t being managed.” The overall assessment of 
HTSU 1’s legitimacy strategies by stakeholders, thus, appears to be positive.  
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5.5.6 Summary: HTSU 1  
In HTSU 1, interconnected transcension and negotiation strategies on the one hand and 
negotiation and compartmentalization on the other hand were observed. Generally, 
positive assessments of these strategies were evident.  
5.6 HTSU 2: Legitimacy strategies 
With the absolute objective of achieving financial outcomes – sales. (HTSU 2, Manager) 
Sales were outlined as the primary current focus for HTSU 2, a sentiment illustrated in 
the above quote. There were, however, different strategies originating from this 
common starting point: on the one hand utilizing a broad transcendant “vision”, and on 
the other hand  a desire for a tightly contracted vision based on sales to a specific 
market segment. 
The strategies discussed by HTSU 2 interviewees incorporate a temporal dimension and 
this is represented in Figure 5.8. A transcension strategy of promulgating an expanded 
vision had been utilized throughout the company’s history. This was accompanied by a 
contraction strategy of avoiding investors who were perceived as potentially misaligned 
with such a strategy. Another contraction process had been enacted during the 
company’s past; specifically, restructuring to become more commercially oriented. 
Finally, a more recent strategy, and one also projected by some interviewees as a vision 
for the future, was further contraction around a focused (rather than broad) vision.  
The evolution of these strategies (for example, the need to further implement 
contraction) was at least partly related to crisis-like decision points concerning the 
company’s cash flow. Such ‘crisis’ points are indicated in the quotation below:  
We had to take redundancies because it was a real down time and he [CEO] explained it, 
put it up on the table: “here’s our money, here’s our cash flow in and out.” And we just 
can’t survive. (Scientist employee, HTSU 2) 
It wouldn’t have survived without it [the ‘restructuring’ strategy]. That was a survival 
step. (Investor, HTSU 2) 
However, this evolution was also linked to a picture of natural transitions associated 
with HTSUs moving from basic to commercialized science.  
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Figure 5.8 HTSU 2: Legitimacy strategies 
Transcension
Contraction 
Compart-
mentalization
   Negotiation
tension
Restructuring
(B) 
Pre-emptive 
contraction 
(A)
Contracted vision
(C)
Strategies are 
connected
Strategies in 
tension
connected
connected
Expanded 
Vision
(A)
Time A: Strategy applied throughout HTSU 2’s history
Time B: Strategy applied in HTSU 2’s past
Time C: Strategy applied recently/desired for the future
Manipulation
Integration
Segregation
Adaptation
 
5.6.1 Transcension 
Expanded vision. 
It has a number of aspects to it other than just making money. We have three 
overarching objectives. One is to become a large profitable company…The second one is 
we really want to maintain a base in NZ…we want the heart of it to be here. And the 
third thing is that we all have an ambition to be part of major science breakthrough…It 
could be in [socially significant area one], some [socially significant area two] thing – 
whatever. That’s outside the money-making thing, we want to have that as well…why do 
people want to do this sort of thing? You see someone like Bill Gates throwing all his 
money at the grand challenge for global health – malaria and so on…money’s great he’s 
made lots of it, but he wants to do more than that. (CEO, HTSU 2) 
The CEO’s quote above exemplified the two aspects of this strategy: 1) a vision that 
incorporated being involved with a significant scientific discovery, being NZ based, and 
becoming a “billion dollar company”; and 2) a broad rather than defined conception of 
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the market. This vision is reiterated by various participants as well as in the secondary 
data. It was largely implemented by the CEO and was directed at all stakeholders 
involved rather than being focused on a particular stakeholder or tension.  
The intent of this strategy was to rise above the tensions between specific and 
immediate stakeholder legitimacy demands to create integration around that expanded 
vision. For example:  
So what we do and how we do it is important. That doesn’t mean we’re naive about 
making money, because I think actually it drives us to make more…People think it’s one 
or the other…I see it as actually a more sustainable way to make money… *T+hey *various 
stakeholders+ see that I’m not just in it to make my own quick buck. Therefore I get away 
with a lot that I wouldn’t get away with if you were just in it for the money. (CEO, HTSU 
2) 
The investor provides another example, explicitly linking HTSU 2’s expanded vision with 
his decision to invest in it:  
I’ve developed a phrase that unfortunately applies to…let’s say 85 percent of companies 
I’ve encountered, and they’re ghost ships. They have no heart. They have no purpose 
that is motivational…to me as a person I’m attracted to people and organisations with a 
mission to create something that’s important. I’ll give a hell of a lot more in that context 
than a company that is simply distributing profit to shareholders. (Investor, HTSU 2) 
A broad vision for the company also allowed them to be flexible about their exact 
direction (i.e., target market) at different points in time. A manager explains:   
The evolution of a small enterprise, is an unbelievable minute by minute dynamic 
process…you take the analogy of a sport like windsurfing, the lighter the wind and the 
more you try and stay still, the more likely you are to fall off…it works because you’re 
constantly moving…constantly adjusting…running a small business, a start-up is very 
much like that…getting there could take you any number of different routes…that we 
might at some point be heading this way is pretty much immaterial provided that you’re 
not stupid about it [and where you are heading]. (Manager, HTSU 2) 
Three other interviewees similarly outlined that being NZ based (which was a clear part 
of the CEO’s vision) was an additional motivating factor:  
We are purely a NZ-based, NZ-owned company…It’s us conquering the world almost…I 
think people are amazed “oh - this tiny little science company can be a competitor to an 
American company that’s been in existence for twenty years. (Scientist employee, HTSU 
2)  
This strategy was partially enabled by an expanded vision of HTSU 2’s market. For 
example, the founder links the expanded vision in the form of “[CEO] wants this to be a 
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billion dollar company” to the practical implication of a broadly defined market. Such a 
vision entails capturing “the entire market, …*developing+ your own distribution 
channels, your own market brand, fighting those existing incumbents.” The CEO and 
manager consequently remained “relaxed” about defining an exact direction or focus for 
the company:  
We’re still very, very heavily R&D based. And we will be for a very, very long time. 
Because we have a platform technology, so it can be applied across lots and lots of 
different areas and each one has its own research challenges. (Manager, HTSU 2)  
In all, various potential users and different broad market segments were highlighted, 
including within the secondary data.  
A final point is the temporal one depicted in Figure 5.8 whereby this strategy had been 
in play throughout the company’s lifespan:  
Early on we did articulate some quite high values for *HTSU 2+: “We want to create 
a…*product+ that could be used *to combat social issue+…there were some quite high-
ideals. That is quite attractive to me...I think it wasn’t particular well founded, it was  
never grounded scientifically, but I like those sort of ideals for a company. (Scientist 
Founder, HTSU 2) 
As the company developed, however, contraction was reported as being enacted 
alongside this expanded vision.  
5.6.2 Contraction 
Interviewer: ‘Just to summarise…you’ve managed these stakeholder relationships quite 
carefully in order to give you flexibility to do things.’  
HTSU 2 CEO: ‘Dead right. Maintain the control.’ (CEO, HTSU 2).  
Strategies aimed at reducing the stakeholder legitimacy demands that HTSU 2 was 
required to respond to were observed in two ways: 1) restructuring existing stakeholder 
relationships, and 2) pre-emptive avoidance of pluralism inducing new stakeholders. 
Continuing the line of thought contained in the quote above, the CEO notes the impetus 
behind these strategies:  
We joke here: “it’s not a democracy.” So that’s a little bit of the way we operate. It’s a 
little bit autocratic…I’ve got more and more autocratic because I’ve seen how much time 
and energy we’ve wasted going down wrong tracks…*w+hereas when I first started with 
the founders I was quite happy to let them bubble along and it was only when it came to 
a crisis point that I realised that that didn’t work. (CEO, HTSU 2).  
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As these quotations indicate the intent was a reduction in the degree of power diffusion 
and, thus, the number of divergent objectives that company was required to manage. 
These strategies can be classified as manipulative (i.e., seeking to “manage” their 
context and stakeholders rather than adapt to them) as well as segregative (i.e., seeking 
to exclude particular stakeholders and their associated legitimacy demands).  
Restructuring internal stakeholders.  
How have I seen them [start-ups generally] manage those tensions? Most effectively 
when they bring in intermediaries early on…getting owner inventors to let go is probably 
one of the challenges world-wide. (External stakeholder)  
As the references above suggests, the restructuring focused on the scientist founders, 
and occurred partly in response to the “crisis point” outlined by the CEO. All the HTSU 2 
participants linked the founders being bought out (either to take up new roles in the 
company as employees/consultants or finish their association with the company 
completely) to the management of multiple legitimacy demands. That the restructuring 
enabled a focus on the commercial is reiterated in the HTSU 2 secondary data. It was 
also highlighted by external stakeholders (as in the quote above) as an important 
strategy for start-ups generally in managing tensions.  
The following quotations outline this strategy. They also highlight that the rationale was 
to enable a more contracted focus on the commercial:  
The first guys that were the discoverers, they are very much pure scientists: just play 
round and potter and see what discoveries they can make. But it needed someone with 
a sales/product development background to take it from this merely lab discovery to 
something you could sell and make money from. (Scientist, HTSU 2).  
It’s a painful death actually. It was a violent caesarean. I don’t think it was a natural 
process. Because I don’t think it is in anybody’s nature, innately we do not like losing 
power…And some people who made very significant contributions to *HTSU 2’s+ 
beginnings are no longer here…There was nothing natural about it at all. I think it was 
ruthless but necessary. (Scientist Founder, HTSU 2).  
The reference to the strategy being “necessary” in the above quote highlights that this 
contraction was perceived to part of the natural development of a company. This 
assisted the company in navigating that phase with (at least some) of those founders 
remaining partly involved:  
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Right at the outset with the scientists I said: “look there’s going to come a point in time 
where you’re not suited to this organization. There’s going to come a point in time 
where your skills and points of view, while they are fantastically suited to this early stage 
of things, will not always be suited”…before we really started out I didn’t want any of 
them involved unless they agreed with that…we all knew from the outset that was 
inevitably what was going to happen. People haven’t liked some aspects of how it 
happened, but everybody…acknowledges that…at the higher level…*it+ played out the 
way that we initially knew that it would play out. (Scientist founder, HTSU 2).  
This developmental picture of a start-up meant that some individuals with the scientific 
capability were able to understand and accept their changed position in the company, 
with the scientist founders interviewed being examples. Nonetheless, their reduction in 
decision-making power was evident as was the fact that others were now completely 
uninvolved:  
He *scientist founder+ gets upset with us because we…just don’t acknowledge him…we 
don’t want to deal with him…he’s now held himself up as one of the founders of *HTSU 
2]. From our point of view he was the one who nearly killed us. (CEO, HTSU 2).  
Pre-emptive contraction. In addition to implementing structural changes to reduce the 
pluralism being experienced, another strategy reduced pluralism through actively 
avoiding particular demands by pre-emptively restricting the involvement of new 
stakeholders. In HTSU 2 this concerned potential investors and shareholders. This 
strategy was viewed as enabling a less diffused power context to be maintained and 
additional legitimacy demands, or “horrendous conditions” as the CEO describes them, 
to be avoided: 
The drivers are quite different. I’m not very complimentary of VC’s – in fact I think 
they’re a bunch of clowns…Their whole modus operandi is to herd all the investee 
companies all together and they then all circle around them like a bunch of 
predators …And therefore the investee company is largely forced to accept the terms. 
It’s not the money that’s the problem, it’s the terms that go with the money. Some of 
those terms are truly onerous and nobody in their right mind should sign up to them. 
(CEO, HTSU 2) 
This strategy was noted by six (of the seven) HTSU 2 participants. It was also reflected in 
the secondary data, for example, HTSU 2’s website (2010–2011) showed that their board 
consisted only of the CEO. The CEO also explained this strategy in the media as enabling 
him to maintain control.  
The manager and two scientist employees largely reiterated the CEO’s position:  
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We’ve avoided the venture capital market because…of the degree of control [i.e., 
diffused power] and the nature of the framework [i.e., legitimacy demands] they want 
to put around the business doesn’t fit with our view of that business. By that I mean 
often their primary goal is looking at an exit strategy…That isn’t *CEO’s+ aspiration for 
the company. He wants to build a company that has value and keep it in NZ, not sell it 
offshore. So there’s a fundamental philosophical difference between *the CEO’s] view 
and what he wants to achieve as the owner of the company and the venture capitalists.  
(Manager, HTSU 2) 
The ability of HTSU 2 to utilize this strategy of pre-emptively avoiding additional 
stakeholder demands was connected to what was outlined as the HTSU’s unique 
resource in the CEO.  The CEO was skilled at raising private investment, giving the 
company a strategic option that many other high-tech start-ups do not have. This point 
was made by three interviewees:  
*HTSU 2’s CEO+ has been very successful in a very hard environment over the last couple 
of years in raising private shareholding input. So avoiding the need for venture capital by 
tapping into private investment, which of course is different. It means he retains control 
of the company, control of the direction and sort of potential end-game of the 
company…*by contrast+ you do hear some horror stories of really neat NZ inventions 
being taken in a direction that the inventors didn’t want to go, but actually they didn’t 
have a choice because it was either that or die. (Manager, HTSU 2) 
In pursuing this strategy HTSU 2 appeared to gain shareholders aligned with the broader 
vision (beyond ROI and commercial success) of the CEO. He reflected on this, stating: 
“you have in some cases some reasonably wealthy shareholders who also feel motivated 
by those issues.” The CEO had explicitly sought out such individuals. This was also 
reflected by the HTSU 2 investor who contrasted his ability to have a relationship to this 
broader vision in his role as a private investor but that this was distinct from the 
narrower ROI criteria he applies when investing on behalf of an investment fund. For 
this reason this strategy is connected in Figure 5.8 to the desired expanded vision for the 
HTSU 2. Related to this was that through avoiding international investors they were able 
to maintain their overarching goal of being based in NZ and owned by NZers:  
My argument: if I bring foreign money in, the company’s going to go offshore. So I’ve 
resisted getting a lot of foreign *involvement+…from my point of view it doesn’t fulfil my 
objective of a well-managed, well controlled company in NZ, owned in NZ, if I bring in a 
load of offshore money. Offshore people in the end will pull it offshore…The expressed 
expectation from FRST was foreign investment. And I’ll say actually that’s…wrong for 
what we want to do. (CEO, HTSU 2) 
Contracted vision. Another strategy outlined by participants was that of moving towards 
further contraction. There were aspects to this strategy that were currently being 
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implemented. However, it was frequently depicted more as something that participants 
saw as defining the company’s future: 
We’ve got to get to the point now where we stop trying to be all things to all people and 
get really really focused…that means there’s a whole bunch of stuff we leave behind.” 
(Scientist employee, HTSU 2) 
This strategy of moving towards a more contracted vision is reflected in two ways, the 
desire for a solitary emphasis on the commercial legitimacies and the need to focus 
further on a specific market with regards to sales. This was summarized by a scientist 
employee as: “we need to get boring!”  
The first aspect of this tension was the desire to primarily emphasise the commercial, 
particularly sales, rather than some of the more scientifically oriented legitimacies. An 
example was, as an employee phrased it, acting like “a research organization” rather 
than a commercial entity:  
We have all these collaborations. That’s great…But the reality is if that not does 
translate into money in the door then it becomes a liability actually. (Scientist employee, 
HTSU 2) 
Another employee similarly argued that their collaborations were not always aligned 
with their commercial objectives but outlined that the company was already moving 
away from these towards a more contracted sales focus for that reason. The CEO also 
explains:  
We’re now saying we can’t just be endless analysing stuff for other people… “we are a 
small company. We can’t fund your research”… it’s been a learning process for all of us, 
me included. (CEO, HTSU 2) 
The secondary data however illustrated a degree of lasting focus on collaborations, 
suggesting there was perhaps still scope for further focus, as some interviewees 
suggested. For example, the website continues to highlight over twenty collaborations 
and a focus on collaborators (as opposed to customers) was evident in various media 
interviews (HTSU 2 SD 2, 3, 5, 6) and newsletters and press releases (HTSU 2 SD 9–13, 
17–21).  
A future, more specific, focus concerning to whom they were selling (i.e., a more clearly 
defined market) was noted by five interviewees as important strategically:  
 209 
 
It seems that our marketing is a bit hit and miss….*CEO+ goes and sees a whole lot of 
people and suddenly says “I want to be able to do this.” The next thing we get told is 
that we need to do this. But it’s like “you’ve just meet ten people at a conference and 
that’s suddenly our whole new direction?” (Scientist employee, HTSU 2) 
It think a desirable *HTSU 2+…knows it’s place in the world, knows what it is about…is 
focused and knows where it’s going and can articulate that clearly and is not knee-
jerking from one potential market to another potential market.(Scientist founder, HTSU 
2) 
Another founder discussed how focusing and “not capturing the entire market” and 
becoming a “100 million dollar company”, rather than a billion dollar one, was 
potentially a more desirable (and less risky) strategy, yet was not aligned with the 
expanded vision currently being promulgated. An employee also stated:   
Because the *product+ is applicable to such a range of *customers+… it’s quite 
hard…we’re trying to actually be a bit specific that way. So yes it’s going to limit sales but 
it’s going to make our sales more defined: what our sales markets are. I think in the 
short term, in terms of meeting investor requirements and building up the product and 
our sales and validation, it doesn’t matter if we reduce our market. (Scientist employee, 
HTSU 2) 
Steps towards a contracted vision for HTSU 2 was undertaken at the same time as the 
expanded vision. However, it was also a vision for the strategic future of HTSU 2 that in 
some ways contrasted with the expanded vision, for example, an argument was evident 
between a narrowly defined versus broadly defined market.  
Table 5.9 HTSU 2 legitimacy strategies: summary 
Strategies Data sources 
  
Summary of HTSU 2 dataset 
Interviewees: 7–13;  Transcribed data: 464.5 minutes 
External stakeholders [ES]: 56, 57, 62, 63 
Secondary data [SD]: HTSU 2 SD 1-14 
 
Transcension  
 
Expanded vision 
 
Interviews: All HTSU 2 interviewees [7] 
Coding density: 35 separate data segments,  
SD: HTSU 2 SD 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, website.  
 
Contraction  
 
Restructuring 
 
 
 
Interviews: All HTSU 2 interviewees.  
ES: general discussion of strategy as frequently necessary 
[56, 57, 63]. 
Coding density: 32 
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SD: HTSU 2 SD 2, 4, 7, website. 
 
 
Pre-emptive contraction 
 
 
Interviews: 6 interviewees [7, 8, 10–13] 
Coding density: 23 
SD:  HTSU 2 SD: 8, 6, website.  
 
 
Contracted vision 
(moving towards/desired) 
 
 
Interviews: 9 interviewees [7–13; ES: 62, 63].  
Coding density: 41  
SD:  HTSU 2 SD 6; 8; 9; website.  
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5.6.3 Less Prevalent Strategies  
Compartmentalization. As a consequence of the contraction strategy, the scientist 
founders were able to separate themselves from the commercial legitimacies and focus 
on the science. This was reflected in three interviews whereby the point that some 
scientists were able to operate separately from the corporate hub of the company was 
made. This was supported by a geographical separation of a particular “science team” 
and the commercial hub of the company. Nonetheless, this remained an implication of 
one of the main strategies rather than a defining process for the company.  
An additional example relates to a particular interpretation of the research 
collaborations which HTSU 2 engaged in. Collaborations were a way the company could 
continue to access research capabilities and validation of the product while at the same 
time separating this activity from the core of the business:  
That’s *collaborator+ the place to do that stuff. Those guys have the capability and the 
capacity to do blue skies type research…What we can’t do is fund that blue skies 
research. The point of the partnership is that we are in partnership with people who can. 
So when you add all the contributions together you get a great project. (Manager, HTSU 
2).  
Evidence of this connection was made in four separate data segments by three 
interviewees and remains more of a minor strategy than something heavily emphasised. 
It was, however, also mentioned in an article describing HTSU 2’s collaborations as 
enabling the company to continue to engage in research whilst ensuring this was done 
separately from the company’s more commercial focus.  
Negotiation. Negotiation was evident in relation to the ROI requirement and the 
investors involved. This was illustrated by two interviewees in three separate instances. 
One of the founders reflected on the importance of negotiating with investors during 
the early stages of HTSU 2, regarding the company’s initial technology focus. The HTSU 2 
investor provided a similar account of the importance of negotiating with shareholders 
in this way: “it’s vital that you sit down with your shareholders and you articulate the 
period of investment and the period of return and that they’re on board with that.” 
However, analysis revealed small isolated instances of negotiation rather than its 
emerging as a central strategy.  
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5.6.4 Stakeholder Assessments of Strategies 
Different assessments regarding the strategies being utilized to manage HTSU 2’s 
legitimacy in its pluralistic setting were evident (Table 5.10). More and less positive 
assessments of the implemented strategies are both evident. This is largely in relation to 
the tension between a contracted versus focused vision, with three interviewees in 
particular expressing a need to move beyond the current expanded vision. On the whole, 
contraction was assessed as something that was necessary and part of the company’s 
development. 
Table 5.10 Assessment of strategies: HTSU 2 
Strategies  Stakeholder assessment 
Transcension  
Expanded 
vision 
Participants did assess the broader NZ focus of the company positively. CEO 
appears to be driving this strategy, though recognized that some stakeholder 
thought it was ‘naive.’ Some interviewees expressed concern around the lack 
of focus in terms of particular market segments and the need to further focus 
on sales (9–13, 62, 63):  
 
- “I thought they [HTSU 2] looked pretty academic.” (External observer; implicit 
critisim) 
- “My belief is that we really need to get focused... we’ve had a very much scatter-
gun approach. So we go to a conference meet a whole bunch of people and react to 
them coming to us.” (Scientist employee) 
 
Contraction  
 
Restructuring 
The general assessment is one of this being a necessity. Those who were 
reported as assessing this strategy negatively are those who have been fully 
contracted from the company. Their assessment therefore did not impact the 
company anymore.  
   
 
Pre-emptive 
contraction 
General agreement regarding the CEO’s perspective of this being a good thing 
reiterated by the manager and two scientist employees. However, one of the 
founders provides a more negative assessment (below) while the investor also 
expressed concern regarding this strategy. 
 
- “It would have been better for [HTSU 2] to have actually had people, investment, 
come in a year ago that said “we want a seat on the board.” I think that actually 
some decisions that have been made because it’s been a bit of a dictatorship have 
not been the right decision…So I don’t agree with that at all.” (Scientist founder, 
HTSU 2) 
 
 
 
Contracted 
vision 
Agreement regarding the need for further contraction (concerning a major 
focus on sales rather than collaborations for example) was expressed by all 
interviewees. Some interviewees viewed that further focus regarding the 
target market was necessary, while the CEO and manager did not really 
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acknowledge this.  
 
 
5.6.5 Summary: HTSU 2 
The central story expressed with regards to HTSU 2 was transcension and contraction. 
Contraction was focused on managing scientist founders and (potential) venture 
capitalists. However, these contraction strategies had not focused on moving the 
company to a sole emphasis on a singular objective. For instance, the strategy of pre-
emptively discounting a particular kind of investor (contraction) supported, at least 
partly, the broad vision of the company. Currently, the issue appeared to be the desire 
for an increasingly contracted focus (in terms of the commercial), potentially at the 
expense of this expanded vision.  
5.7 Summary: Chapter Five 
This chapter has considered the question of what strategies organizations are perceived 
as implementing to manage legitimacy demands in pluralistic contexts. It has highlighted 
that these organizations used a number of strategies simultaneously. This suggests that 
potential understanding regarding not only the individual strategies but combinations of 
strategies can be drawn from these findings. Four cases have been shown to have 
experienced crisis-like events in their histories and associated changes, or potential 
changes in the case of CRI 2, in strategies. By contrast, CoRE 1 and HTSU 1 were reported 
to have utilized similar strategies throughout their history and reported no such periods 
of crisis. Finally, it was shown that the strategies utilized by three cases (CoRE 1, CRI 1, 
and HTSU 1) were associated with largely positive stakeholder assessments, while this 
was not as apparent for the other three organizations included in this study.  
The result of Chapter 5 is six distinct case-based stories organized similarly to enable 
cross-case comparison. Such cross-case comparison is the focus of Chapter Six.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Discussion: Theoretical Implications 
This chapter highlights the implications of the findings for the legitimacy literature. Inter-
case comparison and iteration between the empirical and theoretical domains are engaged 
in. First, the case-specific strategic pictures are brought together. This also involves 
comparing the empirical data with the legitimacy literature. Second, the contextual analysis 
(Chapter 4) is used to increase understanding of these legitimacy strategies. Third, a 
temporal picture of the six case studies is provided. Finally, the combinations of strategies 
are outlined as a central implication.  
6.1 Inter-Case Comparison of Legitimacy Strategies   
6.1.1 An Overview 
A summary of the strategies within the six cases is depicted in Figure 6.1. This introduces 
the inter-case comparison. The organizations are clustered to highlight the similar strategies 
pursued by three organizations of different types (i.e., CoRE 1; CRI 1; HTSU 1). These 
organizations were found to implement transcension and negotiation. An additional 
rationale behind the clustering of these three organizations was that the stakeholder 
assessments of their strategies were more positive than in the other three cases (see: 
Chapter 5 above; Table 6.2 below). The second cluster shows that the other organizations 
implemented three individual strategy combinations. HTSU 2 was characterized by 
transcension and contraction. CoRE 2 similarly implemented a contraction strategy but 
combined it with negotiation. Finally, CRI 2 combined negotiation and compartmentalization. 
 
 
 216 
 
Figure 6.1 Summary of main strategies: 6 Cases 
 
Transcension
Contraction
Compart-
mentalization
   Negotiation
Compart-
mentalization
   Negotiation
Contraction
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CRI 1CRI 1
HTSU 1
CoRE 1 CRI 2
HTSU 2
CoRE 2
CoRE 2
HTSU 1
HTSU 2
Manipulation
Integration
Segregation
ManipulationAdaptation Adaptation
CoRE 1
CRI 2
HTSU 1
Cluster One Cluster Two
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6.1.2 The Legitimacy Strategy Framework  
Having provided this overview (Figure 6.1) the sub-themes will now be compared. The wide 
array of strategies surfaced is outlined in Table 6.1 and suggests support for the focal 
framework (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Each of the surfaced strategies will now be considered, 
moving from more (transcension and negotiation) to less (compartmentalization and 
contraction) integrative approaches. This sequence reflects the prevalence of these more 
integrative strategies within the findings.  
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Table 6.1 Summary of Legitimacy Strategies 
 
Legitimacy strategies 
[perceived by participants] 
Cases 
 
Transcension 
 
 
 
Overarching objective / 
expanded vision 
CoRE 1: ‘Expanded vision’; connected to 
‘expand what’s expected.’ 
CRI 1:‘Overarching objective.’ 
HTSU 1:‘Overarching objective’ 
HTSU 2: ‘Expanded vision’ 
 
Infusing with value 
CoRE: ‘Entwining within system’; Aspects of: 
‘Leading the way’; and ‘democratic 
partnership.” 
HTSU 1:’Putting the company first.’ 
 
Transformation 
(creative enactment) 
CoRE 1: ‘leading the way’; ‘expand what’s 
expected’ [linked to expanded vision]. 
CRI 1: ‘Self-determination”; ‘Transforming 
scientists.’ [Linked to overarching objective]. 
 
Negotiation 
 
Democratic principles CoRE 1:  ‘Democratic partnership.’ 
Collaborative 
understanding 
CRI 2: ‘Utilizing interdependencies.’ 
HTSU 1: ‘Links of understanding.’ 
Sense of balance CoRE 1: ‘Maintaining balance’ 
CRI 1: ‘A flexible balance.’ 
 
Partial adaptation 
(managing the periphery; 
compromising) 
CoRE 1: ‘Managing the periphery.’ 
HTSU 1: ‘Managing the periphery.’ 
CoRE 2: ‘Compromising” 
CRI 2: ‘Compromising.’ 
Active bargaining CRI 2:  ‘Negotiating for more.” 
Comparment- 
alization  
Bounded separation HTSU 1: ‘balanced separation’ 
Separation CRI 2: Separating science work from 
financial/managerial concerns.  
 
Contraction 
 
 
Focusing on singular 
objective 
CoRE 2: ‘Focusing on singular objective.’ 
HTSU 2: ‘Contracted vision’ 
Restructuring stakeholder 
power relation 
HTSU 2: ‘Restructuring’  
Pre-emptive contraction HTSU 2: ‘Pre-emptive contraction.’ 
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Transcension. Three transcension strategies were noted across four cases (Table 6.1). Such 
agency-intensive legitimation is widely recognized as being under-investigated within the 
legitimacy literature (Fligstein, 1997; Kitchener, 2002; Kraatz & Block, 2008) (Chapter 2). 
That a wide range of transension strategies were contained in the findings helps address this 
omission.  
The first strategic sub-theme was the use of an overarching objective/expanded vision to 
integrate various legitimacy demands. This varied depending on whether interviewees 
described an overarching objective (CRI 1 and HTSU 1) or an expanded vision made up of a 
collection of objectives (CoRE 1 and HTSU 2). For instance, HTSU 1 was focused around 
“growth” as an objective that multiple stakeholders could relate to, albeit in different ways. 
HTSU 2, by contrast, articulated multiple objectives which formed a multifaceted vision. 
Despite both having an integrative impulse, the degree of integration differed. With an 
overarching objective, multiple legitimacy demands were brought together in relation to a 
single objective (Pratt & Foreman, 2000). For example, CRI 1 reconfigured the legitimacy 
demands placed on it to clarify a public good ‘purpose’ that all other objectives worked 
towards. A less synergistic strategy would be closely joining two or more objectives together, 
to provide an encompassing vision, but not expressing that as a single objective (Pratt & 
Foreman, 2000). This was evident in the case of CoRE 1: the ‘research’ and ‘relevance’ based 
legitimacy demands were brought together in a multifaceted expanded vision as opposed to 
a single overarching objective being evident. The concepts of a “synergy rhetoric” in the 
pluralism literature (Jarzabkowski & Sillince, 2007) and that of an overarching frame and the 
ability to link contradictory objectives to it in the paradox literature (Lewis, 2000; Smith & 
Tushman, 2005) are aligned with these examples. The findings here consequently indicate 
that constructing an integrating vision is potentially important as a way of strategizing for 
legitimacy within pluralism. This contrasts with other studies which imply that such an 
approach is unlikely or less desirable than others (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Reay & Hinings, 
2009).  
A second transcension strategy is transformation, a strategy the entails the ability to self-
define (Kraatz & Block, 2008). This encompasses dynamics that aimed to transform both 
internal and external stakeholders in CoRE 1 and CRI 1. These were examples of “creative 
enactment”: organizations seeking to expand the possibilities inherent in their context 
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(Alexander, 1996). For instance, CRI 1 sought to expand the potential inherent within their 
context through transforming industry’s relationship to research within NZ. The intent was 
to create an environment that enabled them to more easily meet both the demands for 
financial viability and public good delivery simultaneously. Interviewees reported a strategic 
focus on influencing the thinking in the Government’s ‘CRI Taskforce Report’ to seek a 
degree of resolution regarding the tensions faced by CRIs. This indicated that CRI 1 was also 
engaged in transformation efforts vis-à-vis Government. CoRE 1 meanwhile seized the 
opportunity to self-define what a CoRE was supposed to be. Through leading the way they 
were able to flexibly embrace multiple legitimacy demands from multiple stakeholders in a 
‘self-directed’ fashion that best suited them. These findings suggest that some organizations 
are able to self-define or transform the relevant legitimacy criteria upon which they are 
assessed (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 
1991) as a way of managing their legitimacy within pluralistic contexts.  
In both CoRE 1 and CRI 1 transformation was also directed internally. These strategies 
focused on changing what it means to be a scientist. An example was specific socialization 
and educative activities seeking to enable CRI scientists to be more business aware. Another 
was utilizing the benefits PIs derived from CoRE funding to enable the CoRE to expect more 
from those scientists as a “tax” on that research funding. This involved “changing what it is 
to be an academic” as one interview describe it. Parallels can be drawn to Battilana and 
Dorado’s (2010) depiction of socialization and training programs seeking to transform 
employees into hybrid individuals. While the concept of ‘creative enactment’ is usually 
applied in relation to the external environment and stakeholders (Alexander, 1996), this 
suggests that approaches that extend a context beyond its standard limits can also be 
focused internally. Here the importance of those internal stakeholders to the organization 
meant that they were a strategic focus. This suggests a distinction between these findings 
and the pre-occupation with external stakeholders within much of the legitimacy literature 
(Pache & Santos, 2010; Stryker, 2000).  
A third transcension strategy can be more directly linked with the concept of “infusing the 
organization with value” (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Selznick, 1957). This was observed in CoRE 1 
and HTSU 1. For example, in the case of HTSU 1 the identification of the scientist founders 
with the organizations was indicative:  
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[HTSU 1+ is like this baby that screams and you’ve got to be there for it…I can’t let go!…its 
part of me and that’s it. (Scientist, HTSU 1) 
Viewing the start-up as infused with value provides an explanation for HTSU 1’s strategy of 
the companies needs being put first by stakeholders, even when in conflict with some of 
their individual demands. In CoRE 1, a strategy of entwining themselves within their external 
environment to break down distinctions between them and external stakeholders was 
evident. For example, they blurred the boundaries between them and their partner 
organizations through not owning anything. ‘Ownership’ instead was located within the 
existing university system rather than the CoRE competing for it. The CoRE consequently 
positioned itself as part of, rather than separate from, its external stakeholders. Selznick 
(1992, p. 234) provides the foundation for interpreting ‘value infusion’ in this way, arguing 
that it is not solely ‘psychological’ but also evident in the establishment of strong ties and 
alliances. While this was the most obvious example in CoRE 1, aspects of their other 
strategies such as ‘leading the way’ and embracing ideals of democratic inclusion were 
associated with high degrees of identification with the CoRE by PIs and partner 
organizations beyond the research funds received. Hence, these were also indicative of 
value infusion. As Kraatz and Block (2008) suggest, through these strategies CoRE 1 and 
HTSU 1 were viewed as ‘theirs’ by their diverse stakeholders. They were therefore able to 
retain freedom and continued support even in the face of specific decisions that conflicted 
with more ‘parochial’ legitimacy demands. This understanding of “infusion with value” as a 
legitimacy strategy amidst pluralism extends previous research as it has been previously not 
been addressed by the literature.  
Negotiation. The analysis also highlights the importance of negotiation: strategies focused 
around reaching compromise and balance through mutual adjustment between 
stakeholders (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Lindblom, 1965). Four negotiation strategies were 
evident across five of the organizations.  
A strategy of partial adaption was perceived in four cases (Table 6.1) and involved adapting 
to multiple stakeholder requirements partially (D'Aunno et al., 1991). First, a strategy of 
managing the periphery was evident in CoRE 1 and HTSU 1. Partial adaption to legitimacy 
demands defined collectively as less central, but still recognized as important to particular 
stakeholders, was reported by interviewees. For instance, in HTSU 1 a central objective was 
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agreed upon (i.e., growth). However, “around the edges” different stakeholders did add 
additional demands. These more ‘peripheral’ demands were then variably adapted to, in 
order to give everyone “enough happiness.” The balance devised in CoRE 1 (discussed 
further below) was meanwhile centred on ensuring additional demands where incorporated 
in a partial way that did not compromise their “hard core” of science excellence. A similar 
dynamic was reflected within CoRE 2, where they sought to limit the effect of some 
legitimacy demands (for relevance) on their primary research excellence focus. These 
examples are illustrative of D’Aunno et al.’s (1991) point that organizations adopt a degree 
of hierarchy in managing pluralism demands. A link between these findings and studies that 
show how organizations adapt at the margins while simultaneously seeking to protect what 
is considered most ‘sacred’ can be inferred (e.g., Alexander, 1996; D'Aunno et al., 1991; 
Glynn, 2002).  
A second partial adaptation dynamic was compromise. In contrast to ‘managing the 
periphery’ above, this was more indicative of ‘partisan mutual adjustment’ than negotiation 
in relation to an overarching or prioritized objective (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Lindblom, 
1965). CRI 2 and CoRE 2 provide examples of a trade-off with regards to one legitimacy 
demand in order to meet others. For example, CRI 2 compromised its research outputs to 
fulfil short-term financial demands. Similarly, in CoRE 2 a singular research excellence focus 
was compromised to meet stakeholder’s relevance-based demands. However, they also 
simultaneously compromised with external stakeholders regarding the need to demonstrate 
direct contribution to the economy. These findings support the argument that strategizing 
amidst pluralism frequently does not result in “resolution” but rather compromises by 
stakeholders who, grudgingly, recognize its necessity (Jarzabkowski, et al., 2009a; Kraatz & 
Block, 2008; Reay & Hinings, 2009). 
A closely related approach was an explicit emphasis on maintaining a flexible balance. This 
was evident in CoRE 1 and CRI 1 where they focused on avoiding becoming imbalanced with 
regards to any of their objectives. This entailed maintaining broad and flexible parity 
between demands. Unlike the strategy above (CoRE 2; CRI 2) this balance was not explicitly 
associated with one legitimacy demand requiring compromises in another, but with  
divergent objectives being achieved if balanced correctly. For example, in CRI 1, preventing 
any objective from dominating was viewed as part of ensuring that all objectives supported 
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the CRI’s defined overarching purpose. This last point is indicative of the relationship 
between negotiation and transcension that was evident in some cases. For CoRE 1, this 
strategy was about balancing multiple demands to ensure that additional demands did not 
detract from the maintenance of their research excellence. This balance was therefore part 
of CoRE 1’s strategy of managing the periphery (i.e., non-research excellence objectives) 
outlined above. This strategy remains distinct from the managing the periphery outlined in 
HTSU 1 which was about managing imbalance rather than avoiding it. This finding of balance 
is reflected in the theoretical frameworks this study has drawn from (Kraatz & Block, 2008; 
Oliver, 1991).  
Collaborative understanding entailed developing collaborations through inter-stakeholder 
understanding and recognition of interdependencies (Reay & Hinings, 2009). This was 
evident in two cases. In HTSU 1 a strategy highlighting the links between and importance of 
different stakeholders to each other was evident. This was depicted as fostering ‘respect’ 
and ‘understanding’ between the commercially and scientifically focused stakeholders. This 
has similarities to Pratt and Foreman’s (2000, p.32) aggregation strategy and its focus on 
“forging links.” In CRI 2 a strategy involved building mutual recognition of (and then 
strategically utilizing) the interdependence within their relationship with their clients to 
create a collaborative dynamic. This then enabled those stakeholders’ demands to be 
negotiated. Recognition of interdependencies between stakeholders has previously been 
shown to be a way of negotiating pluralism (Jarzabkowski, et al., 2009a), and highlighted as 
having the potential to result in pragmatic collaborations (Reay & Hinings, 2009). However, 
despite such isolated empirical examples, this collaborative finding contrasts with the 
assumption of competition and conflict apparent in the majority of research (e.g., Glynn, 
2000; Oliver, 1991; Sonpar et al., 2010).  
Two final strategies were evident in CRI 2 and CoRE 1. First, a negotiation strategy in CRI 2 
can be differentiated through incorporating more explicit bargaining element (Lindblom, 
1965; Oliver, 1991). CRI 2 sought to negotiate for more (either money or a reduced ROI 
requirement) from particular stakeholders to enable CRI 2 to meet their multiple demands. 
An example was alerting clients to the consequences if they were not mindful of CRI 2’s 
dilemmas. Second, a distinct negotiation strategy was evident in CoRE 1. They utilized 
‘democratic principles’ as a way of reaching solutions accepted by multiple stakeholders. 
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This ensured a sense of representation and inclusion in decision-making among 
stakeholders. Consequently, even when some elements of the CoRE were less aligned with a 
particular stakeholder’s demands, a sense of ‘parity’ (Oliver, 1991) and fairness was 
maintained. This strategy included structural elements such as a democratically elected 
decision making body where issues could be debated and multiple perspectives represented. 
Such a strategy does not appear to have been previously noted in the literature.  
Compartmentalization. Compartmentalization was not as prevalent as transcension or 
negotiation. Nonetheless, two compartmentalization strategies were found and support the 
use of ‘separation’ as a way of managing pluralistic legitimacy demands (Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pratt & Foreman, 2000).  
Bounded compartmentalization was evident in HTSU 1. This entailed separating stakeholders 
and/or legitimacy demands, but simultaneously limiting the degree of this segregation. In 
HTSU 1 segregation was evident in decisions regarding the structure of the organization that 
ensured separation between the company and its academic foundation. Segregation was 
also evident at the individual level where a degree of separation from the organization 
enabled individuals to focus on a single objective such as technological excellence. HTSU 1 
suggests a slight adaptation of ‘pure’ compartmetnalization described in the literature 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008; Praat & Foreman, 2000). In HTSU 1 this separation was bounded in its 
close association with the negotiation strategy of developing linked of understanding 
between stakeholders. This placed limits on that segregation. This finding of combining 
strategies (e.g., compartmentalization and negotiation) will be returned to in greater depth 
in Section 6.4.  
In CRI 2 a strategy focused on separating the science work (both in terms of ‘research’ and 
‘service’) from commercial legitimacy demands was described by interviewees. One 
example was CRI scientists deliberately separating their service delivery from managerial 
overview and the CRI’s commercial demands (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This is an example of 
decoupling occurring intra-organizationally, between scientists and managers in this case. 
This differs from the dominant treatment of this strategy as a way of managing external 
legitimacy demands amidst pluralism (e.g., Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Separation of research 
from the service work in the organization and managers shielding scientists from the CRI’s 
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commercial pressures were also evident. As a scientist mentioned, CRI 2 scientists 
appreciated being told: “your job is to do the science.”  
Contraction. Two case studies utilized contraction (Figure 6.1), with three strategies used to 
reduce pluralism.  
CoRE 2 implemented a strategy of focusing on a singular objective (research excellence) 
through ignoring other demands (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 1991). For example, they 
initially did not put any resources towards outreach activities or connecting to end-users, 
something which government (as the funding stakeholder) demanded. The assumption was 
that their singular focus would enable them to excel to such a degree vis-à-vis their science 
that other demands would not affect them. Focus through contraction was also observable 
in HTSU 2 where many stakeholders desired a focused tightly defined sales goal. Contraction 
is frequently depicted as a unsuccessful strategy for pluralism contexts (e.g., Humphreys & 
Brown, 2002; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Sonpar, et al., 2010). This was observable in CoRE 2 
where the diffused power nature of their context meant they were not able to ‘escape’ 
(Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995) the additional stakeholder demands. Stakeholder reaction to 
CoRE 2’s lack of attention to some legitimacy demands prompted a shift in their strategy.  
HTSU 2 exhibited two other forms of contraction. Pre-emptive contraction entailed 
intentionally attempting to avoid particular stakeholders and their demands. In HTSU 2’s 
case, venture capital was avoided to limit power diffusion away from management and the 
introduction of additional demands. Second, contraction through restructuring stakeholder 
power dynamics occurred. Here the original scientist founders were bought out to enable a 
more commercial focus in HTSU 2. Both of these strategies mirror emphases in the resource 
dependence literature concerning an organization’s ability to ‘select’ or ‘escape’ its context 
to choose more homogenous one (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). 
HTSU 2 also provides a contrast with the literature’s argument that contraction is usually 
undesirable (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Instead, in HTSU 2 there was no 
evidence of the suggested escalation of conflict usually associated with contraction 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a). In this way it offers a distinct perspective to the negative one 
commonly promulgated.  
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6.1.2 Reflecting on the Framework  
The focal legitimacy strategy framework (Kraatz & Block, 2008) has not previously been 
empirically explored. Indeed, a summary of the literature is that empirical studies have 
tended to focus on idiosyncratic strategic responses rather than referring back to or 
constructing broader frameworks such as Kraatz and Block’s (Pache & Santos, 2010). The 
findings here suggest support for the use of the framework to gain understanding into 
legitimation in pluralistic contexts.  
In contrast to much of the underlying assumptions within legitimacy theory (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995), simple 
acquiescence to stakeholder demands provided little explanation regarding the legitimacy 
strategies implemented here. For instance, transcension has been less frequently 
investigated as a legitimacy strategy. However, the findings suggest that organizations in 
pluralistic settings are likely to utilize agency-intensive strategies. This study consequently 
provides a contribution regarding our understanding of agency-intensive legitimation (e.g., 
Alexander, 1996; Kraatz & Block, 2008). In comparison, the empirical development of 
acquiescence or isomorphism (Deephouse, 1996; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Tolbert 
& Zucker, 1983), decoupling (Hirsch & Bermiss, 2009; MacLean & Behnam, 2010; Westphal 
& Zajac, 2001) and even negotiation (D'Aunno et al., 1991; Glynn, 2002) has previously been 
more extensive.  
Two additional examples of how the empirical findings add insight are worth reiterating. 
First, was the finding of democratic partnership as a negotiation strategy. This has not 
previously been suggested in the literature. Second, increased insight into contraction was 
provided through examples of it as enabling in one case (HTSU 2), while less positive in 
another (CoRE 2). As suggested above, this more multi-faceted perspective is distinct from 
the largely negative portrayal of contraction in the literature.  
That organizations appear likely to combine multiple strategies is evident in the findings. 
Before focusing on this point in greater depth, additional understanding of the specific 
strategies will first be sought through linking them with aspects of the pluralistic context. 
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6.2 Legitimacy Strategies and Perceptions of Pluralism 
Suchman (1995) indicated the question of whether particular contextual conditions are 
particularly suited to particular legitimacy strategies as an area for future legitimacy 
research. This question is equally applicable for pluralistic contexts. Within pluralistic 
settings, why might one legitimacy strategy, rather than another, be implemented?  
Due to the focus on pluralism of this thesis, the understanding developed here of the 
organizational context centred on diffused power and divergence. All six cases were found 
to experience pluralism. However, participants in some cases (e.g., CoRE 2) were shown to 
perceive higher degrees of divergence and/or power diffusion than those in the comparable 
organizations of similar type (e.g., CoRE 1). This distinction is represented by ++ (higher 
perceived power diffusion and/or objective divergence) and + (less high, although still within 
pluralism “quadrant”) in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2.  
Patterns between these distinctions (Chapter 4) and the strategies implemented by the 
different organizations (Chapter 5) were then examined. Despite two organizations dealing 
with broadly similar tensions and power dynamics (e.g., the two CRIs) different strategies 
were implemented by these organizations. Indeed, a common pattern in strategic approach 
was observed across three organizations of a different type (e.g., CoRE 1, CRI 1, HTSU 1). 
Differences in how the dimensions of pluralism were perceived in each case emerged as one 
way of understanding this. As will become evident below, the performance aspect of these 
strategies, something explored through stakeholder assessments, also appears helpful in 
interpreting these associations. This is, therefore, also included in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2 Legitimacy strategies, context, and stakeholder assessments 
 
Case 
Study 
Strategies utilized 
 
(Chapter 5) 
Strategies explicitly 
excluded 
(Chapter 5) 
Perceived  degree of 
diffused power 
(Chapter 4) 
Perceived degree of 
divergence 
(Chapter 4) 
Stakeholder assessments of main 
strategies success 
(Chapter 5) 
CoRE 1 Transcension; 
Negotiation 
 
Contraction  
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
CoRE 2 Contraction 
Negotiation 
 
Transcension  
++ 
 
 
++ 
 
+/- 
CRI 1 Transcension 
Negotiation 
Contraction  
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
CRI 2 Negotiation 
Compartmentalization 
Contraction  
++ 
 
++ 
 
+/- 
 
HTSU 1 Transcension 
Negotiation 
Compartmentalization 
None  
++ 
 
No clear distinction 
evident between two 
cases 
 
+ 
HTSU 2 Transcension 
Contraction 
 
None  
+ 
 
+/- 
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Figure 6.2 Dimensions of pluralism and strategies 
Low
Diffused  power
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Limited 
pluralism 
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pluralistic
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High
Low High
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Objectives ++
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+
+
Compart.Contract.
Trans. Negotiat.
.
 
Pache and Santos (2010) outline the need for increased understanding into when individual 
strategies may or may not be applied to a pluralistic setting. The only insight available is the 
broad one that acquiescence is unlikely (Oliver, 1991). The development here adds to this 
through focusing specifically on the dimensions of pluralism. The value of this is increased 
insight into when organizations facing “similar conflicting demands may experience them 
differently and, in turn, mobilize different responses” (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 459). Pache 
and Santos cite George et al.’s (2006) cognitive perspective and their argument that 
patterns of isomorphism depend on whether change is perceived as a threat or opportunity. 
While a specifically cognitive analysis was not adopted here, the distinctions in internal 
stakeholders’ perceptions regarding divergence and power diffusion can be connected to 
this research agenda. A further rationale for a focus on ‘perceptions’ was its alignment with 
post-positivism. Such a position focused this study on interviewee perceptions and is 
tentative about the ability of interview data to enable correspondence with reality beyond 
those perceptions (Phillips & Burbules, 2000).  
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Four propositions will now be developed as a basis for further investigation. They suggest 
associations between differences in perceptions of divergence and power diffusion and the 
resultant strategies. They also incorporate an assumption concerning time and assessments 
of success. For instance, an organization can implement strategies that are less aligned with 
its contextual dynamics. However, this will be argued to be often linked with less positive 
stakeholder assessments. One consequent interpretation is that over time either the 
strategy or the perceptions are likely to change in line with the theorizing here. For example, 
CRI 2 was currently looking for a new approach while its perceptions of higher (++) degrees 
of divergence being, according to the proposition below, were misaligned with its 
implemented negotiation strategy.  
6.2.1. Contraction and Perceptions of Pluralism 
A link between divergence being perceived as particularly high (++) and the implementation 
of a contraction strategy is proposed. In the case of CoRE 2, the perceived divergence was 
found to be comparatively higher. For example, one director explained how: “everything 
else you do works against excellence. You pour money into other things you take it away 
from excellence.” This partly explains why CoRE 2, despite being aware of the variety of 
legitimacy demands, initially still chose to focus on only one of them. Conversely, both cases 
(CoRE 1, CRI 1) that were classified with relatively lower degrees of perceived divergence (+) 
explicitly discounted contraction as a strategy.  
Pratt and Foreman (2000) theorize that low-synergy responses such as ‘deletion’ are more 
likely when the degree of compatibility is particularly high. The greater the degree of 
divergence, the less feasible integration is thought to be. Oliver (1991) likewise suggests 
that a high degree of divergence between internal and external demands increases the 
likelihood of strategies of defiance as well as avoidance through “escape.” Oliver’s argument 
has been explored empirically with varying degrees of support. However, the single 
measures of ‘objective congruence’ used in those studies cannot be said to be fully 
incorporative of pluralism (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995). 
Second, a link between perceptions of a lower degree of power diffusion (+) and the 
likelihood of a contraction strategy is proposed. HTSU 2 suggests such a connection. For 
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example, the CEO outlines that much of the product innovation came from him rather than 
the scientist founders. A link is suggested here between that perception, which entails an 
assumption of a lower degree of diffuse power, and contraction with regards to those 
scientist founders. This link between comparatively lower perceptions of power diffusion 
and contraction was further supported by the cases which did not utilize contraction. For 
example, in HTSU 1, they explicitly linked their dependence (++ power diffusion) on 
“technical links” to a lack of contraction. Further, their discussion of any future movement 
towards contraction was linked to a scenario where this reliance had reduced (+). 
In CoRE 2, the perceived degree of power diffusion was outlined to be higher (++), which 
appears to be inconsistent with this association. However, the fact that contraction 
attempts failed in their case can be connected to government enforcing their position as 
funder and evaluator of CoREs. Perceptions of higher (++) degree of diffused power 
potentially grew as part of this and led to contraction being seen as less viable than it 
initially had been. Other strategies that reflected this were consequently pursued. As such, 
while the interview data do not allow full insight into the existence of a temporal shift in 
perceptions, CoRE 2 is potentially an example where feedback from the environment 
changed perceptions. Negative feedback, and associated action, from external stakeholders 
likely prompted the perception of power diffusion to increase (++) and a negotiation 
strategy then becoming dominant in line with that change. One potential explanation is of 
initial perceptions of lower power diffusion (+) being linked to contraction during “Phase 
One” of the CoRE prior to this change in perception.  
Contraction being associated with a lower degree of power diffusion can also be inferred 
from the literature. Oliver (1991) indicates that the lower the dependence on ‘institutional 
constituents’, the greater likelihood of defiance strategies. An association between low 
degrees of ‘institutional pressure’, in relation to internal ‘countervailing power’, and 
defiance strategies has been similarly illustrated empirically (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & 
Simons, 1995). Pratt and Foreman (2000) also link ‘deletion’ strategies to contexts when the 
‘identity’ being deleted is not associated with powerful stakeholders. Jarzabkowski et al.’s 
(2009a) study can also be interpreted as providing an example where stakeholders’ ceasing 
their attempts at marginalization were connected to growing recognition of their mutual 
dependence on other stakeholders and logics. This can be inferred as indicative of increased 
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perceptions of power diffusion (++) by those involved resulting in contraction becoming 
abandoned.  
Based on these insights it is suggested that:  
Proposition 1: Contraction is more likely to be implemented when 1) stakeholders’ objectives 
are perceived to be incommensurable (++); and 2) when the level of power diffusion is 
perceived to be lower (+).  
6.2.2. Compartmentalization and Perceptions of Pluralism 
CRI 2 interviewees perceived higher (++) power diffusion and higher divergence (++) 
between objectives. In this case, the perceived degree of divergence between the 
“commercial” and “public good” demands can be associated with CRI 2’s 
compartmentalization strategy. The strategy of scientists decoupling aspects of their service 
delivery is associated with perceptions that the CRI’s commercial objectives explicitly stood 
in the way of their public good work (i.e., were highly divergent). Likewise, that the CRI 
separated aspects of its research capabilities and service work can be associated with 
relatively higher perceived divergence between those two activities. For example, they had 
distinct ‘research’ and ‘service’ scientists, indicating that a strong distinction between the 
two was made. Furthermore, in CRI 2 those dictating the various legitimacy demands (e.g., 
government and clients) were perceived as too powerful to ignore or directly manipulate – 
that is, particularly high (++) power diffusion. This suggests that the heavy emphasis by 
powerful clients on service was part of what led the CRI to compartmentalize its research 
components.  
HTSU 1 also suggests a link between compartmentalization and perception of higher 
diffused power (++) and higher objective divergence (++). A distinction regarding relatively 
higher or lower divergence was not possible between the HTSUs. Nonetheless, the need to 
separate HTSU 1’s commercial operations from its “academic” scientific foundation was 
related to the perceived degree of divergence between those objectives. For example, the 
divergence was such that the “commercial” was perceived as needing to be protected 
through this compartmentalization. It was also, however, outlined that HTSU 1 could not 
alienate the providers of the science capabilities through marginalizing them or not giving 
them “some happiness” (i.e., contraction) (power diffusion: ++). Consequently, the more 
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adaptive compartmentalization strategy enabled them to keep those stakeholders on board. 
This compares with HTSU 2’s contraction strategy and associated perceptions of relatively 
lower power diffusion (+).  
Oliver (1991) and Pratt and Foreman (2000) provide similar perspectives. For example, in 
Pratt and Foreman discuss the compartmentalization of identities as a strategy more likely 
in situations where the “compatibility…of the identities is low” (i.e., level of divergence) and 
“support by powerful stakeholders for” (p. 26) a particular identity is high. Oliver outlines 
that strategies of avoidance (which include decoupling) are more likely in contexts of higher 
dependence on constituents than defiance and manipulation strategies. Elsbach and 
Sutton’s (1992, p. 710) case studies can be inferred as an example of this association. In 
their studies the level of divergence between constituent demands was so high that 
illegitimacy with one group legitimated it with another. However, at the same time “survival 
and effectiveness” of those organizations depended on engagement with both groups. 
Decoupling was the consequent organizational response.  
Based on these insights it is suggested that: 
Proposition 2: Compartmentalization is more likely to be implemented when 1) stakeholders’ 
objectives are perceived to be incommensurable (++); and 2) when the degree of power 
diffusion is higher (++). 26 
As with all of these propositions, the above association does not exclude moderating factors. 
For instance, a high degree of scrutiny is said to make compartmentalization amidst 
pluralism difficult (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1991; Krratz & Block, 2008). Compartmentalization 
strategies are argued to be premised on an ability to decrease the visibility of particular 
activities and, thus, buffer the organization from scrutiny (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 
1991; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). This offers an explanation for why CoRE 2, despite higher 
perceptions of divergence and power diffusion, did not implement compartmentalization. 
The reported increased scrutiny by government in response to CoRE 2 reaching a “crisis” 
                                                     
26  This proposition and discussion concern compartmentalization generally as opposed to decoupling 
specifically. Discussions of decoupling have related more to power imbalance and the split between 
substantive (linked with powerful stakeholders) and symbolic (linked with less powerful stakeholder) action 
rather than the overall level of perceived power diffusion (George, et al., 2006; Westphal & Zajac, 2001).  
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point may have made compartmentalization (for example, separating the responses for 
internal and external stakeholders) less viable.  
6.2.3 Negotiation and Perceptions of Pluralism  
With a majority of organizations implementing negotiation strategies, proposing a pattern 
vis-à-vis particular perceptions was less immediately obvious. However, through drawing on 
both the empirical data and the literature an association between negotiation and the 
dimensions of pluralism can still be argued.  
A link between perceptions of higher degrees of power diffusion (++) and negotiation was 
evident in CoRE 2, CRI 2, and HTSU 1. In these organizations perceptions of a relatively 
higher degree of power diffusion can be connected to the use of negotiation to adapt to, 
balance, and accommodate multiple demands. For example, increased awareness regarding 
the power of government in CoRE 2 was connected to negotiation (rather than contraction) 
becoming the dominant response. Another example was in HTSU 1: a link can be suggested 
between the perceived importance of the scientists and the CEO engaging in negotiation “to 
keep everyone happy at least some of the time.” This was despite his expressed preference 
for a more singular focus. Negotiating a compromise and bargaining in CRI 2 was similarly 
indicative of being “caught between” powerful stakeholders. This required more adaptive 
responses, rather than ignoring or manipulating them being viable.  
This link can also be inferred within the literature. Oliver (1991) outlines that ‘compromise’ 
is more likely (than ‘manipulation’ or ‘defiance’) in contexts where dependence on 
institutional constituents is high (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995). Pratt and 
Foreman (2000) similarly argue that aggregation (forging links) is more likely in situations 
where powerful stakeholders support multiple identities. Empirical examples connecting 
negotiation strategies to recognized mutual dependence amongst stakeholders have also 
been noted (e.g., Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Reay & Hinings, 2009).  
In addition, negotiation was observed in association with lower perceived diffused power in 
two organizations (CoRE 1 and CRI 1). Negotiation in these organizations can be partly 
explained by their simultaneous utilisation of transcension strategies that also made the 
most of that greater degree of perceived potential agency, that is, the degree of power 
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diffusion being perceived as relatively lower (+). This suggests that also thinking about these 
strategies in a combinatorial way is important, something addressed further below.  
A link between negotiation and perceptions of lower degree of divergence (+) helps explain 
the utilization of negotiation by CoRE 1 and CRI 1 outlined above. In CRI 1, the strategy of 
striving for balance between objectives, rather than one particular demand being dominant, 
was connected to those objectives being perceived as somewhat commensurable. For 
instance, financial viability and research worked together towards the fulfilment of CRI 1’s 
purpose if balanced. Likewise, in CoRE 1 the strategy of ‘democratic partnerships’ was linked 
to perceptions that collaboration within a competitive system was possible. This contrasts 
with a situation where competition and collaboration were viewed as largely 
incommensurable, a perspective that was more apparent in CoRE 2. 
Successful negotiation is associated with a capacity to demonstrate connections and 
negotiate compromises. This is dependent on a perception of partial commensurability. This 
point is implied by Pratt and Foreman (2000) who connect higher degrees of identity 
compatibility with ‘aggregation’ responses. Oliver (1991) similarly suggests that 
“compromise” strategies are most likely when there is moderate consistency between 
organizational goals and institutional pressures. Pache and Santos (2010) argue that 
compromise is less likely when there is conflict over goals rather than means, the former 
being indicative of more serious divergence than conflict over means. For example, Reay 
and Hinings (2009) show that ‘pragmatic collaboration’ was assisted by two stakeholders, 
driven by divergent logics, realising a degree of commensurability. 
Again, some of the findings in the case studies lie outside this suggested association. CoRE 2 
and CRI 2 implemented negotiation strategies despite higher perceived levels of divergence. 
However, a potential pattern in this regard is that engaging in negotiation in association 
with perceived high divergence is also linked with less positive assessments by stakeholders. 
A degree of perceived commensurability between objectives appears to play a role in 
determining a stakeholder’s positive experience of negotiation and one can assume that 
positive assessments of a strategy make it more likely to persist in the long term. This 
suggests that either their strategic approach or their perceptions of the degree of 
divergence is likely to change over time. For example, CRI 2 was at the time of the 
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interviews looking for a “new” strategy in the face of dissatisfaction with the current 
strategic approach. It is also partly explained by how negotiation was combined with other 
strategies (discussed further below). Both CoRE 2 and CRI 2 combined negotiation with 
segregative strategies which have been proposed above to be associated with these higher 
perceptions of divergence.  
Encapsulating the above discussion, it is suggested that:  
Proposition 3: Negotiation is more likely to be implemented when 1) stakeholders’ objectives 
are perceived to be partially commensurable (+), and 2) when the degree of power diffusion 
is higher (++).  
6.2.4 Transcension and Perceptions of Pluralism 
Lower perceived diffusion of power (+) can be connected to CoRE 1 and CRI 1’s ability to 
adopt agency-intensive strategies. In CoRE 1 the perception of a degree of autonomy vis-à-
vis TEC can be associated with their strategy of ‘leading the way.’ This strategy was explicitly 
discussed in relation to perceptions of a degree of autonomy existing within its relationship 
with government. Similarly, CRI 1’s more transformative efforts in relation to its context can 
be associated with perceptions of not being completely dictated to by external stakeholders 
(government and clients). By comparison, CRI 2 interviewees described a lack of autonomy 
in relation to their external stakeholders as preventing them from implementing 
transcension instead of their current negotiation strategy. Finally, internally in both CoRE 1 
and CRI 1, the ability to transform scientists was connected to perceptions concerning 
power. For example, CoRE 1’s utilized the research benefits and funding it provided to PIs as 
a way of transforming what it meant to be an academic. In CoRE 2’s case the benefits of 
being a PI were not able to be used in this way, with interviewees reporting comparatively 
little such benefits. Consequently, CoRE 2 had less ability to transform PI behaviour in that 
way.  
With the HTSUs a connection between the level of diffused power and transcension was 
also apparent. HTSU 2’s ability to follow an expanded vision, a vision that emanated from 
the organization’s managers, was connected to the perception of power being relatively less 
diffused (+). For example, investors and their demand for ROI were important but perceived 
as manageable. It was not necessarily something that dominated HTSU 2’s decision making 
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and demanded they have a narrow ROI focused vision. For instance there was not clear non-
managerial voice on the board. By contrast, in HTSU 1 the implementation of negotiation in 
combination with transcension is perhaps indicative of the higher perceived power diffusion 
(++). This provides a contrast with HTSU 2 sole focus on more agency-intensive strategies.  
The connection between transcension and perception of comparatively lower perceived 
power diffusion (+) can be also inferred from the literature. For example, Alexander’s (1996, 
p. 830) transcension strategy of “creative enactment” entails the ability to perceive “a 
universe of possibilities.” In the example provided the power of external stakeholders was 
recognized yet not perceived as necessarily overly constraining. Similarly, Oliver (1991) 
describes “manipulation” strategies (e.g., ‘transformation’ in Table 6.1) as more likely in 
contexts where dependence on “institutional constituents” is lower.  
An association between transcension and perceptions of a degree of commensurability is 
also suggested. This link was evident in CoRE 1 and CR1 1. The following examples are 
illustrative:  
 In CRI 1 a degree of commensurability (+) can be linked to the strategy of an 
overarching purpose, with many objectives seen as working towards the same thing. 
Similarly, such perceived compatibility was behind the efforts to create business 
literate scientists.  
 Lower perceived divergence was behind CoRE 1’s strategy of an expanded vision. 
Rather than incommensurable, its various objectives were viewed as working 
together to define what the CoRE was and did (i.e., ‘expanded vision’).  
 A clear distinction between start-ups regarding perceptions of divergence was 
unable to be made. However, in HTSU 2 the CEO outlined how there was a degree of 
compatibility between “science” and “business.” He also outlined that incorporating 
“public good” objectives was a more sustainable way of doing business. As the 
expanded vision the company promulgated incorporated these three elements, such 
perceptions of compatibility can be connected to this strategy.  
This association is supported by Pratt and Foreman (2000) who connect more integrative 
strategies to situations where degrees of compatibility exist. An example provided in the 
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broader pluralism literature is Jarzabkowski and Sillince’s (2007) concept of a “synergy 
rhetoric”, connected to use of an overarching objective here. This “constructs a context in 
which multiple activities are compatible and mutually supportive” (p. 1646). It can be 
inferred that it is consequently built on the simultaneous impression and construction of a 
degree of compatibility between demands.  
This discussion is represented in the following: 
Proposition 4: Transcension is more likely to be implemented when 1) stakeholders’ 
objectives are perceived to be partially commensurable (+); and 2) when the degree of 
power diffusion is lower (+). 
In reflecting on Proposition 4, it is worth noting that these perceptions of the degree of 
diffusion and divergence (+) seem to be linked to an acceptance of pluralism rather than a 
denial or attempt to curtail it (Kraatz & Block, 2008). For example, in CoRE 1, the recognition 
of the opportunity to self-define went hand-in-hand with efforts to democratically include 
all stakeholders (i.e., PIs, university partners and government). As Kraatz and Block (2008, p. 
252) note, the interrelationship between “acceptance of irreversible commitments” to 
stakeholders and autonomy (the perceived ability to make “reciprocal claims” on those 
stakeholders) are interconnected.  
6.2.5 Summary: Propositions 1–4 
The four propositions and related theoretical extension are depicted in Figure 6.3. Also 
contained in the framework is Proposition 5 which relates to the combinations of strategies: 
the focus of the final section of this  chapter (6.3).  
The level of perceived power diffusion and divergence has been shown to have explanatory 
value in understanding why different strategies were pursued by different organizations. 
Such propositions can be connected to a conceptualization of the environment as enacted. 
The idea that organizational contexts can be perceived as partly created through 
‘attentional processes’ and resulting action is illustrative (Alexander, 1996; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). A potential framing is that organizations 
reinforce perceptions of different contextual characteristics (in this case degree of power 
diffusion and divergence) through their actions. In so doing, they partly create that context. 
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However, it is also recognized that there are limitations to enactment (Jauch & Kraft, 1986; 
Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). This interaction between enactment possibilities and 
constraints within the “objective environment” (Pfeffer & Salanik, 1978) is not fully resolved 
or incorporated in the theoretical development here. However, it is envisaged that the two 
interact in explaining these propositions. For example, CoRE 2 was constrained from 
successfully enacting, through contraction, the low power diffusion context they perhaps 
initially perceived. This could be interpreted as a case where performance was “affected by 
parts of the environment *initially+ not noticed or heeded” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 79).  
Figure 6.3 Managing legitimacy demands in pluralistic contexts: Propositions 1–5 
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6.3. Highlighting the Temporal Story 
A temporal understanding of the strategies can also be gleaned from the findings. While a 
process perspective was not the primary level of analysis, a degree of insight into the 
question of how organizations strategize over time (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a) resulted 
from the data. Legitimation takes place and responds to contexts that are changing and 
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developing (Sonpar et al., 2010). Static representations are acknowledged as providing a 
somewhat limited understanding.  
Two broad temporal patterns were evident. First, in CoRE 1 and HTSU 1 there were no 
reported changes in their strategic approach over time. Second, the four other cases all 
reported experiences of crisis at some point. For these organizations this was associated 
with a rethinking of their strategic approach. For example, one CRI 1 manager outlined how 
“It was basically bleeding to death” before their change in strategy. A temporal summary is 
depicted in Figure 6.4.  
Figure 6.4 Temporal picture of strategies 
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The research design did not always enable a complete understanding of past strategies. It 
nonetheless was made it apparent that changes in strategy had occurred (CoRE 2, CRI 1, 
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HTSU 2) or that a crisis was prompting a potential rethinking of current strategies (CRI 2). As 
a temporal story, the case of CoRE 2 is similar to the one outlined by Sonpar et al. (2010) 
where contraction led to activism on the part of the contracted party. This resulted in the 
recognition of the need for negotiation.  
The potentially obvious point that the management of pluralism is a dynamic process is 
highlighted in Figure 6.4. This supports research efforts that provide process frameworks of 
legitimacy strategies. Overall, it highlighted an iterative approach to addressing stakeholder 
demands in response to, for example, crises. While the cases were temporally bounded to 
focus on strategies currently at play, the empirical data provided the insight that an 
understanding of those strategies was inseparable from the broader temporal picture.  
In addition, however, it appears that strategies are also to a degree entrenched, something 
described in the strategy literature as inertia (Miller & Chen, 1994). To reiterate, 
accompanying much of the strategic change were crisis-like events. Crisis appears to be a 
required prompt for significant changes in strategic approaches to pluralism (Seo & Creed, 
2002). For example, while a change in strategic approach was evident in CoRE 2, some 
interviewees continued to promulgate the initial contraction strategy. This was despite it 
being largely recognized as unviable.  
Population ecology authors highlight structural inertia in explaining this. Characteristics at 
time of founding can become imprinted and resistant to change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). However, this point regarding the path-dependency of legitimacy 
strategies themselves is something on which previous legitiamcy research has largely been 
silent. The tension between consistency and conformity Kraatz and Block (2008) raise 
(Section 2.3.2) with regards to legitimacy strategies amidst pluralism is put forward as 
potentially explanatory. Not only are organizations expected to symbolize their conformity 
with prevailing beliefs (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), but they must also “evidence cross-
temporal consistency in their words and deed” (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 248). For example, 
a commitment to a singular focus on science excellence on the part of CoRE 2 (consistency) 
interacts with their negotiation of additional demands (conformity). It is, therefore, 
suggested that legitimation over time can be understood as a reflection of the 
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consistency/conformity tension that Kraatz and Block outlined as characterizing legitimacy 
strategies amidst pluralism.  
6.4 Combinations of Legitimacy Strategies  
A combinatorial approach to legitimation was apparent in the overview provided at the 
beginning of this chapter (Figure 6.1). A central finding is that organizations amidst 
pluralistic implement multiple strategies simultaneously. This includes combinations that 
are seemingly paradoxical, for example, simultaneously implementing integration 
(transcension) and segregation (contraction) as exemplified in HTSU 2.  
Binder (2007, p. 551) connects legitimacy research’s ‘oversight’ regarding organizational 
agency to institutional theories focus on the search for “an organization’s single response to 
the environment.” Binder focused on how a strategy of compartmentalization (Kraatz & 
Block, 2008) enabled separate subunits to focus on different demands and, thus, exhibit 
distinct strategies. The findings here address this identified preoccupation with single 
strategies through looking at how different strategies are combined in the absence of such 
overarching sub-unit segmentation. Understanding legitimacy strategies in pluralistic 
contexts is enabled through showing how strategies interrelate and are combined by 
organizations simultaneously.  
To reiterate, Pache & Santos (2010) point out that studies addressing the question of 
strategizing for legitimacy in pluralistic settings have focused on the identification and 
exploration of single idiosyncratic strategies. For example, Elsbach and Sutton (1992) 
investigate decoupling as a means for managing divergent legitimacy demands (although 
they do link decoupling to various impression management techniques). Battilana and 
Dorado (2010) similarly focus on particular practices (hiring and training) and relate that to 
either a strategy of integrative vision or identity in two organizations respectively. Other 
authors (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Sonpar et al., 2010) outline variations in strategies over 
time but do not focus on how different strategies (as defined by the framework here) are 
implemented simultaneously.  
Pluralism and tensions are frequently argued as not fully resolvable (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2009a; Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Even when a strategy that exhibits characteristics 
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of transcension is observed, it is unlikely that complete resolution is achieved. This means 
ongoing strategies of negotiation or compartmentalization are likely. For example, in HTSU 1 
there was discussion regarding how stakeholders were integrated around a picture of 
growth (transcension). Despite this, negotiation around the periphery was still required.  
Pluralism has been shown here to go beyond duality to incorporate a multiplicity of tensions 
(Smith & Lewis, 2011). All six organizations were facing multiple embedded tensions rather 
than a single defining point of divergence. This provides more understanding regarding the 
use of multiple strategies in pluralistic contexts: multiple strategies may be needed to target 
different tensions or stakeholders. This is perhaps clearest in CoRE 2. A specific strategy that 
addressed the tension between competition and collaboration was not apparent in this case. 
This was an exception: in the other five organizations, strategies directly or indirectly 
targeting all points of divergence were evident. A possible assessment is that CoRE 2 
suffered through its lack of a multi-faceted strategic approach in this regard. Interviewees 
assessed the organization’s strategies negatively and expressed frustration with respect to 
the unaddressed tension between competition and collaboration. 
Pluralistic contexts are consequently proposed to frequently demand a combination of 
strategies:  
Proposition 5a: In pluralistic contexts, combinations of strategies are more likely to be 
implemented than a single dominant strategy by organizations.  
This combinatorial approach to legitimation complicates the picture of the suggested broad 
strategies themselves. For instance, “partisan mutual adjustment” is theorized as 
coordination “without a dominant common purpose” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Lindblom, 
1965, p. 3). Rather than ‘pure’ reflection of this negotiation strategy, some organization 
cases here showed stakeholders adjusting to each other in relation to an overarching 
objective. Negotiation in this sense was, for example, evident in HTSU 1’s managing the 
periphery strategy or the balance engaged in by CRI 1 in relation to an overarching purpose. 
As this suggests, the conceptualization of transcension as an ‘ideal option’ that mitigates 
legitimacy problems (Kraatz & Block, 2008) is also not the complete picture. Instead, 
organizations engage in strategies that ‘integrate or somehow transcend’ some legitimacy 
demands while simultaneously being engaged in on-going partial adaptation and balancing. 
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In this way, the overlap between these strategies may, therefore, be relatively frequent, and 
theoretical elaboration highlighting this is important. Another example of theoretical 
refinement being required to reflect the combinatorial findings, regards ‘bounded 
compartmentalization.’ This was evident in HTSU 1 where, due to its close association with 
negotiation, the degree of segregation was limited.  
This more complex picture is indicative of the argument that “contradictions” in legitimacy 
criteria offer opportunities for multiplicity, creativity, and agency with regards to legitimacy 
strategies (Aurini, 2006). For example, in HTSU 2 contraction was incorporated in some 
areas (e.g., with regards to venture capitalists) alongside other, even paradoxical, strategies 
(e.g., an expansive vision). This, perhaps surprising, combination of strategies is partly 
explanatory of the more positive picture of contraction presented in the cases here. 
Contraction was not necessarily reported as a dominant approach that markedly reduced 
pluralism (e.g., Kraatz & Block, 2008), but rather as a strategy that partially reduced 
pluralism in particular areas in combination with other strategies that simultaneously 
embrace aspects of plurality.  
Figure 6.5 Alternative depiction of framework (Proposition 5) 
Transcension
Negotiation
Compartmental-
ization
Contraction
CoRE 1
CRI 1
HTSU 
1
HTSU 2
CoRE 2 
[phase 1]
CoRE 2 
[phase 2]
CRI 2
More integrative
More segregative
More adaptive
More manipulative
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The consequent result of these observations is additional development (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002) of the framework. This is conveyed in Figure 6.5.  
That particular combinations between strategies are more common is also illustrated in 
Figure 6.5. It is suggested here that it is more likely for strategies to be combined when they 
share a degree of commonality along one of the framework’s dimensions (i.e., integration or 
agency) (Oliver, 1991; Pratt & Foreman, 2000). For example, transcension and negotiation 
are both more integrative and are therefore proposed as more likely used in tandem than 
contraction and negotiation which differ both in their degree of agency and integration. This 
suggests contraction/negotiation and transcension/compartmentalization are less likely 
than other combinations.  
The findings here support this theorization. Only one case provides a counter-example. This 
instance of combining contraction/negotiation by CoRE 2 was, however, also associated 
with less favourable stakeholder assessments. Indeed, exploring whether there is a 
performance dimension to this proposition (5b below) would be potentially illuminating. 
While organizations can in practice combine any of the strategies, perhaps such counter-
examples are likely to result in less positive assessments; as was the case in CoRE 2. Similarly, 
CoRE 2 reflects examples in the literature (e.g., Sonpar, et al., 2010) through the 
relationships between its strategies being partly temporal in nature. While elements of the 
two strategies were shown to overlap, CoRE 2 can be described as shifting from a dominant 
contraction strategy to negotiation being the predominant approach. This contrasts to the 
more obvious simultaneous implementation of strategies in the other five organizations.  
Based on the above discussion, while organizations can combine any strategies, the 
argument is that some combination will be more likely:  
Proposition 5b: Combinations of strategies that share either a common level of integration 
or agency are more likely to be implemented than combinations that do not.  
One particular combination of strategies stands out within the dataset as the most common: 
transcension and negotiation (CoRE 1, CRI 1, HTSU 1). Moreover, it is those three cases that 
combine transcension and negotiation that are associated with more positive stakeholder 
assessments of their strategies. In contrast, CoRE 2, CRI 2, and HTSU 2 are linked with more 
varied assessments (Table 6.2).  
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An element of transcension appears to be important in explaining this association with 
perceptions of success. The findings suggest that when not combined with a degree of 
transcension, negotiation strategies are more likely to be assessed as a frustrating process 
of compromise and ongoing renegotiation. For example, in CRI 2 negotiation was 
characterized by some interviewees as a lack of strategy; in CoRE 2 negotiation was 
characterized by some as detrimental compromises, with the CoRE “becoming less 
desirable.”  
However, transcension does not provide the full answer; a direct association between 
transcension specifically and more positive assessment was also not evident. For example, 
the transcension is specifically associated with less positive assessments by some HTSU 2 
interviewees. Another illustrative example is in HTSU 1 where the supplementary dynamics 
of managing the periphery and creating links of understanding were central. For example, 
actively managing the periphery was important in enabling the transcension strategy of an 
overarching objective to be something around which multiple stakeholders were integrated. 
Without this ongoing partial adaptation, the overarching objective could have increasingly 
represented a contracted sales focus. It is the combination of integrative strategies that 
appear to stimulate more favourable stakeholder assessments.   
This can be summarized into the following two propositions:   
Proposition 5c: Organizations are more likely to combine integrative strategies (transcension 
and negotiation) than implement other possible combinations of strategies.  
Proposition 5d: Integrative combinations are more likely to be associated with broadly 
positive stakeholder assessments than other possible combinations of strategies.  
This finding of organizations successfully combining transcension with negotiation differs 
from Battilana and Dorado’s (2010) conclusion that identity synthesis is the only sustainable 
way to manage conflicting logics. Instead, it seems here that organizations frequently 
combine a broad overarching vision with ongoing partial adaptation and compromise 
regarding stakeholder demands. Simultaneously, it contradicts an assumption that the 
development of more transcensive strategies is unlikely or even unhelpful in such contexts 
and that negotiation will instead be apparent (e.g., Fiol et al., 2009; Jarzabkowski et al., 
2009a; Reay & Hinings, 2009). For example, the concept of ‘partisan mutual adjustment’ 
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explicitly excludes any form of overarching integrative vision or objective (Lindblom, 1965). 
Instead, the findings highlight the importance of the relationship between these two 
strategies.  
6.4 Summary: Chapter Six 
The theoretical implications of this thesis have been highlighted as four-fold. First, increased 
understanding of the specific strategies in play was sought. Insight into infrequently studied 
strategies (such as transcension) has been provided, as has support regarding the utility of 
Kraatz and Block (2008) conceptualization. Second, the analysis of the pluralistic contexts 
(Chapter 4) and the strategies the organizations employed (Chapter 5) were brought 
together in Section 6.2. This enabled propositions regarding why particular strategies may 
or may not be implemented by organizations. Third, a temporal perspective is provided. The 
findings in this regard were explained as a potential reflection of the tension between the 
simultaneous need for consistency and conformity (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Overall, it 
highlighted an iterative approach to addressing stakeholder demands, which evolved in 
response to crisis. Finally, the issue of strategic combinations is highlighted as central to 
understanding legitimation amidst pluralism. The implications of these findings will be 
further reflected upon in the concluding chapter.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion: Creative Chances at the Clashing Point 
The clashing point of two subjects, two disciplines, two cultures - of two galaxies, so far as 
that goes - ought to produce creative chances. (Snow, 1959, p. 16) 
So that’s very radical. Again it’s ironic – turning things around. And that’s shocking. But we 
are going to do that. We are going to do shocking things. And there’s value in that: it’s 
grasping that bigger picture. (Director, CoRE 1)  
The inclusion of pluralism means “one arrives at a less tidy, less idealized, but nevertheless 
truer and more realistic picture of our social condition” (Rescher, 1993, p. 189). Within the 
organization literature this same point is made by Glynn et al. (2000, p. 726) who argue that 
although pluralism “can make demands on our models”, its inclusion enables increased 
accuracy and nuance. It has been proposed here that incorporating pluralism into our 
understanding of legitimacy strategies offers such benefits to the legitimacy literature. To 
return to Snow’s (1959) quote, the findings here highlight that ‘creative chances’ do indeed 
exist for organizations amidst pluralism (Aurini, 2006; Kraatz & Block, 2008). An example 
was seen in CoRE 1 whose ‘strategic enactment’ (Alexander, 1996) and embracing of 
pluralism is highlighted in the quote above.  
The story promulgated is one of active organizational agency as part of legitimation. 
Organizational actors respond strategically to “construct, change and 
enforce…expectations” (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988, p. 562) as they manage divergent 
perceptions of desirability and appropriateness from multiple sources. However, we lack in-
depth understanding of agency-intensive legitimation at the organizational level; 
particularly, within pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 
2009). This thesis offers a contribution as part of the growing body of research seeking to 
rectify this imbalance. In particular, insight into how organizations combine, sometimes 
paradoxical, strategies extends the existing framework and related literature (Binder, 2007; 
Pache & Santos, 2010). While the underlying framework (Figure 2.4) enabled insight into the 
empirical data, the organization cases appear unconfined by the ‘lines’ that initially 
differentiated the four strategic categories. Theoretical development in Chapter 6 
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consequently softened the demarcations between these legitimacy strategies to more 
explicitly account for combinatorial approaches.  
How do organizations manage their legitimacies in pluralistic contexts? This question has 
been recognized as remaining both under theorized and under empirically investigated 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008; Lounsbury, 2007; Pache & Santos, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009) 
(Chapter 2). This thesis sought to address this issue through exploring legitimacy within the 
pluralistic context of New Zealand’s (NZ) science sector. Using a multi-case study design and 
thematic analysis, the research explored the application of an analytical framework. This 
focused on contextualization (legitimacy demands and the dimensions of pluralism) and 
legitimacy strategies (Kraatz & Block, 2008). The findings then described the pluralism each 
organizations encountered (Chapter 4) and the legitimacy strategies perceived as 
implemented by each organization amidst such contexts (Chapter 5). The discussion that 
followed explored the theoretical implications of those findings through bringing together 
these different aspects of the thesis. This concluding chapter further outlines the particular 
contribution to legitimacy theory. First the specific findings and their relationship to our 
understanding of legitimacy strategies is highlighted, as is their connection to the research 
questions outlined in the introduction. Second, the broader contribution, to what Alexander 
(1996) labels ‘strategic institutional theory’, stakeholder theory, paradox literature and 
literature focused on managing science organizations are outlined. Implications for practice 
will be suggested before I canvass avenues for future research about which this thesis leaves 
me enthusiastic.  
7.1 Research Questions, Findings, and Contribution  
7.1.1 Contribution: Specific Findings and Research Questions  
A central contribution made is theoretical elaboration at the intersection of pluralism and 
legitimacy strategy frameworks and theory. The connection between this and the research 
questions guiding this study are summarized in Figure 7.1.  
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Figure 7.1 Research questions and findings: A summary 
How do organizations 
strategize for 
legitimacy in 
pluralistic contexts
Secondary question: 
Why are certain 
strategies used and 
not others
Secondary question: 
What strategies are used
Secondary question: 
Are strategies 
combined and if so 
how?
Secondary question: 
How is the pluralistic 
context perceived/
experienced? 
Extension to framework Extension to framework
Finding 
 Temporal picture
Finding 4:
 Combinations of 
strategies 
Finding
Insight into Kraatz and Block 
(2008) model extended; deeper 
insight into infrequently explored 
strategies
Finding
Pluralism’s 
dimensions and 
strategy 
implementation 
Finding 
Embedded rather than dualistic 
tensions; different perceptions of 
pluralistic contexts.  
Understanding into the framework and specific legitimacy strategies. This increased insight is 
connected to the specific sub-questions of what strategies are used by organizations in 
pluralistic settings. Kraatz and Block’s (2008) framework has not previously been directly in 
empirical studies of legitimation. For example, Pache and Santos (2010, p. 457) characterize 
the literature as “a few empirical studies have identified idiosyncratic responses to 
conflicting institutional pressures for conformity…without proposing a more general 
framework.”  
Transcension as a strategy has been infrequently explored within legitimacy literature. 
Historically, the underlying assumption in legitimacy theory has been that less agency-
intensive strategies, such as of isomorphism or decoupling, will be more frequently and 
easily utilized (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Suchman, 1995). The findings here address this omission through highlighting agency 
intensive dynamics such as ‘infusing with value’ (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Selznick, 1957) and 
‘creative enactment’ (Alexander, 1996). The fact that transcension strategies were 
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uncovered in various cases consequently helps address this broad imbalance in the 
literature. I would suggest that pluralism indeed provides an opportunity to explore 
strategies that are less central in homogenous contexts where acquiescence is proposed to 
be more characteristic (Oliver, 1991). The findings also provide a different perspective to 
viewing transcension within pluralistic settings as unlikely, in comparison to ongoing 
negotiation and the development of ‘grudging’ or ‘pragmatic’ truces (e.g., Jarzabkowski et 
al., 2009a; Reay & Hinings, 2009).  
Negotiation was also confirmed as central to understanding strategizing in pluralistic 
contexts. This suggests that negotiation concepts such as mutual adjustment (Jarzabkowski, 
et al., 2009a) and partial adaptation (D’Aunno et al., 1991) as well as the proposition that 
organizations are able to transcend pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008) are both explanatory. 
Understood singularly, neither emerged as centrally prominent. This contrasts with different 
literature that has been reviewed (see Chapter 2) as outlining one of these strategies as 
either more likely (e.g., Jarzabkowski, et al., 2009a) or ideal (e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Reay & Hinings, 2009). Finally, the idea of ‘democracy’ was raised as a particularly novel 
negotiation strategy. Such democratic processes have not previously been discussed as a 
legitimacy strategy.  
Increased theoretical insight into segregative strategies was also gained. Understanding of 
compartmentalization was extended through the finding of ‘bounded compartmentalization’ 
(discussed further as part of combinatorial approach to legitimation below). Highlighting 
compartmentalization as a way of managing divergent legitimacy demands between 
internal stakeholders (managers and scientists) is also novel. The concept has usually been 
instead used to explore the management of distinct external demands versus internal 
demands (e.g., Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
Increased insight into contraction also moved beyond the wide-spread discounting of this 
strategy within the literature (Humphreys & Brown, 2002; Sonpar et al., 2010). Contraction 
was indeed shown in one case (CoRE 2) to be associated with a risk of negative reinforcing 
cycles as proposed by the paradox literature (Lewis, 2000). However, the contrasting 
perspective that contraction processes can be usefully applied as a focusing mechanism in 
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pluralistic contexts was apparent in HTSU 2. This is something that has been infrequently 
argued from a pluralism perspective.  
To summarize, support for Kraatz and Block’s (2008) framework is provided; it is shown to 
offer understanding into how organizations strategize for legitimacy amidst pluralism. The 
following discussion, however, has the intention of extending and refining the theoretical 
picture with which this research began.  
Organizations combining legitimacy strategies. Another specific contribution relates to the 
question of how strategies are combined in pluralistic contexts. It is argued that 
organizations in pluralistic contexts will likely implement multiple, sometimes seemingly 
paradoxical, strategies simultaneously. The “paradox lens” is outlined in this thesis as a body 
of literature closely related to, but distinct from, the context-focused nature of pluralism. 
This strand of research may be a particularly useful in understanding this combinatorial 
finding. Smith et al. (2010, p. 450) use the term ‘paradoxical strategy’ to define multiple 
strategies that are contradictory yet interrelated. This term is indicative of the combinatorial 
approach adopted by some organizations here. Implementing strategies in combination was 
shown to affect how the strategies themselves were conceptualized. For example, the close 
association between negotiation and compartmentalization in HTSU 1 led to a restricted 
form of compartmentalization. Consequently, the initial representation of distinct strategies 
(Figure 2.4) was refined to reflect this understanding (Figure 6.5). In highlighting this 
combinatorial approach, I suggest that part of the legacy of underutilizing a pluralism 
perspective within legitimacy research is assumptions around strategy implementation that 
are also homogenizing. For example, the underlying frameworks do not explore the idea of 
combining strategies as part of the presentation of the array of legitimacy strategies (e.g., 
Oliver, 1991; Kraatz & Block, 2008). As the literature review highlighted, these assumptions 
have been upheld through empirical concentration on uncovering single ‘idiosyncratic’ 
responses (Binder, 2007; Pache & Santos, 2010).  
Finally, this study found what appears to be particularly important strategic combination. 
The interrelationship between transcension and negotiation is suggested as likely to be 
associated with positive stakeholder assessments. Consequently, while the idea of patterns 
within legitimacy strategies highlights the degree of strategic innovativeness that can be 
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pursued by organizations, performance-based limitations to strategic combinations were 
also suggested. The findings suggest that while organizations can paradoxically combine any 
strategies within the framework, some strategic combinations are likely to be more 
successful (and likely) than others.  
The ‘transcension’/‘negotiation’ dichotomy. The idea of combinatorial strategic 
implementation moves beyond a distinction observable in the literature. The different 
pictures emerging of legitimacy strategies reflect a difference between authors highlighting 
transcension (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Selznick, 1957) and negotiation strategies (Jarzabkowski 
et al., 2009a; Lindblom, 1965; Reay & Hinings, 2009) as either more likely or desirable. Here 
I suggest that insights such as ‘infusing with value’ (transcension) and ‘mutual adjustment’ 
(negotiation) can instead be used simultaneously to understand legitimation in pluralistic 
settings. This differs from these strategies being considered as opposing, or even sharply 
distinct, strategic options.  
This research consequently contrasts with the argument that “to be sustainable…an 
organization needs to create a common organizational identity…such an identity prevents 
the formation of subgroup identities within the organization” (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, p. 
1420). That organizations can be sustainable in pluralistic settings without this absolute 
degree of synergic resolution is instead proposed (Pratt & Foreman, 2000). However, the 
findings also differ from previous research that has highlighted grudging mutual adjustment 
between stakeholders or operating amidst an “uneasy truce” through “non-trust 
collaboration” (Jarzabkowski, et al., 2009a; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Here, in contrast, 
enhanced ability for organizations to transcend pluralism was observed than such previous 
studies suggest.  
Legitimacy strategy and pluralism’s dimensions: proposed associations. A connection 
between perceptions of pluralism’s dimensions and strategies likely to be utilized by an 
organization is proposed. For example, a particular strategy (e.g., transcension) is proposed 
as more likely to be implemented in association with particular perceptions of pluralism 
(e.g., a degree of perceived commensurability between objectives rather than complete 
incommensurability). A suggested framing of this is one of ‘enactment’ (Alexander, 1996; 
Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). A conceptualization is suggested of 
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perceptions of pluralism guiding strategic implementation, which in turn perhaps ‘enacts’ 
those particular pluralism dynamics. This is explored further in section 7.3 as an avenue for 
future research. The understanding this offers regarding why some strategies are perhaps 
implemented by different organizations contributes to a recognized research gap regarding 
legitimacy strategies generally (Suchman, 1995) and in pluralistic contexts specifically (Pache 
& Santos, 2010). In this thesis connecting the focal framework (Figure 2.4) to the dimensions 
of pluralism is offered as a theoretical extension.  
Both strategic dynamism and inertia. The importance of understanding strategizing over time 
was also highlighted. While the research design did not focus around longitudinal data as 
other studies have, some insight was still gained (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Reay & Hinings, 
2009; Sonpar et al., 2010). An element of inertia vis-à-vis strategic implementation was 
found, something not explicitly highlighted in previous research taking a longitudinal 
approach. The suggestion is that organizations seek to balance the need to be both 
responsive and consistent over time in their legitimacy strategies (Kraatz & Block, 2008). 
This partly explains why resistance to or difficulty implementing a completely new 
legitimacy strategic approach was observable. In particular, shifts in strategy appeared to be 
associated with major events: the four cases that reported changes in their strategies also 
reported “crisis” triggers. This is another potential interpretation of the analogy of the 
“clashing point” and the creative chances therein (Snow, 1959). The ‘crisis points’ spurred 
new, potentially creative, strategies (Alexander, 1996). For instance, it was suggested that 
being faced with a crisis (at the time of the interviews) was connected with CRI 2’s current 
search for new strategies that transcended some of their pluralism.  
Additional notes on contribution: methodology and literature review. This study appears to 
be rare in exploring legitimacy strategies in pluralistic contexts through a multiple case-
study design. The majority of other published studies exploring this research problem have 
tended to utilize single organization cases (e.g., Binder, 2007; Brown, 1995; Glynn, 2002; 
Humphreys & Brown, 2002). Other studies have incorporated multiple organizations within 
a broad sector without incorporating cross-case comparison (Alexander, 1996; Aurini, 2006; 
D'Aunno, et al., 1991; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Exceptions include Elsbach and Sutton’s (1992) 
case of decoupling in pluralistic contexts which compared the similar strategic dynamics of 
two social movement organizations. Battilana and Dorado’s (2010) study also incorporated 
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cross-case comparison of two cases and described different strategies from the same sector. 
This study adds to these through its replication of different organization types within a 
single sector. Through studying six organizations within a sector that incorporates both 
similar and different structures and contextual characteristics, the cross-case comparative 
aspect of this study was particularly enabled. The number of organizations incorporated (i.e., 
more than two) was also behind the wider array of strategic stories surfaced here, 
something that proved useful in “fleshing out” the framework (Eisenhardt, 1991). That this 
study incorporates both internal and external stakeholders, including employees or 
equivalent, within a single study was also important in moving towards a fuller account of 
pluralism. Other studies that have included a focus on internal sources of pluralism have 
tended to focus mostly on the managerial voice (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Jarzabkowski et 
al., 2009a).  
Two contributions related to the literature review can also be summarized. First, an 
adaptation of a broadly utilized multi-dimensional definition of legitimacy was provided 
(Suchman, 1995). This adaptation involved grounding the definition of legitimacy in multiple 
stakeholder perceptions and assumptions. This was a shift from a conceptualization of 
“generalized legitimacy” to explicitly highlighting multiple legitimacies. This definition is put 
forward as a useful one for those seeking to explore legitimacies in pluralistic settings. It 
represents an explicit differentiation from the “monolithic tendencies” (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2009a, p. 284; Lounsbury, 2007) that have defined aspects of legitimacy research. Second, 
structuring the relevant literature review around the focal framework is novel. These studies 
have infrequently been brought together or positioned in relation to an overarching 
legitimacy strategy framework. The organization of this literature is tied to the particular 
conceptualization adopted here and, therefore, remains partial as only one possible 
representation of the conversation (Philips & Burbules, 2000). However, the hope is that a 
useful platform of understanding has been provided for future research.  
7.1.2 Additional Broader Contributions 
Strategic institutional theory. This research positions itself based on the permeability of the 
strategic and institutional strands of legitimacy theory (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 1991; 
Suchman, 1995). It consequently contributes to a strand of research labelled “strategic 
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institutional theory” (Alexander, 1996). Legitimation is depicted as a process involving 
organizational agency and insights from both institutional and strategic strands of legitimacy  
theory are incorporated (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 1991). As Alexander (1996) suggests, 
the separation of so-called ‘institutional’ and ‘technical’ environments was an unnecessary 
restriction (also see Ruef & Scott, 1998; Wilkinson, 1996). Understanding stakeholder 
legitimacy strategies depended on both an appreciation of resource flows (e.g., CoRE 
funding depended on government evaluation of their legitimacy) and the institutionalized 
values and norms (e.g., those associated with an academic conception of research 
excellence). As Kraatz and Block (2008) suggest, this more “strategic” approach to 
understanding legitimacy, as something that incorporates agency at the organizational level, 
is one the can profitably draw from older strands of institutional theory (Selznick, 1957). 
This positioning follows the example set by Kraatz and Block of separating the “neo-
institutional research endeavour” from their specific organizational-centric contribution. 
They argue that their framework at the organizational level is distinct from the broader 
‘organizational institutionalism’ project and label this: ‘institutional organizationalism.’ It is 
to this specific area of legitimacy theory where this thesis also contributes. Indeed, many 
authors from within institutional theory call for such an approach. For example:  
The overwhelming majority of [institutional] studies now take for granted that the 
organizational field or environment is the level of analysis. Other levels of analysis have 
rarely been considered. For example, few studies treat the organization as the level of 
analysis (Greenwood, et al., 2008, p. 45).  
This study can, therefore, be seen as part of a growing literature focused on addressing this 
imbalance through seeking understanding of legitimation at the organizational level. While 
not directly an institutional study of legitimacy, this is aligned with the expressed wish from 
within institutional theory for its future to include further application of its insights to 
multiple levels, topics and settings (Greenwood et al., 2008).  
As already suggested, this research also contributes to the broad research gap regarding 
institutional theory’s “limited theory of action” (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Fligstein, 1997, 
p. 397; Kraatz & Block, 2008). This has been described as the “proconformance bias” that 
underpins this theoretical approach to legitimacy (Kitchener, 2002, p. 411). In this sense, 
this thesis can be connected to the “institutional work” research agenda which has been 
 257 
 
similarly focused on addressing this. Institutional work provides a framework for 
understanding how individuals and organizations create, maintain, and disrupt institutions 
rather than simply conforming to them (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). As with this 
thesis it drew from Oliver’s (1991) institutional response framework. The institutional work 
framework was, however, not directly incorporated here for a number of reasons. First, 
Kraatz and Block’s (2008) theorization was found to be more specifically focused on the 
issue of ‘legitimacy strategies’ within pluralism. Second, Kraatz and Block’s framework 
enabled the incorporation of a broader array of strategies, for example, including escaping 
and restructuring resource dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995). This 
contrasts with institutional work that has a more restricted and tightly defined focus on 
institutions. However, a link between the exploration of legitimacy strategies and 
institutional work is evident. Both enable conceptualization of organizations as 
simultaneously constrained by, and exhibiting agency in response to, legitimacy demands 
(Lawrence, et al., 2009, p. 1).  
This thesis helps address the omission that Jarzabkowski et al. (2009) similarly identify: 
research in the institutional work area has rarely addressed how conflicting institutions 
coexist. Instead, the picture has usually been that of a new ‘created’ institution replacing or 
reframing an existing one. In this way institutional work involved in managing pluralistic 
institutions or sources of legitimacy remains understudied; the findings here help attend to 
this gap. For example, the combinatorial finding suggests that research looks at how 
organizations amidst pluralism may engage in ‘creation’, ‘maintenance’, and ‘disruption’ 
work simultaneously.  
Dimensions of pluralism and institutional logics. As outlined in the literature review, 
institutional logics have been a central mechanism for the incorporation of a more 
pluralistic understanding of legitimacy within institutional theory (e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Such logics are theorized as broad templates for action, for 
example, the ‘capitalist system’ and ‘religion’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991). While an explicitly 
institutional logics theoretical frame was not adopted here, a similar understanding of 
legitimacy demands based on ‘science excellence’ ‘public good’, and ‘commercial’ demands 
was surfaced. However, in reaching understanding of the complexity that organizations 
were dealing with, including multiple embedded tensions, explicitly incorporating the 
 258 
 
dimensions of pluralism was integral. The dimensions of “diffused power” and “divergence” 
perhaps offered a more fine-grained and nuanced approach to surfacing pluralism at the 
organizational level. For example, multiple different and overlapping points of divergence 
associated with the legitimacy demands were described (Chapter Four). This enabled 
attention to points of divergence originating from within what could have been classified as 
a broad “logic.” Similarly, focusing analysis on ‘stakeholder legitimacy demands’ rather than 
adopting an explicitly ‘institutional logics’ analysis was helpful. For example, this enabled 
insight into dynamics such as a single stakeholder (for example, government through 
regulation) making multiple divergent demands and simultaneously prioritizing one of them. 
This was the case, for instance, with the CRIs.  
It could be argued that understanding pluralism at the organizational level, rather than the 
field level benefits from this more detailed assessment of the tensions affecting particular 
organizations. This contextualization of the cases in the more specific dimension of 
pluralism (Denis et al., 2007), rather than the broad logics at play, appears to be a novel 
approach within legitimacy literature.  
Stakeholder theory. The connection between legitimacy strategies amidst pluralism and 
stakeholder theory has been raised theoretically (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 
2010) and increasingly utilized empirically (Driscoll & Crombie, 2001; Sonpar et al., 2010). A 
stakeholder-focused conceptualization of legitimacy here was central to an understanding 
of pluralism.  
This thesis offers support for stakeholder theory’s broad proposition that attending to 
multiple demands is positive both in a performance and a normative sense (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008; Sonpar et al., 2010). For example, CoRE 1’s 
embracing of multiple stakeholder objectives was explicitly linked by interviewees to 
positive stakeholder assessments of the organization. As Pache and Santos (2010) suggest, 
an approach that explores both perceptions of conflict and perceptions of the importance of 
various stakeholders would build natural bridges to the stakeholder theory literature 
(Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). While stakeholder theory holds that 
divergent salient stakeholder demands confront organizations and should be responded to 
(Sonpar et al., 2010), it is argued that it has not adequately explored the strategies 
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organization engage in to achieve this (Kraatz & Block, 2008). In particular, stakeholder 
theory stipulates that organizations will respond differently to different stakeholders 
depending on their salience (e.g., Friedman & Miles, 2002; Mendelow, 1991; Mitchell et al., 
1997). This point is incorporated in this study through the diffused power dimension. 
However, as Laplume et al.’s (2008) review shows, while various idiosyncratic strategies for 
managing stakeholders have been proposed by stakeholder theory (e.g., ‘looking to Islamic 
texts’ (Beekun & Badawi, 2005) or using mediation (Lampe, 2001)), a meta-frame is absent. 
The framework here perhaps provides one and it could be utilized and extended by those 
adopting a stakeholder theory perspective. 
This research also shares the implicit objective of stakeholder theory vis-à-vis providing a 
different picture to that of “shareholder hegemony” (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004) dominant 
within modern corporations (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pfeffer, 2009; Selznick, 1996). As 
Laplume et al. (2008, p. 1153) explain:  
Stakeholder theory is also controversial because it questions the conventional assumption 
that pursuit of profits is the preeminent management concern, which Jensen (2002, p. 237) 
calls the “single-value objective” of a corporation.  
I have analyzed companies (HTSUs) and public organizations that have multiple-value 
objectives including, but not reducable to, that “single-value objective” Jensen refers to 
above. The application of this framework to a wider variety of corporate contexts, the 
typical focus of stakeholder theory, will be useful for furthering this theory. In particular, the 
framework provides an avenue for stakeholder theory to more directly address the question 
of how shareholders might be managed if they are, as stakeholder theory suggests, 
“deposed from their preferred status” (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 264).  
The paradox lens. As stated in the literature review (Section 2.1) a plethora of studies within 
the broader pluralism field are focused on ‘paradox.’ Some of these have included a focus 
on ‘coping’ strategies (e.g., Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Smith et al., 2010; Werner & Baxter, 
1994). These studies usually explore a single specific tension such as that between 
exploitation and exploration (e.g., Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004; 
Smith et al., 2010; Smith & Tushman, 2005). This study necessarily limited an in-depth 
review of the literature to the specific issue of legitimacy strategies. However, this broader 
paradox research agenda can be reflected on. Smith and Lewis (2011) acknowledge that 
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much of the paradox literature, including their own extensive review, has focused on 
dualities. This is distinct from the embedded array of tensions that pluralism usually denotes. 
This thesis is, consequently, a rarer example explicitly focused on understanding the 
management of multiple embedded tensions.  
Managing science organizations. This research also contributes to understanding the 
challenges of knowledge-intensive organizations and technology management more broadly. 
Specifically, within both institutional theory and the pluralistic literature generally, greater 
attention has been paid to the tensions within cultural (Alexander, 1996; Glynn, 2000; Glynn, 
2002), education (Jarzabkowski & Sillince, 2007; Meyer et al., 1987), and healthcare 
(D'Aunno et al., 1991; Denis et al., 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Sonpar et al., 2010) than to 
science organizations. This thesis consequently adds to studies that focused on the 
challenges of organizations faced with conflicting demands in the modern science context 
(Colyvas, 2007; Colyvas & Powell, 2006, 2007). In particular, research highlighting how such 
organizations have managed this pluralism remains rare. The above studies instead utilize 
an institutional perspective to explore the institutionalization of new “hybrid” models rather 
than focusing on the divergent legitimacy demands involved. This study also adds insight to 
the body of work seeking to conceptualize changes within NZ’s science sector (e.g., 
Davenport et al., 2003; Devine, 2003; Leitch & Davenport, 2005). It extends such work 
through increasing understanding of how these changes, and associated tensions, have 
been managed at the organizational level by different types of organization.  
7.2 Implications for Practice  
Managers of both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations face a more multi-faceted 
world. Multiple objectives as a root to sustainability are increasingly acknowledged 
(Laplume et al., 2008; Pfeffer, 2009). Further, knowledge is spread across organizations 
(Pisano & Verganti, 2008; Powell et al., 1996; Walter, Kellermanns, & Lechner, 2010). This 
makes understanding legitimacy in contexts where power is diffused increasingly pertinent. 
Pluralism has consequently been depicted as increasingly typical, not restricted to 
traditional examples in the public sector (e.g., Glynn et al., 2000; Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 
2006; Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a). If we accept this assumption this means a pluralistic 
understanding of legitimacy is also pertinent for practitioners. ‘Legitimacy strategies in 
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pluralistic contexts’ (as in the framing here) then becomes the standard experience of 
legitimation for organizations full-stop. Indeed, a prime motivation of this research was an 
ontological one: incorporating pluralism was seen as reflective of what organizations and 
managers are actually faced with and do.  
Incorporating insights from institutional theory at the organizational level to focus on the 
practical activity of organizations is said to increase its utility outside academia (Lawrence, 
et al., 2009, p. 2). The stories here indicate for managers something about how they can 
manage their organization’s legitimacy in complex contexts: they can implement any of the 
strategies suggested. This contrasts with many traditional studies of legitimacy which 
instead outlined broad institutional pressures to which whole organizational fields conform. 
Such an approach tells managers little about how a specific organization, such as their own, 
navigates the complex array of assessments of their desirability and appropriateness. 
Instead, this thesis assumes that strategies implemented by managers matter and provides 
pointers regarding how legitimacy can be successfully managed. In this way the framework 
provided enables increased insight for managers regarding their current approach to 
pluralism and prompt discussion regarding future, potentially more beneficial, strategic 
options.  
Propositions 1–4 hold potential implications for practice. The connection made between 
perspectives of pluralism and legitimacy strategies provides organizations with a sense of 
which strategic responses make sense considering their particular situation. For example, 
awareness of the existence of persistent perceptions of incompatibility between objectives 
suggests managers explore whether opportunities for contraction exist (e.g., Proposition 1). 
Such propositions suggest that efforts to influence perceptions (either their own or those of 
their staff) might better support the strategy they are currently implementing, or wish to in 
the future are worthwhile. For example, communicating points of compatibility within 
divergence in an effort to change perceptions is proposed as important for enabling a 
transcension strategy. Initial practices associated with transcension can then be used to 
reinforce the growing perception of compatibility. Another implication also concerns 
individual leaders: awareness of their own perceptions of their pluralistic context becomes 
critical. 
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The propositions focused on how organizations can combine strategies also provide insight 
for practice. They suggest that managers view individual strategies as components that 
create a complex whole made up of multiple, potentially paradoxical, strategies. Managers 
are prompted to be innovative in their approach to pluralism and the management of their 
stakeholders. For example, they can implement a contraction strategy in one area while 
embracing pluralism in another. The message here is that complete “resolution” cannot be 
expected in such contexts. Managers can, however, still aim for a degree of transcension, at 
least in some areas. For example, attempts to articulate an overarching vision within 
complexity appears worthwhile. This is potentially a more empowering message than that 
contained in studies that outline on-going compromise and grudging acceptance of 
divergent demands by stakeholders.  
A particularly successful strategic combination is also proposed here between negotiation 
and transcension. This provides a concrete suggestion regarding how organizations might 
navigate pluralistic legitimacy demands; the findings suggest that the least risky strategy in 
pluralistic contexts maybe one with an integrative impulse. By contrast, a combination of 
contraction and negotiation is suggested to be a more difficult strategic combination (Figure 
6.5). For example, in CoRE 2 such a combination was shown to be a potentially less 
successful one. Such insight provides broad guidance for managers seeking to shift 
strategies that they are currently dissatisfied with.  
The selection of NZ’s science sector as an empirical setting was motivated by a view of the 
importance of the RS&T sector to NZ’s future. This fact has been proposed but the 
difficulties inherent in linking science activity to a more prosperous future is also 
acknowledged (Callaghan, 2009; Crown Research Institute Taskforce, 2010; Fox, 2009). The 
hope is that this study offers those navigating this specific context insight into the 
associated difficulties and potential successful organizational strategies. That pluralism 
exists in NZ’s RS&T sector has been widely outlined by literature (Davenport et al., 2003; 
Devine, 2003; Leitch & Davenport, 2005). This study focuses on how that can be managed. 
Ziman states of the changes that have brought this increased pluralism that:  
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Nostalgia is a fruitless sentiment…The real question is not whether the structural transition 
is desirable, or could have been avoided: it is how to reshape the research system to fit a 
new environment without losing the features that have made it so productive in the past 
(Ziman, 1994, p. viii) 
Although not addressing this question at the sector or policy level, this thesis suggests ways 
this can be achieved at the organizational level. The constraints faced by these organizations 
are very real and have been outlined here and elsewhere. However, despite this, 
opportunities for “creative enactment” (Alexander, 1996) exist for NZ science organizations. 
The findings here provide examples and link these to strategic processes that other 
organizations within this sector could be guided by.  
7.3 Future Research Avenues  
This section highlights some questions that this thesis has left me enthusiastic to explore. 
Within this discussion the limitations of the current study are also outlined as representing 
opportunities for further investigation.  
Increased access in exploring pluralism. Future research could increase understanding into 
pluralism through more broad-based access. Limitations associated with access in this study 
are acknowledged (Chapter 3; also Chapter 4, footnote 21). That this may have affected the 
findings is recognized. For example, the implications of not including clients in the HTSUs, 
administrative staff in the CRIs, or the community in the CoREs are recognized as possibly 
limiting the degree of pluralism observed. Access limitations were based on a pre-
determined understanding of the relevant tensions to specific science organizations, 
pragmatic constraints (such as confining the number of interviews at the CEO’s request), 
and a focus on the stakeholders identified as central to the emerging tensions in initial 
interviews within each organization. In addition, a full appreciation of legitimacy strategies 
over time demands longitudinal engagement. While the retrospective aspects of the 
interviews as well as the secondary data assisted in a degree of understanding regarding 
legitimacy strategies over time, the unit of analysis remained largely a “snapshot.” 
Longitudinal access would enable further exploration of whether legitimacy strategies 
change over time and to what extent they are characterized by inertia and a desire for 
organization consistency (Kraatz and Block, 2008).  
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Future generalization. While the strengths of qualitative cases studies are espoused and 
made use of here, their limitations are also recognized. Aligned with the post-positivist 
approach adopted, analytical generalizability has been achieved rather than statistical 
generalizability (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2009). The empirical understanding remains grounded 
within the specific cases encountered and the generalizations remain “petite”: they refer to, 
refine or modify existing theorizations. They have not been “tested” or generalizabled to 
populations (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). Future research could operationalize the associated 
propositions to test their generalized applicability. In particular, investigation of the 
proposed association between perceptions and resulting strategies could suit a large-scale 
quantitative research design. Further, the proposition regarding common combinations of 
strategies (and their potential link to measures of organizational success) could be explored 
through such an approach. In such research, attention would need to be given to issues such 
as ensuring participants were able to report the existence of multiple strategies, not only 
the most dominant. Similarly, many statistical studies have focused on a specific practice, 
such as downsizing, as signifying institutional resistance (Greenwood et al., 2010; Marquis & 
Lounsbury, 2007). The framework developed here, and associated combinatorial approach 
proposed, is potentially more challenging to quantify as it is situated at the organizational 
level and encompasses multiple practices. In contrast to a focus on a specific practice, this 
would be more demanding in terms of devising appropriate research instruments.  
Combinations of strategies or new legitimacy strategies? An issue I was conscious of during 
data analysis was whether the etic-level categorization was constraining. Sub-themes were 
initially developed during the analysis process without reference to the broad framework. 
However, whether some of these strategies, either singularly or through their close 
association with other strategies, exist outside the theoretical framework remains an 
avenue for future exploration. For example, utilizing democratic principles and structures 
was a strategy not previously outlined in the literature. It was classified as a negotiation 
strategy due to it being a forum for active and ongoing discussion between stakeholders and 
focused on adapting to multiple stakeholder demands (in comparison to seeking to 
manipulate them) (Chapter 5). However, that “democracy” contained elements that could 
perhaps be defined as indicative of transcension was also alluded to. Similarly, the dynamics 
of transcension and negotiation are suggested as being closely related. Does this close 
 265 
 
association, the overlap represented in the adapted framework depicted in Figure 6.5, 
represent a combination of negotiation and transcension or is it better represented as a 
new strategic process?   
In addition, with regards to negotiation, a large variety of different sub-strategies were 
found. For example, the dynamic balance evident within CRI 1 and CoRE 1 was quite 
different from the grudging “compromise” associated with other cases (e.g., CoRE 2, CRI 2). 
Future research can perhaps focus on further defining a collaborative/competitive 
distinction to differentiate two distinct forms of negotiation. Through developing such a 
distinction, it could be found that a particular type of negotiation may be connected with 
transcension strategies (e.g., CoRE 1, CRI 1), with the other being more likely to be 
combined with segregative strategies (e.g., CoRE 2, CRI 2). Such a re-conceptualization 
involving two broad types of negotiation might explain the prevalence of negotiation and 
why it was less clearly associated with particular perceptions of pluralism. A limitation is, 
therefore, that such distinctions within the negotiation category were perhaps largely 
subsumed within the broader categorization used.  
While acknowledging these issues, maintaining the distinctions in Kraatz and Block’s (2008) 
framework was helpful in enabling an understanding of combinations of strategies. It helped 
focus analytical attention on multiple but distinct strategies within the organizations rather 
than subsuming them within a broader single category. This developed a combinatorial 
understanding. Further, the use of an overarching framework allowed me to comment 
directly on an available broad strategy framework. As Pache and Santos (2010) state, within 
the literature this remains a novel approach. Practically, the abductive use of the 
overarching framework also helped avoid the “death by data asphyxiation” that authors 
warn of vis-à-vis qualitative case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 540; Pettigrew, 1990).  
To conclude, this research is recognized as partly constrained by the applied framework. As 
the post-positivist perspective suggests, empirical observations are necessarily selective and 
underdetermined by theory (Crotty, 1998; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). My goal has been to 
establish whether the framework is a warranted account and a useful way of understanding 
the research problem (Patton, 2002a). Other frameworks may still, however, have 
uncovered aspects that this particular framing did not. Future research could more explicitly 
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focus on developing organizational level strategies that exist outside the framework used 
here.  
Enacted environments. That organizations enact, to a degree, their environment is 
tentatively suggested as a frame for understanding the link between perspectives of 
pluralism and particular strategies. Through their perceptions of their environment 
organizational actors partially create that context in which they are strategizing (Alexander, 
1996). This was outlined by Smircich and Stubbart (1985, p. 724) who suggest that “a 
pattern of enactment establishes the foundation of organizational reality, and in turn has 
effects in shaping future enactments.” This concept is aligned with resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) which has been depicted as foundational to understanding 
legitimacy strategy. The position here is reflected by Alexander’s (1996, p. 830) observation 
regarding the constraints of enactment: “clearly, even if *actors+ are free to choose within a 
set of possibilities, the universe of possibilities is determined by funding.” In other words,  
organizations cannot “enact” any environment they desire (Jauch & Kraft, 1986; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). A constructivist perspective would have, instead, further grounded multiple 
aspects of this thesis within the implications of an “enactment” frame.  
Further, the question of causality within the association between the strategies and 
stakeholder perspectives has not been answered here. Whether the strategies adopted are 
behind the creation of perceptions (e.g., transcension may foster particular perceptions of 
objective divergence and power diffusion) or whether the perceptions are behind the 
adoption of particular strategies remains open. As Figure 7.2 suggests, the complexity 
associated with this question means that it is not surprising that these issues have not been 
made complete sense of here. The suggestion is that future research seeking to explore 
causality in this way embraces rather than limits the ongoing iterative dynamic between the 
different components.  
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Figure 7.2 Strategic enactment: a framework for more investigation 
Legitimacy
Strategy
Perception of 
pluralism
Context /
Environment
(limits to 
enactment)
 
Additional limitations related to propositions 1–4. Future research could strengthen the 
proposed association between particular perceptions of pluralism and negotiation and 
compartmentalization strategies. First, with compartmentalization, there were fewer fully 
developed examples in the dataset and CoRE 2 sat outside the suggested dynamic through 
not reporting compartmentalization as a prominent strategy. As a consequence, the 
theorized link between compartmentalization and perceptions of higher degrees of diffused 
power and objective divergence requires further investigation. Indeed, reflecting a similar 
issue raised by Montgomery and Oliver (1996), decoupling as a strategy perhaps made 
sense with regards to some of the cases. However, their data, like mine, did not capture the 
distinction between substantive and symbolic responses that decoupling entails. For 
example, CoRE 2 may have tried to decouple its primary focus on science excellence from its 
reporting requirements to government. Yet the ability to delineate symbolic and substantive 
responses was beyond the capacity of the dataset here. The understanding here was, 
instead, located primarily in stakeholder perceptions and their reporting of the strategies, 
which did not enable assessments of symbolic versus substantive action.  
Negotiation was shown to be a widely reported strategy associated with many different 
combinations of strategies. A link between ‘negotiation’ and specific perceptions of 
pluralism was therefore less explicit (Chapter 6). Again, future research can unpick whether 
negotiation is broadly associated with particular perceptions, or whether it is instead best 
viewed as a strategy that is useful across a variety of contexts, frequently in combination 
with other strategies. Further distinctions regarding negotiation as a category, something 
discussed above, could be used to explore this issue. Perhaps different types of negotiation 
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are more likely to be associated with different perceptions of pluralism? For example, 
‘balance’ is potentially particularly associated with perceptions of a degree of 
commensurability and therefore frequently combined with transcension strategies (e.g., 
CoRE 1 and CRI 1). Meanwhile, ‘compromise’, with its associated grudging trade-offs, might 
be likely to be linked with perceptions of incommensurability and, therefore, more 
frequently combined with segregative strategies (e.g., CoRE 2, CRI 2).  
Further elaboration of legitimacy’s dimensions. This study has primarily focused on 
evaluative legitimacy: normative, pragmatic, and regulative assessments of desirability and 
appropriateness (Suchman, 1995). By asking for and exploring participants perceptions I 
focused on their evaluations of the organizations rather than their taken-for-granted 
assumptions. As such, the relationship of cognitive legitimacy to the question of strategizing 
within pluralism remained largely unaddressed. Some institutional theorists suggest that 
cognitive legitimacy becomes less prevalent in pluralistic settings. Stryker (2000, p. 189) 
suggests that “cognitive taken-for-grantedness is likely to disappear…in an arena in which 
two or more institutional logics are available to provide alternative behavioural scripts.” This 
is linked to evaluative definitions: a focus on divergence and tension meant my research 
questions necessarily emphasized what was not taken-for-granted. However, institutional 
theory would suggest that cognitive legitimacy, for example, what was ‘unable’ or 
‘questionable’, still defined the realm and domain of the debate. An example is seen in how 
the need for HTSUs to provide a return on investment was not questioned or discussed, 
merely the degree of primacy and urgency associated with this demand. However, 
Deephouse & Suchman (2008) highlight the difficulty of researching taken-for-grantedness: 
it is an issue experienced by the legitimacy literature more broadly. Deephouse and 
Suchman consequently suggest that the operationalization of legitimacy focused on its 
sources (stakeholders) rather that its dimensions. This advice was followed here.  
Another aspect that could have been explored further in this dataset is the effect of 
regulative legitimacy. In particular, a greater degree of agency to (successfully) implement 
some strategies such as contraction may be associated with a lack of regulative legitimacy. 
For example, the legitimacy demands of CRIs and CoREs were explicitly translated in 
government policy, as well as reporting and selection criteria. By contrast, the demands 
placed on HTSUs were not expressed in such a way. This potentially explains the relative 
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capacity for HTSU 2 to implement a contraction strategy. By contrast, CoRE 2 was ultimately 
unable to do so because of regulative demands associated with CoRE re-funding (Oliver, 
1991). 
These two points suggest that a more fine-grained treatment of legitimacy dimensions may 
provide additional insight into legitimacy strategies within pluralism. 
Potential of a critical paradigm. Another area for further exploration is the role power, in the 
critical sense, could play in understanding legitimacy in pluralistic settings (Courpasson, 
2000; Gordon et al., 2009; Vaara et al., 2006; Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). Legitimacy, 
based on its Weberian foundation, is also the “recognition of the right to govern.” It justifies 
why some individuals hold power and others give their consent and submit to authority. It 
provides “solid grounds for domination” (Courpasson, 2000, p. 143). This issue is raised 
because scientists were depicted here as semi-autonomous knowledge workers whose 
legitimacy demands count. This has perhaps overshadowed an alternative description, for 
example, one that includes fuller appreciation of the limited options for scientist workers 
within the NZ context, an issue mentioned by interviewees. An interpretation of the data 
highlighting the subtle primacy of the managerial and commercial over the science-worker 
and the scientific may have resulted. This provides an alternative framing to the one used 
here where the autonomy of the “knowledge worker” was seen as part of the pluralism the 
organizations were navigating.  
Combining legitimacy strategy frameworks. The importance of language was highlighted by 
some interviewees. For example: 
Quite often it’s just a re-expression. Trying to develop some commonality around language. 
(CEO, CRI 1) 
Issues concerning language could have been more explicitly focused upon in this study. 
Currently there are two broad research strands of understanding regarding ‘legitimacy 
strategies.’ The one that this research is based on is directed at the organizational level and 
incorporated organizational practices (e.g., Kraatz & Block, 2008). Another has a more micro 
conception of strategy focused at the ‘language’ level of rhetoric or discourse (e.g., Suddaby 
& Greenwood, 2005). These two distinct types of legitimacy strategy framework at different 
levels of analysis have infrequently been brought together. Incorporating both within a 
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single study would represent a novel contribution to an understanding of legitimacy strategy. 
In particular, the data coded using the broad strategic categories, transcension, negotiation, 
compartmentalization, contraction, could be explored for the associated rhetorical or 
discourse legitimacy strategies at play. Questions such as whether particular strategies in 
the model here are associated with or particularly supported by specific rhetorical strategies 
(e.g., Erkama & Vaara, 2010) could be investigated.  
Pluralism and legitimacy: Some tensions. Two tensions were raised in the literature review as 
existing between legitimacy theory and pluralism (Section 2.3.3). First, is the tension 
between ambiguity (outlined as important strategically in pluralistic settings) and clarity 
(outlined as important in terms of attaining legitimacy) (Stone & Brush, 1996). Second, is the 
tension between consistency (over time and between responses, for example) and 
conformity (to many different demands) (Kraatz & Block, 2008). These two tensions were 
observable in the background of my analysis and it would perhaps be illuminating to further 
understand the role of these tensions. In particular, the relationship between these tensions 
can be further explored. For example, strategically utilizing ambiguity may enable an 
organization to simultaneously be both consistent (with regards to its overarching vision) 
and inconsistent (in its response to immediate stakeholder demands) and, thus, navigate 
this tension. Similarly, consistency over time in relation to an ‘overarching objective’ could 
build stakeholder clarity regarding the centrality of that objective as the organization’s basis 
of legitimacy. At the same time, the broad nature of that vision simultaneously allows a 
degree of ambiguity and ‘inconsistent’ relationships to that objective. This is perhaps 
particularly descriptive of HTSU 1 and its use of an overarching objective. The next step is 
perhaps to move beyond an 'either/or' conception to explore how organizations can instead 
adopt a 'both/and' approach to managing these tensions (Lewis, 2000). For example, 
investigating how organizations can be both consistent and inconsistent at different levels 
of stakeholder interaction as a way of managing legitimacy (Smith et al., 2010). 
7.4 Concluding Comments 
Through engagement with both Kraatz and Block’s (2008) framework and the six focal 
organizations I am left with an impression of the potential of organizations to thrive within 
pluralism. The strategic innovativeness exhibited by some organizations and their capacity 
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to benefit from pluralism was something that I had not been expecting. In retrospect, this 
was, however, something for which Kraatz and Block laid the theoretical grounding: 
We acknowledge that pluralism problematizes legitimacy, but we also suggest that 
organizations may benefit from it and thrive in its midst. We think that future research might 
give more attention to the possibility that organizational legitimacy can be additive or even 
multiplicative, rather than zero-sum...we see no obvious reason to predict that an 
organization cannot fulfil multiple purposes, embody multiple values (or logics) and 
successfully verify multiple institutionally-derived identities. Indeed, we think that 
organizations that embody multiple values and are successful at more than one thing….may 
be especially legitimate for that very reason (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 261).  
Based on my findings I end with the same point here, albeit with the following additional 
caveats. First, the “problematic” nature of the legitimacy/pluralism dynamic means 
organizations are as likely to experience the traditionally expressed negative association 
between legitimation and pluralism as they are to grasp the potential inherent in it. The 
risks and difficulties associated with pluralism highlighted in some organizations here 
prevent naivety in this regard. Second, an ongoing need for negotiation does not negate the 
“transcension” picture in the way Kraatz and Block appear to assume. Partial adaptation, 
compromise, and balancing are, instead, part of how organizations can productively ‘thrive’ 
within pluralism. This is distinct from the implicitly negative depiction of negotiation Kraatz 
and Block promulgate in their comparisons between it and their advocated transcension 
strategy.  
A danger in this message is perhaps that of expecting too much of organizations and those 
managing them. However, the realization that organizations can encompass divergent 
legitimacy demands is also an empowering one (Kraatz & Block, 2008). An interviewee 
encapsulates what I mean by this:  
It’s what I call ‘raising the sights.’ It’s about scientists who often get bogged down, because 
we’re so focused on our work we often get bogged down with the irritations of the context 
that we’re working in…by lifting our sights we’re empowered. (Director, CoRE 1) 
To reiterate, that organizations can benefit from the complexity in their context, capturing 
the ‘creative chances’ at the ‘clashing point’ (Snow, 1959),  was a strong message within the 
empirical data.   
A central argument promulgated here is that managing legitimacy in pluralistic contexts is 
likely to involve implementing multiple strategies simultaneously. This moves beyond much 
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of the available theoretical and empirical studies. These have tended to instead focus on 
idiosyncratic responses and/or implicitly assumed the implementation of a single dominant 
strategy. Understanding the complexity of organizational pluralism, as well as the reference 
to a broad legitimacy strategy framework, has informed a more nuanced view of 
legitimation. Overall, this research has hopefully extended legitimacy theory while also 
reflecting more fully on the complexity within which organizations actually engage in 
legitimation (Glynn et al., 2000). 
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix One: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Managing complex stakeholder relationships: The New Zealand’s science sector 
I am carrying out research into New Zealand’s high-tech research sector and invite you to 
participate. This research is for my PhD in Management at Victoria University Wellington, 
funded by the Tertiary Education Commission’s Top Achievers Doctoral Scholarship.  
My research will investigate how organizations manage complex stakeholder relationships. 
The aim is to gain insight into a range of different perspectives within New Zealand’s high-
tech research sector and explore how these complex relationships and expectations are 
responded to by organizations. This should provide insight into both the multiplicity of 
opinions that exist and the most effective ways for managing this complexity. My case 
studies will include high-tech start-ups, Centres of Research Excellence and Crown Research 
Institutes.  
To conduct this research I will be using interviews and secondary data (for example policy 
documents).  
How will you be affected and ethical issues: 
 The interview will take approximately 60 minutes and will be scheduled at a time 
that suits you.  
 I would like to record the interview, but this would only be done with your consent. 
The recording will be transcribed by the researcher.  
 I will be asking you about your views, expectations, and experiences of a particular 
organization. The questions will focus on different perceptions of the organisation 
and what the organization does to manage these.  
 The organisation has agreed to participate in this project and provided names of 
potential interviewees for my research.  
 While the organization has agreed to be included in this research you are under no 
obligation to participate and can pull out, without providing a reason, before data 
collection is completed (likely June 2010).  
 I will talk to people individually and in confidence – quotations will not name the 
individuals interviewed but merely the broad stakeholder group they identify with. 
I will ask you to indicate a suitable position descriptor (e.g., manager, scientist or 
employee) to use where appropriate. The organisation will not be provided with 
the details of who has participated or have access to confidential data.  
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 The organization will be referred to by organizational type rather than by name 
and no identifying information (for example location or size) will be included.  
 All information will be stored securely in either a locked cabinet or password 
protected file before being destroyed.  
 Upon completion of the project I will provide a summary of my findings to all 
participants.  
 If you agree to be interviewed I will ask you to fill in a research agreement form 
that, together with this information sheet, outlines your role in the project and 
how I will respect your rights as a research participant.  
 
Thank you for your time and help in making this study possible. If you have any queries 
please phone, email or write to the researcher Rebecca Bednarek, or my supervisors Urs 
Daellenbach or Sally Davenport. 
Researcher: Rebecca Bednarek 
Victoria Management School 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Phone: 04 463 9693  
Email: rebecca.bednarek@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Supervisors: Associate Prof. Urs Daellenbach  Prof. Sally Davenport 
Victoria Management School    Victoria Management School  
Victoria University of Wellington   Victoria University ofWellington 
Phone: 04 463 5732     Phone: 04 463 5144 
Email: urs.daellenbach@vuw.ac.nz   Email:sally.davenport@vuw.ac.nz 
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Appendix Two: Research Agreement 
 
 
Managing complex stakeholder relationships: New Zealand’s science sector. 
Researcher: Rebecca Bednarek, Doctoral Candidate, Victoria Management School, Victoria 
University Wellington.  
 
Please read and check off the following conditions associated with participating in this study.  
 
 “I have read the Research Project Information Sheet for this study and have had the 
details of the study explained to me. My questions about the study have been answered 
to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.”  
 
 “I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I may withdraw 
from the interview or decline to answer any particular questions in the study. I may 
withdraw from this project prior to June 2010 without providing reasons. I understand 
that if I withdraw any data provided will be destroyed or returned to me.” 
 
 “I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential and 
reported only in an aggregated/non-attributable form. For instance I will be referred to 
by a generic position descriptor (such as manager or government employee) which I 
have the option to help decide upon.”  
 
 “I understand that the information obtained will be stored in a locked cabinet or 
password protected file. All tape recordings will be wiped after they have been 
transcribed. All data will be destroyed within three years of the completion of my PhD.” 
 
 “I understand that the information I provide may be used as part of a PhD thesis and 
may also be published and presented.” 
 
 “I understand that a summary of the research will be provided at the completion of my 
PhD (likely late 2011) 
 
I agree  /  do not agree to the interview being recorded 
 
Any more conditions to be written in by the participant:  
 
Participant: 
Signature…………………………………………….  Date ……………………….. 
 
Name & Organisation …………………………………………………………………………
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Phone  0-4-463 5676 
Fax  0-4-463 5209 
Email
 Allison.kirkman@vuw.ac.nz 
Appendix Three: Human Ethics Committee Approval: Memorandum 
 
 
TO Rebecca Bednarek 
COPY TO Urs Dallenbach; Sally Davenport 
FROM Maggie Teleki-Rainey;  
On behalf of Dr. Sudan Corbett, Chair, Pipitea Human Ethics 
Committee 
 
DATE 16 March 2009   
 
SUBJECT HEC application - approval 
REF :RM 16342 
To :Rebecca Bednarek 
On behalf of: Susan Corbett, Chair, Pipitea Human Ethics Committee. 
Please note that the Human Ethics Committee has reviewed and approved your application 
for the project "Organisational legitimacy in pluralistic contexts: Strategic management of 
salient and contradictory stakeholder demands". 
Regards 
Maggie. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Maggie Teleki-Rainey 
Senior Administrator, Faculty Research 
Room - RH 1205 
Faculty of Commerce and Administration 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Te Whare Wānanga o te Ūpoko o te Ika a Māui  
PO Box 600 
Wellington 6140 
New Zealand 
Phone : + 64 4 463 5943 
E-Mail : Maggie.Teleki-Rainey@vuw.ac.nz  
Web : www.vuw.ac.nz 
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Appendix Four: Interview Schedule 27 
Interview 
Steps 
Questions [Managers] Questions: other stakeholders [employees and external stakeholders]  
Introduction 
questions 
 Tell me a little about the organization?  
 What is your role/how long have you been involved with the 
organization? 
 Tell me a little about [organization x]/group of organizations?  
 What is your connection to organization/s [x]?  
 How long have you been connected to the organization?  
Legitimacy 
and 
stakeholders  
[diffused 
power] 
 Who are the key stakeholders that your organization depends on?  
 What criteria do those stakeholders use to assess your organization’s 
desirability and appropriateness? e.g., probe: any differences?  
 What are your own assessments/expectations of the organisation 
based on?  
 Who are the key stakeholders involved in the organizations?  
 As a [particular stakeholder] what determines the desirability and 
appropriateness of the organization?; e.g., prompt: How do you assess 
the desirability and appropriateness of the organization?  
 In general, what is your perception of the organization? 
Divergent 
objectives / 
tensions 
 Is the organization required to meet multiple, potentially quite 
divergent, objectives? [probe e.g., any specific tension points?]. 
 Do different stakeholders have different expectations of what is 
appropriate and desirable?  
 Is the organization required to meet multiple, potentially quite 
divergent, objectives? [i.e., tensions.]. 
 Do your assessments of what is desirable and appropriate differ from 
other stakeholders?  
Legitimacy 
strategies  
[amidst 
pluralism] 
 What, if anything, has [organization x] done to increase perceptions of 
its desirability and appropriateness?  
 How has the organization managed divergent expectations of what is 
desirable and appropriate?; e.g., prompt: How has the organization 
managed its divergent objectives? 
 What has been particularly successful in managing divergent 
perceptions of desirability and appropriateness? 
 What, if anything, has the organization done that has increased your 
perceptions of its desirability and appropriateness? 
 How has the organization managed divergent expectations of what is 
deniable and appropriate?; e.g., prompt: How has the organization 
managed its divergent objectives?  
 What has been particularly successful in managing divergent 
perceptions of desirability and appropriateness? 
Summary 
questions  
 What does a desirable and appropriate [organization x] look like?  
 Anything else to do with the management of the various placed on the 
organization? 
 What does a desirable and appropriate [organization x] look like?  
 Anything else at all you want to say, or expected I would ask and 
haven’t? 
                                                     
27 The interview protocol was used flexibly. Similar questions were asked of each interviewee, but the probes/prompts and direction of each interview varied to fit the flow 
of the interview. Further, depending on the timing/flow of the interview not every question was asked directly in all 58 interviews. The questions were more general for 
external stakeholders (e.g., public sector managers), i.e., focused on CRIs generally rather than a specific CRIs but moved through the same sequence of questioning and 
focused on surfacing examples. Finally, some interesting strategic dynamics frequently were raised by the interviews prior to the “strategy” stage of the interview itself. For 
example, many interviewees independently moved from defining multiple objectives to outlining how they were managed. Any issues raised were then picked up on again 
in that third stage of the interview.   
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Appendix Five: NVivo Coding: An Example (CRI 1) 
Stakeholder 
legitimacies
Pluralism
Response
Strategies 
Research
Public good
Commercial Not scientist
CRI 1
Case 
Categorization 
Parent node
Child node: 
Level 1
Child node: 
Level 2
(example)
Managers
Shareholder
Previous 
regime
Diffused 
Power
Divergent 
objectives
Financial &  
public good
Research &  
public good
Research &  
financial
Defining public 
good
A flexible 
balance
Broad system 
(government)
Overarching 
objective
Changing 
definition of 
scientist
Perception of 
strategy
Reconfiguring 
objectives
Building 
understanding in 
stakehodlers
Engaging 
scientists
Translating into 
something more 
specific
Step 3
Step 2
Step 4
Transcension
(e.g.)
Inter-case 
comparison
 
